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Preface 
 
Ever since I was a child I have been fascinated by the natural world. My curiosity 
about nature resulted in a degree in science and soon after graduation I was occupied 
with environmental research and environmental protection issues, a route that led me 
to the field of education. In company with thousands of eager children and adults, I 
have been able to experience and discuss numerous aspects of the natural world but 
also to reflect on the options and the limits of human activities. I have met teachers, 
students, researchers, politicians and administrators from all over the world. My 
participation in Finnish, Nordic, as well as in the World Conservation Union’s 
(IUCNs) educational committees and working groups have been especially valuable 
and have confronted me with many urgent environmental issues. The practice of 
teaching triggered me to explore the challenge of educational theory and to enter the 
field of research, and then the step was short to the philosophical arena. Thus, it 
happened that I came to settle down in this mixed field of interest that I soon will 
present. In this book I combine my theoretical and practical experiences of nature, 
education, and philosophy. As a matter of fact, my interest in the topic of this study 
has gradually grown out of personal experiences and knowledge both of and in 
nature, of and through education and of and in philosophical studies, discussions and 
reflections.   
Before I start the story I will present the frameworks for my study and thank 
those who have contributed to it in one way or another. Through talented guidance, 
many possibilities for mutual reflections and full-time grants this work has gradually 
found its shape. The most important framework has been the Doctoral School on 
Bildung, Learning and Late Modernity at the Åbo Akademi University’s Faculty of 
Education in Vaasa. Since 2005 I have been a member of this research forum that has 
offered very creative, supportive and responsive cooperation. This professional and 
ambitious research training has notably encouraged my research attempts and helped 
me to go on writing. Since the doctoral school group has consisted of people from 
various educational research fields, the group members have helped me to see the 
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environmental educational dilemmas from a broad angle and have triggered me to 
defend my thoughts concerning environmental issues profoundly. Our both formal 
and informal discussions about Bildung, diverse forms of modernism, inter-
subjectivity, recognition, collaboration, critical education, art, and many more issues 
have been very valuable to me and I have learnt much during our joint training. As a 
member of this doctoral school it has been possible for me to discuss my research not 
only with many interesting persons within the group, but also with invited 
international researchers representing other contexts and bringing in alternative and 
innovative philosophical and educational perspectives.  
In addition to this general educational support, the membership in the research 
project Environmental Education: Creating Sustainable futures at University of 
Helsinki offered me topic related support. This group dealt with questions like 
environmental values, sustainability, active citizenship, participation, 
multiculturalism and various other aspects of environmental education. We have had 
possibilities to discuss our thoughts about basic concepts and matters many times, 
especially during our joint writing processes. In addition to the research group’s own 
work, the research seminars in Geography and Environmental Education at 
University of Helsinki offered possibilities to reflect on matters connected to my 
research outlook and many others. The research seminars in Environmental 
Education at Åbo Akademi University in Vaasa especially challenged my own 
topical reflection, while the research seminars in Philosophy at Åbo Akademi in 
Turku have enlarged my philosophical perceptive during the last semesters of my 
doctoral research.  
There are many of persons that I owe thanks. Firstly I want to thank my first 
supervisor, Professor Michael Uljens, for all the hours spent on reading my 
manuscripts, and tolerantly discussing my research dilemmas, and for steadily 
offering support and inspiration to push me further. I also want to thank my second 
supervisor, Professor Sirpa Tani, for trying to see the point in all my optimistic new 
ideas and for meeting them with uplifting encouragement. In addition to the 
supervisors, I wish to thank the pre-reviewers Professor Tapio Puolimatka and 
Professor Bob Jickling for constructively commenting on my manuscript, and 
Professor Bob Jickling also for honoring me by traveling all the way from Canada in 
order to be the opponent of my thesis. I also want to thank Docent Irmeli Palmberg, 
and Docent Hannele Cantell for reading and carefully examining my work. Likewise 
I owe thanks to Professor Olli Lagerspetz for commenting my interpretation of 
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Descartes and Rousseau, to Professor Colin Heywood for supporting my reading of 
Émile, and to Professor Thomas Regelski for both patiently and carefully helping me 
with the English language and for triggering my thoughts.  
I have enjoyed many interesting discussions with many faculty associates and 
research students at Åbo Akademi, both in Vaasa and Turku and at the University of 
Helsinki. In the doctoral school I have received intellectual support and friendship 
from my colleagues Calle Carling, Sara Frontini, Juha Hartvik, Christian Lindedahl, 
Rita Nordström-Lytz, Doctor Hanna Kaihovirta-Rosvik and Doctor Birgit Schaffar. 
Last but not least, I owe gratitude to Inger Österlund for being my research-sister in 
sun, snow and rain, on foot, boats and train from the very beginning of this 
educational journey. Furthermore, I am thankful to Elsbeth Träskelin for constant 
practical aid and friendship. Among the researcher friends and colleagues in Helsinki 
I especially want to thank Doctor Sanna Koskinen, Doctor Margarita Gerouki, Hanna 
Nordström, and Anna-Leena Riitaoja. I also hope all not mentioned by name, but 
who have been there for me in my research concerns and earn thanks for sharing both 
troubles and joy, will honestly feel you are remembered, not on the least all my 
friends and research colleagues from Strandgatan 8 in Vaasa. During my years of 
research I have also met colleagues in conferences, seminars, the EUDORA 
Consortium’s BIP summer school in Jurmala, Latvia and other cooperative activities 
that have helped me to formulate and develop my thoughts. During the work on this 
book, I have been offered several possibilities to present parts of my study in 
compilation works, and beside many persons already mentioned, I also want to thank 
Docent Taina Kaivola and Professor Ossi V. Lindqvist for their valuable 
collaboration. So, thank you to all research mentors and partners for many fine 
theoretical discussions. 
The doctoral school membership at Åbo Akademi University provided a fulltime 
scholarship for four years. The following foundations and financing agencies have 
also supported the research: Svenska kulturfonden, Svenska litteratursällskapet i 
Finland (Ingrid, Margit och Henrik Höijers donationsfond), Maj & Tor Nessling’s 
Foundation, Oskar Öflunds stiftelse, Waldemar von Frenkells stiftelse, and Svensk-
Österbottniska samfundet. Thanks to Åbo Akademi’s rector’s grant it was possible 
for me to participate in the American Educational Research Associations’ (AERA) 
annual meeting in San Francisco in 2006. The City of Espoo’s scholarship purse 
called “stipendikukkaro” paid many concrete research costs, and through the help of 
Gösta Branders forskningsfond I was granted research literature. I am enormously 
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thankful to all parties that have believed in me and made this research economically 
possible! 
My family members are my steady companions and supporters. They have helped 
me to not get totally stuck in research these last years but also enjoy other dimensions 
of life. This work has thus not hindered me from participating in all kinds of family 
events throughout Europe. Without my beloved husband, my four amazing children, 
and my two lovely granddaughters, born during the time of my research process, this 
contribution to educational research should not have become what it is now. 
Therefore, I want to thank you Erik for your daily love and  the steady support of 
your wife, my children Lisa, Simon, Artur and Joel and their partners, and my 
granddaughters Liv and Elinne for sharing many joyful and relaxing moments with 
me. I am also grateful for the time I have spent with many other close persons. 
Therefore, I want to thank all friends and relatives not mentioned for just being there 
and bringing me back to earth during these inventive and also intensive years when I 
have been occupied with reading, writing or theoretical reflections in the most odd 
situations. 
My research has frequently taken place outside in the garden, on the seashore, in 
the forest, or wherever nature’s voice has called me. I have worked out many parts of 
this book sitting close to my four footed family member Elvira, our cat who passed 
by during this work and left a void behind her. In conclusion, I am very grateful to all 
kinds of creatures that in one way or another have inspired, encouraged, supported 
and sponsored my research or me personally during more than a half decade and thus 
made my doctoral thesis achievable for a greater public.  
 
Vaasa, December 15, 2010 
 
Lili-Ann Wolff 
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1 Introduction 
 
A US funeral business that specializes in launching cremated human remains into 
Earth's orbit has begun taking reservations for landing small capsules of ashes on 
the moon.... The company hopes to install a cemetery on the lunar surface to hold 
cremated remains of the dead, or a smaller symbolic portion of them, which one 
day could be visited by relatives of the deceased.... For sending a tiny, one gram 
portion of cremated remains to the moon, the company charges 9,995 dollars … 
Other funeral services besides the full lunar trip include sending ash into Earth's 
orbit -- the cheapest option, starting at 700 dollars -- and all the way up to 
launching remains far, far away into deep space, for which the company charges 
more than 37,000 dollars. (Staff writers, Moon Daily, November 14, 2008) 
 
In the middle of November 2008, numerous newsletters and websites announced 
news about future graveyards on the moon. This news awakens many thoughts about 
the inventiveness and abilities of humans to extend their temporal and spatial spaces. 
Given these tendencies, eager scientists have made it possible for ordinary humans to 
expand their territory from the earth to another celestial body. Even if this sounds 
fascinating, the news can be read as both good and bad. Maybe the whole idea is only 
a curiosity, but the prospect can nevertheless both convey desperation and carry hope. 
As desperation, this news simply describes the hypermodern humans’ view of 
themselves as superior creatures but as having no safe future as a species on the earth. 
As hope, the story may be a sign that humanity has reached a moment when it is 
technologically capable of breaking the limits of nature and making the dream of a 
heavenly afterlife come true. Alternatively, this project is purely a manipulative and 
commercial gimmick aiming at profit. In any case, for those who accept this offer, the 
old phrase “from dust to dust” loses its initial meaning, as this sky project definitely 
will prevent the corpse from returning to the circulation of earthly elements. This 
business announcement happens at a time when more and more people and agencies 
worry about climate changes that already increasingly threaten the life in numerous 
places on the earth. Another way out from all the earthly troubles might be better than 
burying humans on the moon: to transfer human beings to outer space when they are 
still alive. Science fiction authors and scientists have discussed such options. Yet, 
whether the transfer happens in life or death, such extra-terrestrial opportunities will 
10 
 
most certainly be available for only a minority of the humankind in the near future, 
especially at a time when the world faces an extensive economical crisis.  
All of us will probably have to go on living as we hitherto have done, dependent 
on earthly circumstances. Humans have always lived as, in and of earthly nature; the 
forces of nature have acted both inside and outside the human skin in a constant 
process of interaction; and, after death, the body has returned to earthly elements. 
Humans’ relation to their internal nature as well as to external nature has hence been 
intricate, and the way they have treated nature has caused problems over hundreds, 
even thousands, of years. However, only recently in human history has a marginal 
group of people regarded this as a worldwide problem and requested radical changes 
of human behavior in relation to the natural world. Undeniably, human life is now 
changing more than ever. In addition to major problems of population growth, global 
warming, depletion of the ozone layer, pollution of air and water, and biodiversity 
loss, most of humanity’s activities and undertakings have had negative impact on the 
natural world. Inequality and unjust distribution of resources threaten personal 
security and make life for most people a tremendous struggle. Moreover, humans 
these days have not only started to abandon their attachment to earthly nature and 
thus give up their species’ native habitat, they have simultaneously started to 
compromise their innermost genetic distinctness and mix human genes with those of 
other species in nanotechnology-based research, thus altering human nature.  
Overall, humankind’s hazardous lifestyle presents major challenges for education. 
As humanity has always been a part of and dependent on nature, its relation to nature 
is an issue that has been present in education and addressed one way or another by 
many school subjects and university disciplines over the ages. The aim of 
understanding the role of humans in nature as a responsible one, living for nature 
(maintaining its wellbeing) not just in it, is thus a project of a more recent date. But it 
appears that this project is once again fading away in favor of other more “human” 
undertakings, thus ignoring the interrelation of nature and culture.  
This chapter continues with a clarification of why I have pursued this research 
and describes the choice of method, presents important characters, and states my 
theoretical point of departure. A second main issue involves an interpretation of some 
central concepts and a discussion of how I will use them in this study. Finally, the 
chapter ends with a brief content outline for the rest of the book, an ending that will 
briefly depict the complete research approach stage by stage. 
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1.1 Whys, What Fors and Hows 
 
In the last decades, an increasing number of researchers in many research fields have 
sought answers about why humans have treated nature as they have, and how to 
enhance the protection of nature and promote a more sustainable living. Research in 
philosophy, history, anthropology, religion, sociology, psychology, economics, 
ecology, geography and many other disciplines have all studied problems in 
connection to humanity’s relation to nature. Researchers have suggested solutions to 
the very complex and challenging dilemmas concerning how humans relate to other 
creatures and the earthly habitats they share with them. Many of these solutions have 
required education. The concepts of environmental education (EE) and education for 
sustainable development (ESD) have both attracted increasing attention in education, 
even though they do not quite mean the same thing. In particular, the field of 
environmental education has proposed different methods for teaching people to live 
on the earth more gently. For its part, environmental education has progressively 
been accompanied by the concept of education for sustainable development as a 
solution to the common quest for a more sustainable life on earth that emphasizes the 
need for present generations to assure appropriate living conditions for future 
generations. The differences between the concepts will be explained in Chapter 
Two,
1
 but for present purposes it is important to note the relatively recent attention 
given by educators to the impact of humans on their natural environment and the 
need to protect that environment for the future.  
Despite attempts at educational solutions, humans continue to use nature in non-
sustainable ways. No adequate methods available for teaching about environmental 
issues have promoted pledges of sustainability, and no one has come up with any 
brilliant clue of how education or other institutions or influences could contribute to a 
larger and more profound environmental commitment that could significantly change 
the treatment of our natural world. While environmental education is a new teaching 
field, the research that theorizes and discusses the teaching practices in this field is 
also young and has a tradition of less than 40 years; education for sustainable 
development is even a younger focus. From the beginning, the most common 
approaches to environmental educational research have been empirical studies 
concerning effective means of promoting a more environmentally gentle living. 
                                           
1
 Readers are asked consult 2.1 already if they are not familiar with these concepts. 
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Environmental protection became a common concern as awareness of the 
environment increased in the 1950s and 1960s along with calls for action; as a result, 
the protection of nature came to be seen as a duty. This new awareness did not arise 
out of nothing. Awareness of environmental questions and concern for nature already 
existed in the 19
th
 century; in some form, it already existed long before that. But such 
awareness did not become a pressing concern until the last half of the 20
th
 century. 
The demand for the educational study of environmental topics (and not only as a part 
of science or biology, but across all subjects) has only become urgent since the 
beginning of the 1970s when the concept of environmental education gained a 
foothold, first in environmental protection circles and assemblies, and also gradually 
in typical educational contexts.  
Since the 1990s, more and more representatives of environmental education have 
called attention to the need for a more critical view (e.g., Breiting, 2009; Saul, 2000; 
Tilbury, 2002) and for philosophical approaches to environmental education (e.g., 
Jickling, 2001, 2009; Orr, 2004; Sauvé, 1999). Recently, voices have summoned 
environmental educational research to emerge from isolation and expand to a wider 
cultural and social relevance, following the same trend in other forms of educational 
research (e.g., Lotz-Sisitka, 2009; Scott, 2009). There have been forceful arguments 
both for approaches that are more theoretical and for more multidisciplinary 
approaches to environmental education. I subscribe to these opinions, and I believe 
there is especially a striking lack of historical and philosophical views, a serious lack 
that Carr (2003) also notes concerning educational research in general. He describes 
the condition as one of “fragmentation” (ibid., p.16). Most history investigations of 
environmental education do not go further back than to the 1950s, if that far. 
Moreover, critical and philosophical perspectives have hitherto been rare in 
environmental education.  
 
Focus and Inquiry  
 
This research study sets out from the premise that in most cases education has not 
managed in tackling the environmental problems adequately. In this critique, I do not 
blame anybody and, if I did, I should be as blameworthy as anybody else as I have 
worked in the field of environmental education for many years. Instead of blaming, I 
prefer to stress that, despite some effective environmental educational achievements 
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around the world, all contributors need to be self-critical; steadily aware of which 
theoretical directions they apply, and ready to discuss various options on a long time 
basis. Despite many good attempts, there are still many gaps and tensions between 
our knowledge about how best to treat nature and the willingness to act in such ways 
for the present and the future. Many well-considered steps need to be taken before 
awareness leads to concrete actions; and on the road from knowledge to concrete 
actions, individuals and societies both have to consider a host of value-laden issues 
that are in need of ethical scrutiny. However, ethical considerations are not the same 
thing as instructing others to adapt a given ethical behavior. From the very beginning, 
both environmental education and education for sustainable development have 
focused on the need to change attitudes towards nature and the environment. 
Discussions are, therefore, extremely crucial about what it means to purposefully 
change somebody’s attitudes and under which circumstances such undertakings are 
defensible. In the last ten years, an increasing number of researchers have rejected the 
quest for changed attitudes and instead recommend more emphasis on, and 
discussions about, what ethics
2
 entail in the context of environmental education. 
Many remarkable persons have already tried to solve the ethical problem of 
humanity’s relation to nature, both through the models of their own lives and on a 
theoretical plane. “Environmental ethics” is a discipline in philosophy that 
increasingly discusses these issues. The understanding of environmental ethics has 
thus also increased, but philosophy of education has rarely discussed environmental 
ethics. 
With various requests and calls for alternative environmental educational research 
methods in mind, I found that my research might be most beneficial if it would bring 
certain critical perspectives from philosophy and history to bear on problems of 
environmental education and the sustainability dilemma. I have thus decided to 
contribute to the discourse about environmental educational by focusing especially on 
the ethical dimensions of education from a multi-disciplinary perspective that 
comprises a blend of education, philosophy, and history. Central considerations in 
this book are, then, the contradictions between, on the one hand, humans as biological 
                                           
2
 ‘Ethics’(from the Greek word ēthos, custom, disposition) is the branch of philosophy that deals with 
questions related to ‘morality’ that in turn relates to codes of conduct. Ethics is an ambiguous concept; there 
are many philosophical schools with different ethical views, and my aim is not to distinguish them 
systematically. At this stage, I simply use ‘ethics’ to denote ‘the moral principles governing or influencing 
human conduct’.  Later in this chapter, I will launch into a few basic ethical problems and in the next chapter 
I will present a few basic ethical theories as a background to the following chapters that mainly will describe 
ethics according to the philosophies of Rousseau and Foucault.  
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creatures born as part of nature and simultaneously into social-cultural communities 
and, on the other hand, how humans create self-understanding and view themselves 
in relation to fellow creatures, to the rest of nature, and to society. While education 
that deals with problems very strongly related to ethics
3
 eventually will reveal 
contradictions both within particular individuals and among individuals, as well as 
conflicts at the societal level and on a global scale, important issues will be ethical 
conflicts and power formations. Thus, my main interest is to discuss how education 
can deal with conflicts that arise from humans’ divided role as both natural and social 
beings, a division that affects the complexity of their relations within themselves, to 
each other and to the entire world. The main research question is twofold and 
focuses, firstly, on ethics and, secondly, on education and asks:  
 
 
a) What ethical dimensions are challenged by the enigma of sustainability? 
 
b) What kind of education do these dimensions require? 
 
 
To answer this twofold question I have divided my study into three parts. Part One 
attempts (1) to identify the topic of the book and study how education has dealt with 
nature and sustainability hitherto, and (2) to identify typical answers about why 
humankind has caused so many environmental problems. However, because this 
starting point showed that humans’ relation to nature was an old and manifold ethical 
dilemma, my curiosity for historical answers was triggered and, therefore, I decided 
to delve more deeply into history in Part Two, concentrating on how humans have 
dealt ethically and educationally with their relation to nature in the Western tradition.  
To avoid undertaking a task that is too broad, I chose to focus on a particular era, 
the modern era,
4
 a philosophical movement that has had a great impact on human 
development not only in the Western regions but in most parts of the world all since 
                                           
3
 All education actually relates to ethics in one way or another. 
4
 The terms "modern," "modernism" and "modernity" are widely disputed, and ‘modern philosophy’ is often 
separated from the later ‘modernism’ movement in Western art and literature (Silverman, 1996/2006). When 
I use the word ‘modern,’ I mean a philosophical movement that emerged gradually already during the 
Renaissance as an alternative to the ancient philosophy and accelerated rapidly during the Enlightenment. 
The expressions “enlightenment” and “modern” can also be seen as states of minds that are not strictly 
limited to special time epochs (e.g., Kant talked about “enlightenment “and Foucault about “modern” as 
ways of relating to the world). 
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the Enlightenment,
5
 and a particular representative of that pivotal age, Jean-Jacques 
Rousseau. In this second part of the study, I chose to employ Michel Foucault’s 
historical research methods. However, this choice brought him in as a speaker with 
his own voice. Progressively, then, a discussion between three voices unfolded: me, 
Rousseau, and Foucault. Part Two is the result of that discussion and it tries to 
consider various angles of a tricky and never-ending topic starting from human nature 
and ending with education. This second approach includes three studies that ask: (I) 
What discourses about nature, knowledge and education inspired Rousseau?; (II) 
What were Rousseau’s ethics in relation to nature?; and (III) What is the role of 
nature in Rousseau’s educational philosophy? Part Three concludes and brings these 
three studies together in a present day reflection. Thus, the entire research approach 
starts and ends with contemporary educational challenges.  
 
Turning towards History 
 
Why focus on the past? The answer is that we can neither solve the problems of today 
nor of tomorrow without an understanding of their historical background. When 
trying to understand the challenges that education has to face today and in the future 
because of a non-sustainable human lifestyle, we can gain from viewing the past and 
learning from earlier experiences. Environmental education is a young phenomenon 
that arose when it first became obvious that humans had selfishly destroyed and 
diminished the living conditions of the other creatures of the earth, and when it 
became apparent that the human impact on other humans had reached negative 
proportions. Environmental education arose as an important promoter of change in 
the 1970s and 1980s when the human impact on nature rapidly increased and the 
resulting environmental problems became unmistakably global, unscrupulously 
crossing political boundaries. Eager environmentalists were the first to take a stake in 
environmental education. Given this source, the environmental educational research 
field jumped right into the field of education through a side-door, eager to achieve 
                                           
5
 The length of the Enlightenment is interpreted in various ways, mostly starting in the end of the 17
th
 century 
(e.g., Schmidt, 2006) or beginning of the 18
th
 and ending about the time for the American Declaration of 
Independence in 1776 or the French Revolution in 1778  (Dictionary of the Histories of Ideas; Sörlin, 2004). 
My distinction for the Age of Enlightenment coincides well with Foucault’s’ classical era’ that takes place 
from 1660-1800 (Best & Kellner, 1991). So, when I use the word Enlightenment with capital letter it 
connotes a limited epoch, starting at the end of the 17
th
 century and covering the entire 18
th
 century; when I 
use the word with small letters it denotes an unrestricted progress culminating in the 18
th
 century.   
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rapid changes. However, this extraordinary start overlooked a long tradition of 
educational philosophy that had wrestled with similar ethical issues facing 
environmental education. Originality is not necessarily detrimental to progress, but 
ignorance can easily lead things astray. I will argue that the numerous attempts to 
solve environmental problems and to reach sustainability by behavior modification 
have been a failure that could have been avoided if environmental education had been 
better anchored in, or at least made better use of, educational theory from the very 
beginning. With the help of history, I want to identify some basic philosophical 
problems that make it so challenging to try to steer human life in the direction of 
greater sustainability of the environment and into more just social practices. My 
attempt is to re-introduce some old ethical fundamentals from educational theory and 
to apply them to environmental education. Conversely, I will also juxtapose historical 
and philosophical issues with current environmental problems hoping to contribute 
new perspectives to educational research in general. If environmental education has 
overlooked the philosophy of education, education in general has both theoretically 
and practically likewise overlooked that humans are a part of nature, not just in it or 
in control of it.   
My research training has been within the field of theoretical education; so called 
allmän pedagogik,
6
 a field that studies education from multiple viewpoints. My 
background and special interests are also multifaceted and include, on the one hand, 
education and philosophy, on the other hand, bio- and geosciences. Therefore, I have 
neither the ambition nor capacity for performing a customary one-discipline 
investigation. Instead, I want to combine my package of theories and experiences into 
a multifaceted but focused study.  
A historical research perspective is a conversation with the past that can expose 
deep-rooted cultural biases and expose why we are who we are. But it is also a way 
of uncovering forgotten truths. It is a way of making the rapidly changing world more 
understandable. A dialogue with history is, in this case, an opportunity to obtain a 
more profound understanding of the ethical obstacles behind humankind’s 
complicated relation to nature, obstacles that delay all radical change processes. 
History can also protect us from historicism; that is, from trying to generalize the past 
and rashly applying former solutions to present dilemmas (see Foucault, 1984). 
                                           
6
 The research area that in my Finno-Swedish context is called allmän pedagogik is, like the German 
Allgemeine Pädagogik, a discipline that focuses on educational conditions and learning theories from 
philosophical, but also historical, sociological, psychological, and political perspectives. The English concept 
that comes most close to allmän pedagogik is philosophy of education.  
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Humankind cannot jump off the train and run backwards. Nevertheless, history can 
influence the choice of direction, and historical awareness can protect against 
repeating earlier mistakes.  
But, why did I decide to start with the Enlightenment? Are not the Enlightenment 
and the modern era passé as archetype epochs? Yes, they are. The problems are 
different now than during the modern era, but some profound phenomena have 
obviously more or less evidently survived or even returned in a new shape in the 
present epoch that some call late modern and others (who want to stress that our time 
diverges from the modern) postmodern and even high modern.
7
 Education was the 
great Enlightenment project, a kind of “savoir of the world.” This project has gained 
strong winds again. The tensions between rationality and desire as well as rationality 
and emotions that were discourse issues in the 17
th
 and 18
th
 century, have come into 
view again. Today, as then, a protest is rising against a too strictly rational and 
utilitarian
8
 view of reality (e.g., P. H. Ray, 1996; Ray & Anderson, 2001; O’Sullivan, 
1999). Likewise, contemporary critiques of consumerism and the selfish satisfying of 
present desires instead of sacrificing to protect the needs of future generations and for 
a more sustainable development all resemble 18
th
 century critiques of increased 
consumption and of luxurious lifestyles. There is also a similarity between the 
Enlightenment and the present when it comes to pleas for global equality and more 
interest in discussing issues like cosmopolitanism versus nationalism.
9
 There are also 
many unmistakable differences between our time and the 18
th
 century. While the 
strength of nation states increased in the 18
th
 century, at present the role of these 
states has decreased rapidly in favor of global interests. New thoughts emerging from 
deep ecology, alternative philosophies, postclassical sciences, feminism, and 
“deconstructive education”10 indicates that a new worldview might emerge; a view 
that could guide twenty-first century citizens to a more sustainable way of life. The 
modern framework that legitimated the industrial revolution with its side effects of 
resource reduction and pollution could thus soon lose its usefulness.  
                                           
7
 The concepts of postmodern and late modern are especially much in use in social science discourses (see, 
e.g., Bauman, 2000; Beck, 1992, 2006; Giddens, 1991; Wolff, 2008). 
8
 See more about utilitarianism in Chapter Two. 
9
 David Hume, Adam Smith, and many other philosophers, statesmen and scientists in diverse European 
countries and colonies shared cosmopolitan views that ranged above and beyond national contexts. These so-
called “Men of letters” belonged to a limited group of educated people that circulated letters (“The Republic 
of Letters”) that built a kind of  conceptual space defined in terms of ‘cosmopolitanism’ and ‘universality’ 
(e.g., Withers, 2008). 
10
 In school contexts, promoters of “deconstructive education” aim at a complete reorganization of the 
schooling.   
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However, there are also many other strong winds blowing in the opposite 
direction than people led by unconventional visions predict. Furthermore, strong 
forces are keenly pushing towards endless economic growth, regardless of the fact 
that the resulting global economic imbalance is enormous. The present condition 
seems critical, then, and recently many voices have talked about “the ecological 
crisis” in past, present, and future terms (e.g., Sargent, 1968; White, 1967; von 
Wright, 1986). This ecological crisis has turned to a moral problem; yet optimists 
predict that it will lead to a rising tide of ethical change across the globe (see, e.g., 
Edwards, 2005; Fry, 1994; Singer, 2003)—a prediction reminiscent of the progress 
many dreamt about in the 18
th
 century, dreams that ended in political revolutions. The 
change expected by optimists for the near future is envisaged as even more sweeping 
than the Enlightenment; as a total rethinking of the human role in the natural world 
(Orr, 2005) and as more revolutionary than the Industrial Revolution (Edwards, 
2005). 
The advocates of sustainable development argue for changes and actions towards 
a better future. Although pragmatic, the idea of sustainable development shares a 
likeness with perhaps the most characteristic brainchild of the Enlightenment, the 
prediction that “reason” would promote a future characterized by ever-unfolding 
“progress.” The dreams of sustainable development and of continuous progress are 
both wed to the much older belief in perfectibility
11
 and of ongoing elevation of the 
ethical conduct of humankind. People often have had such visions of an overall 
improvement of human life on earth, a kind of forgetting of the past and hoping for 
something better to come. These visions have created utopias of many kinds. 
Nonetheless, at the same time people have felt desperate and have lacked clear 
images of the future. They have thus felt trapped in the present, searching for new 
ways forward. Education has always been central to that search, a kind of a key to the 
exit gate. Education was thus a key theme of social dialogue during the 
Enlightenment and is still featured in current debates about the best ways of attaining 
more sustainable bases for human life. Education has become the catalyst and 
foundation of attempts at sustainability (Edwards, 2005). Questions about whether 
existing educational practices provide the knowledge one needs for sustaining life is 
just as appropriate as it was 250 years ago. However, in this study I do not intend to 
draw direct parallels between the Enlightenment and our current situation. My 
                                           
11
 I will further discuss the concept of “perfectibility” in Chapter Two.  
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intention is also not to turn back the clock of history and present some great but 
forgotten truth. Instead, I want to stimulate reflections and discussions about the 
complexity and misguided nature of the questions asked about nature, education, and 
sustainability today by analyzing an old issue in a new perspective and by presenting 
a relatively new theme through the lens of an old viewpoint. This historical approach 
seeks to provide a detailed look at how humans have regarded and thus dealt with 
their relations to nature during a particular era, especially in connection with the 
growth of the knowledge base and with how education has dealt with the resulting 
explosion of knowledge. 
Historical research has shifted towards the end of the 20th century because of the 
postmodern critique. Influences from other research fields and disciplines have 
started to challenge historical research (e.g., Kalela, 2000). Interdisciplinary and 
critical approaches have revealed new historical perspectives. In the early 20
th
 
century, the members of the “Frankfurt School” introduced critical views of history 
and many after them have also produced critical inquiry. The philosophers of the 
Frankfurt School focused their criticism on all kinds of social conditions, from 
institutions, to ideological topics, such as democracy, freedom, enlightenment and 
human rights (see, e.g., Horkheimer, 1972; Adorno, 1955/1987). Max Horkheimer 
and Theodor Adorno attacked the Enlightenment in their famous Dialectic of 
Enlightenment (1972) and blamed it for being a myth in itself, although the strong 
belief in scientific knowledge during the Enlightenment era was intended to counter 
other myths. The social critique employed by the Frankfurt School, so called “Critical 
Theory,” aimed not only at creating theories, it strived to ‘change the world’, as Marx 
defined the task of philosophy in one of his early writings (Marx, 1995).  
 
A Foucauldian Approach 
 
In this book, I take on the challenge of applying philosophy to our historical 
understanding of educational thinking about the environment, while remaining aware 
of the growth of the natural as well as social sciences and the resulting knowledge 
about the world that cannot be neglected. To stay critical, but not wed to Critical 
Theory, I decided to implement Foucault’s methods. He partly agreed and partly 
disagreed with Critical Theory and developed his own critical views and methods.
12
 
                                           
12
 Foucault actually developed his theories simultaneously with Critical Theory unaware of the works of the 
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“[P]hilosophy is that which calls into question domination of every level and in every 
form in which it exists, whether political, economic, sexual, institutional, or what 
have you” (Foucault, 1997e, pp 300-301). Foucault labeled his research “history of 
thought
13” (Foucault, 1997c, p. 117) and described his undertakings as a rediscovery 
of “problems” or “problematizations” (ibid., pp. 117-118). Through the practice of 
problematization, the researcher discovers how diverse practices have become 
problems and what kind of solutions they have offered. While Immanuel Kant 
searched for the limits of human understanding in his critical philosophy, Foucault 
shaped a critique “that takes the form of possible crossing-over [franchissement]” 
(Foucault, 1997h, p. 315). History, then, is a study of “the events that have led us to 
constitute ourselves and to recognize ourselves as subjects of what we are doing, 
thinking, saying” (ibid.). Viewing history, this way is not a matter of searching for 
universal truths but of promoting possible changes and thus the practices of freedom.  
Gradually, Foucault came to emphasize philosophy as a “critical ontology of 
ourselves” (Foucault, 1997h, p. 319) in which one investigates the contemporary 
ways of acting and facing reality in the light of one’s historical background. These 
“historico-critical investigations” are practical, because the point of departure is 
actual human existence. They are specific, since they focus on a particular material 
(e.g., a special practice or discourse) and they are general, while they deal with 
questions of relevance in our present societies (Olssen, 2006). Even though his aim 
not was metaphysical, Foucault (1997h) wanted to encourage a critical process that 
breaks and then strives to surpass the limits imposed on individuals in order to 
establish a new way of being in the world, a new ethos. According to Foucault, there 
was nothing original with his methods. He used textual references, citied authorities, 
drew connections between texts and facts, suggested, and offered explanations, just 
like other historians. Yet, with his stories, Foucault wanted to initiate transformation 
of his own and his readers’ experience of themselves as participants in their own 
moment in time, their current mode of modernity, and of what is offered as the ‘truth’ 
and ‘right knowledge’ at a given moment and in a given space. Foucault’s history 
writing intended to promote a different relationship with the issue under study, with 
its present status as well as its historical roots. Furthermore, the experience he offered 
                                                                                                                                            
Frankfurt School philosophers, since they were not known in France at the time when Foucault started to 
write his books (see, e.g., Foucault, 2000b). 
13
 Another label was “history of the present” (Foucault, 1977, p. 31), which meant writing “a history about 
the past in the terms of the present” (ibid.). The primary interest was not the past, but contemporary 
problems. 
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his readers had to relate to a collective practice. His research aimed at offering 
experiences in form of fictive images unbound from what is true or false (Foucault, 
2000b). The precondition of such a study is that it has to be open-ended. Its purpose 
is not to expose “the truth,” as was the claim made by Enlightenment philosophes,14 
but to evoke an experience for both the writer and the reader (Foucault, 2000b). 
History has built up our present way of facing the world, but history is different from 
the present―and hence offers a distanced perspective (Oksala, 2005). Such distance 
is especially useful when the focus of research is the use and abuse of power. 
Foucault (e.g., 1986a, 2000g) sensed the necessity of studying instances where forms 
of power meet resistance; this identifies diverse forms of power that have otherwise 
gone unnoticed and helps elucidate how they interact, how they are wielded and to 
what (or whose) benefits they accrue.  
Writing a book was primarily a critical experiment for Foucault, and his aim was 
not to tell “the truth” or explain any state of affairs. Instead, he wanted to raise 
complex questions, show issues in new relations, and introduce alternative views to 
taken for granted perspectives. Research that is in line with Foucault’s historical 
approach strives to explain events in a most honest way without ignoring off-stage, 
behind the scene variables that have otherwise gone unmarked when history recounts 
only what happens on the historical stage. This kind of research also aims at making 
researchers aware of their own biases and limitations. The task of the kind of critical 
research inspired by Foucault is, therefore, not to judge the present or to guide the 
flock. Instead, the task is to introduce alternative answers to current complexities 
while acknowledging the past (see also Simons, Masschelein & Quaghebeur, 2005). 
Historical research, performed in accordance with Foucault, does not show how the 
past has lead inexorably to the present; rather, it illustrates that the present is no less 
strange than the past (Kendall & Wickham, 1999). Foucault wanted the reader and 
the researcher to collaborate in a transformative process that raises doubt and 
considers things from completely new perspectives and, thus, that is capable of 
changing and therefore even changes their previous standpoints. In this research, I 
will show how the series of the historical events fall together for me, not make claims 
about how things actually were, are, or have to be. The aim is mainly to raise 
curiosity and encourage discussions.  
 
                                           
14
 The word “philosophe” will be interpreted in the end of Chapter Two. 
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Rousseau as the Hourglass Waist 
 
Beside Foucault, another focus in this study is on the writings of a leading 
Enlightenment thinker, Rousseau. Choosing one main person to represent the entire 
modern Western tradition in illuminating the topic at hand was an easy task. 
Rousseau’s reputation is unquestioned in Western history, regardless if the topic is 
education, philosophy, nature, environment, anthropology, psychology, politics, or 
society. He is a given name in the environmental debates of today. A team of thirty-
five experts classified him as one of the “very obvious ‘great names’ in the 
environmental world”, one among the forerunners in the volume Fifty Key Thinkers 
on the Environment (see Palmer, 2001, p. xiii-xiv). Few others have entered the 
discourses on nature, education, and modern human identities with such enthusiasm 
as did Rousseau, who dealt with these issues in most of his writings. He participated 
in discourses about what ‘human nature’ is and what it means to live in accordance 
with what is ‘natural’. These questions caught his interest from ontological, political, 
and metaphysical perspectives. In addition, he concerned himself with methods for 
encouraging human potential and saw ethical criteria as the foundations of a decent 
society. He problematized many ideas of his epoch that are relevant in a sustainability 
debate. Even if he often stood apart from the mainstream of the Enlightenment by 
questioning many of its fundaments, he also agreed with and encouraged certain 
others. He was, nevertheless, more a naysayer than a ‘yes man’, and almost his entire 
literary production as well as his own life was to a large degree an embodiment of 
resistance towards the behind-the-scenes uses of power that Foucault (1986a) has 
encouraged researchers to trace. Rousseau was a man who dared to think differently 
and argued frankly against what he regarded as corrupt. His radical view, one whose 
influence has largely faded as education has been influenced by industrial models, is 
worth revisiting in the contemporary context of today when environmental problems 
have attracted much new huge attention. 
Rousseau’s writings demonstrate that he was familiar with the history of Western 
ideas since Antiquity. He knew the traditions and infused them with his own as well 
as others’ newborn ideas. While his writings have had a great influence, his thinking 
influenced the whole Counter-Enlightenment movement and his impact has been 
strong on Romantic and Post-Romantic philosophy and education. For example 
Immanuel Kant, Johann Gottfried von Herder, and Friedrich Hegel were all inspired 
by Rousseau  
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Many of Kant’s main ideas were actually first expressed, however briefly, by 
Rousseau. As a quick answer on why I chose to rely on Rousseau, I can answer with 
Sörlin’s words:  
 
He is the hourglass waist in the European history of ideas.… Everything came 
together before him, but after him all things split into thousand small grains of 
sand. That is exactly the modern destiny; the split, the lack of overview and 
coherence, the impossibility in a system that tries to catch it all.
15
 (Sörlin, 2004, p. 
371, Wolff’s trans.) 
 
Rousseau did not personify this hourglass waist alone, but he definitely stood at the 
zenith of the Enlightenment.
16
 His thoughts both brought together many pre-modern 
views and influenced various disciplines in many new directions. Since Rousseau 
expressed rebellious thoughts during an age of fermentation, his famous book Émile 
was both banned and praised. Rousseau inspired school reformers in many European 
countries and in America and Russia, and his political thoughts had an influence on 
many thinkers. The influence of Rousseau on the German Bildung tradition is 
unquestionable (see Benner, 2005; Tenorth, 1988), and he has also played a great role 
in the development of American (deGarmo 1907/2006) and Scandinavian education 
(Rinne, Kivirauma & Lehtinen, 2004) through his influence especially on Kant, 
Friedrich Herbart, and John Dewey.
17
 In addition to Plato’s Republic, W. Carr (2003) 
notes Rousseau’s Émile and Dewey’s Democracy and Education as two canonical 
texts in the Western modern educational tradition that seriously discuss the 
importance of education in promoting a good society. While Western education until 
now has followed certain ‘modern’ traditions, it will be helpful to turn back to one of 
the formative sources of that tradition and explore what Rousseau actually said about 
human being, nature and education. Yet, he is also an outstanding example of how 
difficult it is to bring theory directly to bear on the living of life. In that, he serves as 
an example for any humans searching to manage their own life regardless of epoch. 
The hourglass is a symbol for an intermediate position between the past and the 
future. It depicts human life as a struggle between three spaces: the past, the present, 
                                           
15
 ”Han är timglasets midja i Europas idéhistoria .... Mot honom förs allt samman, efter honom löper allt isär 
och bildar tusen små sandkorn. Det är just det som är det moderna ödet, splittringen, bristen på överblick och 
sammanhang, det omöjliga i ett system som fångar allt.”   
16
 Researchers still argue about whether Rousseau belonged to the Enlightenment or counter-Enlightenment 
(see, Delaney, 2006). 
17
 Dewey’s Schools of Tomorrow leans a lot on Rousseau’s educational ideas. 
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and the future, where the present moment is rushing by very quickly. My intention 
was to join Rousseau right at his space, in the middle of the modern hourglass, as a 
spokesperson for the past, concerning the future, and who nonetheless was intensely 
occupied with and emphasized the present. I wanted, on the one hand, to know what 
he had to say about nature and education, and on the other hand, to observe not only 
how his thoughts have influenced modern educational tradition until today but also 
what has been forgotten. From the very beginning, I had a strong presentiment of that 
his arguments might have something to offer contemporary education debates 
concerning sustainability and, after completing my investigation, I am not 
disappointed in this respect.  
 
Choice of Vista 
 
This study will focus on many gaps that complicate the educational process. 
Primarily, there is a big gap, or in fact many gaps, between solid knowledge and 
sound actions. Since Antiquity, it has been obvious that knowledge, even if combined 
with rational thinking, is not enough to foster virtuous actions. Various barriers widen 
and multiply these gaps and thus debilitate attempts at bridging them―in particular, 
the contradictory aim of sustainable development is a barrier between knowledge 
about the environmental problems and sound actions towards a less environmentally 
destructive future (see e.g., von Wright, 1993). It is difficult to reach equality and 
protect nature at the same time as we are racing towards ever more economic growth 
(ibid.). Therefore, matters that threaten the prospects of economic progress easily are 
readily rejected as irrelevant (Svendsen, 2004). One scenario shows that consumption 
ensures employment and development and leads to longer, more fulfilling lives. 
Another scenario shows that such out-of-control consumerism threatens the survival 
of the world. So, the views of economic expansion and the sustainability of the 
natural world are diametrically opposed. Thus, the quest for ever-greater 
consumption continues, even though there is no evidence that human life has 
improved overall (ibid.). Free trade capitalism and its progressive globalizing 
influences both rich and poor countries and make them rush to join the despoiling of 
the natural world in search of the growth of capital. 
The gap between knowledge and action exists on both an individual and a social 
level. Educational discussions and theories, in particular educational debates and 
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research about the environment, have often dealt with the challenges of these gaps 
and have searched for successful methods for overcoming the obstacles that foil 
environmentally responsible actions. Ideally, the direction from knowledge to action 
is linear. Hypothetically, if knowledge is the beginning point, an input of particular 
educational elements automatically results in the expected outcome. There is, 
however, no straight route from knowledge to a desirable action because the obstacles 
are numerous between “right knowledge” and “proper action”. How the teacher can 
choose learning activities that lead the students from knowing to doing is, therefore, a 
basic educational quandary. Nevertheless, the dilemma can also be the result of 
ignorance: people act, but lack proper knowledge for their actions. While problems 
with the environment increase in number and complexity, ignorance is all too typical, 
both in daily life and in educational support for sustaining the environment (see 
Palmberg, 2008).   
Beside such gaps, dynamic tensions between humans and their relation to nature 
produce even more problems. While ecology and the role of humans in that ecology 
are complicated enough to begin with, to these can be added tensions between 
different views of which or whose knowledge to rely on. Global warming is a good 
example of the kind of tension that can arise between different scientific 
perspectives—not to mention social, cultural and political ideologies that influence 
which or whose science will be accepted and acted on (or not). Thus other 
contradictions, quite aside from the scientific knowledge base, arise between 
individuals and social groups. Individuals can even be conflicted by their 
membership in different groups: for example, their workplace and its values and their 
personal values. Such components involve the opposite push-pull of emotional 
desires and rational desires. Emotional desires are innumerous and, typically, their 
conflict with rationality is often difficult to overcome (see Irvine, 2006). Rationality, 
the possibility of and longing to think objectively and logically by employing 
intellectual, reasonable, scientific knowledge, does not always harmonize with 
emotional desires. Even if rationality rules over emotional desire, it does not easily 
win (ibid.). Confronted with a choice, for example, individuals may prefer to follow 
their ‘wants’ and to do what pleases them from a personal view rather than act in 
accordance with what reason points to as the ‘needs’ of the environment as shared by 
all people. Selfish desires too often win the battle with the unselfish intentions. Yet, 
not all desires are necessarily selfish, and one’s own emotions and body do not 
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necessarily initiate what one chooses to do; in fact, other individuals and external 
matters easily influence one’s choices (ibid.). 
In the long term, individuals and communities may know what is ‘just’ and ‘right’ 
in relation to the natural world and for society; but their immediate desires can lead 
them to prefer to have a good life in the near future or even to attain satisfaction at 
the very moment. Acting rationally implies doing what is known or calculated to be 
the best of alternatives, and basing one’s actions on unemotional and non-ideological 
grounds. To the contrary, blindly or easily following one’s desires without rational 
behavior implies that one is a slave to those desires. Yet, even if such desires rise 
from emotions, emotions are not necessarily harmful. Trying to base one’s actions 
merely on rationality without emotions has been diagnosed as one of the causes of the 
contemporary despoiling of the environment (see, e.g., Orr, 2003), and this view 
shows similarities with Rousseau’s judgment of his own time. Neither purely rational 
desires nor purely emotionally led desires can result in equality and justice in human 
life, and that includes a more sustainable life for all creatures. Rationality without any 
emotional balance may lead to catastrophic choices that create certain sufferings on 
pursuit of a goal that only seems to be good from a rational perspective.  
Although individuals who have knowledge and want to act on behalf of what they 
know should be best, they do not necessarily do so. Effective knowledge about the 
environmental issues and a desire to act are not enough for actions to result (see 
Cantell & Larna, 2006). The desire and the will to act do not proceed in a straight line 
because the will is steered by so many conflicting desires. Of all such pressures, the 
desire to obey social dictates—to avoid attention and act generally as others do—is 
very strong. Rousseau (e.g., 1
st
 D) problematized this human tendency to follow the 
masses as to what one ‘ought to do,’ but Martin Heidegger (1927/1996) especially 
drew attention to this ethical problem. Humans prefer to act like a kind of neutral 
‘Everyman’ (das Man) instead of to act in accordance with their own ethical and 
practical criteria (ibid.). Being ‘just like everyone’, like sheep in a herd, is tantamount 
to being ‘no-one’ and thus no individual can be blamed when ‘groupthink’ leads all 
astray. Besides acquiescing to general norms, the immediate desire to earn 
appreciation from family members, friends, and colleagues is another priority that 
easily succeeds. An alternative choice should be to follow the desire to act in what 
one knows to be environmentally responsible ways and to ignore ‘general’ or 
‘everyday’ attitudes that lead away from that end. But, clearly, the alternative is more 
difficult to follow than to acknowledge.  
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Eighteenth century discourse had already focused on the struggle between acting 
rationally regarding long-term ends and fulfilling immediate desires. Like the earlier 
mentioned gaps between knowledge and decent actions, these tensions actually 
inspired educational aspirations over the ages that have yet to find a satisfactory 
solution. Yet, these aspirations are based on reason, such as for increased social 
administration and a strong control over nature (Habermas, 1995). Therefore, the gap 
between knowledge and actions can also exist at an institutional level. Science, 
technology, industry, and administration have become a conglomeration in which the 
relation between theory and practice consists of utilizing scientifically proved 
techniques. The Enlightenment project has thus become a matter of strategic 
manipulation, and the promised liberation has left only instructions about how to 
manage objective processes. In these processes, the individual does not know how to 
distinguish technical and practical (moral) power. Instead of discussing the 
consequences of scientific development, members of society start to believe and 
accept that their entire lives are technologically controllable. According to Habermas 
(ibid.), the only way to break this trust in technical control is through resolute critical 
discussions that can liberate people from dogmatism. Foucault, on the other hand, 
talked about scientific knowledge as “games of truth” (Foucault, 1997e, p. 297), like 
the general rules that govern most discourses, and power as “games of strategy” 
(ibid., p. 298). He stressed that critical philosophy has to discern these numerous 
games and their relation to the subject. Therefore, when Habermas suggested 
communication, Foucault suggested, “Make freedom your foundation, through the 
mastery of yourself” (ibid., p. 301). However, one does not exclude the other. 
In Western philosophy, reason has been regarded as evidence of the superiority of 
humans over other animals. Acting irrationally, then, has been equated with 
animalistic, uncivilized behavior, and with the holy soul as being trapped in an 
animal body (e.g., Suutala, 1996). A human being, ‘the wise man’, is looked upon as 
capable of reasoning, including moral reasoning, and as capable of regulating 
irrational desires. Actually, the conflict between rationality and desire is a problem 
that Plato had already noted in his Republic and something he includes as a basis for 
his educational program in this famous dialogue. Rousseau was highly influenced by 
Plato’s Republic and looked upon it as the best book ever written about education 
(see E).
18
 When reading Rousseau, the influence of Plato on his thoughts emerges 
                                           
18
 The abbreviations of Rousseau’s works are described in the beginning of the Bibliography in the end of 
this book.  
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unmistakably and, according to Broome (1963), Rousseau’s thoughts owe more to 
Plato than to any other philosopher (see also Kelly, 2009). But they also owe much to 
Aristotle and to many of Plato’s and Aristotle’s followers. Awareness of Rousseau’s 
precursors makes it easier to understand certain aspects of the personal as well as 
social struggles in Rousseau’s writings.  
The struggle between rationality and desire is a significant feature in Rousseau’s 
book Julie, or the New Heloise. In the Republic, Plato (580d-581e)
19
 distinguishes 
three types of desires that enslave human beings: firstly, rational desire for 
knowledge and truth; secondly, spirited desire for achievements like honor, victory 
and good reputation; and, finally, appetitive desire for things like food, drink, sex and 
money. Individuals having different types of desires thus have different judgments as 
to what is good, according to Plato. Wise persons are those who can control their 
desires by the rational parts of their souls (ibid.). A basic educational aim is therefore 
to encourage students to change their desires from what they falsely believe is good 
to true happiness. The cave metaphor, with its dialectical emphasis, is central to 
Plato’s description of what education ought to be; namely, a complete study of what 
good is ‘in itself’ (ibid., p. 514). Everybody has the capability of learning what is 
good but education is needed to learn what is good. Nevertheless, while Plato’s 
education strives to deliver people from already established errors, in Émile Rousseau 
experimented with preventing errors from arising to begin with (Bloom, 1997; Kelly, 
2009). Instead of enlightening students to make them change, as was one aspect of 
emerging from darkness into the clear light of day, Rousseau saw humans as born 
free and without prejudices (not as sitting chained in a dark cave as in Plato’s 
allegory). Therefore, the best education is not the one that enlightens and liberates, 
but the one that starts early enough to prevent humans from having their minds 
enslaved by error to begin with, according to Rousseau (Kelly, 2009). Instead of 
enlightening the students and bringing them out of their delusions so they change and 
remember what they had learned in their previous lives, as in Plato’s dialectical 
myth,
20
 Rousseau saw ideal students as uncontaminated individuals with the innate 
potential to make good judgments if only somebody pushed them forward and 
empowered them to proceed. Because unlearning is very difficult once a vice has 
developed, it has to be stopped from emerging in the first place.  
                                           
19
 As references for Plato’s dialogues I have mainly used J. Stolpe’s Swedish translations in six vol. from 
2000-2009 and. G. M A. Grube’s trans. of the Republic from 1992. The reference numbers follows 
Stephanus pagination that is equivalent in all versions. 
20
 Plato believed in transmigration of souls as typical in Orphism and among the Pythagoreans. 
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Goodness is a basic purpose in the education Rousseau pictured, not as 
knowledge, but as a practice and a mode of being. Human beings are born good,
21
 
according to him, but their natural goodness is destroyed by society which interferes 
with the development of the good part of the soul. In society, the initially innocent 
child loses its natural ‘grace’; poor education moves the child increasingly farther 
from its natural goodness. According to Rousseau, although human beings are 
initially harmless, they have to practice goodness to avoid evil and thus become 
capable of participating in cooperating with others in the building of a good society 
(e.g., E). In this emphasizing of practice he is reminiscent of Aristotle.  
Carr (2003) maintains that Aristotle made the relation between education and the 
good society that Plato wrote of into a practical problem. In The Nicomachean Ethics, 
Aristotle posed “the good life” of happiness as the highest goal of human struggle 
and the primary goal of education. Aristotle claimed that human beings always aim at 
something good. All knowledge and all intentions strive for the good (1095a).
22
 The 
noblest and highest good in accordance with complete “virtue” is happiness, but what 
happiness is depends on context, time, and practical needs (1097b). Therefore, 
Aristotle did not believe in any singular universal good, but that good was elastic and 
plural. Happiness consists in the exercise of virtue. It is not a selfish but an ethically 
selfless endeavor, although the masses sees happiness as pleasure and act almost like 
cattle while sophisticated people see happiness as honor, Aristotle argued (ibid, 
1095b). Virtue, in accordance with Aristotle, is ethics that is born from custom or 
disposition and realized in praxis (Silfverberg, 2005). However, while goodness and 
“the good life” can be the same thing, this is not the rule. On the one hand, education 
can promote “the good life” for an individual in the present, while on the other hand, 
a good life in the long run for the whole humanity and even the whole universe can, 
and often is, impeded by selfish individualism. Only the far-reaching aim of a 
common good life verges on goodness. In The Nichomacean Ethics Aristotle claimed 
that humans often blend happiness with pleasure, and education thus has to prevent 
the young from developing a craving for exaggerated pleasure. 
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 ‘Good’ is here not the same as morally good or virtuous, but means ‘without original sin’. According to 
the Catholic doctrine, children were born with original sin and only the sacrament of baptism could wash it 
away (Heywood, 2007). St Augustine (Augustinus, trans. 1954) even argued that no naturally innocent 
children exist. See more about this in Chapter Four and Five. 
22
 The references to Aristotle’s books relate to different translators, but they all follow the Becker numbers, 
which are independent of editions.  
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Aristotle distinguishes two parts of the human soul, one rational that directs 
reason and the other irrational. He also divides the rational part of the soul in two: 
firstly, a part that perceives things that cannot be altered (this ‘scientific’ part obeys 
reason) and, secondly, a part by which it is possible to investigate things that can 
change (this ‘estimative’ part possesses reason and thinks). The irrational part, in 
turn, consists of a vegetative part (e.g., physical growth, nutrition) that does not 
communicate with reason and an appetitive part that has desires and to a certain 
extent, at least, listens to reason (e.g., takes close relatives and friends in account). 
Three parts of the soul have authority over actions: intellect (or intuition), sense 
(power of sensation), and desire (The Nichomacean Ethics, 1139a). Humans can 
think, reflect, judge and steer their desires by help of the will. We have the freedom 
to judge and purposefully choose (following the dictates of the will) between various 
desires, but the will is independent of desires. ‘Right actions’ are thus the result of 
making rational decisions to follow the right desires, whereas ‘wrong actions’ are the 
result of following wrong desires and neglecting rational thoughts. However, this is 
no easy equation, since there are many answers on what is right or wrong.  
Although different in many ways, a noticeable feature in both Plato’s and 
Aristotle’s thoughts is that the problems of society and individuals interrelate. Social 
problems, therefore, have an impact on the individual and vice versa (e.g., Plato´s 
Republic, 462d). Humans have to learn to master themselves;
23
 the good part of the 
soul needs to combat bad desires and through that struggle the individual becomes a 
good member of society (ibid., 431). Rousseau adapted this Ancient view of the 
individual’s relation to society, and it is apparent in his ethics. The social role of 
Ancient ethics was also under consideration in Foucault’s ethical studies.  
Even if both rationality and emotions are involved, without aspiration or will, one 
does not achieve anything. The will allows individuals to act with a purpose they 
have set for themselves (Lübcke, 1988). When it comes to the problem of global 
injustice, knowledge cannot overcome insufficient emotional engagement and lack of 
will: the entire struggle between knowledge and desire is often thus reduced to 
silence. Philosophers and theologians have been engaged in discussions of whether 
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 Foucault interpreted the word “self” as the ways the soul uses the body through diverse tools and language. 
The way the soul becomes a subject of actions relates to the Greek khēsthai that entails various relationships 
one can have with oneself, but also with other persons or objects. Therefore, these relationships can take the 
forms of attitudes, honors, worship, etc. To take care of the self is to take care of one’s soul and its relations 
to diverse things, but also to take care of the form of the soul (Foucault, 2005, see more about this issue in 
Chapter Five).  
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humans have ‘free will’ or not and if they can rationally and purposefully tackle their 
desires and act mindfully and autonomously. Nonetheless, this has become a 
marginal educational problem that the last two centuries has downplayed on behalf of 
strictly cognitive educational interests. Voices have been raised, however, on behalf 
of an education that fosters an autonomous ‘will’ that is capable of dealing with one’s 
own desires. A zealous philosopher of education defending this view in the beginning 
of the 19
th
 century was Herbart, who emphasized that education should not have only 
cognitive purposes; instead, it has to foster morals, as well (see Oettingen, 2001). For 
Herbart, moral education helps children learn to know themselves, and it presents 
several moral options from which they can choose, thus not pointing to any particular 
one as the right one. Children are thus summoned to make their own decisions and to 
act in accordance with their own judgments, according to Herbart (ibid.). Payot 
(1909), a century later, was upset that education neglected nurturing the will; instead, 
he saw the will as the most powerful human trait. For him, without the strength of 
one’s own will, individuals become lazy and their life governed by mindlessly 
habitual behavior. All misfortunes come from weakness of the soul, in this view. Still 
another century later Uljens (2006, 2008) argues that education should pay attention 
to fostering the will and try to develop the student’s ‘sense of judgment’. At the 
beginning of the present century, an increasing number of researchers have also noted 
that ‘desire’ is a neglected topic in education (see, e.g., Thøgersen, 2010). This is a 
remarkable oversight since education should help mediate between desire, power, and 
control, not ignore them. The human intellect—the life of reason—has been the 
primary target of education and the bodily desires have especially been shunted aside 
(ibid.). According to Thøgersen, Rousseau can help us reflect on what desire means 
in human life and how it can be educated.   
Starting with Plato, but also as seen in Rousseau’s theory, the conundrum of 
whether education shall strive for a given or open end is exposed, and many 
researchers in environmental education continue to discuss this issue today. 
Rationality has been a basis of and is still a frequently discussed in relation to liberal 
education (Halstead, 2005). For some, the promotion of rationality is analogous with 
encouraging critical thinking and results in an education without specific ends. For 
others, liberalism can never be neutral regarding aims such as justice and equality 
(ibid.). Foucault distinguished the word “processes of liberation” from the “practice 
of freedom” and saw freedom as a more profound and transforming act: an act that 
makes change on the individual’s internal level (Foucault, 1997f, p. 283). Educational 
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researchers interested in Foucault’s theories also discuss these issues, especially the 
consequences of neoliberal education and of supporting self-serving independence 
and autonomy as its educational aim (see, e.g., Marshall, 1996; Wolff, 2008). “Indeed 
it can be said that to advocate autonomy as an educational aim, undermines the 
traditional welfare state, as well as all other strategies of collective action that are 
necessary to human survival and well-being in a global age” (Olssen, 2006, p. 188). 
This means that an education that promotes autonomy without social responsibility is 
a deathblow to prospects of mutual agreement and action, such as the need for 
responsible actions on behalf of the entire earth. The apparent tension between 
rationality and desire thus easily brings to light the multiple tensions in contemporary 
education between individual autonomy, social goals and human survival. Autonomy 
may imply both freedom to fulfill desires (to act as one wants to) and freedom from 
desires (not to be a slave under one’s own desires).  
For Rousseau, freedom was something internal, not a matter of insubordination 
and he claimed that humans are born with a ‘free will’; that is, with the potential of 
making their own moral choices. In addition, he argued that a just and equal social 
life requires that everybody subordinate themselves to the ‘general will’; that is, the 
common will becomes an obligation (SC).
24
 In Foucault’s interpretation, “[f]reedom 
is the ontological condition of ethics. But ethics is the considered form that freedom 
takes when it is informed by reflection” (Foucault, 1997f, p. 284). However, there are 
many connections between their views, but I will return to the issue in the concept 
definition below and in Chapter Five that deals with ethics. 
According to Foucault (e.g., 1986b), since the beginning of the modern age a 
major problem has been that Ancient ethical practices have been replaced by a rigid 
and unwarranted trust in objective knowledge as the only access to truth. Instead of 
considering the search for truth as a self-transforming process, knowledge itself has 
been mistaken as the only way to truth. Referring to Seneca, Foucault (2005) reminds 
us that knowledge alone cannot cure ignorance. But, through one’s ethical practice 
the individual’s ‘care of the self’ is an active choice to transform one’s self; it is a 
way of achieving mastery over ones’ desires. Importantly, ‘care of the self’25 is not an 
egoistic process; it is an action that includes relationships to others, where the 
individuals are involved with each other through shifting constellations. These power 
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 I will discuss Rousseau’s view of both the ‘free will’ and the ‘general will’ in Chapter Five. 
25
 The Greek Epimeleia heautou in Latin has been translated to cura soi. Foucault’s French translation Le 
souci de soi is in the English versions of his books translated to 'care of the self' or ‘care of oneself’ and 
means the same as ‘attending to oneself’ or ‘being concerned about oneself’ (Foucault, 2005, p. 2).  
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constellations interrelate like games
26
 and connect the individual with the joint 
shaping of freedom and knowledge (Foucault 1997e, 1997f, 2000g). Knowledge
27
 is 
thus not an objective thing or a matter of free-floating ‘facts’; it is a collective 
undertaking that involves everyone individually and socially in interaction with the 
many relations of a person’s life, both rationally and emotionally, including self-
relation, relation to others, and to physical nature. “Subjects exercise freedom in 
critically reflecting on themselves ad their behaviour, beliefs and the social field of 
which they are a part” (Oksala, 2002, p. 27).  
Rousseau was critical of the Enlightenment’s strong emphasis on rationality, but 
rationality was nonetheless a functional element in his philosophy. Foucault declared 
that the most essential and critical philosophical question since the 18
th
 century is 
how humans maintains their existence as rational beings when rationality in itself is 
hazardous (Foucault, 1989), an argument that shows Foucault’s skepticism of 
rationality in comparison with most Enlightenment thinkers. However, he noted that 
one does not have to be for or against the Enlightenment and need to escape the 
principles of rationality; rather, one has to accept that the Enlightenment was an event 
or set of events that has made us who we are (Foucault, 1997h). The problem is not 
rationality as such, but the form it can take (Foucault, 2000c, 1997h). 
 
1.2 Naming and Concepts  
 
Education, nature, and sustainability are key words in the title of this book. With this 
choice, I intend to bring these three issues strongly into focus, both individually and 
as they interact in practice. It is a book concerning education in general and examines 
ideas about humanity’s relation to nature and the role of education in the ambition to 
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 “[W]hen I say “game,” I mean a set of rules by which truth is produced. It is not a game in the sense of an 
amusement; it is a set of procedures that lead to a certain result, which, on the basis of its principles and rules 
of procedure, may be considered valid or invalid, winning or losing” (Foucault, 1997e,  p. 297). 
27
 The English word knowledge has two distinct interpretations in French, connaissance and savoir, and there 
are various definitions of these words. Foucault (2005) interprets connaissance according to his Ancient 
studies as pure knowledge belonging to the realm of knowledge having a rational structure, knowledge of a 
domain of objects. He saw connaissance as a Cartesian kind of knowledge. It can denote knowledge about 
the self but, in that case, is objective knowledge of the self is without spirituality, according to Foucault. 
Conversely, savoir stands for knowledge where the truth is a technē for affectingand transforming the 
subject. The subject has to exercise the knowledge; it is a reflected system of practices connected to askēsis. 
Savoir is knowledge that forms ēthos and can free the subject. Even when it is knowledge about the world, it 
is not objective, but it transforms the subject.  
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promote a more sustainable life. Rousseau and Foucault in the sub-heading identify 
the two figures whose theories will occupy the second part of this research. 
Consequently, the task of the title is to both convey the principal scope of the whole 
book while pointing to its focal points. In addition to these topics, and with the 
exception of Rousseau and Foucault, along the way I will clarify how I understand 
other common terms and concepts important to the themes of this book; for example, 
learning, freedom, environment, sustainable development, human being, and the 
central topic, humanity’s relation to nature.  
 
Education in its Complexity 
 
The word education has multiple meanings in the English language. It can entail 
learning and experiences of many kinds, teaching in many situations and with many 
kind of targets, instructing, tutoring, studying, training, coaching, schooling, 
acquiring of knowledge both in schools, universities and other institutions (formally) 
or in arranged situations outside schools and educational systems (non-formally) and 
in daily life situations (informally). When the word “education” is used as synonym 
for “pedagogy” it entails the science of studying the philosophy, history, politics, 
psychology, sociology, curriculum theory, and practices of education. Beside 
concrete instruction, the aims of education, the processes of learning and the contexts 
where learning takes place, are also of scientific interest. When one uses the word 
“education” to describe the educative process it is not self-evident that it means the 
direct transference of knowledge (etc.) from teacher to students, with the intention of 
enhancing their theoretical understanding or practical abilities. Education can also 
involve self-directed and group learning. Even when “education” is used as a 
synonym for “instruction,” it entails so much more than transmitting information, 
facts, and data from one person’s brain to another’s, or from a computer or book to 
students. In this book, “education” implies all kinds of teaching, fostering, and 
developmental processes, regardless whether the process is led by a teacher, or 
whether learning or improvement comes about through interaction or is self-
governed. I will especially discuss what Ringborg calls “education as control”28 and 
describes as “one of the oldest and most vital educational processes” (Ringborg, 
2001, p. 50, Wolff’s trans.). Shaping of humans into perfected creatures has been an 
                                           
28
 In original language, Swedish, Ringborg talks about pedagogik som påverkan. 
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educational dream throughout the world since Ancient times (Compayré, 1953; 
Passmore, 1970). Education, therefore, generally aims at producing results for 
students that are better than before the students begin the educational process.  
Like “education,” the word “learning” has many interpretations, and “learner” has 
gradually replaced the words “student” and “pupil”: the one who learns receive some 
kind of new knowledge, talent or insight. Nevertheless, every student in an 
educational situation does not necessarily learn and, of course, does not necessarily 
study, either. Moreover, what they learn can last for years or disappear rapidly 
because so many elements affect the learning. “Learning” comes about in many 
various ways. If, when and how learning happens is dependent on myriad elements 
that affect the learning situation, such as the environment (place, set of conditions, 
atmosphere, etc.), attitudes (the teacher’s, student’s, of the learning materials, etc.), 
earlier experiences, other persons involved, motivation, and so on. The things one has 
learned can be stored, used or forgotten. Education can aim at “transmission” of 
traditions and habits in a particular society, or “transformation” that promotes a 
change of thinking or practice. The aim of an education that strives towards 
transformation can either be to merely change the individuals or to empower or sway 
the individuals to change society. Any change, on the other hand, can either be 
directed towards a given end and thus be a result of a purposeful normative 
instruction, or the outcome can be open-ended and the transformation unpredictable. 
Change of moral conduct is never completely predictable―especially not long-
lasting change.  
Moreover, with education comes the complication of “power.” According to 
Foucault, power is “a certain type of relation between individuals” (Foucault, 2000c, 
p. 324). In social contexts, power, right and truth interact and shape discourses 
(Foucault, 1980c). Every field of discourse (science, education, health care, etc.) 
creates comprehensive power relations that shape net-like systems. Power is not 
necessarily hierarchical, but it circulates and subjugates the freedom of individuals 
(Foucault, 2000c). When one person teaches another, the teacher decides about aims, 
methods, timetables and other factors; but behind every teacher or student, in every 
particular educational situation, is the often-neglected complexity of hidden power 
constellations. To uncover this complexity, critical discourse is urgently needed. 
Power is, however, no easy one-way relation and cannot be taken as merely 
something negative, because power can also enable freedom (Ricken, 2006), as I will 
describe in Chapter Four. The way one understands power involves how one 
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understands oneself objectively and the relation one has to one’s own person (ibid.). 
The role of power in education can, therefore, take form as both repression 
(obligation) and empowerment (possibility). 
Since Rousseau and Kant, many social scientists and philosophers have 
interpreted the concept of ‘freedom’ in a double sense. The two extremes of freedom 
are, positive freedom (internal freedom, freedom to, self-fulfillment), and negative 
freedom (external freedom, freedom from external constraints, freedom in relation to 
the demands of others) (see Kant, 1788/2002; Plant, 1995). This division is only a 
hypothetical construction to show contrary and polarizing forces since negative and 
positive freedoms always are in dynamic interaction. Yet, the distinction is important 
to keep in mind in educational discussions and when discussing Rousseau’s and 
Foucault’s ideas. In the forthcoming chapters I will mainly use the concepts of 
‘freedom’ and “autonomy”29 to entail positive freedom. “Freedom is necessary for 
moral responsibility” (Yaffe, 2003, p 335n), but “manipulation” undermines freedom. 
Yaffe distinguishes two kinds of manipulation, “indoctrination” and “coercion.” 
“Indoctrination is defined as causing another person to respond to reasons in a pattern 
that serves the manipulator’s ends” and “coercion as supplying another person with 
reasons that, given the pattern in which he responds to reasons, lead him to act in 
ways that serve the manipulator’s ends” (Yaffe, 2003, p. 335). When education 
focuses on controlling the growth of the young generation and more or less on force-
fitting students into a prescribed direction, education becomes a kind of 
indoctrination (Björk, 2000) or coercion rather than an open-ended process that opens 
the door to a transforming worldview.  The view of education I will discuss in this 
book is its role as both social and individual transformer and relates to what 
education is (reality), what it could be (visions), and what it ought to be (aims).  
 
Nature and Natural 
 
One of the central concepts in this study is the noun “nature” and the related adjective 
“natural,” two complex words that are difficult to interpret. Their origin is in the 
Latin word natura (birth) and nasci (born) (Soanes, 2003; Harper, 2001-2010), 
deriving from the Greek word physica (physics). Physics was originally the word for 
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 The word “autonomy” has been interpreted in many ways in educational discourses (see, e.g., Marshall, 
1996). 
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the surrounding world upon which humans depend and the first name for philosophy 
(Deely, 2001). Beside the physical world, both natura and physis also represented 
physical laws and thus the logos or meaning of life (von Wright, 1993). Nature is a 
problematic word loaded with history and multiple meanings (see Roach, 2003). 
Although, the word is common in daily language, there are many different 
perspectives about what the word encompasses. Lovejoy and Boas (1935) distinguish 
66 meanings of the word in their book Primitivism and Related Ideas in Antiquity. 
Contemporary encyclopedias also interpret the words nature and natural in very many 
ways, for example in Webster’s Encyclopedic Unabridged Dictionary (1994) 
“nature” has 20 different meanings and “natural” has 30. Among the first listed 
interpretations in Webster’s are nature as a native or inherent character of a person, 
an animal, or a thing, followed by the instinct directing conduct and other 
understandings about features characteristic of something or somebody. The sixth 
explanation is nature as the universe and the seventh sees nature as a term for the 
natural world.  
Many values similarly burden the concept of “natural”; it can be a criterion for 
something good and desired, but also for something bad and rude. A reverse strategy 
for revealing the meaning of the word is to search for its opposites: for example, 
supernatural, artificial, or inorganic, but even then the list seems to be endless. It is 
more or less impossible to reach a satisfactory definitive meaning for the word 
nature, as the question does not have any universal answer. Neither in daily language, 
nor in science or metaphysics are there any definite interpretations; the answers vary 
depending on when the question is raised (time and context) and by whom, as well as 
who responds to it and when this response takes place. “Nature can be infinite, finite, 
stable, chaotic, teleological, contingent, eternal or forever changing,” writes Lähde 
(2008, p. 37), and he highlights the fact that it is very easy to slip from one meaning 
to another during a discussion. The risk that we merge different meanings is 
especially large when we consider nature from a historical perspective. However, the 
word (and its interpretation) is going to be one of the main concerns in this research, 
and it will make no sense to give nature any more of a thorny definition at this stage. 
Such an attempt might remove a part of the curiosity to continue reading. 
The reason I have chosen “nature” and “natural” as starting points is because 
these words are gradually losing their significance. These days complicated and even 
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vague concepts:
30
 for example, biological, ecological, environmental, sustainable 
development, and biodiversity (not to mention important concepts related to such 
concepts) rhetorically provide a "protective face" for nature. These concepts easily 
make nature into something neutral, as though apart from human beings, while the 
role of humans as part of nature and inescapably in personal relations with nature is 
too often ignored. The genuine world of nature hides in new concepts like 
“environment” and “sustainable development.” The “natural environment” is a part of 
a broader environment, while the concepts “ecologically sustainable development” 
and “biodiversity” have taken over as primary concepts for discussing the natural 
world using the rhetoric of “sustainability.” These changes are remarkable and 
consequential. I will thus start my study of Rousseau’s writings with a glance at what 
the word “nature” generally implied at the time when the Western world stepped with 
all seriousness into the modern era. After that, I will approach nature and natural as 
ethical aspects in his writings. However, given the variables mentioned above, the 
meaning of the concepts “nature” and “natural” in this study vary considerably 
according to context under discussion and are not intended to be directly comparable 
between those contexts. I will try to face this difficulty as truthfully as possible. 
 
Human Being and Citizens 
 
This study also often employs the concept of human being (Latin wise man) or 
human
31
 that entails being a member of the species Homo sapiens and its only 
subspecies Homo sapiens sapiens. That subspecies ‘includes all people presently 
alive’. Zoologically, ‘Homo sapiens’ belongs to the family Hominidae and genus 
Homo (see, e.g., Roberts, 2007). In social research it is more common to talk about 
people or persons, but by talking about ‘human beings’ or references to being humans 
call attention to my intention not to separate the human species from other animals 
and not to look upon it as superior to, ‘higher’ than, other species. I am nonetheless 
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 Please, do not understand this as a naive critique of the mentioned concepts. They are useful and accurate 
in many situations, but people often overuse them and apply them in odd connections where the initial 
meanings of the words are lost or hidden. In this book, I will thus employ these concepts without special 
restriction wherever I find it necessary for a proper understanding.   
31
 I use constantly the word human instead of Rousseau’s ‘man’, when it is obvious that he talks about both 
sexes. According to J. T. Scott (2006), Rousseau used the word ‘man’ to make his claims genderless; but I 
agree with Lähde (2008) that even if Rousseau follows the French practice (l´homme), certain gender biases 
are obvious. Okin (1996/2006) even claimed that Rousseau basically talked about men, and therefore used 
the word ‘men’. 
39 
 
aware that I might be accused of uncritically employing a concept from a 
classification system that denotes preference for a particular view of nature.  
However, whatever word is chosen cannot be neutral; any word will be colored 
by existing worldviews of my own culture, in which humans are either regarded as 
distinct from the rest of nature or, instead, as objectified and classified in a 
hierarchical system of animal taxonomy. Many interpretations of the word “nature” 
incorporate such a dualistic view of nature and humans as distinct and apart; such 
meanings have been associated with the word “nature” from the very beginning of 
recorded history. Without this particular word there would hardly be any separation; 
nature and humans would be indivisible. This heavy burden of history makes it 
difficult to talk about humans in relation to nature without ever using the dualistic 
expression “humans and nature”; completely avoiding the conjunction “and” is 
almost impossible. In parallel with references to human beings I will also talk about 
“we” “our” and “us” especially in referring to the present, since I am and all readers 
are human beings. Unfortunately, nature is always categorized by the words used in 
connection with ‘it’ (Börjesson, 2003), and neither “human being” nor “we” is 
neutral. The history of Western thought has trapped us in the language we use 
(Roach, 2003), as Foucault also stressed. And this trapping has taking place long 
before the modern era. 
When a human being is situated in a society the concept of citizen is in common 
use. One can interpret the meaning of the word “citizen” in several ways. In many 
political documents, the word entails a member of society in general. According to 
Rousseau, citizens were active committed participants in the political affairs of their 
society. In contemporary social sciences, the word often means that a person has 
national citizenship holding juridical rights as a member of a country. Organizations 
may use the concept of active citizenship to depict people acting responsibility on 
behalf of their societies. Since many people are refugees and do not enjoy national 
citizenship from the countries in which they live, the concept of citizen is, therefore, 
also complicated. What it means to be a “citizen” is thus not entirely clear.     
 
Humans and Nature 
 
It is important to distinguish the difference between the words “nature” and 
”environment,” not at least in connection with education; “nature education” and 
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“environmental education” are not the same thing. It appears that human interests 
have changed the concept from nature to environment; so-called ‘natural resources’, 
such as oil and coal are not inherently ‘resources’, but human activities that makes 
them into assets for the use of humans (Schnack, 1988). Moreover, as resources they 
become economic and social issues that are thus part of our environment. It is also 
possible to clearly distinguish environmental issues as matters that arise in the natural 
world but have effects on public spaces (Belshaw, 2001). However, when tracing the 
word “environment” backwards in time, it easily grows larger. The English word 
“environment” is almost similar to the French, where it has its origin. The French 
world environnement comes from the word environ (adv.) that means ‘around,’ (en-, 
‘in,’ + viron, circle, circuit from virer, ‘to turn’) (Harper, 2001-2010). The word can 
be split into environ de nous, meaning something that one sees when turning around 
(en virant), a meaning that comes close to what philosophers call the “external 
world” (Chappell, 1997) and, secondly, the interpretation of nature as “physics” 
discussed above. When juxtaposing “environment” with the “external world,” 
environmental philosophy becomes much more than a discrete topic; it is inherent to 
the discipline (ibid.). Similarly, if “environmental” was seen as embracing the entire 
external world, the view of environmental education would rise to something much 
more profound than as a mere supplement to general education.  
Sauvé (2002) recognizes a change in the interpretation of the word “environment” 
over the 30 years of environmental education. From merely just one more ‘subject’ of 
study, it has become much more wide-ranging. She argues: “The weft of the 
environment is life itself, at the interface between nature and culture. The 
environment is the crucible in which our identities, our relations with others and our 
‘being-in-the-world’ are formed” (Sauvé, 2002, p. 1). The definitions of 
“environment” are many, even contradictory, according to Tani (2006); therefore, as 
was the case with the concept of “nature,” it is difficult to arrive at a single, definitive 
meaning of the word. Tani ranges across three dimensions of the concept. Firstly, she 
distinguishes environment as an entity: a scientific approach, where the view of 
environment is at a distance and an object for study. Secondly, she sees it as 
experiences: the environment is the area around a particular individual, a space for 
daily life experiences. Finally, she considers it to be a social and cultural 
construction: the environment as a culturally and politically created phenomenon (see 
also Tani & Suomela, 2004).  
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Sauvé (2002) divides the way humans relate to the environment into seven 
different categories: as nature, as a resource, as a problem, as an eco-socio-system, as 
a place to live, as a biosphere, and as a community project. This is neither a value 
neutral nor an unequivocal division; rather, it is a derived from various ideas 
involving social research, such as Louis Goffin’s view of systems theory, Arne Næss’ 
deep ecology (see Chapter Two in this book), James Lovelock’s Gaia Hypothesis, 
scientific biodiversity research, and indigenous peoples’ conceptions of the universe. 
Sauvé is aware that her diverse interpretations of how humans relate to the 
environment make environmental issues difficult to grasp in education. Her list is, 
however, a good starting point for discussion.  
In Willamo’s (2005) definition, a “nature relation” entails all human interactions 
and associations with other parts of nature, whereas “environmental protection” deals 
mostly with problems that arise from these relations. Given this definition, 
environmental protection then becomes one part of humans’ relations with nature. 
That relationship causes problems that need treatment and the treatment brings about 
a new relation. In addition to Willamo’s definition, and in agreement with how 
strongly he associates the human body as a part of nature, I will also include humans’ 
relation to themselves and their own bodies as humans’ relationships with nature and 
will advance this conception in my study. The relation of humans to nature is, thus, 
more than one-dimensional; it is multifaceted and involves countless intertwined 
interactions, including dreams and realism, love and hate, admiration and 
disapproval, fear and confidence (see Roach, 2003). These, in turn, produce many 
tensions and concerns, desires, reasons, and dreams. In my study of the complex 
features of humans’  relations to nature, I look at, first of all, what is meant when 
referring to “nature” and “natural”  and, then, at what could be meant by ‘having a 
relation to nature’ in the 18th century. On the other hand, I will discuss what the 
meaning of “nature” and having a ‘relation to nature’ can entail today.  
The third central concept of this study that relates to nature and education is 
“sustainable development.” In brief, the concept describes social and economical 
development where the utilization of nature resources takes place with future 
generations’ life opportunities in mind. The background and interpretation of this 
relatively new concept will receive more detailed consideration in Chapter Two. 
While I am critical when the word “development” is used to denote indisputable 
belief in steady economic and technological growth or progress, like many other 
writers I am going to use the single concept of sustainability. By the word 
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“sustainability” I mean management of the earth in a way that does not damage life 
but that preserves its various life forms for the future.  
 
1.3 A Cross-Modern Study and a Stepwise Design  
 
The issues of ethics, freedom and the gaps and tensions I have described in this 
opening chapter will be considered in one way or another in this book, but mainly in 
connection with humanity’s relationships with nature, sustainability, and education. 
These tensions continually fuel my curiosity and provide the direction for my 
exploratory trip into both our present time and as concerns the role of nature viewed 
in historical perspective. It also guides my reflections on contemporary issues, 
especially the quest for sustainability. The struggle between rationality and desire, as 
well as between duty and freedom, takes place repeatedly in the aesthetic language of 
Rousseau that is exceptionally transparent on these points and does not hide such 
tensions, but still does not solve the problems. It is also a central theme in the 
philosophy of Foucault, who examined the Ancient Greek and Roman philosophy in 
which ethics was considered the conscious practice of freedom. Both Platonic ethics 
and Stoic philosophy create threads between the ethics of Rousseau and Foucault, and 
with these ideas I hope to bring new views to contemporary discussions about 
whether education can promote sustainability and, if so, how best to do it. 
The point-of-view I have chosen for this study is neither straight-forward nor one-
dimensional; it is, therefore, difficult to locate it in a single discipline. It could easily 
be classified as either history of education, environmental education or history of 
ideas, but its diversified features makes such labeling complicated and even pointless. 
My main interest is theoretical education, but such educational research draws upon 
many other research areas. Scott (2009) takes note of the problem that environmental 
educational researchers often have performed research in isolation and thus have not 
been able to embrace other research fields. Yet, in attempting to avoid a strict 
disciplinary locus and to, instead, draw from several alternative and diverse 
approaches, my study has faced the many challenges typical to other 
multidisciplinary research efforts. However, by relying on a multidisciplinary 
approach, I am able to discuss my ideas in various disciplinary contexts and thus 
hope to reach readers other than the customary followers of environmental education. 
I have, therefore, felt free to mix approaches and met Scott’s call for risk-taking. 
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As a multidisciplinary study, the target of my book is an audience with diverse 
backgrounds and interests. I have chosen to overcome the problem of meeting the 
needs and interests of this expected diversity by varying the style and focus, from 
particular views to broad discourses, from philosophy to history of practices, and 
trying to move as smoothly as possible between arenas belonging to different 
disciplines. My sincere intention has been to do this without losing track of common 
themes and interest and thus boring my audience. Although the book works as a 
whole, most chapters are self-contained narratives engaging a specific topic. The 
design of the study follows a stepwise process divided into three distinct phases: Parts 
One, Two and Three (see Table 1). I will critically analyze discourses and networks 
of discourses about nature, sustainability and sustainable development, ethics, 
knowledge, and education. The story begins with the birth of environmental 
education a few decades ago and then jumps to the Renaissance, then follows modern 
history forwards, until settling down for a while in the 18
th
 century for a deeper 
consideration of the particular case of Rousseau. Finally, it returns to the present time 
and looks to the future.   
With this looped process, I have wanted to shape a story about how humans’ 
relation to nature has been problematized as it moves from distant times to the current 
problem of sustainability in hopes of promoting a more comprehensive view. Another 
intention is to identify crucial ethical and educational dilemmas that are necessary to 
reflect on in relation to the role of education in promoting sustainability. Through the 
example of Rousseau, I want to show how sustainability is a problem that touches 
fundamentals of human life on many levels. In my judgment, Rousseau’s writings 
offer excellent examples of both the importance of ethics and education in dealing 
with this problem. And with the help of Foucault, I want to set the stage for 
understanding such fundamental ethical and educational issues as matters of power 
whereby the internal struggles and improvements of humans towards self-
actualization and personal development are located in a much larger network of 
struggles shared by society, even across the world. The sustainability enigma is 
extremely complex and, therefore, so much more that just one educational ‘subject’ 
among others and my intention is to try to demonstrate that by reference to two of the 
most notable scholars in the Western intellectual tradition. Both have deeply reflected 
on the role of humans in today’s world and have helped guide and support my 
conclusions about the ethics of education in relation to the quest for sustainability.   
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Table 1 The research design. 
 
Chapter Aim Method Main Literature 
 
Part I  Sustainability as an Educational Challenge 
 
1 
 
 
Introduction 
 
To introduce the problematic 
 
 
A philosophical 
discussion 
 
 
Mainly various basic 
philosophical sources 
2 
2 
 
 
Gaps and scapegoat 
jungles 
 
 
To give a portrait of how 
education and educational 
research have dealt with nature 
and environmental issues in 
relation to ethics 
 
A critical  
literature study  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Multidisciplinary 
sources, e.g., history, 
political documents, 
literature on 
environmental 
education research and 
philosophy. 
 
 
Part II Between the Past and the Future 
3
3  
 
 
A Foucauldian 
Rousseau study 
 
To present the research 
methods 
 
Description of the 
research methods  
Basic works by 
Foucault and Rousseau, 
Foucault commentators  
 
4 
4  
 
Modern discourses 
about nature and 
knowledge 
 
 
To presents thoughts and 
discourses before and during 
Rousseau’s lifetime as 
examples on what ideas 
triggered his writing. 
 
 
A research 
influenced by 
Foucault’s 
genealogy 
 
Multidisciplinary 
sources, mainly 
historical and 
philosophical 
5
5 
 
Rousseau on nature 
and ethics  
 
 
To analyze Rousseau’s ethics 
in relation to nature 
 
A modification of 
Foucault’s ethical 
approach 
 
Rousseau’s writings 
about politics and 
ethics, Rousseau 
commentators, 
Foucault’s ethics 
 
6 
6 
 
Nature in Rousseau’s 
educational 
philosophy 
 
To analyze Rousseau’s ideas 
about education in relation to 
nature 
 
A research 
approach 
developed from 
the one applied in 
Chapter Five 
 
 
Rousseau’s writings 
about education, 
Rousseau 
commentators 
 
Part III Back to the Present 
7
7 
 
 
Rousseau, Foucault 
and contemporary 
educational challenges 
 
 
To summarize, conclude, 
evaluate the method and return 
to the present 
 
Critical reflections 
 
45 
 
 
2 Gaps and Scapegoat Jungles 
 
The previous chapter aimed at exposing the target of this study and sketching the 
historical concern of this book. This chapter starts the ‘winding loop’ by observing 
what has taken place during the last few decades and earlier in world history. Firstly, 
I will frame how humans’ relation to nature has come to engage education and 
discuss the educational challenges related to nature and the environment that 
humankind faces today. Unfortunately, the educational path that could promote an 
alternative relationship between human beings and the rest of nature has many gaps; 
therefore, I will continue the discussion of the gaps introduced in the previous chapter 
and identify a few more. Secondly, I will compare various educational suggestions 
about how to answer the challenges caused by humans’ relation to nature and the 
resulting quest for sustainability. The focus will be on educational discussions and 
strategies as well as on research. In addition, I will relate the educational discussion 
to common ethical theories. Thirdly, I will illustrate how the search for explanations 
for the current environmental situation has been mostly a search for scapegoats in 
which various guilty parties are identified. While I neither became convinced enough 
that any of the accused scapegoats were clearly guilty, nor that any of them were 
totally innocent, this chapter ends by discussing why this tricky situation needs more 
investigation and why philosophical perspectives are necessary for any educational 
process or program faced with the dilemmas of sustainability. 
  
2.1 A Quest for Educational Efforts 
 
Human beings have increasingly developed technologies and lifestyles that threaten 
nature, including all organisms, and thus the bases of life on earth. Despite so-called 
“progress,” life is still not safe and just for all people. One reason is that the division 
and use of natural resources is very unjust and many people do not have possibilities 
for living decent lives. Widening the perspective beyond the human species, many 
other organisms are increasingly threatened and some have already vanished 
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completely. This is even the case in countries with a highly educated population since 
populations with high degrees do not necessarily act more intelligently in relation to 
nature. Increased knowledge is not enough of a positive influence. Consequently, 
either the problematic situation now reached by humankind may be a result of 
inappropriate practices, or of inadequate thinking built on an inappropriate 
worldview, or both. 
 
Environmental Education 
 
The harmful impact of humans on the natural world is unfortunately not a new 
phenomenon. Many signs of this exceedingly long-lasting and worldwide influence 
have gradually become evident. Agriculture and mining have polluted land, water and 
air, while hunting and the fishing industry have even radically decimated the number 
of species in numerous locations. Human concern for nature and environment also 
has a long background and writers have occasionally addressed the problem, but only 
a few considered nature or environmental issues to be problems facing humankind 
and the earth until the middle of the 19
th
 century. One of the first books in the genre 
was Georg Perking Marsh’s Man and Nature, published 1864. However, the history 
of environmental education and education for sustainable development are very 
short. Environmental issues as urgent educational concerns have a history of fewer 
than 40 years.  
A short background starting some decades ago helps give a broader 
understanding of the concept of environmental education. Before the emergence of 
the new concept, the term ‘environmental studies’ had been used since the 1940s to 
denote a mixture of geography, biology, and history (Palmer, 1998), but literature 
expressing a concern about the human future started to appear, for example Road to 
Survival by William Vogt, in 1948. While greater awareness of the precarious state of 
nature and of increased environmental problems arose in the 1950s and 1960s, this 
awakening led to a concrete willingness to act responsibly, and Palmer (1998) traces 
the term “environmental education” back to a conference held in Britain in 1965, the 
same decade the first textbooks
32
 were published in this field. 
                                           
32
 It is not so easy to distinguish which were the first books in a genre, because there is often a gradual 
evolution from a previous to a new stage.  
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In the 1970s, when it became obvious that industrialization had caused 
tremendous environmental problems and had damaged the natural world, enthusiastic 
nature conservation quickly appeared. Simultaneously, a need developed to act 
globally on behalf of the natural world (see, e.g., Singer, 2003). This in turn resulted 
in an interest in environmental education with many notable events taking place 
across the world (see Sytnik et al., 1985). A great number of nature conservation 
organizations ‘saw the light’ at this time and the United Nations Conference on the 
Human Environment in Stockholm 1972 was a noteworthy international assembly that 
had major consequences for education concerning environmental issues. 
Representatives from all over the world, from both rich and poor countries, gathered 
in Stockholm to start a process of global environmental cooperation and to discuss 
issues connected to the right of all people to a healthy and productive environment. 
At this conference, delegates drew attention to education’s crucial role in the creation 
of a social sense of environmental responsibility. One special outcome of this ground-
breaking assembly was identifying environmental problems as crucial educational 
topics. Consequently, the conference announced the International Environmental 
Educational Program, IEEP.  
Three years later, 1975 in Belgrade,
33
 UNEP
34
 and UNESCO
35
 proclaimed the 
main goals of environmental education in the Belgrade Charter on Environmental 
Education. This agreement was put into place in 1977 when the first environmental 
education conference at the ministerial level took place in Tbilisi.
36
 The statements 
from the Tbilisi conference stressed that governments have to provide education that 
benefits the environment and an improved quality of life. Furthermore, it stressed that 
education promoting environmental responsibility ought to be carried out at all levels 
of education, as well as in informal learning situations and in the training of 
professionals with the aim of promoting a lifelong and global educational process that 
is available to all. The most notable goals for environmental education can be 
summarized as follows (Sytnik et al. 1985, p. 15):
37
  
                                           
33
 UNESCO/UNEP International Workshop on Environmental Education. 
34
 UNEP (United Nations Environment Programme) is a United Nations body established in 1972 by the 
General Assembly to promote international cooperation in matters concerning the environment. 
35The UN body UNESCO (United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization) was established in 
1946 with the purpose of upholding international cooperation on education, science, culture, and 
communication.  
36
 UNESCO – First Inter-Governmental Conference on Environmental Education. 
37
 Quoted from Intergovernmental Conference on Environmental Education UNESCO/UNEP, Tbilisi, USSR, 
1977, Final Report, Paris, 1977. 
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a) to foster clear awareness of, and concern about, economic, social, political 
and ecological interdependence in urban and rural areas  
b) to provide every person with opportunities to acquire the knowledge, values, 
attitudes, commitment and skills needed to protect and improve the 
environment  
c) to create new patterns of behaviour of individuals, groups and society as a 
whole towards the environment.  
 
The Tbilisi principles for environmental education at the individual level include 
efforts to improve critical thinking strategies and problem solving, as well as building 
a capacity for participation in democratic work aimed at producing responsible, 
motivated and self-confident citizens (ibid.). Many of the goals, statements, and 
principles from Tbilisi are still present in contemporary educational policy 
documents
38
 and the Tbilisi conference paved the way for many follow-up 
conferences in other countries and built the foundation for the environmental 
educational work of today. From the beginning, basic efforts in environmental 
education were to define its role and promote its importance and legitimacy (see also 
Palmer, 1998). Educational aims concerning the environment, however, were 
expressed normatively stressing that education has to encourage attitudes towards 
environmentally friendly living. An education with predetermined aims needs more 
than one method to encourage the students to judge and choose a living that they find 
appropriate with their own judgment. The normative attempts have deeply influenced 
environmental education actions and research until the present day.   
The holistic nature of the Tbilisi-documented message (see Sytnik et al., 1985) is 
remarkable, however, in stressing the need for an interdisciplinary approach and a 
holistic and balanced perspective. In it, environmental education is regarded as an 
instrument for changing the orientation of the entire teaching and learning field, not 
only a part of it, towards an emphasis on holism and a new art of holistic living. 
Considering the fundamental objectives of such an environmental education, 
accentuating awareness of and knowledge about the environment and its problems, 
promoting attitudes and values for protecting the environment, promoting skills for 
handling environmental problems and creating opportunities for participating in 
environmental work, Sytnik et al. (ibid., p. 19) conclude that “all education should be 
                                           
38
 On UNESCO’s homepage December 3, 2009: “Education for sustainable development aims to help people 
to develop the attitudes, skills and knowledge to make informed decisions for the benefit of themselves and 
others, now and in the future, and to act upon these decisions.”   
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an education for the environment [italics added].” Particularly notable is that, 
according to the Tbilisi Conference material, environmental education was not to be a 
separate school subject, a project based issue, or temporary theme. The role of 
environmental education was to be “a catalyst, a common denominator, in the 
renovated process of modern instruction” (ibid., pp. 46). 
As a result of the Tbilisi conference and the movement it initiated, environmental 
education became a key concept and the practice started to expand. So following both 
the change of focus from nature to environment, including natural, social and 
human-built environment, and the rhetorical change from nature conservation to 
environmental protection, there was a gradual change in the vocabulary from “nature 
studies” and “nature education” to “environmental education” in the 1970s, although 
the concept had already been uttered earlier for the first time (see also Fien & 
Tilbury, 2002; Hopkins & McKeown, 2002; Leal Filho, 1996). The International 
Union for Conservation of Nature, IUCN, and UNESCO have played important roles 
in the development of environmental educational principles along with UNEP, the 
World Wildlife Fund, WWF, and an increasing number of other organizations. 
Accordingly, environmental education originates in voluntary environmental work 
and management policy. Environmental education is, hence, like lifelong learning: an 
example of what, according to Sjöberg (2002), is a theoretical approach initiated 
externally to educational disciplines.  
 
Sustainable Development and Education 
 
In 1980, the non-governmental organizations IUCN and WWF in collaboration with 
the UNEP published World Conservation Strategy. This document underscored that 
socioeconomic development and nature conservation are inter-related and that 
development therefore has to consider environmental issues. The aim of this 
document was to propose guidelines for a vital world where plants, animals, and 
people can share a good life. A renewed version, Caring for the Earth, was published 
in 1991.  
With the 1987 report, Our Common Future, the World Commission on 
Environment and Development (WCED) pointed out sustainable development as a 
political aim for all segments of society, not the least for education. The aim is thus 
global―a kind of universal vision of a better future for humankind and a call for new 
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values and norms of behavior at all levels of society, but without diminishing 
technological and economical progress. The document summons parents, decision 
makers, scientific communities, educational institutions, and many others, to partake 
in activities for a more sustainable future. In the Chairman’s Foreword, Gro Harlem 
Brundtland especially emphasizes teachers as important in the work for a better 
world. While the report stresses economic and social matters as causes of 
environmental problems, it makes sustainable development both a political concept 
and a social goal. According to the report, sustainable development aims at meeting 
the basic needs and desires of all people for a better life. Nevertheless, fulfilling 
present needs is not allowed to endanger the possibilities for future human life on 
earth (see World Commission on Environment and Development, 1987). The 
ambition is huge, and the path towards the goal of sustainability is marked by gaps 
and tensions, so the report does not really propose an easy solution for the world’s 
population. As a result, implementation has not been a clear success.  
The discussion offered in the Brundtland report continued in the first international 
environmental and development conference, the United Nations Conference on 
Environment and Development, in Rio de Janeiro in 1992—a conference that 
gathered thousands of leaders from around the world.
39
 Since this conference, the 
concept of sustainable development has been politically divided into three 
dimensions:
40
 ecological, social/cultural and economic. As with the Brundtland 
report, the Rio conference (also called Earth Summit or UNCED) stressed the role of 
teachers and education in the search for a more sustainable development. In the 
strategic action program, Agenda 21, the 36
th
 chapter deals entirely with education 
(see UNCED, 1993).
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After the Rio conference, education for sustainable development has become a 
common concept in political educational documents at all levels, and it has 
increasingly embraced issues of environmental protection in discussions and 
planning. As a result, the concept of education for sustainable development is, 
especially in politics, used concurrently with the concept of environmental education 
and the three dimensions of sustainable development (ecological, economic, and 
                                           
39
 About 120 head of states and other delegates from 170 countries. 
40
 This three-fold perspective is a widely accepted alteration of the initially suggested economic, social and 
environmental division proposed by Mohan Munasinghe at the conference in Rio (see 
http://www.eoearth.org/article/Sustainomics_and_sustainable_development). 
41
 Chapter 36 in Agenda 21, the resulting major action program from the UNCED Conference bears the title 
On Promoting Education, Public Awareness and Training.  
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cultural/social) are all stressed as important educational goals (e.g., Tilbury, 2003), 
and these three dimensions have thus been topics of ongoing concern. This has led to 
suggestions for enlarging the triangular depiction and for adding new dimensions to 
it. Cantell (2003), for example, distinguishes six educationally significant 
environmental
42
 dimensions by adding an aesthetic and an ethical dimension and 
splitting the social/cultural category into two separate dimensions. Kemp (2005), in 
contrast, uses five sustainable dimensions: to the social and economic dimensions, he 
adds three dimensions: a nature-philosophical and a juridical and, in addition, a basic 
ethical dimension. Of these five dimensions he underscores the ethical as 
fundamental and stresses that nature is much more than resources and can never 
become completely calculable capital because not merely the natural world but also 
humans’ relation to nature and the vision of sustainability are indistinct factors and 
thus unpredictable. According to Kemp, then, it is not enough to create an ethics via 
political economic programs. He searches for a dimension of international justice that 
might solve the present situation and concludes that sustainability starts with ethics 
and ends up in law. An ethics for sustainability relies on care for “the other,” and the 
other may be other persons as well as all other living creatures and their right to live 
(ibid.). A seminar arranged by UNESCO in connection with the second global 
environment and development conference, The World Summit on Sustainable 
Development (WSSD, Rio +10 Conference), held in Johannesburg 2002 also stressed 
ethical responsibility, strategies for poverty elimination and improvement of life 
qualities as important educational issues (Tilbury, 2003). In order to encourage value 
clarification and develop social responsibility, Tilbury also recommends that 
education for sustainability should promote a critical and creative attitude towards 
one’s own culture in order to reveal the multiple assumptions that influence one’s 
daily life.  
 
Theories and Goals Contrasting Practice 
 
The conferences, programs and other proceedings mentioned above are only a 
fraction of the key events and developments concerning environmental education and 
education for sustainable development. Many others have also taken place, books 
have been written, working-groups have met, curriculums have been designed, and 
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 See the interpretation of the concept ‘environment’ above in the Introduction (1.2).  
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lessons have been taught, and so on. In addition to what have already been mentioned 
are the more recent Earth Charter and United Nations Millennium Development 
Goals. The earlier mentioned Brundtland Commission called for a new charter to set 
norms for a transition to sustainable development. After a long working process, 
Earth Charter was finalized in 2000. The document is an international consensus 
about the meaning, challenge and vision of sustainability and it is now in use as a 
basis for sustainable development negotiations and processes in many contexts (see 
The Earth Charter). With the change of the millennium, world leaders adopted the 
Millennium Development Goals as another blueprint for the future of humankind. 
These goals strive to: (1) eradicate extreme poverty and hunger; (2) achieve universal 
primary education; (3) promote gender equality and empower women; (4) reduce 
child mortality; (5) improve maternal health; (6) combat HIV/AIDS, malaria and 
other diseases; (7) ensure environmental sustainability; and (8) develop a global 
partnership for development (United Nations, 2009). Some of the global problems 
addressed by the Millennium Development Goals have decreased in the first nine 
years following their launch (e.g., the number of people dying from HIV, and 
children not attending primary education), while others have increased (e.g., poverty). 
The global economic crisis at the end of the first decade of the new millennium is one 
cause of lack of progress because the poorest people have the most to lose (Ban, 
2009). Numerically the goals have been optimistic, but the current UN secretary 
general Ban Ki-moon (ibid., p 3) is still hopeful when he states that the “global 
community cannot turn its back on the poor and the vulnerable,” but have to 
“strengthen global cooperation and solidarity.” Maybe it is not a question of hope but 
of desperation. Yet goals do not automatically promote actions for change. 
It is not only general global development goals that have generated interest but, 
unsurprisingly, also the goals, content, and methods of education for sustainable 
development. Given the number of meetings, reports, and documents, most likely 
more has already been said than done in this field. Discussions of sustainable 
development have become routine at various levels, but this does not automatically 
mean that sustainable processes and sustainable action take place on a daily basis and 
on a scale that truly meets the needs of the entire world and its inhabitants. To have 
goals is unfortunately not enough―especially as long as there is insufficient 
commitment to the goal of sustainable development, a goal that is not even generally 
accepted. A diffuse and even contradictory goal may slow down willingness to 
change and, for that reason, Jickling (2001) encourages educators to move beyond the 
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goal of sustainable development and instead to concentrate on what sustainable 
development is not. This entails talking about intrinsic values and daring to criticize 
what is taken for granted in present day societies. 
 
Critics and Failures 
 
The previous chapter has already dealt with gaps concerning the complexity of 
human life and the differences between knowing and doing. This chapter started with 
a history that described a sea of global negotiations and goal settings and showed that 
it might be easier to defend a better world verbally than in practice. Similar 
phenomena exist in smaller contexts, for example in schools. There is a significant 
gap between environmental educational rhetoric and philosophy in relation to reality 
and educational practices (see, e.g., Palmberg, 2000; Sauvé, 1999; Stevenson, 2007), 
and this gap has not decreased during the last 20 years (Stevenson, 2007). Despite 
enthusiastic efforts, the challenges facing this field are still huge and when 
governments tend to see the public schools as instruments of political policymaking 
and enforcement, the situation becomes paradoxical. The rhetoric of environmental 
education extols ecological harmony and a better life for all people on earth, 
including social justice and equal rights to natural resources. This is, however, in 
contrast to contemporary European as well as international educational policy 
documents that focus on educating autonomous individuals with responsibility first 
and foremost for themselves
43
 (e.g., Biesta, 2006; Olssen, 2006; Wolff, 2008). An 
obvious contradiction also exists between the purposes of environmental education 
and wider-ranging purposes of general education, namely to uphold the existing 
social and economic world order and to strive mainly for instrumental ends (Jickling 
& Wals, 2008; Stevenson, 2007; Wolff, 2007, 2008). Environmental responsibility 
depends on both complicated problem solving and ethical considerations and takes 
time in contrast to instruction having easily measurable structural tasks that are most 
common in daily school practices and other formal studies. Although value related 
reflections and discussions are slow processes, they can generate completely new 
views.  
Nonetheless, Sterling (2001) and Tilbury (1999) claim that the educational 
process initiated in Rio de Janeiro has been too slow. Similarly, the Johannesburg 
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 Compare ‘negative and positive freedom’ described in Chapter One. 
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conference demonstrated that ten years of purposeful environmental work brought 
only marginally noticeable benefits to the environment (Pigozzi, 2003). The 
Johannesburg Declaration on Sustainable Development (2003) also expresses this in 
plain language in paragraphs 13-15:  
The global environment continues to suffer. Loss of biodiversity continues, fish 
stocks continue to be depleted, desertification claims more and more fertile land, 
the adverse effects of climate change are already evident, natural disasters are 
more frequent and more devastating, and developing countries more vulnerable, 
and air, water and marine pollution continue to rob millions of a decent life. 
Globalization has added a new dimension to these challenges. The rapid 
integration of markets, mobility of capital and significant increases in investment 
flows around the world have opened new challenges and opportunities for the 
pursuit of sustainable development. But the benefits and costs of globalization are 
unevenly distributed, with developing countries facing special difficulties in 
meeting this challenge. 
We risk the entrenchment of these global disparities and unless we act in a 
manner that fundamentally changes their lives the poor of the world may lose 
confidence in their representatives and the democratic systems to which we 
remain committed, seeing their representatives as nothing more than sounding 
brass or tinkling cymbals. (United Nations, 2003) 
As an attempt to use education to intensify progress towards  a sustainable 
development UNESCO has launched the years 2005 to 2014 as the Decade of 
Education for Sustainable Development (DESD), a theme that is put on national 
educational agendas on many levels, from governmental policy to voluntary choice. 
The Earth Charter has been an important influence in the implementation of such 
policy (see The Earth Charter). Whether DESD can contribute something promising 
and long lasting to the educational arena remains to be seen since the project is still 
underway. As I have insinuated, strong contrary winds of many kinds seem to prevent 
a progress towards more sustainable life and instead promote opposing and 
contradictory social goals. An environmental concern that at least has stimulated 
planning and brought money to bear on environmental efforts is global warming. The 
effect of these efforts depends on many elements that call for quick action but is 
extremely vulnerable to political oscillations. However, whether the dilemma initiates 
change depends on mutual agreement. Yet, the UN’s Climate Change Conference in 
Copenhagen in December 2009 is widely regarded as having been a failure. This 
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letdown did not awaken much hope for future negotiations. Instead, to protect 
economic growth, many agencies discover new opportunities to benefit from, for 
example, a huge expansion of nuclear power. 
Many voices, of which I will only give a few examples, claim that the concept of 
sustainable development is not sustainable in itself and that its interpretation has 
failed (see, e.g., Gonzáles-Gaudiano, 2006; Holland, 2001). The concept has become 
a slogan or, as Ingimundarsson (1997) calls it, a magic word (trolleord) associated 
with several contradictory myths about nature. Gonzáles-Gaudiano (2006) also calls 
sustainable development a myth; yes, even a “salvation grand narrative” (p. 297). 
Being more like a parable than a concrete aspiration, it is easy to use sustainable 
development as a slogan in many fields―politics, business, all kinds of social 
planning and, last but not least, education (see Adams, 2001). The concept sounds 
simple, however grounded in deep conviction. Therefore, different stakeholders 
easily start to interpret it in completely different ways. Scott and Gough (2003) find a 
connection between the policies for sustainable development and lifelong learning: 
both are similar slogans that can give a false expression of substance or coherence 
(see also, e.g., Edwards & Usher, 2001). Wallgren (1990) criticizes the Brundtland 
report for glorifying economic progress and for having too much trust in the salvation 
power of technological progress, thereby forgetting the basic cause of the crises 
humanity faces, namely politics. Another aspect that Wallgren criticizes is that too 
much trust has been placed in instrumental reason, a claim that correlates with von 
Wright’s (1986) curiosity for the survival of humankind and his warnings against 
exaggerated belief in science and technology. Dorn claims that, “commonly 
understood,” sustainable development “simply means achieving long-run economic 
growth while preserving the environment” (Dorn, 2007, p. 1). Similarly, O’Sullivan 
accuses the Brundtland Commission for allowing us “to have our cake and eat it too” 
(O’Sullivan, 1999, p. 113). Furthermore, the three dimensions of sustainable 
development have been critiqued. Considering the economic sphere as its own 
dimension and not related to the social is, as Sauvé (2002) argues with very good 
reason, a sign that economic interest have come to dominate our current world.  
The Brundtland report repeatedly suggests the need for political change, but the 
demands of consensus and resistance to radical change have led to paradoxical 
suggestions both in the Brundtland report itself and in the concrete politics that 
attempt to implement its message globally and locally (See World Commission on 
Environment and Development, 1987). Increased production and consumption 
56 
 
combined with equal possibilities for a good life are a difficult equation. 
Consequently, conflicting criteria cause basic contradictions and complicated 
circumstances that make sustainable development difficult to address effectively in 
education. Along with increased global environmental protection work, sustainable 
development has become an educational concern and has taken its place on the 
political agenda. Education has become a means to reach such sustainable goals but 
Sauvé (2002), among others, claims that a concept like education for sustainable 
development limits education to merely a tool for reaching sustained economic 
growth (see also, Hesselink, van Kampen & Wals, 2000). This means that Sauvé 
regards economic growth as one taken for granted aim of sustainable development, a 
presumed aim that brings the whole sustainability project into conflict with 
educational methods based on critique. Carr and Kemmis (1986) warn that viewing 
education as a process that strives towards particular ends fails to see how 
educational aims, policies and methods are strongly interconnected. And, Carr 
accuses the culture of modernity for being based on the pillars of “technologization 
and institutionalization” and for promoting “utilitarian and economic purposes” rather 
than “ethical activity directed towards morally desirable or socially transformative 
ends” (Carr, 2003, p. 15). Furthermore, he stresses how Plato’s Republic already took 
for granted that education can only be examined and understood as a part of society 
and that education and society are continuously being reproduced. So, a crucial 
question in the sustainability debate is how can education promote development other 
than what is supported by the society of which it is a part? 
 
Concept Indistinctness 
 
Today many researchers and educators are involved in a discussion about whether 
environmental education and education for sustainable development are equivalent or 
poles apart, and about which concept is more relevant. I will briefly show the 
diverging arguments by help of a graphic (Figure 1). Based on an Internet-debate 
Hesselink & al. (2000) describe four different ways of distinguishing the relation 
between the two concepts (1-4 in Figure 1). Tani, Cantell, Koskinen, Nordström and 
Wolff (2007) present a version with six difference views of the relation. The 
intermediate views are that EE is a part of ESD (1) or, vice versa, (2), or that EE and 
ESD are partly the same thing (3), or that ESD represents a higher developmental 
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form in an evolving process where EE is a lower stage (4). In addition to these four 
views, Tani et al. present two extreme forms showing that EE and ESD mostly 
disagree (5) or that they are almost equivalent (6) (see also Hesselink et al., 2000; 
McKeown & Hopkins, 2003; Wolff, 2004). 
 
  
Figure 1: Six ways to describe the relation between environmental education and education for 
sustainable development (Tani et al., 2007, expanded from Wolff, 2004 and Hesselink & al., 2000). 
 
Given that the concepts “environmental education” and “education for sustainable 
development” have more and more become the important educational issues of today, 
the incongruence in definitions certainly obstructs discussion.
44
 As with Sauvé 
(2002), Jickling and Wals (2008) consider global agendas like sustainable 
development hazardous to implement in education. It is unlikely that an education 
aiming at sustainability can compete against the ‘market model’ in education, 
according to Sherren (2008), but she is still not completely pessimistic. Jickling and 
Wals (2008), on the other hand, are conscious about when education for sustainable 
development becomes business orientated. They do not recommend implementation 
                                           
44 I have participated in the discussion about the differences between environmental education and education 
for sustainable development in Tani & al. (2007). Many other researchers have discussed this difference, as 
well (e.g., González-Gaudiano, 2006); Jickling & Wals, 2008; Hopkins & McKeown, 2002; Sauvé, 1999; 
Stevenson, 2006; Öhman, 2006). 
 
1. EE is a part of ESD 2. ESD is a part of EE 
 
3. EE and ESD are 
overlapping concepts 
4. ESD is a higher develop- 
ment stage than EE  
5. EE and ESD are very distinct  6. EE and ESD are almost 
synonyms 
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of environmental issues according to business standards. Even if non-educators 
setting policy agendas and controlling funding easily accept these concepts, such 
agendas might turn out to be merely imaginary. Policies and standards resulting from 
the business and industrial world threaten dictating education for sustainable 
development, as is the case for many other aspects of education. However, standards, 
benchmarks and other control mechanisms might be the wrong manner of 
implementing value-laden issues. Nevertheless, bench-marking of the sustainability 
of schools and universities is a growing business. Education is not about teaching 
what to think but how to think, Jickling and Wals (ibid.) argue. One cannot compare 
the education of humans with the promotion of business profits and producing 
saleable commodities.   
 
Contemporary Teaching Challenges 
 
Although a quest for environmental education started around 40 years ago and much 
has happened since then, how teachers can fulfill the mission of promoting a more 
sustainable world is still worth discussing. Whether current educational systems can 
actually promote a more sustainable world is seldom considered, however. 
Environmental education focused first on nature studies, but it has gradually evolved 
to include social issues. Common concerns in strategies for education for sustainable 
development today are justice, equality, democracy, human survival and active 
citizenship.
45
 Higher education has tried to emphasize liberal education, 
interdisciplinary, cosmopolitism and civics (Sherren, 2008).  
However, this widening of perspective only makes the educational task more 
demanding. The teaching of these issues is incredibly challenging, but so is common 
educational planning and curriculum work, and there are many value related 
obstacles. Educational institutions are not directly ready to adopt and promote new 
values and to make profound changes. This has especially become obvious in higher 
education (see, e.g., Bawden, 2004). The outcomes depend on the teachers, but also 
largely on the students; their backgrounds, views of the world, dreams, and so on, not 
to mention the conditions of the actual context where the education takes place. The 
entire educational establishment, including both physical and social environments 
and their political connection to the surrounding society, the state and diverse 
                                           
45
 See UNESCOs webbsite: http://portal.unesco.org (education, education for sustainable development).   
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counterparts, influence formal education. The list of influences on non-formal or 
informal education is limitless. Yet, education that takes place in many other contexts 
than formal education influences both children and adults. Dillon (2003) accurately 
accuses environmental educational research for ignoring basic learning theories and 
paying too little attention to learning that takes place outside formal educational 
contexts. 
Jickling (2003) warns against presenting education as a tool for advocating the 
ideology of sustainable development. In the report Our Common Future (1987), Gro 
Harlem Brundtland already had said that teachers are to be the tools for achieving a 
sustainable development. The word ‘tool’ undoubtedly sounds instrumental; to make 
education or even human a tool is an ethically complicated prospect. The rhetoric 
relates to the shift of educational emphasis that Carr and Kemmis (1986) saw taking 
place in the middle of the 20
th
 century when teachers became like workers in 
educational “factories” (ibid, p. 16) and the role of education was to maintain an 
academically designed curriculum. According to the tool metaphor, teachers have to 
work toward meeting a preset agenda. Yet, in the scenario Carr and Kemmis (ibid.) 
portray such curricula are programs designed to transmit knowledge as a social 
commodity that then becomes “capital.” Educators are turned into agents of the 
economic globalization agenda with sustainability as its basic standard (Jickling & 
Wals, 2008). Neither of these views gives the teachers a role as agents who 
reflectively promote both the ethical and intellectual development of students, and 
both views contradict a critical agenda. To discuss this issue, I will concentrate for a 
while on formal education. 
Instruction has never been and will never be neutral and normativity is not only a 
curricular problem. When teachers teach about problems in relation to nature, 
environment or sustainability, the outcome depends on their own views of the world; 
beside ethics, these also include spatial and temporal aspects. Nobody can shake off 
the dispositions, values, and attitudes bequeathed by their backgrounds and 
frameworks. Curriculum, pedagogy, and assessment always reflect the teacher’s 
philosophical and theoretical position that, in turn, depends on assumptions about 
knowledge, human beings and the world. Various philosophical assumptions thus 
hide in instruction and, therefore, teachers need to become aware of their own 
relation to other persons, nature and environment, diverse cultures, economics, 
politics, and so on. As these relations vary considerably, a closer investigation 
actually shows that there are a plentitude of approaches to environmental matters and 
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sustainability in education. Every lesson depends on a choice: something is included 
and something else excluded. The individual aims of a lesson are diverse: some are 
partly obvious and others tacit. They merge both tacit personal and societal goals on 
many levels, in addition to the explicit goals stipulated by curriculums. Even if the 
teacher has personal motives for promoting particular environmental values, the 
educational policy may be a too powerful counterpart to change or struggle against. 
And in addition to large profound aims, there are also more practical and systematic 
aims that steer environmental educational praxis (see also Stevenson, 2007; 
Palmberg, 2000, 2008; Sund & Wickman, 2008). Due to intricate value conflicts, 
tremendous gaps between aims and actions exist both on the individual level, in 
society and in the field of education. Carr (2004) argues that education always has 
ethical implications and needs to aim at making people ‘better’. But, who decides 
what is better? 
However, it is not only contradictions between guiding principles that cause 
problems; so do incongruence between aims and knowledge. If the teachers do not 
understand the theoretical background of, for example, climate change, they cannot 
advance students knowledge base in ways that facilitates or encourages proper 
actions. This has become evident in surveys in many countries (Palmberg, 2008). 
Misconceptions and limited knowledge about fundamental processes of nature 
complicates the teaching of controversial concepts like sustainability. Yet, as with 
values, the problem is that such knowledge is not definitive or value free. Scientific 
discourses are ruled by power and knowledge is, therefore, formed in accordance 
with a particular view of what the ‘truth’ is (see, e.g., Foucault, 2000i). Since 
empirical-analytical science produces technical recommendations but does not 
answer moral questions (Habermas, 1995), science becomes a technical power rather 
than a practical (moral) power that could engage conscious, reflective individuals.  
Initially, environmental education dealt mainly with the natural world, but in the 
1980s interest turned towards society. Thus human problems with the natural world 
became regarded as social problems and calls for systematic changes have increased 
accordingly (e.g., Sterling, 2004). One of the most drastic, O’Sullivan (1999, 2004), 
even suggests a radical break with the past. Promoting systematic change is, however, 
not easy in rigidly organized schools or other institutions. One problem is that the 
strict division of school subjects according to scientific disciplines does not serve 
broad, general issues like sustainability and makes it difficult for teachers to share 
responsibility for interdisciplinary topics (see, e.g., Kaivola, 2000). Since 
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sustainability is such a complex topic, its implementation requires shared 
responsibility among the teachers of all subjects. Another aspect often neglected 
when making decisions about educational aims is that the current generation of 
teachers may not have the knowledge about what kind of cognitions and attitudes the 
students will need in the future (see Klafki, 1997b). Klafki warns against making 
school education into a simplification of scientific knowledge; instead, his approach 
is to define contemporary “epochal key issues’” (such as peace, environmental issues, 
use of technology, social justice, the role of media, and so on) as ways of presenting 
educational content in more universal modes (Klafki, 1997a, 1998). In addition, he 
strongly emphasizes the use of practical education and instruction that promotes 
critique, argumentation and empathy (Klafki, 1998).  
Similarly, the cosmopolitanism in Kemp’s (2005) vision pays attention to key 
epochal natural, cultural and economical issues. Kemp’s visionary human beings 
oppose both extreme individualism and admiration of the state and, instead, they see 
the global community as the highest goal. Nevertheless, in this vision the educational 
goal is already set in the present. A crucial point in this debate is that gaps between 
knowledge and action do not reside only on an individual level, but arise in 
connection with social and political variables. As a result, the quest for change moves 
from distinct individuals to structural levels and to the need to transform entire 
systems. However, individuals build the systems at the same time the systems create 
the individuals. 
 
Educational Research 
 
Promoting an environmentally gentle lifestyle is not only accomplished through 
educational politics, planning and praxis, but also via educational research. Although, 
environmental educational research interests have changed and widened especially 
during the 1990s and the first decade of the new millennium, there is still a deep-
rooted predisposition to normative solutions. Many environmental educational 
research projects have concentrated on empirical studies and sought answers about 
the circumstances that make a person act environmentally responsibly. Statistical 
analyses have quantified observable behaviors and thus have served as a foundation 
for so-called objective conclusions about implementing environmental issues in 
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education in ways that encourage others to change their lifestyles in accordance with 
environmental criteria (see Robertson, 1994).  
Models and Normativity 
Especially in the 1980s and 1990s, many researchers have constructed theoretical 
models showing which elements enhance environmentally responsible behavior 
(Hungerford, Peyton & Vilke, 1980; Hungerford & Volk, 1990; Kollmuss & 
Agyeman, 2002; Käpylä, 1995). Their models try to overcome the gap between 
environmental knowledge and responsible actions, and they systematically propose 
how to form responsible citizens (see more about such models in, e.g., Cantell & 
Koskinen, 2004; Kollmuss & Agyeman, 2002; Palmberg, 2003; Robottom & Hart, 
1993). A large meta-analysis (Hungerford & Volk, 1990) initiated environmental 
educational research that targeted environmentally friendly behavior, although the 
creators of the model never aimed at any practical application. The model starts from 
so called “entry-level variables” (sensitivity) through owner-ship variables” (in-depth 
knowledge and personal investment) and ends with empowerment variables” 
(environmental action strategies), and other researchers have followed this general 
outline. All such models thus build on a hierarchical order of knowledge and skills in 
coherence with Bloom’s renowned taxonomy (see Bloom, 1957), and they lean on 
the belief that certain instructional steps taken in the right order will change the 
students’ behavior and make them act more appropriately towards nature and society 
(see Chapter One). Such studies have had a major impact on the development of 
environmental educational research in many countries, and they still have (see, e.g., 
Ramsey & Hungerford, 2002), although critical voices were raised against 
environmental ‘behavior modification’ models from an early stage, among them 
Jickling (1991), Robottom and Hart (1993).  
Basing their arguments on a large study of behavior modification models, 
Heimlich and Ardoin (2008) object to such behavior shaping in environmental 
education by emphasizing how extremely complex human behavior is, representing 
an intermingling of affective and cognitive processes. Their arguments do not address 
ethical aspects, but lean on psychology and studies of behavioral theories. They thus 
conclude that trying to change others’ behavior in a predestined direction is far too 
complicated to be manageable and predicable. Even so, even today researchers offer 
studies that aim at changing behavior (e.g., Ballantyne & Packer, 2009). Moreover, 
the aim of the Decade of Education for Sustainable Development is “to promote 
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sustainable skills and behavior, inspired by creative and critical ways of thinking, in 
order to encourage the resolution and management of problems that stand in the way 
of sustainable development” (UNESCO, 2005, p. 4). The route is thus determined 
and the educators’ task is to shape the students’ behavior to suit the predicted aim.  
In combination with the call for critical thinking, the aim of promoting particular 
behavior becomes paradoxical. Jickling and Spork (1998) remind us that if people are 
taught to think, they may actually think for themselves and not adopt desired 
behaviors. Short’s (2010) aims of environmental education are quite similar to 
UNESCO’s. Environmental education “must ultimately serve the social function of 
transmitting knowledge, skills, attitudes, and behaviors that provide long-term benefit 
to the individual and community without bias against the sustainability of the 
supporting environment” (ibid., p. 2). In addition, Short points out that it is very 
important to evaluate the outcome of environmental education continuously in terms 
of the attained knowledge, and resulting awareness, critical thinking, action skills, 
attitudes, and behaviors. However, if ‘critical thinking’46 implies a way of choosing 
between alternatives and not a way of criticizing educational frameworks and the 
students’ existing worldviews, the inconsistency diminishes between striving towards 
a particular aim and promoting critical thinking. Such criticism is, then, only an 
instrumental technique.  
The construction of theoretical models can be effective, however, if they promote 
a better understanding of the complex relations between the numerous relevant 
elements in the educational processes. A model is, nevertheless, only a simplified 
picture of some of the elements that affect the process. It is an abstract trial to explain 
real situations and it cannot directly guide practice because it is not even possible to 
handle or know all the relevant elements. Although a model relies on empirical 
studies, it can never be complete. To know what the educational situation is does not 
necessarily give enough information about how it ought to be. Knowledge that 
something is wrong does not mean that it is ethically proper to correct it purposefully 
by manipulation. This simply means that knowledge about the existing situation 
cannot give exact knowledge about how to change the practice and formulate aims 
because there are too many elements involved that influence the outcome. In 
                                           
46
 The concept of “critical thinking” does not necessary relate to “critical education” or “critical pedagogy” 
as based on critical philosophy. “Critical thinking” can denote a rational, reflective thinking strategy while 
“critical education” aims at the creation of a dialectic consciousness and promotes transformation (see Wolff, 
2006a). Yet, even a critical approach can have a preset goal. 
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addition, even if a model seems promising it does not immediately give the educator 
a legitimate right to use it as a manipulating instrument since every model needs to be 
modified to suit its context and cannot serve as a blueprint for making students 
behave in a particular way. 
Environmental education aiming at behavior change is not only taking place for 
young people in schools but also in adult education and information; thus it is a social 
policy that involves informal education situations using mass media, advertisement, 
and other kinds of informal educational media. Actually, informal education and 
advertising targeted at adults are growing businesses since sustainable development 
has become a marketing concept. Furthermore, the target is not only ordinary citizens 
as private persons but also various professional interest groups and business people 
from managers to employees; that is, it embraces entire companies and workplaces. 
Educational tools in environmental protection work that supplement command-and-
control and market-based methods have emerged in the United States (Dietz & Stern, 
2002), but also elsewhere. These tools strive for what they call a voluntary change of 
behavior; that is, to generate a change that not is forced by regulatory social methods. 
However, as Dietz and Stern state, the influence of market-based methods might be 
over-blown and more of a return to historical models than a new approach (ibid.). 
Market-based methods generally aim at someone creating profit by influencing 
another’s conduct, although the manipulation may be well hidden. Behavior change 
through advertisement depends on skilful psychological methods and is, therefore, 
first class secret manipulation (see Schor, 2004). A voluntary change cannot take 
place under such conditions, but has to be built, instead, on maximally objective and 
diverse knowledge and with opportunities for a thoughtful choice. 
O’Donoughue and Lotz-Sisitka (2002, p. 262), criticize pro-environmental 
behavior modeling from a social view. They point out the existence of “blind spots 
and blockages that persist in disallowing social politics and history to illuminate the 
complexities of human social habitus.” They continue: “Factors and barriers on a 
flow diagram mask and ‘factor out’ much of the intermeshed complexity and 
diversity in the relational worlds of humans and other living things.” Although 
education affects attitudes and values it does not instantly bring about changed 
behavior; learning is among other things related to context and circumstances 
(Palmberg, 2003). A Finnish study showed that even if young persons are concerned 
about the environment and have positive feelings towards environmental issues, and 
even if they say that they want to act on behalf of the environment, they will not 
65 
 
necessarily do so (Cantell & Larna, 2006). About half of the respondents
47
 were 
interested in contributing to environmental protection and sustainability, but only five 
percent actually did. Lack of knowledge was not the problem; a gap existed between 
intention and action. They knew how best to act and wanted to, but still did not. Other 
researchers found similar problems in another large investigation targeting secondary 
school students in four European countries (see Miranda, Castells, Oliver & Cabral, 
2004).
48
 The students had knowledge about sustainability issues and they believed it 
was important to act, but they did not even want to take responsibility themselves but 
left it to others to act. Gender and social class differences also affected the answers, 
and most of the respondents had a very negative vision of the future. Therefore, 
Oliver (2004) calls for teacher training that deals with how to relate to sustainability 
issues as reflective practitioners and learning facilitators. Koskinen and Paloniemi 
(2009) warn that lack of encouragement or even discouragement may cause a 
motivated person to fail to act on their commitment to the environmental. Therefore, 
they point to the necessity of providing children and young people with adult support 
and companionship during the processes in which they learn to see themselves as 
social actors and users of power and develop their own action strategies. 
Courtney-Hall and Rogers (2002) point out another wide gap environmental 
education has to overcome; the gap between the researcher and the researched. In the 
creation of pro-environmental behavior models researchers too easily regard 
themselves as external elements or masters managing others’ change processes 
(ibid.). Simons et al. (2005) calls this researcher mode “pastoral,” where the 
researcher as a critical intellectual is the one with both moral and technical authority 
who is trying to transform the objects of study (other persons). Attempts to change 
other peoples’ behavior are like walking on a cliff’s edge―the risk falling into the 
abyss is ever-present, and the only available bridge across it may turn out to be 
manipulation. The fact is that the more one tries to become aware of the gap between 
knowledge and action, the more new gaps one finds (see also Kevany, 2007).  
 
                                           
47
 Cantell’s and Larna’s study included 1132 persons and a handful of them were interviewed. The young 
respondents had, among other things, discussed with their peers about global warming, vegetarianism, waste 
management, pollution, rain forests, and nuclear power. The questions the researchers asked in relation to 
conduct dealt with issues like conscientious consumerism, membership in activity groups, and participation 
in civic activities. 
48
 The respondents of the survey were 1437 students from Portugal, Spain, the UK, and Finland. The 
questions dealt with social, ecological, and political topics and included a wide range of sustainability issues, 
global, local, and related to daily life. 
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Current Trends and Main Concern 
It is obvious that it is neither possible to reduce environmental issues in educational 
research to merely methodological problems, nor can it be considered proper in 
educational praxis to simply train others to behave in a predetermined way. An 
environmental education that is strongly normative does not consider students to be 
autonomous persons with independent rights for choosing lives of their own. 
Researchers have gradually started to consider that environmental problems relate to 
politics, ethics and moral conduct and, therefore, education has to be designed to 
trigger the students’ own thinking and judging (e.g., Jickling, 2001; Wals, Alblas & 
Margadant-van Arcken, 1999; Wolff, 2006a). However, ethics in education can be 
both a method and an aim. As a method, ethics activates students morally and 
encourages even unpredictable transformation; but if regarded as a narrow aim, 
educators can only transmit a particular ethical view. An educator creates a 
comprehensive picture of what a sustainable development ought to be and what the 
predicted end is that students need to reach. In contrast, if the educational model 
leaves the end indistinct, without any determined aim, the outcome becomes 
undecided and makes room for all the involved to formulate visions and jointly shape 
temporal aims and even to disbelieve the entire “sustainable development” aspiration.  
Wals et al. (1999) see normative approaches as part of the problem instead of part 
of a solution and ask for new vehicles for researching the issue from the perspectives 
of life-styles, power relations, humans’ connection with the earth and each other. In 
1998, Palmer wanted to shift the focal point of environmental education research to 
the role of aesthetic and spiritual experience in relation to an individual’s 
environmental awareness and concern. Drawing on several other researchers, she lists 
alternative approaches such as philosophical research, feminist critique, narrative 
inquiry, interpretive/historical research, case studies and action research. The last 
decade has initiated an obvious change of research methods in environmental 
education, perhaps thanks to increased political emphasis on environmental issues. 
The focus is moving from normative prospects to promoting common 
accomplishments. A growing number of researchers in the field of environmental 
education are interested in improving students’ joint involvement and participation in 
authentic environmental activities and critical discourses, and in how to encourage 
people to take responsibility for environmental issues that directly affect their own 
lives (e.g., Koskinen, 2010; Lange & Chubb, 2009; Wals, 2006). Other new interests 
are bridge-building between various social groups and focusing on transformative 
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learning (e.g., Wals, 2006; Wolff, 2007). Environmental educational research focuses 
nowadays not only on children; higher education and adult education are newly 
growing targets. Furthermore, focus has spread from formal to non-formal and 
informal educational contexts.
49
  
While individual learning never takes place in a vacuum, Robertson (1994) sees 
environmental problems as social constructions. He asks, therefore, for critically-
oriented, constructivist research concerning how people conceptualize environmental 
issues and the relationship between humans and the rest of the nature. In the 
framework of a project called MUVIN,
50
 environmental educators in the Nordic 
countries have developed a strategy influenced by constructivist learning theories, 
strongly dependent on language and communication as tools. This strategy has 
“conflicts of human interests” as its target and an educational aim has been to 
promote “action competence” (Schnack, 1998; Lundegård & Wickman, 2007) by 
educating students about how to handle the dilemmas arising from the way human 
beings act upon the environment. This focusing on conflicts is based on the 
presumption that environmental problems and the difficulties with implementation of 
sustainable development are not due to the relations between human beings and 
nature but, rather, are about conflicts of interest between human beings.  
According to Schnack (1998), such conflicts exist on three levels. A basic level 
includes conflicts between development trends and democratic aims that influence all 
humans. These kinds of problems are, for example, war, malnourishment, 
radioactivity, climate change and extinction of species, and they are similar to 
Klafki’s (1997a) key issues. On a second level are conflicts of interest between 
different stakeholders with different needs and desires, for example landowners and 
environmentalists. The third level contains conflicts of interest within a single 
individual. Somebody might want to travel fast, but also to save energy (Schnack, 
1998). Lundgård and Wickman (2007) divide this action competence approach into 
three steps: (1) knowledge about the social and structural background of 
environmental problems; (2) ownership and a willingness to act; (3) concrete action. 
An important feature of this approach is that the students themselves initiate actions, 
not the teachers.  
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 Se Chapter One in this book about formal, non-formal and informal education. 
50
 MUVIN is a shortening of Miljöundervisning i Norden; that is, ‘environmental education in the Nordic 
countries’. 
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In Bonnett’s view, education for sustainable development has to change focus 
from policy to a state of mind involving an idea of the human being’s relationship to 
the rest of nature, where nature is an integral element of authentic human awareness” 
(Bonnett, 2002, p. 2; see also Bonnett, 2006, 2009). Sustainability itself then takes on 
new meaning and is no longer a mode simply for the human utilization of nature; 
rather, nature is something living for its own sake and needs “to let be”. An education 
in line with Bonnet’s thoughts concentrates on ethics as a practical undertaking 
(morality), but it leans on a different metaphysics. It is an ethics of receptive response 
to the natural world instead of rules; and, in opposition to a strongly rational 
approach, Bonnet seeks a more intimate, intuitive and sensuous encounter with 
nature.  
The state of mind Caduto (1998) and O’Sullivan (1999) seek goes still further and 
includes clear spiritual dimensions. This approach bears features of the native North 
American tradition and treats environmental ethics and social justice as inseparable. 
Caduto actually calls for a life ethic valuing nature and humankind equally. Schultz 
(2002) emphasizes the need for inclusion in the natural world, and sees a need to 
make people experience that they are part of nature, not above it or controlling it. 
Bonnett’s, Caduto’s, O’Sullivan’s and Schultz’ positions are not similar but they all, 
as do I, strive to re-establish the natural world on the educational agenda. Since the 
early 1970s, several empirical studies in environmental education have confirmed 
that a crucial base for environmental engagement by adults is a history of pleasing 
nature experiences in childhood (see, e.g., Palmer, 1993, 1998; Chawla, 1999). A 
large empirical study performed by 30 researchers from 12 countries and six 
continents showed that educators engaged in environmental education listed pleasant 
experiences in nature as the most important element in their interests. In Australia, 
Canada, South Africa, and the UK, childhood experiences had greater relevance for 
educators’ engagement in environmental issues, while educators from Hong Kong, 
Sri Lanka and Uganda mentioned experiences of the natural world as adults as 
influential for their commitments to the environment (Palmer & al., 1998). So many 
studies indicate the importance of positive experiences of the natural world as a basic 
element that triggers motivation for environmental issues that this variable should not 
be neglected.  
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In, About, and For 
 
Since the Stockholm Conference 1972, the programmatic aims of environmental 
education have been distinguished as education in (or from), about, and for the 
environment (e.g., Palmer, 1998). The preposition about draws attention to cognitive 
aspects of education, such as skills, knowledge and understanding; in recognizes the 
education taking place outside the school in authentic surroundings; and for, in turn, 
aims at purposefully developing attitudes and environmentally friendly or sustainable 
behavior (Scoullos & Malotidi, 2004). Ever since the Tbilisi conference, educational 
policy documents have emphasized education for the environment―a trend that goes 
hand in hand with the empirical research approaches described earlier in this chapter.  
Advocates in the environmental educational field have, however, objected that 
talking about education for the environment might actually be an overly narrow 
approach. For example, Jickling and Spork (1998) argue that despite the usefulness of 
these characterizations and their benefits in the development of environmental 
education, it may be dangerous to depict education with the help of the preposition 
for something, meaning with a clearly envisioned end. Ten years ago, these 
researchers already had suggested revising talk about environmental education and 
advised teachers to abandon their most fixed visions for the future and instead to 
focus on challenging students to create their own visionary views (ibid.). 
Nevertheless, the newer concept of education for sustainable development still 
contains the directional preposition for. Jickling and Spork even stress that “when 
‘education for the environment’ is defined programmatically there is a tendency 
towards narrowing of perspective, limiting of possibilities, anthropocentrism and 
militating against the evolutionary tendencies of environmental thought” (ibid., p. 
11). However, many researchers have also defended the word for as crucial stressing 
that education needs to empower individuals and encourage them to transform society 
(Ferreira, 2009). I will go further and discuss whether or not for serves as an 
empowering focus.  
In the discourse on education for sustainable development, the small word “for” 
makes sustainable development an aim. Nevertheless, Tilbury (2004) wants 
sustainability to become a process more than an aim or end-result and hopes that 
what she calls “environmental education for sustainability” (ibid., e.g., p. 97) can be a 
force for cultural change on many educational levels. Sustainable development may 
become a disputable educational issue, however, if the whole ‘sustainability project’ 
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strives towards a universal goal. As such, is it easily seen as the singular truth, and 
the only right and successful education is then ‘normative’―an education that strives 
towards the pre-set grand goal or, in Ferreira’s (2009, p. 609) terms, “an orthodoxy” 
aiming at social change through empowerment of individuals. However, even if from 
the very beginning there is an immanent problem in the sustainable development 
concept and the entire idea about it, this does not necessarily hinder sustainability 
from becoming a re-creational process and a flexible metaphor that can be constantly 
discussed and reshaped. According to Tilbury (2003), a concrete and universal 
definition of ‘sustainable development’ as well as ‘education for sustainable 
development’ contradicts the key premises of sustainability as a working process. 
Instead, she argues that “fuzziness” (ibid., p. 33) arises in discourses and this has 
definitely happened. What is then the big difference between having universal or 
particular goals? This question leads us to the discussion of ethics, and below I will 
briefly describe today’s three most fundamental ethical positions.  
 
Ethics as Consequence, Duty, or Virtue 
 
One focus in this book is ethics, but ethics is not one, but a diverse issue. Our daily 
actions as well as economics, politics and education all lean on ethical principles of 
some kind, whether consciously or unconsciously chosen. The ethical principles a 
person adopts are a result of many social experiences and lessons. Ethical conduct is 
seldom an exact implementation of ethical theory, but modifications of many 
theories. Still, it is useful to be aware of basic ethical theories and their consequences 
when discussing education in general, but also as regards environmental education. 
The three ethical outlooks or theories of ‘right action’, I will summarize below are 
consequentialism, deontology (duty ethics), and virtue ethics.  
To begin with, I will turn back to the preposition for once more. Carr (2004) 
emphasizes the difficulty with the preposition for in educational philosophy, because 
it can be used both instrumentally and non-instrumentally. One reason for this merge 
is the influence of utilitarianism
51
 that is both an instrumental and non-instrumental 
theory, according to Carr. Utilitarianism is a common view of consequential ethics 
(consequentialism), a theory that values actions on the basis of their consequences. 
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 Jeremy Bentham and John Stuart Mill are known as the developers of utilitarianism. There are many forms 
of utilitarianism, but I will not go further into this subject here, only note that a basic distinction is between 
act and rule utilitarianism.  
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Beside that, utilitarianism also values ethical actions from a welfare perspective. 
Consequentialism
52
 makes morality calculable, because an act is regarded morally 
right if and only if the difference between the total of benefits (positive values like 
advantage, pleasure, good, or happiness) and the total of negatives (negative values 
like mischief, pain, evil, or unhappiness) of the act is greater than the outcome of 
some other available act (see, e.g., Anscombe, 1958; Mulgan, 2001; Pojman, 2009). 
According to consequentialism, education for sustainability is defendable if it is an 
act that brings the greatest good for the greatest number compared with other 
alternatives (“biocentric ethics” also include other parts of nature than humans in the 
greatest number), not because this education is a good thing in itself. However, 
instead of being only extrinsically good (for some instrumental reason and good for 
somebody), the act can also be intrinsically good (good in itself). Attfield (2003) 
emphasizes environmental education both because of its ends and as an act. A trend 
towards a good education both for its own sake and for its ends is to combine 
environmental education with “quality education.” This combination has especially 
been stressed as important when implementing environmental education in poor 
countries.  
Utilitarian ethics or consequentialism is good because it offers simple and useful 
principles, but many theorists have raised objections to the theory. Pojman (2009) 
lists five unfavorable arguments against utilitarianism because it: 
 
1. makes the choice too demanding (the no-rest objection); 
2. makes the choice between methods too complicated if there are two good 
choices (the absurd implication objection); 
3. it is difficult to put another’s goals against one’s own and this leads to 
alienation (the integrity objection);  
4. it is against equality because it strives for the greatest good for the greatest 
number, and not good for all, and a few might have to be sacrificed on behalf 
of the majority (the justice objection); 
5. is a conflict between common rules and the greatest utility in particular 
situations (the publicity objection). 
 
Viewing both education and sustainability from this critical view, there is a problem 
with knowing what goal is the best, and this brings forward a new utilitarian problem: 
how to choose between present and future goals. People do not necessarily want to 
learn how to act on behalf of the environment only because of its promise for good in 
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a far future, if the education is not also meaningful for its own sake here and now. 
Even if the education is concrete it may not help, for example, teaching recycling, 
sustainable consuming and other environmentally responsible actions. It also may not 
motivate either teachers or students if the only reason for doing it is the long-term 
aim. Another problem is that the aims are often in conflict. When technical 
educational aims (instrumental goals) are blended with moral aims (non-instrumental 
goals) this confuses those who have to act in the educational arena (Carr, 2000). The 
same happens when technical and economical goals are blended with the appeal for 
sustainability, a goal that is strongly related to morals. In education, either the choice 
may be between delivering advanced communication technology to enable equal 
possibilities for discussions all over the world or of putting the same money to work 
helping people build their own infrastructures for gradually eliminating starvation. 
Both ways may raise poor people’s confidence; the question is, however, what 
alternative they prefer and why? From the sustainability perspective, two conflicting 
goals may be either to eliminate illnesses by using pesticides, or to let people die to 
avoid pollution followed with damage to nature and new human diseases. Would 
these problems disappear if the whole world followed the same rules? 
An anonymous article in Connect
53
 from 1991, articulated in the framework of 
the UNESCO-UNEP International Environmental Education Programme, IEEP, 
presents a joint search for a universal environmental ethics that through “sensibility 
and conscience, can draw the individuals in the direction of that ultimate goal of 
environmental education, namely, environmentally-ideal personal behavior” (“A 
universal environmental ethics,” 1991, p. 1). Moreover, this article emphasizes a 
common environmental ethics based on various religious beliefs that could be 
developed in collaboration with cultural custodians, priests, rabbis, mullahs, scholars 
and environmentally aware religious and secular educators. This proposed ethic 
combines cultural and religious values with knowledge about life processes from 
contemporary biological and environmental sciences. Thus an old Enlightenment idea 
about universal ethics is reawakened as an aim of environmental educational debate 
in the 1990s (see ASP; Kant 1795/2005).  
Kant (1803/1900) had a vision of a universal duty ethics (deontology) and argued 
that education has to promote the happiness of all humankind. When he developed 
Rousseau’s ideas about individual freedom, Kant saw autonomous will (free will) as a 
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means for individuals to follow rules (duties) they set up for themselves. According 
to Kant (1785/1997), freedom is then obeying one’s own rules and mastering one’s 
desires with the help of reason. Kant not only addressed individual autonomy but also 
collective freedom. He meant that a community is autonomous when it sets up its 
own laws in accordance with the will of its members so that they apply to a general 
will (Kant, 1785/1997, 1788/2002). In the Groundwork of the Metaphysic of Morals 
Kant ambitiously worked out the highest moral principle, the categorical imperative
54
 
through which he searched for the highest standard of moral conduct: “act in 
accordance with a maxim of ends that it can be a universal law of everyone to have”55 
(Kant, 1797/1996, p. 157). He also made autonomous will, self-government, the 
foundation for this standard (Kant, 1785/1997, 1795/2005). Kant’s ethics trust 
humans as rational, moral creatures endowed with reason as means for making duty 
rule over the will and overcoming selfish desires. The universal rules Kant proposed 
were the same for everyone because all humans are rational beings. Thus they have to 
treat themselves and others as rational beings―not as means, but as ends in 
themselves. If one undertakes every action with the presumption that it could be a 
general duty there will always turn up situations where this principle is impossible to 
follow. Thus, “duty ethics” is a beautiful vision suited to a perfect world; but the 
world is not perfect and humans are neither similar nor always rational. Nevertheless, 
Kant’s ethics can serve as a high standard for encouraging people to lifelong ethical 
self-improvement.  
The third ethical line I will describe is virtue ethics that originates in the writings 
of Aristotle, and that I already discussed in Chapter One. Aristotle created a practical 
ethics suitable for a rational creature living an active and normal human life with 
work, friends, and families. According to Aristotle’s ethics, the perfect goal is the one 
that is good in itself and which humans choose for its own sake, not because of some 
other goal (see The Nicomachean Ethics). Happiness is such a goal and another one is 
freedom. Yet, it is not a question about a solitary freedom, but a social one; good 
persons are good towards each other. Virtue for Aristotle, is a middle ground between 
two dichotomous options. Too much and too little are both unfavorable. Too much 
braveness, for example, is ‘arrogance’ and is equally as bad as the ‘cowardice’ of too 
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little bravery. The intermediate, the ‘mean’, is therefore always the best choice. 
However, if the act exhibits a vice, such as envy or malice, there is no intermediate 
option. Virtue is of two kinds: either intellectual or a matter of one’s character. 
Intellectual virtue is a result of education, and requires experience and time, whereas 
moral virtue or virtue of character is a result of habits or upbringing (ethos). When 
practicing justice, generosity and other good actions, one develops a good or virtuous 
character, according to Aristotle. Therefore, virtue is something one acquires, 
because only the inclination to virtue is inborn. Virtue is a kind of decision to be 
good, an ethos that rules one’s actions. It is not easy to be good, and it is thus 
delightful and praiseworthy. Virtue ethics makes environmental issues into problems 
that everybody has to deal with in daily situations, in the kitchen, bathroom, shop, 
car, and whenever we are and have to make big or small choices. It builds on 
considerations and decisions in which both reason and emotions are allowed to have 
their say. Viewed from a virtue ethic perspective, sustainability becomes a lifestyle, 
an ethos.  
Consequentialism can sometimes help us to decide between conflicting options, 
deontological arguments help us to see larger obligations, and virtue ethics is good in 
regard to everyday life situations. Beside the three ethical alternatives presented 
above there are also many other theories, and among them are the feministic and deep 
ecological theories that I will discuss later in this chapter. All these theories have 
advantages and disadvantages, and it might be difficult to follow the same doctrine 
consistently. However, it is also problematic to make difficult decisions without any 
guidelines. A relativistic stand is not to hold what is right or wrong, good or bad, true 
or false as any absolute standards, but as flexible, and thus depending on culture and 
situation. Nevertheless, there are basic global problems in need of definite ethical 
rules that could guide us to not get even more lost than we presently are when it 
comes to equality, survival and caring for the planet.  
 
To Change or not to Change 
 
I will now return to the position advanced in Chapter One that schooling has not 
managed in tackling environmental problems adequately. After surveying articles and 
conference proceedings in the field of environmental education, Palmer (1998) 
criticized the research for lack of rigor and for uncritically presenting success stories. 
A decade later, Cutting and Cook (2009) note the same problem. Cutting and Cook 
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base their claims on a study of more than 160 papers presented at the World 
Environmental Education Congress taking place in Durban 2007 (WEEC 2007). 
Contrary to the paper presenters that showed positive results, many keynote speakers 
pointed out the large scale lack of success and called attention to the fact that a 
generation of environmental educational work has failed to prevent global economic, 
social,
1
 and environmental crises, and that these problems even have grown worse 
(Cutting & Cook, 2009). That such problems have increased is no overstatement: 
after the failure of the UN’s Climate Change Conference in Copenhagen in December 
2009, environmental problems are more obvious than ever, and about 40 years of 
environmental education have not shown any radical change in how humans treat the 
environment. Yet, success stories concern short term results of small projects; they 
are apparently not focused on worldwide change. If the world has not seen any 
improvement in its unsustainable actions, this cannot only be blamed on insufficient 
environmental education. However eager and purposeful environmental education 
has been, it offers only marginal input over a short time span. Remedying ills that 
have developed over hundreds of year, maybe even longer, is no easy task. Even if it 
is crucial, environmental education is a marginal educational issue competing with a 
myriad of other educational interests. It cannot alone change the course of the world. 
At a practical level, this educational field is still in its cradle and so is its supporting 
research.  
Initially, people involved in the development of environmental education spent 
much time formulating aims, creating vocabulary and arguing about concepts. The 
preposition for has been problematic for years, because it brings instrumental 
associations into play. Many other terms used in the discourses, such as “democracy”, 
“citizenship”, and “empowerment” and, last but not least, “sustainable development”, 
are taken for granted as self-evident rather than critiqued (see also Wolff, 2007).  
Despite much effort, the attempts to make teachers change the world has been the 
lodestar for many stakeholders and the meager results makes it look as if the current 
situation is a failure. Environmental education was implemented with an attempt to 
change the world by changing attitudes. Both research and practice neglected the 
problem that it is impossible to make people change against their own will without 
forcing or indoctrinating them. Consequently, environmental educational research did 
not discuss how to deal with value-based concerns such as ethics and policies. 
However, researchers in the field have now gradually started to emphasize these 
perspectives. Power and values are involved in all human undertakings. Thus, the 
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choice of lifestyle is not solely an individual’s own personal option; the cause for the 
choice is to be found at many levels and, as a social system with an obvious impact, 
education is also involved. People’s relation to nature and the idea of a sustainable 
future is wedded to many social dilemmas; for example the conflict between local 
and global. On the one hand, a strong wind blows towards globalization while, on the 
other hand, there is a call for values like participation and pluralism that are much 
easier to promote in smaller communities.  
Eager environmental activists have tried to act rapidly on a slowly changing 
educational arena and have used methods that suit politics and social activism better 
than education. Even if the state of the world is unsustainable, giving up is not an 
option; new directions must be sought. Nevertheless, forcing others to live a life 
according to the principles of sustainable development or any other principles can 
never be an appropriate method for long-term change. Instead of focusing on 
changing individuals, humankind might have to make more radical changes. What, 
then, are the educational options? Can education be a tool for changing the path of 
protecting the environment or is such an undertaking hopeless? On one hand, it might 
be worthless and dim-witted to reflect on whether anyone has the right to educate 
others to take care of the earth in a situation when it is obvious that humankind risks 
steering the world to destruction. If people do not want the species to survive, then 
the species is less instinctively equipped for survival than other animals. But, 
astonishingly, that may be the case. I will leave this possibility open for the moment 
and instead reflect on how the human species has arrived as such a dangerous state. 
The second part of this chapter will try to answer that question.  
 
2.2 Whodunits: The Search for Scapegoats  
 
What are the sources of environmental problems? This question has many answers, 
since there are many reasons offered for why humans’ relation to nature has become 
so troublesome. It is almost impossible to list all explanations for why humankind has 
entered this situation, but I will identify some possible answers, both typical and rare, 
and will comment on them. The focus of attention will thus move towards education 
from a philosophical angle, and the philosophical arguments will confront non-
philosophical stances, as well. So, the whodunits story can begin.  
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Christianity as the First Suspect 
 
When agreeing that environmental problems are at least partially a result of socio-
ethical consequences, one can start reflecting on the kind of obstacles that underlie 
human beings’ increasing problems in relation to nature and the environment. There 
are many explanations for such problems. To begin with, there is a common notion in 
environmental philosophy that the ecological crisis is rooted in Christianity, entwined 
with Ancient Greek philosophy, especially the ideas of Plato. Environmental 
philosophers have often blamed the development of science and technology, 
including a lot of negative impact on the environment from the originally 
Christian―and increasingly globally extended―idea of human beings as ‘the crown 
of creation’. With humans seen as the pinnacle of God’s creation, they are granted the 
moral right to utilize nature however they see fit (see, e.g., Attfield, 1994; Belshaw, 
2001; Suutala, 1990).  
 
And God said, Let us make man in our image, after our likeness: and let them 
have dominion over the fish of the sea, and over the fowl of the air, and over the 
cattle, and over all the earth, and over every creeping thing that crept upon the 
earth. (Genesis 1: 26, King James Bible) 
 
In particular, White (1967) accuses the Old Testament for rejecting nature’s holiness 
and promoting the human right to domination over the natural world. The 
Renaissance and the Enlightenment were eras that fomented change in the 
relationship of humans to nature, according to Belshaw (2001). In Renaissance 
thought, human superiority over other creatures followed two lines; on the one hand, 
the human being was regarded as a godlike creature and, on the other hand, as God’s 
knight (Suutala, 1990). Both visions allowed humans to control the rest of the nature. 
Nonetheless, through the entirety of Western history there have been both defenders 
of and antagonists to the idea of human superiority over other creatures (e.g., Attfield, 
1994). The same variation exists in received opinions about how humans are allowed 
to treat other animals. As I will show in Chapter Four, this was a common discourse 
topic in the 17
th
 and 18
th
 centuries and not only included animals, but also plants and 
minerals. 
The problems do not necessarily disappear when denying the image of a divine 
Creator organizing His creation in a strict order with human beings on top as the most 
advanced and rational of all creatures. Controversially, or maybe more because of a 
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long Christian tradition, even human beings without belief in any creator can start to 
take on the Creator’s role themselves. More and more sophisticated bio-technologic 
experiments with genetic material and technologizing of the human brain
56
 in so 
called cutting edge research makes it look like high-tech human beings have taken on 
the roles of deities themselves these days. However, the Christian message can also 
be interpreted in another way with another influence on how human being treats 
nature. In this contrary version, concern for nature and other species is the direct 
outcome of Christianity’s pastoral matrix and human beings as ‘God’s copy’ take on 
the role of a vice-shepherd for the rest of the creation instead of taking on an 
oppressor’s role. In addition, the altruistic message in the New Testament can in turn 
also endorse equality among people.  
Clark (1997) rejects the idea that Platonism and the Abrahamic religions
57
 
strongly influenced by Platonism are the scapegoats of environmental problems, and 
he insists that it was the Platonists who called attention to humans’ obligations 
towards other creatures (see also Attfield, 1994). Plato and Aristotle regarded human 
beings equal to other parts of nature, according to Suutala (1996), who instead 
accuses the Romans for putting humans in the master position. Yet, Plato’s view of 
the body and the soul is very different from Aristotle’s. In Plato’s dialogue, The 
Statesman (271e-272a), a shepherd god was watching over the first humans who in 
turn watched over the other creatures, and all lived together in peace. Nevertheless, 
no one can deny that the natural world is a rare topic in Plato’s writings and that 
human beings, especially their souls, are the main concern; however, the whole 
cosmos has a central place in the Timaeus dialogue.  
Among many post-Aristotelian philosophers and Neo-Platonists, ‘nature’ came to 
play a vital role. In particular, the Stoics saw the goal of life as harmony with nature, 
but they regarded humans as different than non-rational animals (Carone, 2001). 
From this, it does not logically follow that humans, despite being intelligently 
superior to other animals, have a right to utilize the rest of nature for their own 
purposes. Björk (2000) emphasizes that the Hebrews never divided creation into any 
subject-object relation but, instead, saw the two as interrelated. The human relation to 
others, the natural world, and God was a contract based on loyalty and trust. ‘Faith’ 
was a life-supporting verb, an activity, but the Hebraic thinkers prioritized humans 
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and their relation to God over their relation to nature (ibid.). Obviously, according to 
the Ancient philosophers and the Bible, the way humans relate to the rest of nature 
can be interpreted in several ways, and can suit opposite purposes. These questions 
are difficult and need further study. Since Lynn White 1967 blamed Christianity for 
the ecological crisis, ecotheology has been a growing research field worldwide. The 
ecotheologists try to protect the exploitation of nature and to shape an understanding 
and willingness to prevent environmental problems using scriptural arguments.  
Obviously, Christianity is not the only religion, and other places in the world 
having other religions have followed other lines of development. Yet, is there a 
connection between religion and technical and economical development? China, 
which once was at the forefront of technical innovation, is an example of a region 
without a strong Christian tradition. This example illustrates the difficulty of using 
Christianity as a scapegoat for environmental problems. A comparison between 
Europe and China actually show both certain similarities and differences regarding 
treatment of the environment. China’s main religions, Confucianism, Taoism 
(Daoism), and Buddhism are more like philosophies, but this fusion of religions did 
not prevent achievements in technological development before Europe. During the 
classical era
58
 Chinese philosophers, especially Taoists, criticized hierarchical 
attitudes towards nature (Holm, 2003; Lai, 2001), but there is a diversity of Chinese 
views of nature (Elvin, 2004; Lai, 2001). A typical Chinese notion is a creator who 
constantly reshapes the cosmos. The resulting relation to nature is a mixture of 
utilization and love (Elvin, 2004). Chinese society has a strong tradition of rituals and 
powerful leaderships linked mainly to Confucianism values and practices (Holm, 
2003; Roberts, 2007). As with Christianity, one can blame Chinese religions-
philosophies for both promoting and not promoting sustainable utilization of nature. 
It is frequently overlooked that many discoveries and ingredients essential for 
industrial development were originally Ancient Asian and often Chinese (see 
Diamond, 1997; Goody, 2006; Musgrave, 1999; Roberts, 2007). China was initially a 
leader
59
 of technical development; with pressure on the environment most certainty 
higher than in Europe. But Chinese industrialization slowed in the 18
th
 century while 
European jumped to the forefront with the Industrial Revolution (see Diamond, 1997; 
Elvin, 2004; Musgrave, 1999). The Chinese did not re-join the race until the 1980s, 
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 In the 13
th
 century, there was no European technological or industrial invention unfamiliar to the Chinese 
people. The Chinese invented the compass, the art of printing and gunpowder (Sörlin & Öckerman, 1998). 
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after Mao Zedong’s death60 rejects any Christian influence on Europe’s so-called 
“Scientific Revolution.” Because Christianity flourished in the entire Mid-Eastern 
Mediterranean area, and the Old Testament has a partly nomadic and Semitic 
background, he does not even count Christian values as typical European. He also 
argues that it is Eurocentric and occidental narrow-minded to stress the development 
of Western ‘civilization’ as superior to human progress in other parts of the world. He 
maintains that, although there are differences between east and west, there has not 
been any radical discontinuity between the development processes of Asia and 
Europe. A similar development took place throughout Eurasia at the time in west of 
much appreciated Greco-Roman antiquity and, since then, development has 
fluctuated, but not as much as European historians often want to claim (ibid.). 
Between 1000 and 1450 AD science and technology came to Europe from the 
Muslim countries and, at that time, China had a vastly developed technology 
(Diamond, 1997).  
According to Diamond (1997), China lost its political and technological lead to 
Europe because of politics. He argues that it was advantageous for innovations to find 
ground in a Europe that consisted of many small principalities and states in contrast 
to how easily leaders could impede improvement in a large, united China (see also 
Roberts, 2007). Europe had an advantage in the 17
th 
and 18
th
 centuries because of 
corporate organizational frameworks and financial structures. However, neither 
European technology nor goods were superior to the Chinese, not even the quality of 
production methods (Musgrave, 1999). However, these explanations are but partial 
explanations of a complex phenomenon, and Diamond’s argument in particular is not 
convincing enough, despite his points about the difference between a geographically 
split Europe and a united China. In the 18
th
 and early 19
th
 century, China suffered 
from serious floods, and this may have caused the large-scale clearing of forests 
(Marks, 1998). During the 19
th
 century, the political situation there was unstable 
because of both internal conflicts and foreign invasions, and the beginning of the 20
th
 
century was very turbulent. Conflicts and the financing of wars, state as well as 
regional policy, land use and landownership, cultivation methods and industrial 
technology, leadership, and so on, are all noteworthy elements that had an effect on 
industrial achievements and environmental conditions (see, e.g., Elvin, 2004; Marks, 
1998; Moulder, 1977; Steingart, 2008). In China, a huge population and massive 
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irrigation systems affected development, and notable trade and articles for 
consumption, such as silk, rice, opium and tea, played remarkable political roles that 
even put China under Western control.  
Although Europe had once passed China in the scientific and technologic 
development race, today China struggles with huge environmental problems, much 
greater than Europe has ever had. No ways of reaching the world’s economical top 
position are small in the China of today, according to Steingart (2008). Nothing 
resembling the rapid Chinese industrial development has taken place anywhere else 
since the 19
th
 century European industrialization. At the cost of despoiling nature and 
the suffering of millions of child workers, China pays its price (ibid.). And 
Christianity cannot explain the Chinese example.
61
 Communism is an atheistic 
ideology and, besides religion, elements such as politics, economy, population 
dynamics, cross-boundary movements of goods and people all influence 
development. Thus, many other human factors have an important impact on how 
humans treat nature. Not only humans, but also physical fundamentals and barriers 
have regulated the spread of innovations in earlier times and China, like the Fertile 
Crescent, had the great advantage of positive agricultural conditions (Diamond, 
1997). In conclusion, from the very beginning, the successes and failures of 
industrialization have been an intricate process with a changing focal point and can 
not be directly blamed on Christianity. Nonetheless, neither Christianity nor other 
religions can be regarded as completely above suspicion, but it is more a question of 
how religious texts have been interpreted than of following clear religious values. I 
will return to this point at the end of this chapter and in Chapter Four, and will again 
discuss the issue once more in Chapter Seven. 
 
Dualistic Splitting and Biases 
 
It is also possible to consider the foundation of the environmental dilemma as 
dualistic biases, because it is well-known that humans have a tendency to split their 
conception of the world into two opposing aspects or elements. One of the oldest and 
best-known dichotomies is the Taoist distinction between yin and yang, symbolically 
pictured in black and white. The yin-yang dichotomies are not completely distinct; 
they are searching for harmony in a constant, mutual transformational process, while 
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other opponents are more stable and apart. Other opposites are good-bad, virtuous-
vice, reason-emotion, body-soul, male-female, Western-Nonwestern, developed-
undeveloped, and human-nonhuman. 
 
Gender 
The gender split is a dualism that has come to attention in discourses about the 
environment and as linked to human utilization of the natural world. Yet, the image 
of women is not definite but shifts according to time and location. In Western 
thinking, the image of women has been both positive and negative: on the one hand, a 
positive image of a fertile Mother Earth or a virgin nymph delivering peace and 
serenity, on the other hand, a negative image of an evil being who brought plagues, 
famines, and tempests (Merchant, 1980). Plato had already regarded men as superior 
to women (e.g., trans. 2006, Timaeus, 91). A strong negative female image during the 
Middle Ages and Renaissance was the witch. She was a symbol of evil in nature; she 
was a chaotic feature that needed to be controlled (ibid.).  
Eco-feminism or “ecological feminism” is a broad term for several perspectives 
that emphasize a connection between the suppression of (especially) women, but also 
children and other groups, and the suppression of the natural world (Plumwood, 
1994; Warren, 1994). Fraqoise d’Eaubonne first introduced the term “eco-feminism” 
in 1974, and called for an ecological revolution to address both the oppression of 
nature and gender biases (Warren, 2000). What on a whole distinguishes eco-
feminism from non-feminists views of humans’ interference in nature is that 
ecofeminist ethics is based on the assumption that there are similarities between the 
domination of woman and of nature and, ecofeminism is, therefore, a critique of 
diverse social systems of domination (e.g., Warren & Cheney, 1991). In ecofeminst 
studies historical, religious, literary, political, ethical, and epistemological 
perspectives are relevant (Warren, 1994). The Rio Declaration pointed out the role of 
women in environmental management and development and The Johannesburg 
Declaration stressed empowerment of women and gender equality in the work for a 
sustainable development (Gough, 2004). Moreover, the UN has appointed women to 
key positions in the management of natural resources (Elmhirst & Resurreccion, 
2008).  
The ecological feminists’ critique of Western cultures calls attention to value 
dualism that, in addition to feminine-masculine, includes value-pairs, such as reason-
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nature, mental-manual, civilized-primitive, and human-nature. Men mostly control 
scientific knowledge, while women’s knowledge is considered useless and even 
dangerous, according to Davion (2001). Plumwood (1994) connects the oppression of 
nature to Eurocentrism, colonialism and a habit of treating indigenous people as 
‘primitive’ and sub-rational. While women’s skills, values and needs are ignored in 
most cultures, sexist language, media and science contribute to regarding males as 
superior to women, according to Winter (2002), who drastically draws a line from 
gender biases to poverty and overpopulation that ends up in environmental 
destruction. However, new eco-feministic perspectives connect nature to social and 
political relations and thus analyze contexts instead of focusing on differences 
between men’s and women’s environmental engagement. Instead of a focus on men 
versus women, issues such as nature management, environmental problems, and 
gender biases are put in the framework of neo-liberalism and thus globalization, trade 
liberalization, and social reproduction (Elmhirst & Resurreccion, 2008). This does 
not do away with the topic of gender bias vis-à-vis nature, but puts it in a broader, 
more wide-ranging power complex. In addition, gender is becoming a more flexible 
concept, where the attributes of being ‘female’ and ‘male’ are not so distinct 
anymore.  
 
Soul and body  
Gender-specific attributes also apply to the soul-body dualism often seen as rooted in 
a Cartesian
62
 splitting of mind from body. Historically, the sensing body is bound to 
an idealist tradition that, since Plato, has given the mind higher priority than the 
body; more exactly, knowledge derived from reason has been held to be 
higher―more universal―than sensory knowledge. While René Descartes was a 
substance dualist, who saw the body and soul as two distinct substances, Plato 
thought the body was a negative copy of the divine and immaterial soul. Plato 
describes a myth about the creation of the world in his dialogue Timaeus, and in this 
myth the soul is the ruler of the body (Timaeus, 35a; see also, Phaedo, 106-116). 
According to Plato the body hinders humans from thinking. Bodily sensation disturbs 
the attention of the soul and its search for truth. The body has desires and these cause 
disagreement and war, so that humans no longer recognize what truth is. Humans are 
slaves of their bodies and they are, therefore, not free until they are released from 
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their bodies. To reach the highest virtue, true wisdom is only possible when a human 
is dead and the body separated from the soul (Phaedo, 106-116). In Plato’s 
philosophy a human is a creature situated between the world of ideas and the world of 
sensations (or perceptions). The real life of the soul is in the world of ideas, and time 
on earth is only a bodily period because the soul exists before and after in the world 
of ideas that is the superior world of human (e.g., Laws, 894e-897b; Phaedo, 70c-
72d; Phaedrus, 245c-248e; Republic, 608c-611a). While Plato regards the soul as 
immortal, he implied it had lived and died so many times that it had seen but 
forgotten all things by birth and thus had to learn them again through “recalling” its 
hidden knowledge (Meno, 81c-d). Both Plato and Aristotle regarded the soul as the 
cause of everything (Plato’s Laws; Aristotle’s On the Soul). 
However, with his view of humans in relation to other animals Aristotle was more 
advanced than what was the rule for many hundred years following. In On the Parts 
of Animals Aristotle praised the entire natural world: 
Every realm of nature is marvellous: and as Heraclitus, when the strangers who 
came to visit him found him warming himself at the furnace in the kitchen and 
hesitated to go in, reported to have bidden them not to be afraid to enter, as even 
in that kitchen divinities were present, so we should venture on the study of every 
kind of animal without distaste; for each and all will reveal to us something 
natural and something beautiful. Absence of haphazard and conduciveness of 
everything to an end are to be found in Nature’s works in the highest degree, and 
the resultant end of her generations and combinations is a form of the beautiful. 
(Aristotle, On The Parts of Animals, trans. 1994-2009, Book I, Part 5) 
In opposition to the custom today, Aristotle discusses the human body in comparison 
to other animals without making any important distinction (for example comparing 
the stomachs of humans and dogs in The History of Animals). In On the Parts of 
Animals, he claims: “If any person thinks the examination of the rest of the animal 
kingdom an unworthy task, he must hold in like disesteem the study of man” 
(Aristotle, On the Parts of Animals, trans. 1994-2009a, Book I, Part 5). In On the 
Soul Aristotle sees the soul as the cause of the living body, regardless of whether that 
body is an animal or a plant (nutritive soul). All animals have a sensitive soul, but the 
human soul is the only one that is rational. The soul is the source of movement, the 
end and the essence of the whole living body; it is not separable from the body.  
In many traditions, nature (including the animal part of humans, the body) has 
been deemed to be something organic and physically alienated from the existential 
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states of mind. The Christian church fathers connected sinfulness with the body, 
sensuality, and sexuality, while they regarded the soul as divine (Suutala, 1990). 
There are however, many Christian views of the relationship between body and soul; 
likewise, there are always new views of how Plato, Aristotle, and Descartes looked 
upon the relationship between humans and the rest of the natural world. Yet, a 
dualistic split between soul and body is undeniable throughout history. This view has 
favored the soul as rational or divine—or even as both rational and divine—and in 
opposition to nature and the body. 
In Willamo’s (2005) opinion, education primarily has sought to promote talents 
that split human beings from their relations with nature. Knowledge and books have 
shaped human being’s relation to outer world, while humans have had to deny the 
grounding of the body in nature. Willamo also stresses that human beings can never 
step away from their place in nature and, therefore, he deems it problematic when 
nature is presented objectively, as something apart from human nature’s biological 
roots. The only nature that receives attention, then, is a negative and problematic one. 
   
Environmental protection is like couple therapy for the relationship between 
culture and nature―we apply therapy when the relationship is harsh. But, the 
relationship includes much more than problems, and a good therapist also studies 
the relationship holistically, even though the most crucial aim is to solve the 
problems. If the problems fill up the mass media, the language and our thoughts, 
it becomes more and more difficult for us to see the environment and our relation 
to it as an entirety, in which the problems represent only one dimension.
63
 
(Willamo, 2005, p. 285, Wolff’s trans.)   
 
In a world experiencing increasing environmental problems, the Enlightenment ideal, 
whether in modern or postmodern versions, that emphasized human reason on behalf 
of body and nature might turn out too one-dimensional. It is hard to deny that a 
human being is a holistic entity that consists of consciousness as well as body; a 
biological creature and a thinking one. In that light, female and male features, reason 
and emotions, are equivalent and both women and men have the same rights and 
responsibilities independently of their gender roles.  
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Holism 
Humans have split their own being into two separate parts, mind and body, but have 
divided education into many distinct disciplines. Since the Tbilisi Conference, 
researchers have often recommended that environmental education should be viewed 
holistically (e.g., Palmer & Neal, 1994; Pittman, 2004; Sterling, 2004). Yet, a holistic 
educational approach can be implemented in many ways and on many levels. On one 
hand, methods can be holistic, so that cognitive reflection, bodily experiences and 
aesthetic contemplation simultaneously intertwine. On the other hand, educational 
content can be arranged holistically into an interdisciplinary topic. Instead of splitting 
the issue into many subjects, an interdisciplinary approach deals with the topic from 
many disciplines; for example, jointly from chemical, biological, and historical 
perspectives.  
Holism can also be an approach to organizational change that starts from each 
individual and ends up with a new and transparent educational organization in which 
the sustainable aspects become a part of the entire institutional life (see Pittman, 
2004; Wolff, 2002). Sometimes these kinds of holistic organizations copy ecological 
models in nature (cf. Pittman, 2004; Sterling, 2004). In indigenous education, “a 
principle of totality” or “holism” (Muzzin, 2005, p. 128) implies shaping situations 
where collective knowledge, in its diverse form of stories, art, songs, ceremonies, 
prayers, and so on, is used to shape understanding of the people’s relationship with 
the natural world. Still another kind of holism involves “transdisciplinary 
approaches” used in environmental management and sustainability negotiations 
where representatives from different fields of knowledge meet to discuss shared 
concerns; for example, various academic disciplines, policymakers, artists, and 
farmers (see, e.g., Fish, 2008). 
Finally, a holistic view may imply something more than the manner of 
implementation. It may entail the way human beings consider their roles in nature 
and that the educator’s worldview has considerable consequences for such 
instruction. As opposed to the anthropocentric view described just above, where 
human beings are held to be superior to other parts of nature, instruction where the 
educator considers human beings as equal to the rest of the nature, neither superior 
nor inferior, can produce greatly different outcomes. The most radical variant of this 
eco-centric view is deep ecology that has taken many forms joint by an ethics that 
gives all parts of nature an intrinsic value. Inspired by Mohandas Gandhi (also known 
as Mahatma Gandhi) and Baruch de Spinoza, the Norwegian philosopher Arne Næss 
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was the first who uttered the terms deep and shallow ecology. “Shallow ecology” 
stands for the tendency to value humans as superior to all that belongs to the non-
human world, which consists of an endless number of disconnected objects for them 
to utilize (Fox, 2003). In contrast, “deep ecology” sees humans as part of a nature, 
where all elements are connected and flexible. While the “shallow” metaphor leans 
on economic growth, the “deep” metaphor is based on ecological sustainability. 
“Deep ecology” emphasizes the necessity of listening to one’s own intuition in 
situations when nobody else can prove it to be wrong (ibid.). Næss (2003) believed in 
coherent thoughts and actions and underscored that the environmentalists cannot be 
reliable educators if they hide what they believe in: 
 
Conservation strategies are more eagerly implemented by people who love what 
they are conserving, and who are convinced that what they love is loveable. Such 
lovers do not want to hide their attitudes and values, rather they will increasingly 
give voice to them in public. They possess a genuine ethics of conservation, not 
merely a tactically useful instrument for human survival. (Næss, 2003, pp. 263-
264) 
 
A basic norm of deep ecology is “self-realization”, but since all belongs to the same 
entity, “Self-realization aims at realizing for all beings!” (Næss, 2003, p. 273); or, in 
other words, “Maximize symbiosis!” that follows from “Maximize diversity!” (ibid.). 
Thus, there are “just as many ecosophies as there are supporters” (Næss, 2002, p. 
101). In line with Gandhi, Næss warned about the tendency of having a high living 
standard as a life project, as well as trying to solve environmental problems with help 
of technology. Instead, he underscored the need for gentle, joint human efforts and 
more responsibility and tenderness towards all living things. Gandhi (1938) 
distinguishes between the conventional meaning of the word civilization and real 
civilization, where the latter deals with duties and morality. Morality is the practice of 
controlling oneself and both one’s physical and mental desires. When a person is able 
to master her or his own desires, then she or he has attained self-knowledge and 
happiness, a mode Gandhi calls Swaraj. Spinoza considered God and the world as a 
unity; every single part of nature is both a part of the world and a part of God. 
Spinoza
64
 wanted to endorse an ethics that could inspire people in different contexts 
to take action on behalf of this entirety and, following this inspiration, Næss 
developed deep ecology into a philosophy of partly practical character. He called this 
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philosophy ecosophy T,
65
 which is an ideology based on deep reflections and actions 
towards a total understanding of the relationship between human beings and other 
biotic systems (e.g., Næss, 1973/1981). Yet, it is also an ideology emphasizing 
mutual human relationships. The goal of this ethics is suggestive of the goal of 
sustainable development articulated in the Brundtland report, but it includes if, and 
this simple word “if” is the element that entails freedom.  
 
In human relations today, there is one universal precept which is particularly 
important, namely, that we ought to arrange our lives in such a way that others 
can also live like us, if they so wish.
66
 (Næss, 2002, p. 115) 
 
This open-ended formulation is crucial. It contrasts with behavior modification and 
relates to Rousseau’s view of education for freedom. In addition, this sentence talks 
about present reality, not a visionary future.  While it is impossible to increase the 
living standard for the world’s entire population to the Western standard, Næss 
(2002) asks for another kind of Western education, an education that puts more 
emphasizes on emotional maturing and trains feelings for the joy of life and how to 
take pleasure in simple things. This leads us to the question if education might be the 
scapegoat. 
 
Education that Forgot Nature 
 
In addition to Christianity and dualism, a third cause of suspicion could be that 
education has actually led people to neglect nature instead of the opposite (e.g., 
O’Sullivan, 1999; Peltonen, 1997; Wolff, 2008). Perhaps education has facilitated the 
view of humankind as superior by emphasizing nature utilization and human cultural 
life more than the human role as a biological creature. Societies have for ages, 
probably as long as human beings have existed, striven to, on the one hand, foster 
individuals who are capable of making their own living and, on the other hand, make 
a positive contribution to society. It is often obvious that a particular education 
system at a particular time prioritizes both of these aims. Both can have many 
different implications; focus on the individual can emphasize everything from that 
individuals shall be free to choose their own way of life to achieving a vocation and 
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earning money to support that way of life. As regards society, aims can differ from 
promoting some kind of democracy and citizenship to educating people into a 
particular economic system. The attempt to educate individuals and members of 
society can also be distinguished in two other ways: an education for transformation 
promotes a predestined or indefinite change, while an education for transmission of 
the status quo resists change. In addition to focusing on the individual or society, a 
third source of influence is religion or divine curiosity.  
When religion plays a main part in education it strives to foster worship and 
prepare for a faith-guided earthly life and an afterlife in paradise. It is true that the 
influence of religion since the Enlightenment has gradually declined in countries with 
a Christian tradition and religious values are increasingly sidestepped by secular 
(even profane) ideals. Nevertheless, the impact of religion on education and society is 
still very apparent in many parts of the world, places with Christian religions and 
those with other religions. When education focuses on religion, the soul is the main 
target, not the body or the natural world.  
Life in accordance with nature has never achieved a role comparable with any of 
the three mentioned targets of Western education: not the individual life, not the 
social life, and not even a heavenly life, and none of these three aims essentially 
emphasizes nature. Instead, education about nature has been assessed in the same 
way as mathematics, language or history: only as a subject of secondary concern 
compared with more profound educational ambitions. Not until the middle of the 20
th
 
century, when the future human life on earth appeared to be threatened, was a new 
interest in environmental education awoken, but even then it is still more of an ‘add 
on’ to the curricula than as a central interest. Despite the fact that the human species 
is very dependent on a healthy planet as its habitat, and always has been, education 
has put nature aside for too long and treated it as a secondary concern. Education has 
promoted utilization of the natural world as a resource, and nature has been regarded 
as a place, a tool or an object to help humans maintain their life functions, to develop 
their societies and cultures. But, it has seldom been seen as something worthy enough 
of love and respect to study or enjoy for its own sake, without instrumental purposes.  
 
Modern Education 
Although education has a very old history, the Enlightenment faith in knowledge, 
science, and reason based on logical thinking denoted a significant educational shift 
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and a brave hope that increased education could lead to existential improvements for 
all humankind. In the late 18
th
 and early 19
th
 centuries, German Enlightenment 
philosophers referred to the concept of Bildung
67
 as a promising holistic educational 
approach for developing humankind―an approach that tried to cast off the yokes 
from the church and a restrictive society. The role of education was to culturally 
‘shape’ individuals and thereby transform society (Masschelein & Ricken, 2003; 
Siljander, 2002). The modern Bildung concept is built on the belief in individuals 
whose action competence is based on rationality, and who are prepared to transform 
both themselves and society in an open-ended process, according to Siljander (2002). 
However, Masschelein and Ricken (2003, p. 140), on the other hand, emphasize that 
“Bildung points principally towards individual self-realisation and selfelevation in all 
spheres of social reproduction and therefore breaks through the essentially 
affirmative character of Erziehung,”68 and is not open-ended.  
The Bildung approach has its roots in the Ancient Greek concept of Paideia and 
is thus built on a completely anthropocentric humanistic principle with human needs 
as its central concern. Bildung is the individual’s conversation with self, but Bildung 
does not come about of itself; it is dependent on an education in which criticism of 
the present circumstances is allowed. Bildung, like Paideia, is one of many dreams 
that human beings have envisioned according to the tradition that education can 
gradually change the world to be a better place for people. Bildung recognizes that 
human beings have intrinsic possibilities for self-improvement but also the capacity 
for joining together in the further development of society. However, the assumption 
of the human being as a dynamic rational being capable of actions that can transform 
the immediate present can also be seen as a concealed control mechanism that strives 
toward “normalization” (see Masschelein & Ricken, 2003). 
Pragmatic educational approaches have built on Dewey’s democratic proposal. In 
his renowned 1916 book, Democracy and Education, Dewey argues that education 
has to take place with both the individual and the individual’s position in democratic 
society in mind, and he strongly believed in a practical approach. Ideas similar to 
those of the pragmatic scientific outlook that he unveiled in The Quest for Certainty 
(Dewey, 1929) were employed to the education of young people. Dewey stressed the 
democratic task of education, with the intention being that young people who are 
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allowed to take part in diverse social activities will develop into responsible members 
of society. If knowledge does not influence the formation of social life, but only 
develops self-centered experts, it has failed in its mission, according to Dewey 
(1916/2006).  
Dewey was skeptical of German education based on Bildung, which had served 
as a model for American education in the 19
th
 century; especially the ideas of 
Friedrich Herbart (see Dewey, 1916/2006). While Herbart emphasized educational 
aims chosen according to universal ethics, Dewey stressed the practical use of 
knowledge, arguing that the conception of education as a social process is 
meaningless without having a certain kind of society in mind. When Kant 
(1803/1900) defined education as the process by which man becomes man, Dewey 
accordingly situated learning in a social setting, responding that man becomes man 
through interaction. He stressed the problem (still a gap) between the global and the 
national requirements for education. The arts, sciences, and trades are transnational 
interests, but smaller societies need to promote social talents and civic commitment. 
Dewey criticized both the emphasizing of cosmopolitan and of national (nation state) 
educational aims, and regarded both as incomplete. His aim was to free the potentials 
of individuals and, at the same time, to encourage their social development. There is, 
however, a great difference between the Bildung tradition and Dewey’s view of 
nature and science. He did not spare his words, when he criticized the development of 
science:  
Thus while in fact the progress of science was increasing man's power over 
nature, enabling him to place his cherished ends on a firmer basis than ever before, 
and also to diversify his activities almost at will, the philosophy which professed to 
formulate its accomplishments reduced the world to a barren and monotonous 
redistribution of matter in space. Thus the immediate effect of modern science was to 
accentuate the dualism of matter and mind, and thereby to establish the physical and 
the humanistic studies as two disconnected groups. (Dewey, 1916/2006, pp. 258-259) 
In Dewey’s (1916/2006) opinion, human affairs cannot be split from nature since 
humans are very dependent on the natural world as their home. History shows that 
humans are not aliens in nature; he even argued that research has to be based on the 
methods used in the natural sciences. Dewey opposed fragmentary studies of nature:  
 
Nature and the earth should be equivalent terms, and so should earth study and 
nature study..... When nature is treated as a whole, like the earth in its relations, 
its phenomena fall into their natural relations of sympathy and association with 
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human life, and artificial substitutes are not needed. (Dewey, 1916/2006, pp. 194-
195) 
  
For Dewey, nature was a basic topic for education, and should not be sidestepped by 
literary or humanistic interests. In Experience and Nature, Dewey tried to explain 
that human’s experience is founded in nature. Dewey’s research was 
interdisciplinary: he dealt with education, social philosophy, logic, aesthetics, social 
psychology, naturalism, and philosophy. He had a great interest in science, but never 
as a means solely for technical development and economic progress. Even though he 
criticized the German Idealists, his ideas were initially rooted in that tradition, and he 
had a dream of a morally better society (see, e.g., Carr, 2004; Fallace, 2008). 
However, his successors followed his pragmatic ideas and the scientific method, but 
they did not retain his critiques concerning nature and society (Dalton, 2001). 
Nonetheless, Dewey emphasized participation, cooperative learning, and interactive 
methods that can be beneficial when teaching about complex environmental 
problems. 
Dewey managed to combine scientific and democratic principles in his 
educational vision, and in combination with Enlightenment ideals, these ideas (even 
if dampened) created the foundation of American education and have had an obvious 
influence on the education in many other regions, such as in Europe. Bildung, 
however, has been stronger in Europe. Bildung and pragmatism have both served as 
philosophical bases for educational development in many parts of the world until the 
present and have had a great influence on diverse forms of education, not only in 
Western countries (see, e.g., Bowen, 1981; Eby, 1952; Liedman, 1997). However, 
neither seems to have been sufficient to meet the needs of a world facing 
environmental problems. According to Bauer (1997, 2003), Bildung per se cannot be 
accused for causing the environmental problems, but the route it has taken has 
loosened its connection to social contexts. Carr and Kemmis (1986) call Dewey the 
last of the “grand theory” philosophers who searched to situate education in the 
framework of a larger social theory. However, the ideas of the grand theorists have 
generally been followed only in parts.  
History has mostly dealt with human culture as separate from natural history, and 
even human history is often taught from a very short time-span. One philosopher 
(von Wright, 1994) skeptically asked if humanism actually carries the seed of its own 
destruction. It seems as if the gap between humans and the rest of nature is constantly 
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renewed by humanism’s focus on human development. In that situation it will be a 
tremendous task to reverse the trend and to bridge the gap between humans and 
nature. However, it is questionable how much of a role education is able to continue 
to play in narrowing the gap. Uljens (2000) stresses that it is impossible to solve 
crucial global problems only by means of ‘objective’ information that is free from 
political and ethical considerations. A related point is, that politics and education are 
not the same thing; they have different roles to play. Education cannot be the only 
tool for creating society because it is not the task of education to define the good 
society (ibid.); instead, it is the ongoing role of education to discuss what the good 
life might be (Uljens, 2004b).  
 
The Dream of Perfectibility 
The strong belief in education as a tool for correcting failures and attaining given 
goals has a long history. Human knowledge has been seen as constantly expanding 
and, similarly, humans as progressing in the direction of, if not a completely perfect 
state, at least an increasingly more perfect state of being (Passmore, 1970). Such 
perfection can involve development of technical skills that result in better 
performance of particular tasks; but it also includes improvement in reaching 
particular teleological states, such as happiness or well-being. A third mode of 
perfection is obedience to the commands of authority. Society, nature or God can set 
such tasks, ends, or dictates. The perfect state is infinite and thus ideal. If this ideal 
model is God, humans have striven to become more godlike; if the ideal is nature, 
they seek to be more natural. The ideal has also been to meet some other standard, 
such as becoming a perfect citizen in a perfect society. The physical body, however, 
has often been seen as a hindrance and, therefore, the most perfect state has not been 
possible in this life. Another path for the individual than death has been to cast off the 
bodily yoke and search for another mental state through meditation or by the use of 
drugs. Still another option for reaching perfectibility is the new interest in eugenics: 
perfection of humankind by genetically manipulating the birth process (ibid.). 
Utopian writers have played with ideas about super humans and ideal societies. There 
is, however, still a gap between belief in a perfect human being and actually 
becoming perfect. Many real examples show that humans are still far from perfect 
and contemporary dystopia authors (e.g., science fiction authors) hardly believe in 
any future human improvement. Until his last days Næss (2002), however, believed 
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in a human transition from a lower degree of perfection to a higher through a self-
transforming process. The direction he pointed to was an active change towards a 
more joyful life and more positive feelings towards all other creatures.  
Orr (2004) is no friend of perfectibility; at least not with the help of different 
kinds of knowledge. According to him, it is a myth that human knowledge leads to 
increased wisdom and goodness, to a more perfect state of being, because he does not 
believe that human intelligence can ever safely manage the world. That ignorance is a 
solvable problem and that human can comprehend all the world matters he regards as 
myths, since education has not improved the state of humankind. He calls for 
measuring the result of education in terms of increased human decency and how well 
we manage to live within the limits of the natural world. Actually, he is afraid that 
some form of ignorance that may become disastrous will follow every step of 
advanced knowledge. With this he wants to imply that many scientific advances have 
brought with them severe environmental problems. Thirdly, Orr lists one of von 
Wright’s (e.g., 1986) main argument in the social development debate, the myth that 
the management of the earth will be possible with advanced knowledge and 
technology. Orr’s and von Wright’s arguments are not falsifiable, but neither are they 
conclusive. They are drawn too categorically: although knowledge alone may not 
save the earth, knowledge is not merely a bad thing, and fallacy can sometimes lead 
to something good. The definition of knowledge is crucial here. In von Wright’s 
(1993) opinion, the myth of continuous economic growth and expansion has outpaced 
non-scientific and non-technical knowledge as irrational or affective. That means that 
only Western rational knowledge is true knowledge. It is a myth to believe that 
science and technology lead to happiness (ibid.). The knowledge Orr (2004) criticizes 
has deep roots in modernity—that is, the Enlightenment—and is widely and quickly 
produced and distributed, but he is not without hope for the role of education if the 
view of knowledge changes. He seeks knowledge that can neither be produced 
quickly nor rapidly distributed, but that is reflected on and felt. Such a process may 
take time, so it makes humans realize that they are of the earth and live in cycles of 
birth and death; that the body responds to the earthly rhythms of light and darkness 
and changes of seasons just like other living things on this planet (ibid.). This 
argument brings in a new question, namely, if humans see themselves as a part nature 
or not. 
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Human Nature vis-à-vis Nature 
  
Although I already raised doubts that Christianity is a main source of our 
environmental problems, it is still not free from the scapegoat label. To start with, in 
the Christian tradition nature the human body, especially the female one, has been 
regarded as immoral, housing evil desires and passions. Therefore, according to this 
view, nature needs a rational masculine ruling mind that is more divine than the 
female’s sinful and material body that belongs to nature. Secondly, when it comes to 
Bildung, the concept originates in the world Bild that means picture. This could entail 
that humans who have obtained Bildung have become more akin to the picture of 
God and that they then might have the godlike right to treat nature according to their 
personal desires. Bildung can also be a verb, and then it means build or form. From a 
strictly pragmatic angle, education has to primarily provide workers and citizens with 
vocational training and thus promote the wellbeing of society. Combining these 
views, the natural world could be seen as a primary source, as a supply for godlike 
humans to utilize as they please. But, of course, a godlike creature could also act 
God’s role as a master responsible for the wellbeing of the entire creation or using the 
word “build” as a metaphor for building a better world.  
As a final point, behind the whole idea of being godlike may be the humans’ need 
to cross their limits of understanding and thus transcend that limit. The history of the 
human dream and effort to progressively reach ever-further and to bridge both 
physical and mental borders is most certainly a main motivation for both cultural and 
technological developments, but it has also led to environmental problems. This 
realization leads to the final point.  
The fourth and last possible scapegoat, beside Christianity, dualism, and 
education is a reversal of explanations that blame external―cultural or 
social―reasons. This alternative instead seeks the sources of such problems in 
human beings themselves; in other words, in the human character. Maybe it is an 
inherent human characteristic to step out of ‘wild’ nature and search for other, more 
‘civilized’ human qualities. Acting in this way, people perhaps try to gain recognition 
from their fellow humans and thus raise their social status, thereby demonstrating 
personal importance and power and striving for recognition as splendid examples of 
humankind. There often seems to be a conflict between society’s claims on the 
individual and the individual’s own desires. Whose claims are then best met by the 
idea of sustainable development? The universal idea of sustainability requires both 
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individual and joint responsibility and it thus threatens both individual calls for 
freedom and the claims of liberal societies that generously offer multiple choices.  
Finally, it is worthwhile considering whether humans still have an interest, 
however well hidden, to build a more sustainable relation with nature and an inward 
need to be a part of nature more comprehensively than our society presently endorses. 
Thus, they may see sustainable development as a profound opportunity and 
challenge. The idea of sustainable development is advocated at many political levels 
as a duty for all members of society and market forces have been quick to accept 
responsibility. Commercial organizations consider a gentle environmental image as 
an obligatory and necessary advertising strategy for successful global competition. So 
called “greenwashing”69 has become the order of the day entailing that environmental 
attributes apparently have achieved market value. It increasingly has become a duty 
for every profitable company to advertise its environmental awareness (see, e.g., Le 
page, 2009; Todd, 2004). It might at first sound good that marketing interests 
correlate with international environmental political demands; the problem, however, 
is that the methods are not necessarily ethically in line with the goals. Consequently, 
individuals (consumers) become caught in an unavoidable trap and are made dupes of 
other’s economical prospects instead of encouraged to make their own choices, thus 
developing a more personal global responsibility if their own judgment convinces 
them that it is crucial.  
 
Catch-22 
 
The reflections that I have presented so far in this sub chapter (2.2) offer no more 
than a narrow idea of the complexity of the environment dilemma: it is a gigantic and 
true-life Catch-22.
70
 Christianity is built on ideas that flourished long before the Bible 
was written and combines many elements from Ancient philosophy, old religions, 
and myths. Analogously, dualistic thinking is deeply rooted in the history of 
humankind and relates to host of contrasting elements beside female-male and body-
soul: for example, day-night, heaven-earth, god-devil, virtuosity-vice, and yin-yang. 
In conclusion, the master (shepherd) features of Christianity are not merely a Western 
                                           
69
 Marketing of “green” products has many not quite identical names, like “environmental marketing”, 
“sustainable marketing”, “green marketing,” or “ecomarketing” (Todd, 2004). 
70
 The term ‘Catch-22’ refers to Joseph Heller’s novel (1961) of this title and denotes that somebody is 
trapped in a tricky situation built on circular rules for which there is ‘no way out’.  
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phenomenon. Yet, is education? Because education never has favored the natural 
world very much, education is hence seen as the scapegoat that might be easiest to 
reform and use to help overcome the other obstacles. The potential role of education 
is a story that continues all through the rest of this book. The previous section of this 
chapter (2.1) showed that changing the course of the world through education is not a 
self-evident goal, and it is not even obvious that such a goal is appropriate if it 
includes changing student’s inner lives and behaviors. And there are also other 
hindrances than the Christianity, dualism, and education discussed above: not only is 
human nature a hindrance, but external elements—society, culture—also impede 
progress. 
Ideologies guide human actions over the long term, but practices such as politics 
and economics, with their impact on commerce, production and daily life, influence 
the natural world and human environments more or less directly. Nonviolent use of 
land and resources as well as warfare leaves signs of various magnitudes in nature 
and society. It is not only that human greed causes environmental damage, but the 
struggle to survive, find daily food and protection is also responsible. In such 
situations, the natural world and its welfare stand between life and death, an 
unavoidable gap where there is no other choice than the need to survive. In addition 
to activities that are directly dependent on human beings, it is worthwhile 
remembering that fundamentals like a region’s or state’s geographical position, size, 
climate, natural disasters and diseases, and accessible natural resources have a 
notable impact on how forcefully the natural world reacts to humans’ recent and 
future activities. Moreover, humans do not cause all nature catastrophes, so they 
cannot be blamed for everything that causes harm to nature and its non-human 
creatures. Additionally, the search for the most basic causes of environmental 
problems is a precarious undertaking: whatever the path chosen there are other 
tempting roads leading in ever-new directions, including both forwards and 
backwards. Finding the way out is like searching for clues in a labyrinth.  
Environmental problems and the idea of sustainability are intricately interwoven; 
they are also value-laden and thus complicated cultural and social matters that are 
therefore very difficult to address in education. A big problem concerning our 
species’ way of dealing with the natural world and environmental issues relates to 
human self-centeredness and lack of a sense of responsibility for fellow humans and 
other creatures—not to mention future generations of life on earth. Today, many 
people are both constantly widening their geographical impact on nature, with 
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negative effects on ever-larger parts of the globe, and are causing damage with 
incalculable consequences for the future of the world. There is, however, no reason 
that human beings should have steadily become greedier and more demanding; it is 
only the means of satisfying such human desires that have expanded. “We are 
probably not more wicked than our ancestors, but we are more dangerously 
equipped” (Belshaw, 2001, p. 26). And as our number increases day by day, why 
should not our impact grow? 
I want to point out that many countries struggle with environmental problems that 
stem from insufficient education; where parts of the population lack the knowledge 
and skill needed to handle the complicated environmental related issues of their daily 
lives. The question cannot, therefore, be if we shall educate people about 
environmental issues or not, but about how to do it. We already know that mere or 
more knowledge is not enough to trigger responsibility: knowledge alone does not 
promote the will to act. A first step towards a bridging the gap between knowledge 
and action is to become aware that this gap exists and presents a wide of challenges 
that must be met in closing it. Most demanding is the need to face what hides in the 
gap, conditions such as prejudices, vanity, idleness and various egoistic desires. 
Contemporary educators have to deal with the hugely important moral conflicts 
facing humankind, namely the conflicts between social responsibility and individual 
freedom. Finding a point of departure is a process that inescapably involves difficult 
ethical criteria. The alternatives are many, and stretch over a large range from 
extremely normative instruction to radically critical ways of teaching. Every 
methodological crossroad is, at the same time, an ethical one, since every choice of 
method reflects an ethical preference. But, if we agree to the transformation of 
individuals as the appropriate aspiration for education, we have to accept the risks 
that accompany change—including the risks of going forth into the unknown and of 
changes in existential modes of being with which educators have become 
comfortable, perhaps too comfortable. There is certainly a connection between the 
educational situation and the educators and students that is similar to the connection 
between the critical researchers and their research methods described in the previous 
chapter: a reflective practice generates a change of values among the involved doers. 
Yet, the outcome of such changing values is not foreseeable. 
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2.3 Conclusion 
 
In conclusion, I have discussed the many weaknesses in proposals arguing that 
knowledge about environmental dilemmas results in practical conduct. There are two 
central and intertwined questions in the debate about education for a globally 
sustainable life: on the one hand, how to bridge the gap between human knowledge 
and practice; and, on the other hand, how to solve the conflict between private desires 
vis-à-vis social obligations. It is not only impossible to lay out a predictable route 
from environmental knowledge to action because of so many intervening and 
unpredictable components. Individual choices and fulfillment of personal desires do 
not necessarily promote socially valuable goals. In this chapter, I have also discussed 
a third gap, namely the gap between the rhetoric of environmental educational and 
reality that directly reflects the gap between knowledge and practice. This gap exists 
when the institutional aims and values articulated in curriculums and plans are in 
contradiction with daily actions. It is much easier to formulate profound words in 
documents than to live according to these goals in daily life. I have also mentioned a 
fourth gap: the distinction between the researcher and the researched, a gap that 
entails that the researcher is the one who knows how to live an environmental gentle 
or a sustainable life and searches for methods to change other persons’ thinking and 
lifestyle in accordance with this conviction. Researchers may believe that they 
‘objectively’ know what is collectively right for others to do, but do not look upon 
themselves as participants in this collective; they are the outsiders, the observers, or 
to use Rousseau’s vocabulary, a type of lawgiver. It is not self-evident that it is 
necessarily right to try to purposefully change another person’s behavior, no matter 
how urgent the purpose might appear. Both teachers and researchers have to be aware 
of that they might have to make a choice between self-determination and 
indoctrination. Is it possible for a human being to learn to freely judge and select 
between what she immediately wants and what should be a better choice for all 
society members on a long term? And does any generation of teachers know what is 
best in the long term. 
As fifth gap is the one between knowledge and power of position; a person can be 
in a position that calls for action, but lacks know-how or any other wherewithal a 
responsible actor needs, or knows but lacks power. The biggest gap of all, however, 
is the one setting humans apart from the rest of nature, the natural world, including 
the human body and its role in the female-male gap. The view of nature as something 
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separate from humans suits global economic development and the gap between body 
and soul is often mentioned as a scapegoat of the environmental problems that 
humans struggle with, but the dilemma is complex and searching for scapegoats is, 
therefore, not easy. Forces and people willing to sacrifice nature because of other 
competitive interests everywhere on earth, independently of religion or philosophy, 
are more likely culprits. Lack of knowledge and skill can sometimes sabotage good 
will. How humans treat nature is to a great deal a question of circumstances, 
capabilities and means, but this does not need to be a completely haphazard process 
because human beings after all, are an intelligent and morally aware species. Finally, 
there is one more crucial gap to consider: the consideration of how what is 
sustainable today may diverge from what will be needed in the future. The 
intergenerational gap stemming from social change might be wider than the 
knowledge-action or attitude-behavior gap (see O’Donoghue & Lotz-Sisitka, 2002). 
Many of the available methods for handling the future environmental dilemmas have 
proved to be dysfunctional, malfunctioning, or too slow and will hardly be effective 
in the future. Future problems may require more suitable methods than anybody 
knows today and meeting future challenges may need other visions than that of a 
sustainable development. 
The mixture of moral- and knowledge-related dilemmas described above shows 
that education that tries to promote a more sustainable society is faced with a tricky 
and multifarious enigma. It is obvious that there is a considerable need for new kinds 
of philosophical and educational outlooks in discussions about this topic. The words 
“sustainable” and “development” are not resistant to critique and it often seems like 
the discussion misses the target. Furthermore, it seems difficult to point out any 
scapegoats for our environmental dilemmas; but, as the most possible scapegoat, I am 
nonetheless willing to address the last of those I have studied, human nature. The 
human character relates to a huge number of complicated affairs between humans, 
such as politics, economics, and an unending variety of private relations. Education 
has not managed to face up to this complexity of human life—either intrinsic 
individual problems or extrinsic social problems—and this educational shortcoming 
is nothing new.  
Therefore, I will take a time journey a few centuries back to study the role of 
nature and education during the early modern era and the unsettling Age of 
Enlightenment, using Rousseau as a case. Continuing from the last suggested 
scapegoat, namely human nature, I cannot find a better example than Rousseau, who 
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started his career as a philosophe by writing essays discussing human nature and 
writing about ethical dilemmas on many levels. Rousseau reflected on problems that 
are actualized in the discussion according ‘to be or not to be’ of the preposition for in 
environmental education, and he had also much to say about the gap between human 
nature and the natural world. The gap-dilemma is also a theme that finds inspiration 
in Foucault’s thinking. When stepping back and reflecting on Rousseau and Foucault 
in Part Two of this book, I hope to make it easier to shake off some of the more 
pressing predispositions and to identify the profound obstacles that prevent humans 
from living a more sustainable life. To study environmental education we cannot 
merely study environment, nature or education. Multidisciplinary studies can help us 
to face complicated problems that relate to many different disciplines, and history can 
confront us with hidden matrixes in human cultures. With the help of Rousseau and 
Foucault I will try to show in what follows that knowledge is much more than 
scientific truth and demonstrate that there are hidden power structures in our daily life 
influencing our daily activities. These powers affect our inner lives and being, make 
us play games and alienate our selves from our true characters, which we rapidly put 
in brackets and forget. Therefore, I cannot deny that even this kind of research and 
knowledge production has its aspects of power, but without power, humans cannot 
produce anything, so I have no choice. The next chapter begins with an explanation 
of how I will apply Foucault’s research methods in the studies presented in Chapters 
Four to Six. As a final remark, when I move on, I will neither limit the focus to 
environmental education nor to education for sustainable development; instead, do I 
actually prefer to simply talk about education, since the sustainability dilemma is too 
huge to be crowded into a specific discipline. 
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Part II 
Between the Past and the Future 
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3 A Foucauldian Rousseau Study 
 
After discussing the educational challenge of sustainable development and the 
probable causes of unsustainable human life, this chapter begins the second part of 
my research. The result of both studies presented in the previous chapter showed that 
education faces huge challenges because of the complicated relationship humans 
have with nature—relations which have created the sustainability conundrum. The 
challenge is not one, but engages a vast number in many human life arenas. One of 
the biggest challenges is the relation of humans to their human nature. That challenge 
calls for drawing upon philosophy. I will now, therefore, continue the earlier 
discussion about educational challenges and scapegoats: the four chapters in Part 
Two are unified by the philosophy of Rousseau using a Foucauldian approach; 
however, Foucault also becomes a third voice in addition to Rousseau’s and mine. 
Chapter One gave a brief rationale for why I have chosen to rely on Rousseau and 
Foucault, but this chapter will deal in more depth with their contributions. The aim of 
this particular chapter is to describe the role of Foucault and Rousseau in the research 
methods used in Chapters Four, Five, and Six. Firstly, I will describe Foucault’s basic 
research methods and especially elucidate why and how I will apply them. Secondly, 
I will demonstrate how Foucault’s theories and methods correspond to the study of 
Rousseau’s texts and how I will make use of them. In that connection I will also 
discuss Rousseau’s authorship, and how I will deal with his special writing style.   
 
3.1 The How of Foucault 
   
Even though some history writers might include Foucault as a historian of intellectual 
history, the chair he held at College of France was one in the “history of systems of 
thoughts,” a title Foucault had selected himself and which is often referred to simply 
as “systems of thoughts” (see, e.g., Marshall, 1996). I have already used the word 
thoughts several times in the first two chapters of this book, but Foucault used the 
word in a special way, and to understand what he meant by a history of thoughts his 
concept of “thought” needs interpretation. Foucault neither saw “thought” as a mental 
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action that leads to a certain conduct, nor as the domain of attitudes or meanings. In 
his vocabulary, “thought” is an action that helps a person to free herself from habitual 
matrixes by questioning meanings and circumstances (Foucault, 1997c). “Thought is 
freedom in relation to what one does, the motion by which one detaches oneself from 
it, establishes it as an object, and reflects on it as a problem” (ibid., p. 117). 
According to Foucault, historians of thought analyze why certain practices or habits 
have become general problems that require practical solutions (Foucault, 1997c). 
Thus, a history of thought is interested in notions from their very beginnings and 
through their subsequent development, which in effect means how ordinary and 
accepted practices evolve into problems that elicit discussion and indicates crises. In 
Foucault’s view, there are many kinds of thoughts in a culture; “there is thought in 
philosophy, but also in a novel, in jurisprudence, in law, in an administrative system, 
in a prison” (Foucault, 1998f, p. 267). Such thoughts involve searching for and 
establishing of what is regarded as ‘truth’ in controlled social systems (Foucault, 
2000i). Since there is always more than one ‘truth’ at stake, the history of systems of 
thoughts is open-ended and deals with numerous visions, revisions, and trials 
(Faubion, 1998). In contrast to a ‘global history’ that sees history as an unfolding 
process guided by strict traditions and lines of development, Foucault focused on a 
“general history” (e.g., Foucault, 1969/2006, p. 10) that is uninterested in composing 
a totalized picture of the reality at stake but searches, instead, for cycles, divisions, 
limits, and ruptures. He strongly rejected the historical aim of retracing motives. 
Instead of searching for ‘totalizing’ accounts of ‘the truth’, as “the historians of 
history” typically have done (Foucault, 1998c, p. 380), Foucault advocated looking 
for partial changes and encouraged focusing on specific issues and areas of human 
life; on the individual sphere in relation to social and institutional circumstances (see, 
e.g., Foucault, 1997h). During his active life as a researcher, Foucault developed 
methods that served the purposes of his alternative investigative processes. However, 
when he talked about “method,” he did not mean a ‘tool’ for instrumentally realized 
ends but, instead, offered an alternative way of confronting problems and asking 
questions. 
While an important aim of Foucault was to sketch out a history of the diverse 
ways humans develop knowledge about themselves, he studied a number of social 
phenomena, such as madness, crime, sexuality, and so forth. He focused on how 
humans govern themselves and others by producing truth and thus justifying their 
practices. The relationships between humans and nature that are at the forefront of 
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this book are similar to the topics that engaged Foucault; those relationships can be 
studied in regard to many spheres of human life. Foucault not only considered the 
possibilities of finding definite limits of knowledge; he also reflected on knowledge 
about human limits. The quest for sustainability draws attention to many such human 
limits; for example, the limits of human survival and of human development but also 
of human moral commitment and education.  
In his study of the history of thoughts, Foucault developed three forms of 
analysis, archaeology, genealogy,
71
 and ethics; and discourses were the objects of his 
studies. He called such discourses “games” that take shape through writing, reading, 
and exchange (Foucault, 1993). Archaeology is his method for systematically and 
historically analyzing and comparing the emergence of knowledge in various fields 
(analysis of ‘games’ of truth). Genealogy is the method for studying the connection 
between power and knowledge (analysis of ‘games’ of truth in relation to power), and 
in his ethical analysis Foucault finally studied how humans problematize their own 
existence (analysis of ‘games’ of truth in relation to self) (see also Davidson, 1986; 
Gutting, 2005). These threefold research interests can also be expressed in the terms 
of (1) the re-examination of knowledge, (2) the conditions of knowledge and, (3) the 
knowing subject (Rabinow, 1997).   
 
Genealogy and Power  
 
Archaeology was for Foucault the process of displaying the archives of systematic 
discourses and opening up what once has been said (see Kendall & Wickham, 1999). 
Foucault developed archaeology into his second method, genealogy, by including the 
role of power in his investigations.  The term “genealogy” came from Nietzsche, and 
Foucault affirmed that his view of genealogy was quite similar to Nietzsche’s 
(Gutting, 2005). Much of what he argues about studying discourses in The 
Archaeology of Knowledge also makes sense in genealogy, although genealogy 
broadens archaeology by focusing on non-discursive forms of power. Like 
                                           
71 The way Nietzsche and Foucault interpret the term genealogy differs greatly from the general 
interpretation of this word; even if Foucault states that he does not claim to be the first one who has 
performed research the way he did in Discipline and Punish (Foucault, 1977). The word “genealogy” in a 
dictionary is something that includes family histories, for example Webster’s (1994, p. 589) explains 
genealogy as follows: “1. record or account of the ancestry and descent of a person, family, group, etc. 2. the 
study of family ancestries and histories. 3. descent from an original form or progenitor; lineage; ancestry.” In 
daily language “genealogy” stands for family history, family tree, or research of pedigrees. Genealogy, as a 
research concept, is also common in biosciences, especially genetic genealogy. 
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archaeology, genealogy is non-interpretative; it does not attempt to disclose hidden 
secrets but, instead, seeks to find new sources of knowledge (not only from history 
books) and to read those sources in a new way to reveal fragmentation and 
inconsistency rather than unity (e.g., Foucault, 1998c). Genealogy does not avoid 
intimate details, but “it inscribes itself in the nervous system, in temperament, in the 
digestive apparatus” (ibid., p. 375). Kendall and Wickham (1999) compare genealogy 
with a dinner party where a frank utterance of a child makes all the other guests feel 
uncomfortable because they had wanted to keep hidden the truth that the child 
exposed.  
Besides “general history,” Foucault also used the concept “effective history” as 
distinct from “the history of historians,” since genealogy is without “constants” 
(Foucault, 1998c, p. 380). Genealogy is the concept used to study the history of 
issues like morality, metaphysics, and life as an ascetic or liberated mode of being, 
and genealogy sees neither human life nor history as stable and thus seeks to reveal 
“discontinuity” (ibid., p. 429) rather than unity. The picture of history as a continuous 
flow is thus cut into pieces and all its ruptures revealed. Consequently, genealogy 
does not investigate history as a continuous development, where a historical sequence 
of causes and effects makes one comfortable (Kendall & Wickham, 1999); its aim is 
the opposite.  
 
History becomes ‘effective’ to the degree that it introduces discontinuity into our 
very being – as it divides our emotions, dramatizes our instincts, multiplies our 
body and sets it against itself. ‘Effective’ history leaves nothing around the self, 
deprives the self of the reassuring stability of life and nature, and it will not 
permit itself to be transported by a voiceless obstinacy toward a millennial ending 
... This is because knowledge is not made for understanding; it is made for 
cutting. (Foucault, 1998c, p. 380)  
 
Neither fate nor mechanics rule the historical forces; its rulers are occasioning 
circumstances and struggles. Such occasions are, however, not to be considered as 
games of chance but more as myriads of entangled events. “Effective history” neither 
searches for long-ago circumstances but, instead, has an interest in what is nearest, 
such as the body, nutrition, whatever unattractive realities these findings may reveal 
(Foucault, 1998c, 2003). In the essay Nietzsche, Genealogy, History, Foucault 
(1998c) describes the characteristics of genealogy as corresponding with Nietzsche’s 
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view.
72
 Genealogy, according to Nietzsche, is not a matter of digging in search of the 
original. He argued that the beginning of human history is not as glorious as it was 
created by God’s hand; it is sarcastic. As one commentator observes, “[w]hen 
genealogy looks to beginnings, it looks for accidents, chance, passion, petty malice, 
surprises, feverish agitation, unsteady victories, and power” (Davidson, 1986, p. 224).  
As a result, Foucault preferred to call genealogy “anti-science” since it never 
strives to any scientific exactness but instead is a struggle against formal scientific 
discourse. Nietzsche clearly opposed looking for Ursprung,
73
 a method of finding 
foundational truth and ideal Being. Two words that Nietzsche often used as 
synonyms and that, according to him, suit genealogy better are Entstehung
74
 and 
Herkunft.
75
 All three of these German words can be translated as “origin” in English. 
Herkunft has to do with belonging to a group by bonds of blood, tradition, or social 
status. Various aspects related to the body, such as diet, climate, and soil, are related 
to Herkunft. Nietzsche opposed the search for Ursprung to recover what once existed 
in attempting to establish a perfect picture by masking untidy effects as irrelevant. 
Nietzsche also used the word Erfindung (invention) in contrast to Ursprung, denoting 
a break or something that is low, small, or unfavorable, meaning something that 
might have started from modest beginnings (Foucault, 1994, 2000h). Therefore, 
Nietzsche was not interested in history that tried to remove all camouflage and 
displayed foundational states. Genealogy, according to Nietzsche, is ready to listen to 
what history has to tell. Its arenas are the most unexpected locations, and therefore 
the researcher has to carefully search for possible settings where, for example, 
phenomena such as feeling, love, and passion may be present, but also places where 
they are absent. This genealogical research can reach completely unexpected 
outcomes, sometimes even that what is being searched for does not exist or that it 
consists of innumerable components (Foucault, 1998c, 2003). History as genealogy 
aims at making one recognize strangeness and to question self-evident truths (Kendall 
& Wickham, 1999).  
 
                                           
72
 One cannot simply assume that Foucault accepted all Nietzsche’s arguments in this essay, although 
Foucault presents them without his own comments; but this is the only time he describes in depth the 
historical approach he had adopted from Nietzsche, who called it “genealogy.” Nietzsche’s text nonetheless 
contains ideas in opposition to Foucault’s political ideas (see Gutting, 2005). 
73
 The German word Ursprung means in English roughly foundation, root; in Swedish ursprung, rötter. 
74
The German word Entstechung means in English roughly coming into being; in Swedish tillkomst, 
tillblivelse. 
75
 The German word Herkunft is in English roughly family or lineage; in Swedish härkomst. 
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What it [genealogy] really does is to entertain the claims to attention of local, 
discontinuous, disqualified illegitimate knowledges against the claims of a unitary 
body of theory which would filter, hierarchies and order them in name of some 
true knowledge and some arbitrary idea of what constitutes a science and its 
objects. (Foucault, 1980c, p. 83)  
 
Entstehung makes things visible without claiming that the first vision cannot be 
changed. The genealogy of morality, asceticism, and knowledge rests in details and 
mere chances; it tries to detect wickedness and irony. An analysis of Enstehung has to 
reveal acting powers; how they oppose each other or how they struggle together 
against adverse conditions. Nietzsche argued that power connections emerge and 
become visible through actions in real power situations. The emergence of power 
implies that such forces suddenly enter the stage. However, this does not necessarily 
happen in one special place, but can happen in a “non-place” of pure distance. Power 
can even struggle against itself (Foucault, 1998c, 2003). Power affects what is 
generally held as ‘true’ knowledge and what forms this knowledge will take, 
according to Foucault. He saw power as games of strategy that could create both 
good and bad results (Foucault, 1997g) and that take place, for instance, in and 
through education. It was no problem for him that a person who knows more gives 
instructions to those who know less, as long as there is no malign domination in the 
relation (ibid.). Without power, nothing could be achieved. In addition, where there is 
power there is also some degree of freedom, however limited. Power is at work when 
subjects are turned into objects, but also when they become subjects of their own self-
knowledge or of someone else’s control (ibid.). Power struggles at both institutional 
and individual levels form humans and makes them who they are.  
 
Freedom and Ethics 
 
Like Nietzsche, Foucault believed that humankind can never reach higher moral 
awareness where all power struggles have been put in the past. Both thinkers denied 
the idea of a growing world consciousness or perfectibility. “Humanity does not 
gradually progress from combat to combat until it arrives at universal reciprocity, 
where the rule of law finally replaces warfare; humanity installs each of its violences 
[sic] in a system of rules and thus proceeds from domination to domination” 
(Foucault 1998c, p. 378). According to both, human power conflicts will last forever. 
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This estimation neither prompts one to settle down and relax nor to resignation but 
calls for action and experiment.  
 
Yet if we are not to settle for the affirmation or the empty dream of freedom, it 
seems to me that this historico-critical attitude must also be an experimental one. 
I mean that this work done at the limits of ourselves must, on the one hand, open 
up a realm of historical inquiry and, on the other, put itself to the test of reality, of 
contemporary reality, both to grasp the points where change is possible and 
desirable, and to determine the precise form this change should take. This means 
that the historical ontology of ourselves must turn away from all projects that 
claim to be global or radical. In fact, we know from experience that the claim to 
escape from the system of contemporary reality so as to produce the overall 
programs of another society, of another way of thinking, another culture, another 
vision of the world, has led only to the return of the most dangerous traditions. 
(Foucault 1997h, p. 316) 
 
From the studies of the intertwined topics of power and knowledge and of how 
knowledge is a tool through which humans can be made objects of control, Foucault 
turned his interest towards ethics and focused on how humans have taken 
responsibility for their own self-transformation. Foucault regarded individual 
freedom as the ontological condition of ethics, a relation persons have to themselves. 
Ethics is then the conscious practice of freedom, a “care of the self” that is wed to the 
concept “know yourself”76 that is a primary form of this care. It is, however, not to be 
seen as a selfish practice but as a conduct that aims at promoting other people’s 
wellbeing, and it involves change and an expansion of the self towards a more proper 
way of living. But, care for one’s self is the priority. The power over one’s self 
regulates one’s power over others. When aware of one’s self and one’s own duties 
and limits, one cannot treat others badly. The subject is a form, a way of being, or an 
ethos that is flexible and changes according to time and context (Foucault, 1997g). 
According to Foucault both history and the history of ideas have focused on the 
subject as the source of knowledge instead of focusing on how the subject is 
constituted within or by history. Things does not just happen in history through 
subjects; subjects continuously form themselves within historical processes that 
establishes and re-establishes them (Foucault, 2000h). This formative process is also 
not an isolated exercise. To the contrary, even the self-practicing person requires 
guidance by a more advanced instructor or master in order to advance in her self-
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creation (Foucault, 2005). Knowledge, power, and the individual interrelate, since 
knowledge generates power that in turn creates new knowledge, and the individual is 
both a product of this power/knowledge structure and participates in its creation. 
Active self-creation should develop an understanding of one’s position in relation to 
the world; an understanding that can lead to a conscious transformation of both the 
self and the world (see Foucault, 2000a, 2005). Consequently, Foucault’s turn 
towards ethics was no break with his previous research strategies but a change of 
focus to the level of self-creation, while still relying on archaeology and genealogy. 
Yet, with ethics, the subject and its will to truth became the essential center of 
attention.  
Even though Foucault gradually enhanced and changed the focus of his research 
and ended up in ethics, he never gave up archaeology or genealogy. The different 
modes are complementary not contradictory (see, e.g., Davidson, 1986). Foucault 
says that his works “are interwoven and overlapping” (2000b, p. 266); where one 
book ends, the next has already started. The most important reason why the last part 
of Foucault’s writings can hardly be sidestepped is that they are the most advanced 
and complex of his constantly developing thinking that never paused or stopped 
while he was alive.  
 
Foucault in Educational Research 
 
Foucault’s research approaches have been used often in the social sciences and, since 
the beginning of the 1990s, in a growing number of educational studies (Olssen, 
2006). There are distinct opinions about whether or not Foucault has developed a 
theory of knowledge. In Faubion’s (1998) opinion, Foucault had no theory of 
knowledge and Rorty (1986) also strongly argues for this alternative and does not 
want to refer to Foucault as a creator of a new epistemology or of any other theories, 
not even a method. Rorty writes that “much of Foucault’s so-called ‘anarchism’ 
seems to me self-indulgent radical chic” and “all he has to offer are brilliant 
redescriptions of the past, supplemented by helpful hints on how to avoid being 
trapped by old historiographical assumptions” (Rorty, 1986, p. 47). Couzens Hoy 
(1986, p. 13), in contrast, supports Foucault’s genealogy and calls it a “plausible 
method of immanent social criticism, one that can work without presupposing an 
independent, utopian standpoint.” Following Nietzsche, Foucault did not believe in 
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any one and only historical truth; he rejected Cartesian epistemology and Hegelian 
eschatological
77
 historiography (Rorty, 1986). According to Rorty, Foucault had a 
primarily negative maxim to offer and Rorty claims that a culture having a genealogy 
but no eschatology would make no sense. In contrast to Rorty, Couzens Hoy points 
out that Foucault wrote a history of ethics and not a history of moral codes.  
 
Although he does not construct a totally different ideal to which we could aspire, 
his history does make us more aware of the shortcomings in our own self-
understanding and practices. The imperative to change must come from within 
ourselves if it comes at all. (Couzens Hoy, 1986, p. 19)  
 
Philp (1985) calls attention to the possibility that Foucault was more interested in 
questioning the so-called “grand theories” than of constructing his own. Foucault did 
not want to create any “solid and homogenous” epistemology (theory of knowledge). 
“Our task, on the contrary, will be to expose and specify the issue at stake in this 
opposition, this struggle, this insurrection of knowledges against the institutions and 
against effects of that kind of knowledges [sic] and power that invests scientific 
discourse” (Foucault 1980c, p.  87). Foucault claimed that he wanted “to reveal a 
positive unconscious of knowledge”78 (Foucault, 1970, p. xi) and about the rules that 
come into play in scientific discourses. An episteme is, then, a kind of a matrix that 
regulates knowledge in a specific culture, not by stipulating what is true or false, but 
what is proper science and what is not. The shift from one episteme to the next takes 
place abruptly, as mutations (Nilsson, 2008; see also Foucault, 2000i). These 
mutations are set forth by events that are complicated networks of simultaneously 
acting circumstances, so-called series (see Foucault, 1998c; Kendall & Wickham, 
1999; Nilsson, 2008). To understand what Foucault actually meant by a shift of 
episteme is it worthwhile considering how he defined “episteme”: 
 
By episteme, we mean, in fact, the total set of relations that unite, at a given 
period, the discursive practices that give rise to epistemological figures, sciences, 
and possibly formalized systems; the way in which, in each of these discursive 
formations, the transitions to epistemologization, scientificity, and formalization 
are situated and operate; the distribution of these thresholds, which may coincide, 
be subordinated to one another, or be separated by shifts in time; the lateral 
relations that may exist between epistemological figures or sciences in so far as 
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they belong to neighbouring, but distinct, discursive practices. The episteme is 
not a form of knowledge (connaisance) or type of rationality which, crossing the 
boundaries of the most varied sciences, manifests the sovereign unity of a subject, 
a spirit, or a period; it is the totality of relations that can be discovered, for a 
given period, between the sciences when one analyses them at the level of 
discursive regularities.
79
 (Foucault, 1969/2006, p. 211) 
 
Episteme, in Foucault’s view is not a general worldview that brings together diverse 
sciences of an epoch. Foucault did not believe in any such great, general truth, and he 
never built a grand utopia; instead, his research methods steadily aimed at 
systematically transforming both the researcher and the audience. He saw knowledge 
as more deeply rooted in error than in truth, and he was more curious about how 
human subjects are formed through social processes than about constructing his own 
(normative) theories about knowledge. Consequently, his research more and more 
dealt with subjectivity and freedom.   
Mayo (2000) finds it remarkable that most education-related works about 
Foucault miss that his later work in ethical self-formation stems from his earlier work 
with archaeology and genealogy. Instead of only applying Foucault’s intermediate 
studies and focusing on power, Mayo thus considers Foucault’s attention to freedom 
and ethics as “useful anti-foundations to articulate the project of critical thought in 
education” (Mayo 2000, p. 104). I fully agree with this argument, but since all these 
methods form a functional unit, it is impossible to apply ethics and skip archeology 
and genealogy. For me, Foucault’s works pursue a continuous line of development 
and have to be considered as a holistic entity that never was finished but continually 
advanced by encompassing ever-new elements. 
The choice of relying on Foucault’s methods is an option that is far from 
straightforward. He never wrote any research manuals for other researchers to follow 
because it was never his intention to direct others to follow him obediently. Foucault 
(2000d, p. 224) himself claims that his suggestions are to be taken as “propositions” 
or “game openings” inviting interested parties to join in, not as fixed statements. 
However, Davidson (1986) regards Foucault’s ideas as very useful research vehicles 
and totally opposes those who argue that Foucault’s writing are of no help in the 
search for explanations for specific changes in sciences. Butin (2006), on the other 
hand, claims that the use of Foucault in educational research has taken place narrowly 
with the intention of “either liberating us from or entrapping us within our culture’s 
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structures and practices” (ibid., p. 371). The argument is that many researchers have 
been unfamiliar with Foucault’s ideas and, therefore, have both misused and 
mistreated them. They have actually reshaped Foucault’s theories to suit their own 
empirical studies. Butin (2006) also stresses that the reader who understands Foucault 
as a liberator or believes that he wanted to play a trick on the reader has totally 
missed Foucault’s irony (see also Peters & Besley, 2007; Rabinow & Rose, 2003). A 
complete error, in my judgment, is to try to use Foucault’s ideas only practically, as 
tools. Foucault’s ideas are neither reducible to mere technical method, nor are they 
merely studies in philosophy or history. In his own words, his writings are 
“philosophical fragments put to work in a historic field of problems” (Foucault, 
2000d, p. 224). No quick guide or marked passage is, therefore, available from 
Foucault’s systems of thoughts. Every Foucault reader has to ask: What does he have 
to tell me and what use can I make of his ideas? (Nilsson, 2008). And, how much am 
I allowed to modify his ideas without deforming them? However, Foucault (1980c) 
calls his works “lines laid down for you to pursue or to divert elsewhere, for me to 
extend upon or to re-design as the case might be. They are, in the final analysis, just 
fragments, and it is up to you or me to see what we can make of them” (ibid., pp. 78-
79). After all, I can hardly discredit him, since he even declared that he enjoyed 
distorting the authors he liked and making their thoughts groan, totally without regard 
for what his commentators might say (Foucault, 1980a). If I like his thoughts, why 
should I need to be any more truthful to his own outline? Research has to be 
transformative. Nevertheless, the point of departure needs to be rooted in an 
understanding of what he meant and in a conscious choice of how to use his ideas 
without distorting them. In the partial study in Chapter Four, I follow some of 
Foucault’s general genealogical principles, but do not try to copy his method. In 
Chapter Five, I follow his ethical approach more faithfully, and in Chapter Six I let 
him inspire me to a modification of that ethical approach.   
 
Discourse Analyses 
 
In practice, Foucault’s history of thoughts is a study of systematic discourses. There 
is unfortunately no genealogical counterpart to The Archaeology of Knowledge. 
Gutting (2005), however, looks upon Discipline and Punishment as Foucault’s only 
lasting genealogical exercise and suggests that the researcher interested in using 
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Foucault’s genealogy should follow in his footsteps in that book. Although the first 
volume of History of Sexuality often is regarded as another genealogical study, this 
book is merely a general introduction to a large project that never was fulfilled
80
 
because it was interrupted by Foucault’s death. Gutting does not want to regard 
Foucault’s second and third volumes on History of Sexuality as genealogy, although 
Foucault himself suggested so, because the ethical intention in these volumes is much 
more striking than the historical analyses (Gutting 2005). I do, though, hold these 
books as useful ‘lines’ to follow in parallel with Foucault’s other works, especially 
Discipline and Punishment. In my research, thus, the approach Foucault employs in 
The Use of Pleasures, Volume Two of History of Sexuality especially has much to 
offer. In this book he presents a research approach that suits my intentions very well. 
Another useful reading has been The Order of Discourse, a small book built on 
Foucault’s inaugural lecture at Collège de France. This lecture offers a 
comprehensive lesson on Foucauldian discourse analysis.  
There are many kinds of discourses in a society; some of them are more temporal 
and concentrate on sporadic problems, as for example policy matters; others are more 
eternal and universal, revisiting the same concerns, as is the case, for example 
religious, scientific, or scholarly discourses. So the Bible and texts written by Ancient 
philosophers are constantly studied and re-interpreted, although the intensity may 
fluctuate and the viewpoints shift. Various attempts at studying texts takes place 
under the heading “discourse analysis.” There is, however, no clear definition of a 
proper discourse analysis; the concept is, instead, the focus of complex theoretical 
debates (Doberty, 2007; Börjesson, 2003). Foucault has decidedly inspired a growing 
interest in discourse analysis, especially in the humanities and social research. But his 
interpretation of discourse analysis is much more than the systematically study of 
particular uses of vocabulary and grammar and word counting that is typical for many 
forms of what some call discourse analyses.  
According to Foucault (1993) almost everything can take the shape of a discourse 
and can be uttered as discourse. Discourse is like a game, a game of writing, reading 
and communicating. In order to analyze the discourse’s preconditions, games, and 
effects, researchers have to question their desire for finding a final or singular ‘truth’ 
and instead concentrate on and carefully describe what actually takes place in a 
discourse. Instead of searching for absolute truth, then, they have to search for how 
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the so called ‘truth’ is constructed, and to really get to the bottom of this task they 
need to be aware of the power webs interweaving with and even upholding the 
discourse, otherwise they will easily stumble and fall prey to the power obstacles at 
stake (see Foucault, 1993). Discourses form layers of interrelated domains. Yet, the 
domain of epistemology is connected to practices, politics, and the way institutions 
are formed (Foucault, 1998d, 1998e). Genealogy is like a tool that helps researchers 
untie the presumptions of their own cultures and eras through a historical 
investigation that creates a view of the present from an altered viewpoint. The aim is 
thus to make the unknown trigger a new and clearer view of what is supposedly well-
known by unmasking the hidden connections between the various layers of discourse. 
 
Procedures of Control 
According to Foucault (1993), important characteristics of any public discourse are 
procedures that control, choose, and organize them so that they appear more neutral 
and thus conceal their aspects of power and threat. Among these procedures, he 
mentions three external actions of exclusion.  First are obstructions regulating what 
can be talked about and where, but also who is allowed to talk. A second excluding 
mechanism separates participants in a discourse into categories of acceptable versus 
not acceptable, where one is permitted and the other disqualified to speak in most 
situations—although the latter can sometimes be tolerated or even carefully listened 
to under special circumstances. An example of this is the talk of the insane: under 
certain conditions in European history, listening to the insane has not been regarded 
as worthwhile while at other times such discourse has been taken as revealing the 
truth (see also Foucault, 2001). A third excluding system Foucault mentions is the 
conflict between the true and the false, two steadily differing circumstances 
maintained by a whole system of institutions and power constellations (Foucault, 
1993, 2001). Here the question is about a wish for truth that history performs and 
institutions distribute, and this ‘truth’ thus stimulates and forces other discourses. To 
not make the huge mechanisms of exclusion visible, this strong desire for ‘truth’ is 
kept in silence and well-hidden. 
There are, however, not only external procedures acting on a discourse, but also 
internal ones. For example, principles for classification, organization, and 
distribution of a discourse have the aim of slowing down its unsystematic 
presentation, thus avoiding confusion. Foucault sees the  role of authors  as resulting 
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from many complex processes; what authors contribute (or not) to discourses are 
dependent on both the society that has formed them, the particular disciplines they 
are parts of, as well as on their own more or less random choices at a particular 
moment (Foucault, 1993, 1998g). When a text grows old or disappears, it is not only 
the primary text that is the discourse object anymore, but a number of secondary 
interpretations and analyses have entered the discourse as well. In such cases, the 
discourse includes all kinds of commentary texts and subsequently the role of 
ongoing commentary role becomes crucial. As soon as the commentaries articulate 
something other than the original text, they influence and change the discourse and 
add new dimensions or reveal its essence in new ways. Thus, it is rather impossible to 
discuss the original text without mentioning anything about what it says. The 
commentary not only reflects earlier commentary but proposes what has been left out. 
This is, however, controlled inside a particular discipline, where it is not only a 
question about reinforcing or reshaping a discourse, but about steadily formulating 
new arguments. The sentences written in a discipline have to fit that particular 
theoretical field’s strict boundaries. It is even impossible to know if a sentence is 
false or true until it has been situated in or by a particular discipline. Despite how 
accurate a new argument may be, no one will listen to it and take it as true until it is 
articulated in the right place, as part of the right discourse (Foucault, 1993).
81
 For 
example, trying to argue with a group of biologists against evolution theory is an 
abortive undertaking, even though the same argument might make sense to religious 
fundamentalists.   
Foucault additionally mentions a third group of procedures controlling 
discourses; that is control of the rules that have the effect to turning the discourse into 
a game. This form of control regulates and selects who has the right to enter the 
discourse and become a speaking subject. Many discourses are only open for people 
who fulfill particular demands and thus require that the people accepted into the 
discourse are familiar with the common rituals in the actual field (cf. Wittgenstein,
82
 
1953/2001). Those, who want to be heard, have to know and observe acceptable 
behavior, including the various gestures and games of talk. Particular manners, social 
rules, and language usages thus become entering codes (Foucault, 1993). The 
members of a school or discipline, that is people sharing the same principles, in turn, 
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may accept a great number of new members and thus steadily increase in size. The 
demands for acknowledging common beliefs may vary, but members have to accept 
the conclusions that are defining of the group and reject others. The discourse of a 
school or discipline directs the speaking subjects at the same time as these subjects 
shape the discourse. Finally Foucault points out the big gaps between different 
peoples’ possibilities for gaining entrance to a particular social discourse, although 
education aims at reducing such gaps. Education, according to Foucault, cannot avoid 
supporting procedures for directing and weakening discourses of the kind mentioned 
above, and thus it nourishes the control and organization of the discourses in 
question.  
 
Regularity Principles 
Discourse analysis built on Foucault’s method is based on four principles: (1), 
reversal (turnaround), (2), discontinuity (interruptions, breaks), (3), specificity 
(constituting a kind), and (4), exteriority (coming from outside):  
1. To begin with, according to the principle of reversal, researchers have to reject 
what first comes to their minds and try ‘to turn around’ what at the outset seems most 
obvious in the discourse. Instead of concentrating on the author, the discipline, or the 
desire for truth, they have to try to alter their position and find other ways of 
searching in order to reveal less obvious events or proceedings (Foucault, 1993, see 
1969/2006). The primary assumption is that there is no universal or ‘final truth’ 
hiding anywhere in a discourse, but many intertwined or distinctly different ones.  
2. In line with this thinking, the appealing thing is how the second principle of 
discontinuity influences in various ways the emergence of a discipline or set of ideas. 
Research then mainly deals with how a new rationality appears and with its diverse 
effects. Genealogy studies the configuration of discourses both inside and outside the 
limitations. It is a matter of investigating the fields of particular practices in which 
discourses turn up, how they develop, under which circumstances they will survive, 
and what regularity principle they follow (Foucault, 1993). Genealogy, according to 
Foucault, makes a distinction between microscopic and macroscopic scales of a 
history. What happens at a larger social scale does not necessarily need to follow the 
same pattern on an individual scale; instead, different connections, hierarchies, 
networks of willpower, and several forms of teleology
83
 interact in complicated 
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networks. Interest does not therefore rest in tradition and other traces of the past but 
in fundamental transformations. Instead of concentrating on continuity and causality, 
genealogy defines series and their parts, regulations and limits, and also addresses 
how these series are mutually interlinked.  
3. The third principle, specificity, implies that it is impossible to break up 
discourses according to the play of earlier existing meanings and decoding of the 
world. The world is not there for us to decipher and interpret since the state of the 
world and our knowledge do not necessarily match (Foucault, 1993). Therefore, 
discourses challenge things, make them uncomfortable and trigger our curiosity. In a 
particular practice, a discourse determines principles for its regularity; in other 
words, for the rules to be followed.   
4. Finally, the fourth principle, exteriority, implies that the researcher has to give 
up the search for a core idea and instead investigate the discourse both as it appears 
and its external conditions (what makes it possible). The focus is on how the 
discourse takes place, what the requirements for its existence are, how its series are 
formed, and what limits the performance of the discourse. In other words, of interest 
are the conditions of possibility of a discourse: what conditions enable it to come into 
being.  
 
In sum, these four concepts control the discourse: event, series, regularity, and its 
conditions of possibility. Genealogy is a distinctive method that pays attention to 
events rather than foundational ‘truths’, to series rather than unity, to regularity 
(sameness) rather than originality and, lastly, to conditions of possibility rather 
than to signification or meaning (Foucault, 1993, pp. 36-38).  
 
At this stage the question may appear as to whether genealogy is not simply a kind of 
critical research. If not, what is the difference, then, between critical research and 
genealogy? Foucault (1993) actually found it difficult to separate critical discourses 
from genealogy, but he distinguished dissimilarity according to approach, 
perspective, and constraint. A critical investigation thus concentrates on the principle 
of reversal and tries to identify forms of exclusion, restriction, and receptivity, while 
the critical researcher studies the roles these mechanisms have or have had. 
Genealogy focuses on the other three principles, discontinuity, specificity, and 
exteriority. It studies the configuration of the discourse series and under what 
circumstances these series have emerged. Genealogical discourse analysis studies 
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mainly practical discourse formation. However, Foucault points out that the critical 
and the genealogical approaches have to support each other. 
 
3.2 Research Outline of Chapters Four to Six 
 
The relation of humans to nature and Rousseau’s writings might at first seem far 
removed from Foucault’s historical research. Since Foucault recommended not 
concentrating on the author, my choice to focus on one particular writer might seem 
especially strange. However, this study will not provide any personal portrait of 
Rousseau, because there are plenty of them for those interested in his private life, not 
the least in his own Confessions.
84
 Who he was does authorize his texts, but how he 
wrote and how to read him makes a difference for the commentator, and therefore I 
will return to this issue. Foucault was cautious about fixed identities;
85
 he viewed 
identity as steadily fluctuating and taking on many simultaneous shapes. The ideal of 
identity that Foucault pointed to was one that constantly reshapes itself (see Gutting, 
2005). Rousseau was also a very pliant person, always working on his self-
transformation. A more close examination of Rousseau as an example of an 
individual who struggled with himself, his own society, and his own place in history 
and who theorized these struggles reveals many of the related problems involving 
power that challenge humanity’s relation to nature. Rousseau points out both the 
conflicts between personal desire and socially related power conflicts. In my 
judgment, the study of one individual can even contribute a new dimension to 
Foucault’s theory—if the person is carefully chosen.  
Foucault will not only be an inspiration to and guide of the methodological 
approach in this book; I will also employ his philosophic theories. While many of 
Foucault’s thoughts correspond with the focus of this book, I will not hesitate to bring 
some of them into play as arguments. According to Nilsson (2008), Foucault can be 
applied in three ways. Firstly, the researcher can use his ideas in a thematic way and 
can implement themes and elements that Foucault discussed in his works in similar or 
new contexts. Secondly, Foucault can provide the method; which means that the 
researcher employs Foucault’s archaeology, genealogy, or ethical approach more or 
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less faithfully. Thirdly, the researcher can use Foucault’s theories in a reflective way, 
as inspiration for the creation of one’s own methods. In this work, I will use 
Foucault’s ideas in a thematic and a methodical way, and I will use him rather freely 
and thus even move towards a theoretically reflective application. However, from the 
very beginning I will point out that Foucault initially focused mainly on discourses 
related to practices, although his interest gradually turned towards ethical ideas. Even 
then, however, he saw self-understanding as revealed in one’s actions and patterns of 
actions (Couzens Hoy, 1986). My focus of attention is initially on thoughts and ideas, 
but moves steadily towards practice, especially educational practice.  
According to Foucault (1993) a discourse is a kind of game that takes three 
forms: writing, reading, and exchange. Instead of avoiding the danger of the fields of 
discourse, he invites the researchers to question their will to truth, to return the events 
to the discourse and reveal it in terms of its characteristic power. When I chose my 
research approach according to Foucault’s genealogical and ethical outline this meant 
that I had to find interesting spaces for investigation and dig and plow through them 
in ways different than researchers have done before me; or I had to study other 
objects or find completely unexplored sites and search for what has been buried or 
swept away. Other features of the technique were to combine my findings in an order 
other than according to the common concerns with time, discipline, country, and so 
on. Foucault’s genealogy involves stepping beyond, even under such typical concerns 
and listening to subversive and contrarian words that were only whispered. Where 
could I find these interesting places and extraordinary objects?  
The discourses applied in this second part of my book cover a variety of texts 
from political writings to fiction and letters. I started by exploring the discourse fields 
of nature, knowledge and education that Rousseau was involved in by studying 
diverse types of literature from the centuries preceding him and contemporaneous 
with him. Subsequently, I have included historical, philosophical, Biblical, 
educational, and scientific texts, but also fiction from both the Renaissance and the 
Enlightenment in parallel with Rousseau’s texts. The first of the three studies in Part 
Two of this book investigates the discourses Rousseau was involved in and what 
influenced him. I will present this study in Chapter Four. In order to study in 
particular how Rousseau discussed and dealt with nature ethically (Chapter Five) and 
in connection to education (Chapter Six), I had to consult many of his writings. Yet, 
as Foucault (1969/2006) argued, it is rather impossible to find a limit to all the 
production of an author; every writing is more like “a node within a network” (pp. 
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25-26), as parts of a complex discursive field. In this regard, Rousseau also did not 
deal with issues individually, in isolation; most of his writings are connected and 
entwined with more wide-ranging issues. It has thus been difficult for me to choose a 
particular part of his writings, since nearly all of his writings deals with the topics I 
wanted to study: nature and education. 
Although Rousseau wrote about various topics, certain basic themes and purposes 
appear in most of his works. It is nevertheless possible to classify him principally as a 
social critic, although his flexible style made it possible for him to target a very 
diverse audience ranging from music, to political science, to education, to literature. 
However, a political message is nearly always present. This mixture of approaches 
and types of text is due in part to the fact that no strict division existed between 
different discourse fields in the 18
th
 century. Today Rousseau is mostly called a 
philosopher, although he was not academically trained but an autodidact. In the 18
th
 
century, public intellectuals were called philosophes and, as a group, they wrote and 
openly discussed current social matters. The philosophes were “sophisticated 
‘advanced’ thinkers” (Bowen, 1981, p. 169; see also Roberts, 2007) and we should 
probably label them today as culture critics (Dahl, 1992). Another common label that 
was used for someone like Rousseau was a ‘man of letters’, an epithet for any 
intellectual and literate man in 18
th
 century Europe. One could describe Rousseau’s 
role as what Foucault (1998g, p. 217) calls transdiscursive. This describes a person 
whose writings are not examples of a special genre but that have inspired others to 
write in new ways. Rousseau created new discourse practices and introduced new 
discourse topics. For Rousseau, writing was also a self-learning activity, a “caring of 
self.” Writing about the self became widespread during the modern era and a method 
for actively working on and with one’s own consciousness (see Foucault, 2005). 
Rousseau is also an example of what Foucault (2001, 2005), based on Ancient 
philosophy, calls parrhesiastes or “truth tellers”: people who take on the task of 
enlightening others and who tell the truth despite the risk. A parrhesiastes prefers 
truthfulness towards the self rather than falsifying self to better suit social 
expectations. Parrhēsia relates to freedom and duty, and the individual has not only a 
special duty in relation to her or his own life, but also to others (see Foucault, 2005). 
Words must be congruent, then, with conduct. The parrhesiastes consider it a moral 
duty to be openly critical and try to influence other people. By speaking freely to 
students, the master encourages them to speak freely themselves. Nevertheless, 
Rousseau knew very well that telling the truth is no road to fortune. Nonetheless, he 
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saw it as his duty to speak frankly. It is not only his educational thought as such that 
attracts educational researchers but also his way of constantly writing with the aim of 
instructing readers on how to conduct their lives, thus awakening others to the need to 
pay attention to social inequalities.  
Nevertheless, I will not use Rousseau’s writings only as exemplars of an 
extraordinary and special thinker, but more as a case or illustration of a kind of 
thinking that seemed to denote a break with the Enlightenment mainstream. This will 
also show Rousseau’s contradictory role as both a defender and critic of his own 
society and of some of the most common Enlightenment trends. The study will reveal 
the conflicts at the time between idealistic aspirations and daily actions.   
 
Application of Principles and Theories 
 
In order to describe more precisely how I will employ Foucault’s methods, I will 
present how I am going to use his regularity principles of reversal, discontinuity, 
specificity, and exteriority. To begin with, the principle of reversal entails that the 
researcher has to be free from tradition and search, instead, for other approaches. By 
focusing on education, nature and sustainability, both separately and holistically, 
instead of studying science, biology, education, philosophy, or some other existing 
research field, I will try to identify other connections and ruptures than those that 
already have been investigated in a particular research discipline. Instead of focusing 
on one discipline, I want to study how various fields act in a person’s life and 
thinking, both individually and collectively. In order to do this, I also need to employ 
works of Rousseau other than his educational texts. I also want to study how 
Rousseau contributed to more wide-ranging discourses about nature and education 
and how these thoughts related to or differed from his ideas about other issues.  
Secondly, the principle of discontinuity means that instead of focusing on unities, 
epochs, or centuries, historical research moves towards disruption. In Chapter Four, 
then, I am not going to search mainly for typical features of the Enlightenment era 
but to study more how variable the discourse was, how Rousseau participated in these 
discourses, and how he often diverged or presented original, although not totally 
novel ideas. Furthermore, I will try to reveal fruitless trials that did not lead 
anywhere. A study of discontinuity also includes searching for series of events in 
Rousseau’s thinking and theories and examining how these series work inter-
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dependently in networks while also acting separately and independently. Following 
the principle of specificity implies that I do not have to split the discourse into a game 
of formerly recognized meanings and rearrange it accurately in congruence with a 
given pattern. Instead, I have to find my own way of exploring and arranging events 
according to how they appear to me as a result of new matrixes that I will observe. 
The exteriority principle designates that external features have an effect on 
discourses. This means that I also need to study the ‘conditions of possibility’ and 
search for contextual circumstances that have influenced Rousseau’s writing and 
made it either possible or impossible for him to contribute to advancing a particular 
discourse.  
What I also want to do in this discourse analysis is to investigate the power 
configurations entangled in a person’s relation to nature, epistemological stance, and 
educational outlook—Rousseau’s own, and as seen through the eyes of the fictive 
characters he created. In addition, I will explore how Rousseau dealt with nature in 
his theories, praxis, and in educational discourses; how and where these discourses 
concerning nature and education took place and in what way Rousseau has been 
involved. What did the discussions deal with and what did they hide and remained 
silent? There is not only one discourse to discover, but many separate ones that 
sometimes converge and sometimes diverge and move in different directions. When 
exploring Rousseau’s writings I discovered that these directions can be both abstract 
and concrete because Rousseau was not one to remain still: he was very often on the 
move, traveled and walked by foot from place to place, lived in various places, and 
also moved to and fro between different contexts in the same physical area. This is 
also significant in his fiction. In addition to moving physically from place to place he 
also moved mentally from space to space, and this becomes obvious in his writings. 
He also created literary and imaginary spaces within which to move.  
In line with Foucault’s studies of sexuality I will also include freedom as a main 
focus. The connections between Rousseau’s and Foucault’s technologies of the self 
show unmistakably why Foucault cannot only shape the methodological bases of this 
research; his ideas also have other more fundamental roles to play in the content and 
conclusions of this thesis. I have actually chosen Foucault’s most recent ethical 
studies as models for the analyses in Chapters Five and Six. Rousseau wrote many of 
his texts to stimulate critical reflections on society, on education, and to inspire 
improving readers as ethical subjects. His texts therefore have an “ethopoetic” task 
similar to the texts Foucault investigated in his studies of sexuality (see Foucault, 
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1997d, p. 209; Foucault, 2005). Following Foucault’s outline for his studies in the 
second and third book of History of Sexuality, my studies in the following chapters 
thus concentrate on how humans relate to nature in Rousseau’s personal experiences 
and fiction, as well as his accounts of them in his educational and political writings. 
Rousseau tried to lead his readers in the same self-transformative projects that he 
himself was involved in, and he sketched out his thoughts using various literary 
styles. The intent of Foucauldian research is “to define the conditions in which 
human beings ‘problematize’ what they are, what they do, and the world in which 
they live” (Foucault, 1985, p. 10); that is to find answers about how, why, and 
towards what ends they think and act as they do. This includes an attempt to study 
how persons carry out their lives and seek to transform themselves and others and 
establish rules that aim at changes in ethics, aesthetics, and in both discursive and 
non-discursive practices. Castel summarizes this method of problematization in two 
sentences:   
 
Problematization is not the representation of a preexisting object, or the creation 
through discourse of an object that does not exist. It is the totality of discursive 
and non-discursive practices that brings something into the play of truth and 
falsehood and sets it up as an object for the mind. (Castel, 1994, pp. 237-238) 
 
Reading Challenges 
 
Most of Rousseau’s creative and intellectual output, including letters, books, 
declarations, and so on, combined speech and written language to challenge and open 
up different forms of discourses to one another. His oeuvre was also a fusion of lived 
experiences and dreams, and profound theoretical reflections. But, it was obvious to 
Rousseau that by writing about himself, thus revealing his self, he had to stipulate a 
limit between me and the not-me, and me vis-à-vis others (Foucault, 1998b; Marshall, 
1996). The self must be made into a subject for examination and simultaneously 
made into an object for study. He had to both create and affirm himself as a subject 
through the process of writing and to present a picture of himself as an object in a 
twofold self-splitting task. This becomes most obvious in his autobiographies and 
letters.  
So, although Rousseau’s language may sound plain, the profundity of his 
message does not necessarily emerge easily after the first quick reading. Rousseau’s 
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stories are written poetically; they are multilayered and the stage shifts constantly 
between real, allegorical, and utopian spaces, individual and social perspectives, 
practices, and ideas, and they mostly have both an unmistakable instructional and a 
critical motive. Rousseau himself warned that readers have to read all he has written 
to understand his system (see RJJ). My reading is not that complete but thorough and 
has finally convinced me that he wanted to present a grand theory―not many small 
separate stories about political philosophy, educational methods, or social criticism 
and to write love stories, musical compositions, pamphlets, etcetera, from the 
perspectives of that grand theory. A piecemeal reading of Rousseau can be beneficial, 
but it serves other purposes than I have in this study. While some of Rousseau’s 
narratives are complicated and dense, I am aware that my attempt at distilling key 
themes and concerns can be deemed as amounting to only a fragmentary grasp. But 
my intention is to open up a more extended discourse based on the findings of the 
present book. To be honest, when I started to work on this book I did not yet 
understand how much actually was contained in Rousseau’s concept of nature and 
how much he had written on the topic. Now, I am better informed in this respect and 
realize that this book can only be a launching point into that concept. My plan has not 
been to reveal any final truth about his “grand theory,” but I have decided to try to 
grip why, how and the purposes for which Rousseau constructed this ‘system’.  
The Rousseau reader has to consider his writing style as more than a tool by 
which he clearly expressed his ideas. May (2002, p. 262) has a point when she calls 
the 1
st
 Discourse “an intellectual or ideological game play in which the philosophes 
liked to indulge.” Rousseau wrote creatively; while he did not call himself a 
philosopher and did not like to copy philosophers’ writing styles (see Dent, 1988; 
Starobinski, 1988). According to Dent (1988), Rousseau had few gifts as a systematic 
thinker, but he adds that if we make an effort and read him thoroughly we will find 
unity in his thoughts. His art was not systematization, but rather teasing and probing, 
and such a talent could also be called a special gift. When reading any of Rousseau’s 
texts, we should not forget his flair for sarcasm and dramatic irony, even if he was 
not the only ironic writer in the Enlightenment era. But his ironic style was only one 
of the many he employed to express what he called his ‘system’ of thoughts. He was 
a complex thinker with a specific writer’s voice capable of handling many stories 
simultaneously and of splitting his own personality as author into many concurrently 
acting subjects. He also regularly used a great number of sophisticated literary 
techniques in his art of writing. And he never chose the easiest course; when he 
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described utopias, he put the facts aside and painted more than one visionary picture 
(Shklar, 1966/2006).  
My first intention was to discover how and where he talks about nature in one 
way or another. Therefore, I read all his main writings,
86
 books, discourses, and a 
great deal of his correspondence. The more I read, the more I found. The main works 
in my first reading were: The Social Contract; or Principles of Political Right; Émile, 
or on Education; Discourse on the Sciences and Arts; Discourse on the Origin and 
Foundation of Inequality among Men; Confessions of Jean-Jacques Rousseau; Julie, 
or the New Heloise; Reveries of the Solitary Walker; and Botanical Writings. 
Rousseau regarded Émile and Julie as cornerstones of his philosophy, although 
they were not written as political texts. The third of his major books is The Social 
Contract that he wrote at the same time as these two novels. Ambjörnsson (1977) 
calls Émile and Social Contract twin stories, although one is about politics and the 
other about the education of chiefly one individual. I consider Émile, the Social 
Contract and Julie to be a triad and the culmination of his intellectual work. Émile 
also has direct connections to the two first discourses, which could be called the great 
opening of his entire writing career,
87
 of which the Dialogues and Reveries are the 
grand final and Savoyard Vicar (a part of Émile) a distillation. His Botanical Writings 
differ from all the other works listed above by being the most scientific and concrete, 
as will become clear in Chapter Six. In the beginning of the Chapters Five and Six I 
have explained more in detail which writings I mainly draw upon. I have also 
compared my conclusions with the interpretations of Rousseau by other researchers. 
After this first overall reading, I decided which sources to use for Chapters Four, 
Five, and Six. First, I analyzed how his thoughts correlate with those of other writers; 
then I tried to disclose and elucidate his nature ethics. My third interest was to focus 
on his educational approach to nature.   
I am capable of reading Foucault and Rousseau only at a very basic level in their 
native French. To compensate for this, I have tried to read all main texts in at least 
two translated versions, mainly in English along with translations in Swedish, my 
                                           
86 When I refer to Rousseau’s main works in brackets, with a few exceptions I use Dent’s (1992) 
abbreviating symbols. The two discourses, Discourse on the Sciences and Arts and Discourse on the Origin 
and Foundation of Inequality among Men, I refer to in short form as 1
st
 D and 2
nd
 D. For other of my 
references, I use a short form of the book title listed in the Rousseau part of the Bibliography at the end of 
this book.  
87
 It was not his first publication but was the one that made him famous. He had composed a comedy and 
written articles about music before that. I have not been able to deal with Rousseau’s musical production in 
this book. 
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mother tongue, and in Finnish or German when I have found it necessary. When 
possible, I have also compared two different editions of the same language. If needed, 
I have compared the translation with a version in the original French language. Then I 
have used the Bibliothèque de la Pléïade version from 1959-69 of Oeuvres Complètes 
de Jean-Jacques Rousseau. I have cited the quotations mainly in English, not in both 
English and French, for two reasons: firstly, the text becomes more convenient for the 
reader of English and, secondly, this research is not “formal concept analysis” 
concentrating on particular concepts, and I have therefore not usually presented the 
quotations in French. But in cases when it was important to show the original French, 
I have also added the French text in a note. The English version I primarily have used 
is Christopher Kelly’s edition of The Collected Writings of Rousseau. However, it did 
not include all the texts to which I wished to refer. Nevertheless, I am aware that 
translations sometimes suffer from lack of verbal precision in comparison to their 
original formulation and have tried to avoid this by double checking and careful 
choosing the English versions.  
Rousseau’s commentators have produced a huge number of writings, and it is 
almost unworkable to do justice to all the many worthwhile studies of Rousseau’s 
thoughts. My choices of secondary references have, firstly, concentrated on texts 
available in English and, secondly, focused on texts in the categories of educational 
and political thoughts. A main secondary source has been a series of four volumes, 
Jean-Jacques Rousseau: Critical Assessments of Leading Political Philosophers, 
edited by John T. Scott and published in 2006. This series includes a compilation of 
73 earlier published essays about Rousseau’s political philosophy. The oldest dates 
back to the beginning of the 20
th
 century and the newest are of recent vintage. I argue 
that contemporary educational research does not pay enough attention to the central 
role of Rousseau’s educational theory in his entire literary production, and it has 
likewise failed to address his multidimensional writing style enough. I have, 
therefore, tried to give short presentations in the beginning of Chapters Five and Six 
of all the basic texts I have employed, and I draw attention to his thought-provoking 
writing style and how his texts can be varyingly read. 
As with Rousseau’s texts, when possible I have also read the main works of 
Foucault in two translated versions. In addition to his main books mentioned above 
and his The Order of Things, I have devoted special attention to The Hermeneutics of 
the Subject: Lectures at the Collège de France 1981-1982 that includes a thorough 
explanation of the Hellenistic and Roman notions of “care of the self.” I have also 
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been inspired by Foucault’s essays and interviews in Paul Rabinow’s series Essential 
Works of Foucault 1954-1984. In addition, I have read analyses of Foucault by many 
leading secondary sources. In addition to my initial intention to let Foucault inspire 
the method, I also decided to let him in as a discussion partner in the entire Rousseau 
study whenever it could be done. 
 
Inquiry and Order 
 
The main purpose of this book is to discuss the pedagogical implications of an 
education that can challenges humankind’s ethical relation to nature today by 
answering two questions. First, what ethical dimensions are challenged by the 
enigma of sustainability? And, second, what kind of education do these dimensions 
require?  
My first research strategy, as applied already in Chapter Two was a critical 
reading of key literature in environmental education, environmental philosophy, and 
the history of education. The second phase of this study employs Foucault’s 
genealogy and ethical research approaches in a case study of Rousseau. This second 
phase relies on an analysis predicated on three questions, which I label I, II, and III: 
 
I. What discourses about nature, knowledge and education inspired Rousseau?  
II. What were Rousseau’s ethics in relation to nature? 
III. What is the role of nature in Rousseau’s educational philosophy?  
 
I will describe the purpose of these questions and how I will undertake the research 
according to these questions more thoroughly at the beginning of Chapters Four, 
Five, and Six, in anticipation of the studies in those chapters. Chapter Four provides a 
background to the studies in Chapters Five and Six and draws from many sources. I 
will firstly carry out a simplified customized genealogical discourse analysis. The 
investigation in that chapter is called “Rousseau in modern discourses about nature 
and knowledge” and answers question number I: What discourses about nature, 
knowledge and education inspired Rousseau? In this study I have surveyed many 
books and articles that shaped ideas about nature, knowledge, and education. The 
selected literature includes philosophy, history of ideas, history of science, history of 
education, novels, encyclopedias and the Bible, among other sources. Since Rousseau 
not only interacted with contemporary writers but also replied to earlier ones, the 
131 
 
study starts in the 16
th
 century. The content is divided in four parts focusing on 
different layers of discourses involving the concepts of both nature and knowledge. 
Shaped with the help of Foucault’s genealogy, this study observes his regularity 
principles for discourse analyses. Of interest is how knowledge and “nature” became 
powerful influences that generated social politics and education and how Rousseau 
participated in discourses on these topics. The so-called ‘scapegoats’ from the 
previous chapter emerge again for more in-depth scrutiny.  
In Chapters Five and Six, I concentrated on mainly Rousseau’s writings in 
answering the second and third questions. Table 2 below outlines the reading and the 
research approach taken in these chapters, and why I recommend an alternate reading 
of the diagram and the text below. The study presented in Chapter Five is a 
modification of Foucault’s ethical method and the study in Chapter Six, in turn, is a 
modification of the approach taken in Chapter Five. 
Chapter Five is entitled “Rousseau on nature and ethics” and answers question 
number II: What were Rousseau’s ethics in relation to nature? To answer that 
question, I have analyzed how Rousseau described humans’ relationship to nature on 
an ethical level. It focuses on Rousseau’s vision for the self-education of individuals 
who are free, virtuous, and responsible members of society. He asks for an ethics by 
which human beings problematize what and who they are and that define the 
conditions which are natural for humans; how to relate ethically to their fellows and 
the natural world in which they live; and how to think and act. The Fifth Chapter thus 
comprises Rousseau’s vision of how individuals ought to relate to themselves as 
ethical and natural subjects and how best to discover their roles in this relation. The 
question is problematized by using four fundamental sub-questions that deal with the 
second question in terms of ontology, deontology, ascetics and teleology: 
 
1. What is the ethical substance of Rousseau's conclusions about the moral 
conduct of human beings?  (Ontology) 
2.  What modes of control (i.e., subjection to rules) do humans have to undergo to 
live in tune with their human nature, according to Rousseau? (Deontology) 
3. What forms of conduct or manners do individuals have to choose in order to 
transform themselves into more 'natural' humans, according to Rousseau? 
(Ascetics) 
4. What should the ethical goal be towards which individuals should strive in 
actualizing their moral selves, according to Rousseau? (Teleology)?  
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Chapter Six answers question III: What is the role of nature in Rousseau’s 
educational philosophy? In this chapter, I have employed Foucault’s methods in a 
reflective way to raise new questions about education similar to those raised 
concerning ethics in Chapter Five. Of particular interest is the relation (if any) 
between knowledge and praxis, and what makes education ethically defensible. 
Rousseau was convinced that the world could be a better one and he was strongly 
motivated to influence others with his ideas to that end, but he also wanted to live his 
own life in a morally uplifted way. He pursued this prospect in many different ways; 
not only by writing educational texts, but also through correspondence, political 
writings, fiction, and by participation in the polemics of his age. For example, he 
instigated controversy, proposed provocative thought experiments, offered instructive 
examples using himself and fictive persons as models, shaped visions, proposed 
concrete plans and descriptions and, last but not least, raised his critical voice 
whenever necessary. In addition to his attempts to influence others through his words, 
he also uncompromisingly sought to be a role model, an aspiration that becomes clear 
in what he wrote about himself.  
I will try to reply to question III using the conclusions reached regarding question 
II and I have problematized areas that connect both questions with each other. Thus I 
will try to disclose Rousseau’s educational endeavor through his ethics. The sub-
questions of question III relate both to the problematization of question II and to the 
discussion about environmental education in Chapter Two.  
 
1.  What is the essence of a ‘natural education’,88 according to Rousseau? 
(Ontology) 
2.   What did Rousseau believe that education could do to encourage people to 
adopt particular norms or rules regarding their relationships to nature? 
(Deontology)  
3.   If we follow Rousseau, can education promote conduct that is more in tune 
with nature and, if so, how?  (Ascetics)  
4.  What are the aims of an education that promotes the development of more 
‘natural’ humans? (Teleology) 
                                           
88
 Rousseau called the education he envisioned in Émile “l’éducation naturelle” (OC IV, p. 267), translated 
as “natural education” (e.g., E, p. 52; Rousseau, 2007, p. 26). He also mentioned that certain circumstances 
are “dans l’ordre de la nature” (OC IV, p. 611), which has been translated as “according to the order of 
nature” (e.g., E, p. 298) or “in accordance with nature” (e.g., Rousseau, 2007, p. 275).  
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Areas of Concern and Levels of Writing 
 
I focus on Rousseau’s ethical theory (in Chapter Five) and educational theory (in 
Chapter Six) in terms of four areas of concern. When the words “nature” and 
“natural” are interpreted according to Rousseau, and if the way humans relate to 
nature is viewed from a current sustainability perspective, these four areas of concern 
can operate separately but even more so interactively. I have identified these four 
areas as influenced by Foucault in accordance with what I have distinguished in 
reading Rousseau. I have divided Rousseau's ethical theory into four areas of focus: 
  
1.   How ought individuals who are following their natural inclinations to relate to 
themselves and other persons?  
2.  How ought they to relate to and participate in the creation of society and 
human communities?  
3.   How ought they to relate to the natural world?  
4.   How does Rousseau think they ought to relate to the Cosmos and the Divine?  
 
I use the expression ‘ought’ since Rousseau’s language treads on the dividing line 
between normative endorsement and visionary dreaming. The study of Rousseau’s 
educational theory is correspondingly divided in four areas of concern: 
  
1.   His recommendations concerning the education of a natural individual.  
2.   His views on the best ways to educate a natural citizen.  
3.   How to promote knowledge of the natural world.  
4.   How to encourage love of the Divine in nature.  
 
The scope of Rousseau’s project was wide and his writing style multifaceted. His 
texts are diverse in form and type, and they simultaneously incorporate many meta-
levels of meaning. In this respect his writing is similar to poetry. I have therefore 
divided his texts into a five-dimensional scheme representing five major levels I 
identify in his writing. These five levels emerged, first of all, from my own reading of 
Rousseau’s text and, secondly, from a certain agreement I found between my own 
understanding of Rousseau and Broome’s (1963) reading of Julie.  
First, the story exists on a physical level: descriptions of places, activities, and 
physically expressed affections in the real or fictive domains, and critiques of what 
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actually happens. Second, the story takes place on a mental level: thoughts and 
descriptions of real or fictive feelings. The third level is theoretical: proposed ideas, 
provocative thought experiments, future or utopian perspectives, and fantasies. The 
fourth is an allegorical level: symbolic expressions of morals, politics, and the like. 
Finally, it rises to a metaphysical level that involves mainly religious thoughts and 
perspectives. These five levels constitute the theoretical platform upon which I will 
analyze Rousseau’s texts. Actually, the levels intermingle and intersect in ways that 
are sometimes more or less obvious but that are completely hidden at other times. In 
addition to these five levels, Rousseau’s writings typically have an educational and 
critical social purpose. 
A good example of this complexity is the book Julie, or the New Heloise. While 
all these levels are present, it is still possible to read the book simply as a love story 
and to concentrate, accordingly, on the most obvious levels of reality. A noticeable 
matrix in Julie that the reader without any other ambitions than entertainment can 
thus fail to notice is the direct resemblance between the individual, the family, and 
society that strike a chord reminiscent of both Plato and Aristotle. Another possible 
interpretation of Julie that does not directly emerge is to read it as an allegory of the 
genealogy of humankind in accordance with Rousseau’s 2nd Discourse (see Broome, 
1963). In the short sentence “The mountainside is steep, the water deep, and I am in 
despair” (JNH, p. 76) the connection between scenes of nature and strong feelings 
becomes quite clear. Rousseau’s descriptions of nature are often more than depictions 
of particular locations: they symbolize feelings and states of affairs. Therefore, I want 
to point out that this division into physical and mental levels does not constitute a 
dualistic system. I only want to differentiate between the visible aspects of the 
physical world and the inwardly invisible and subjective experience of it; for 
example, in Julie, Rousseau often describes inner landscapes (feelings) by setting the 
situation in an outer landscape (natural world) that reflects the same features (calm, 
cold, sunny, etc.). My intention is not to break the stories into pieces and list their 
fragments but, rather, to reflect on Rousseau’s stories as multidimensional networks 
simultaneously incorporating reality and dreams, hope and hopelessness, the past and 
the future; and to show how Rousseau’s complex writing style challenges the reader. 
The more or less skillfully hidden matrixes and multiple meanings in Rousseau’s 
stories all serve the same purpose: to reveal Rousseau’s ‘system’ of thoughts to a 
broad public (see Broome, 1963). Many of Rousseau’s works have a strong utopian 
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character. It is obvious that Rousseau had mastered key literary techniques.
89
 His use 
of language was not simply a descriptive or discursive tool but also an art aspiring to 
an aesthetic outcome. Rousseau used aphorisms and paradoxes to cite multifaceted 
truths, which he more or less noticeably tried to synthesize into a holistic picture 
(Payne, 1892/2003). Awareness of Rousseau’s complex writing style at least alerts 
one to delve deeply in understanding his texts. Salkever (1977-8/2006) distinguishes 
two kinds of paradoxes in Rousseau’s language. Firstly, he uses paradoxes as a 
statement that is strongly contrary to conventional held belief, somewhat resembling 
some of Socrates’ arguments in Plato’s dialogues. Such paradoxes have constantly 
shocked many of Rousseau’s readers and many have thus looked upon him as either 
shrewd or inane. By experimenting with completely contradictory views Rousseau 
most certainly wanted to show the moral failings and errors of contemporary views 
and practices (see ibid.). Secondly, his use of paradox also engages two contradictory 
views simultaneously; for example in the 2
nd
 discourse. Philosophical paradoxes can 
either be presented as dilemmas to be solved or to highlight conflicting features of a 
particular issue. According to Salkever (1977-8/2006), most of Rousseau’s paradoxes 
are of the latter kind, but I find him often walking a fine line between vision and 
practice and, therefore, even the paradoxes become paradoxical.  
Rousseau was also a master of the technique of the thought experiment, although 
this term was not in use at his time.
90
 Thought experiments have been used for 
thousands of years in different fields (Gendler 2002) and for different purposes. They 
strive to challenge the understanding of a common situation by bringing a new view 
of the phenomena into focus (Häggqvist, 1996), and they are a kind of intellectual 
game of language play among philosophers (ibid.), but scientists also use thought 
experiments. In philosophy a thought experiment presents a fairly detailed but 
physically unrealized (even unrealizable) scenario (see Gendler 2000; Brown, 2004).  
It is an “imaginary scenario with the aim of confirming or disconfirming some 
hypothesis or theory,” according to Gendler (2002, p. 388). These descriptions very 
well suit Rousseau’s intentions with the 2nd Discourse, Émile, and the Social 
contract. It is obvious that his thought experiments strive to change common 
understanding of a situation by offering a new view. Thought experiments can 
provide a possible solution for testing a situation that is impossible to perform in 
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 He used techniques such as juxtaposition, wit, overstatement, simile, metaphor, even extended metaphors. 
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 According to Brendel (2004) the concept ‘thought experiment’ was mentioned for the first time in 1811, 
which means about half a century after Rousseau’s era as an active writer. 
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reality for some reason, but a thought experiment has to be supported by empirical 
data, otherwise it would not be possible to use it to explain what it aims to do (De 
Mey & Weber, 2003). This is exactly Rousseau’s technique: in his thought 
experiments, he uses the findings of others and also illustrates using the data of his 
own experiences, his own life.  
Lanson (1912/2006) reminds the commentator on Rousseau’s texts that Rousseau 
was not an author who limited his thoughts to abstract theories. He did not present a 
methodically and logically constructed formal system that skillfully avoids all 
contradictions. Instead, he purposefully and controversially featured such 
contradictions in his de facto “system”. His thoughts were shaped by daily life with 
all its up and downs, both emotionally and physically and flavored with emotions and 
imagination, where new thoughts replaced old ones that sometimes remained 
uncorrected. Lanson’s useful advice on how to read Rousseau’s texts can help 
understand him, de facto: 
 
Carefully weigh the sense and important of the texts and consider their spirit 
more than their words. Do not impose inferences on the author, as easily deduced 
as they may be, as an integral part of his own thought since he might have 
declined to make them, and definitely do not substitute the deduced inference for 
the thought itself. Distinguish the unequal worth of the ideas he expresses, and do 
not treat as equal in worth and comparable, or compensatory, a maturely thought-
out chapter and a witticism, the cry or complaint of a personal letter written under 
the pressure of a specific circumstance or the fever of an emotion. Do not 
thoughtlessly introduce arbitrary suppositions into our reasoning about the 
meaning of a text.  (Lanson, 1912/2006, pp. 11-28) 
 
I will mainly try to follow Lanson’s (1912/2006) advice and not treat Rousseau’s 
texts as theoretically formal but, instead, as simultaneously abstract and rebellious, 
purposefully triggering wide-ranging considerations about common affairs in the 
world. Rousseau himself says that reading his books “require[s] constant attention” 
and that to follow their thread “one must reread with effort, and more than once” 
(RJJ, p. 211). I have followed that advice and have tried to be aware of his blend of 
imagination and normativity.   
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3.3 Conclusion  
 
In the second part of this book I will employ research methods inspired by Foucault. 
Many of Foucault’s arguments correspond with the concerns of this study and some 
of them are brought into play when and where relevant. According to Nilsson (2008), 
Foucault can be employed in three ways: thematically, methodically, and 
theoretically. In this work, I will use Foucault in all three ways.  
The relation of humans to nature and Rousseau’s writings might at first sight 
seem far from the topics of Foucault’s historical research. However, a closer 
examination reveals many similarities between the dilemmas and challenges facing 
human beings in relation to nature, and the topics of Foucault’s research, such as 
sexuality, madness, and punishment. As is also the case with these issues, the 
problems of nature and sustainability are strongly associated with human beings; 
furthermore, they all turn out to be linked to knowledge and education. They are even 
all connected to daily human life, both as an individual and social condition, and 
always have been. In addition, they are all linked to issues of power and freedom. 
The Foucauldian perspective can also help me confront the power/knowledge 
paradigms that buttress the conflicting discourses concerning environmental 
education and education for sustainable development. 
In sum, the following three chapters deal with how Rousseau viewed human life 
in relation to human nature and the natural world. Chapter Four uses a kind of 
genealogical discourse analysis to shape a framework of the discourses in which 
Rousseau was engaged. Chapter Five is a modification of Foucault’s ethical method 
and focuses on Rousseau’s view of the human relation to nature. And, Chapter Six is 
a further modification of the method used in Chapter Five and deals with Rousseau’s 
educational theory.  
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Table 2.  Research outline in Chapters Five and Six 
 
 
Research 
Question II 
 
What were 
Rousseau’s 
ethics in 
relation to 
nature? 
 
A 
A 
A
A 
r 
e 
a 
s   
 
o 
f 
 
c 
o 
n 
c 
e 
r 
n 
r 
 
Problematization of Rousseau’s ‘nature ethics’ 
 
 
Human relation to 
self and others  
 
Ontology 
 
 
Deontology 
 
 
Ascetics 
 
 
Teleology 
 
What is the 
ethical 
substance of 
Rousseau's 
conclusions 
about the 
moral conduct 
of human 
beings?   
 
 
What modes of 
control 
(subjection) do 
humans have 
to undergo to 
live in tune 
with their 
human nature? 
 
What forms 
of conduct or 
manners do 
individuals 
have to 
choose in 
order to 
transform 
themselves 
into more 
‘natural’ 
humans? 
 
What should 
the ethical 
goal be 
towards which 
individuals 
should strive 
in actualizing 
their moral 
selves?  
 
 
Being social  
 
Humans in the 
natural world 
 
Nature for 
worship 
Rousseau’s 
levels of 
writing 
 
Physical 
 
Mental 
 
Theoretical 
 
Allegorical 
 
Metaphysical 
  
 
 
Problematization of Rousseau’s ‘natural education’ 
 
Research 
Question III 
 
What is the 
role of nature 
in Rousseau’s 
educational 
philosophy?  
 
A 
r 
e 
a 
s   
 
o 
f 
 
c 
o 
n 
c 
e 
r 
n 
 
 
Creating the natural 
individual 
 
Ontology 
 
 
Deontology 
 
Ascetics 
 
Teleology 
 
What is the 
essence of a 
‘natural 
education’, 
according to 
Rousseau? 
 
What did 
Rousseau 
believe that 
education 
could do to 
encourage 
people to 
adopt 
particular  
norms or rules 
regarding their 
relationships 
to nature?  
 
 
Can 
education 
promote 
conduct that 
is more in 
tune with 
nature and, if 
so, how 
 
What are the 
aims of an 
education that 
promotes the 
development 
of more 
natural 
humans? 
 
 
Educating the 
citizen 
 
 
Educating about the 
natural world 
 
Educating for love 
of nature as a 
reflection of 
divinity 
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4 Modern Discourses about Nature and Knowledge 
 
The previous chapter presented Foucault’s research methods and the strategies that I 
will employ in my study of Rousseau in the upcoming chapters of this book. The 
present chapter works out a picture of thoughts and events that in one way or another 
relate to the thinking of Rousseau, and it focuses especially on the role of nature and 
knowledge as elements in discourses from the centuries before and during Rousseau’s 
life. My particular intention is to search for power constellations involving nature and 
knowledge, both theoretically and practically, and to discuss how Rousseau 
addressed them. By this approach, I will uncover the conditions that made 
Rousseau’s thoughts possible and notable.  
For clarity, I have divided the chapter into four parts. The first part (4.1), Methods 
and Theories, describes how this study applies some basic ideas and theories of 
Foucault. The second part (4.2), Towards Enlightenment with Nature as Guideline, 
traces how humans’ relation to nature and knowledge started to gradually change and 
generate countless new ideas in the centuries before Rousseau. It also reveals how all 
these newborn ideas later culminated in a chorus of critique, and it gives a glimpse 
into how Rousseau related to this miscellany of discourses. The third part (4.3), 
Reshaping the World, portrays several more or less groundbreaking changes that took 
place in how humans related to the world and gives examples of phenomena that 
were regarded as “natural” during the 18th century. The final part (4.4), New 
Learning, focuses on the increased pursuit of education and knowledge that took 
place, starting with the 16
th
 century and continuing to and through Rousseau’s era.  
While shaping a background is a long and complex story, I will concentrate on 
basic elements and a few characters that have had an impact on the creation of the 
modern world and thus situate Rousseau’s ideas in an endless network of discourses. 
With this strategy, I want to identify the situations and discourses in which the 
concepts of “nature” and “knowledge” appeared and to feature the great diversity of 
arguments that leaned on these concepts. I will mainly focus on European trends and 
methods from the 16
th
 century until the time of Rousseau’s death in 1778; thus, I will 
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neither deal with the revolution in France nor in America, nor discuss the industrial 
revolution, nor enter deeply into political disputes. The presentation will nonetheless 
deal with both philosophies and practices.  
 
4.1 Methods and Theories 
 
The question this chapter tries to answer is: What discourses about nature, knowledge 
and education inspired Rousseau? Methodically the review applies Foucault’s 
genealogy and studies the power constellations that shaped knowledge and 
conceptions of nature during the early modern time and the role of Rousseau in these 
constellations. To study these power phenomena methodically, I use the regularity 
principles Foucault suggested. Firstly, the principle of exteriority is the main 
sustaining force of this chapter and searches for influences on Rousseau’s writings by 
investigating the network of discourses in which he was involved or implicated. 
Secondly, the story in this chapter builds on the principle of reversal, which means 
that the researcher has to enter the issue from an altered position. The position chosen 
combines three angles: nature, knowledge, and Rousseau. Plainly speaking, I will 
study the discourses about nature and knowledge jointly and in relation to Rousseau.  
According to the third principle, discontinuity, I will search for how new 
disciplines or sets of ideas emerged. To succeed in this task my study seeks 
discourses related to the concepts of nature and knowledge from many various 
perspectives. In focus are both discourses prior to and contemporaneous with 
Rousseau. Firstly, the texts consulted contain original works written by philosophers 
and scientists, such as books, essays, letters, and novels. Secondly, the study material 
contains various historical texts about modernity, the Enlightenment, education, 
religion, science, childhood, and special books, such as Scripture. The reading of all 
these sources has taken place in parallel with my reading of Rousseau’s main books 
and of some of Foucault’s books, especially The Order of Things. Finally, the fourth 
principle, specificity, has inclined me to use this diverse material to find new matrixes 
diverging from those usually employed and to twist them together in new 
constellations. However, I have also felt free to partly skip Foucault’s guidelines and 
follow more traditional patterns from the history of ideas or classical history, if this 
seemed useful. A crucial determinant, however, has constantly been the connection to 
Rousseau’s thoughts. (See more about the regularity principles in the previous 
141 
 
chapter). To make the course of the investigation more clear, I need to describe 
Foucault’s view of power. 
 
Power as Games of Strategies 
 
The way Foucault reflect on power differs from common sense concepts and the 
focus of his studies is, in fact, the ‘how’ of power. To relate the mechanisms of power 
to two limits, he investigated “the rules of right that provide a formal delimitation of 
power” and “the effects of truth this power produces and transmits, and which in their 
turn reproduce this power” (Foucault 1980c, p. 93). With these words, he means that 
discourses as well as all kinds of other practices in society constitute a huge number 
of power constellations. Therefore, the dilemma is threefold, consisting of power, 
right and truth, and all three strongly intermingled (ibid.). Power is therefore not a 
singular element acting alone in a special direction. The concept of “power” implies a 
diverse and prolific system of power relations that act immanently in particular fields 
of the entire social organization, and it is basic to the conduct of collective (social) 
games (Foucault, 1980b, 2000i). Power is not an institution or a structure; it is a 
multiple strategic condition in a particular society; it can emerge from anywhere, 
exist everywhere, and be present in a variety of connections between two points. 
Accordingly, power is not only a top down mechanism; and it is much more than 
simply repression or the mobilization of negative forces.  
The state is a kind of superstructure related to many other kind of joint power 
structures making demands on the human body and these joint structures include 
entities like the family, kinship, sexuality, knowledge, economy, and technology 
(Foucault, 1980b). In addition, knowledge is innate in all potential power relations, 
since power and knowledge are each other’s preconditions. Power is a social strategy 
that creates both knowledge and individuals, but knowledge, in turn, also creates 
power. Power leads members of society to participate in the production and 
reproduction of truth, in which power, truth, and rights are interdependent. Yet, 
where there is power there are also opposing forces of power in tension with it (e.g., 
Foucault, 1980b). To give an example: When considering the discourse about the use 
of the preposition for (education for the environment) described in Chapter Two in 
the light of Foucault’s view of power/knowledge, the different discourses involved 
can be seen as power struggles. In these struggles, certain concepts hold rhetorical 
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power and dominate general discourse by claiming to be the ‘truth’, while critical 
voices try to attack them as ‘false’ or mistaken. One easily enters such discourses 
unconscious of one’s own role in what is always a complicated power struggle (see 
Ferreira, 2009; see also Chapter Two in this book). The situation rapidly develops 
where one cannot see the forest for the trees anymore. 
Such counter-forces are rather immediate reactions to the allocation of power in a 
power constellation and they therefore have a productive role to play (Foucault, 1978; 
1997f). From this view, power is a force that acts on many levels at the same time. 
Power is not permanent, but malleable and changes shape and focus constantly. 
Although power is directed towards a goal, it does not need to be a goal of a 
particular person. Foucault meant that people cannot act totally apart from the various 
power networks of which they are parts, but they can be more or less in compliance 
with the power networks that involve them. Accordingly, various power networks 
divide not only groups and societies, but also individual’s states of mind. To deal 
with such contradictions, these discourses offer competing alternatives: a discourse, 
on one hand, can purposefully strengthen particular powers and, on the other hand, 
mute others.  
Foucault (1980c) emphasized the study of power at its extreme points, where it is 
most indistinct. This kind of approach does not include questions about ‘who’ or 
‘what’ institution holds the power and what the ‘aims’ are of the persons who hold 
power but, rather, ‘how’ power is implemented in praxis and how it relates to its 
‘objects’. The word ‘object’ may sound as though some person dominates others and 
makes them into objects for power to manipulate, but the personal role of an 
individual may differ from being a target of power to being its source. This dual 
capacity was, as we will soon see, the fate of Rousseau. This is also something that 
seriously complicates our present roles as responsible actors in a sustainable society. 
We are simultaneously subjects and objects in an unsustainable practice of living. 
Even if we feel manipulated and victims of others’ profiting, we steadily participate 
in the global oppress of both certain groups of humans, not to mention other species. 
The concern of The History of Sexuality has much in common with this particular 
research. The presence of power is obvious in the creation of knowledge, but its 
presence is also felt in educational strategies and practices. Similarly, power 
influences the relations humans have with nature. And, as with sexuality, the relation 
of humans to nature can become an occasion for power conflicts between men and 
women, old and young, adults and children, and the conflict can even afflict the 
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individual. The biggest conflict is probably the dualist separation of mind and body, 
where the body is counted as the evil part of the human being, the part belonging to 
nature, in opposition to the rational and holy mind. However, Foucault (e.g., 1978, 
1998c) points out that the body is not a constant; it is an object of power that varies in 
time and space because it is constantly shaped culturally and re-constituted. Power 
works, for example, in situations where teachers meet their students, priests their 
laity, and an administration its population. Peers with different wants and desires use 
power to persuade each other, and the different modes of being human taken on by 
the same individual at different times each come with different involvements with 
power. Additionally, power becomes visible when humans exploit other biological 
creatures and, in return, the power of other creatures, even non-living nature, has an 
impact on human life. And, as with sexuality, humans’ relations with nature play an 
active role in society and can intentionally be used for many purposes.  
When it comes to power, Foucault (1978) encourages searching for the matrices 
power follows in its various interactions, rather than concentrating on who holds 
power, or who has the right to acquire knowledge. The reason for this focus is that 
power relations only reveal momentary parts of larger processes built up over many 
years; nodes at which the active parts interact have changed numerous times. 
However, humans’ relationships with nature may be an exception because there 
appear to be clear, long-lasting manifestation of power in the human regard for nature 
(see, e.g., Suutala, 1990; Chapter Two in this book). Power has also been a variable 
over the ages that cannot be neglected as regards age and gender groups. Therefore, it 
can be important to determine which persons and groups have been allowed the right 
to talk. Rousseau is a good example of a person who others tried to silence. Many 
influential people turned their backs on him because of his willingness to voice 
uncomfortable issues. In the contemporary environmental debate, it is also obvious 
that not all voices are equal. This becomes incredibly relevant on a global scale. The 
last report about the implementation of the Millennium Development Goals shows in 
plain language and statistics that the losers in the global economic game still are the 
poorest people and this continuing problem brings forward the topic of spaces.  
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Spaces, places, and emplacements  
 
Spaces are important in all social life and are always relevant in connection to power 
(Foucault, 1989). Foucault (1998a, p. 175) saw his time as an age of spaces:
91
 “We 
are in an era of the simultaneous, of juxtaposition, of the near and the far, of the side-
by-side, of the scattered.” Giving space a central position is, according to Foucault, a 
way of handling time and history. He also claims that, since Galileo and the 17
th
 
century, all “localization” has been succeeded by “extension” that lately has given 
way to “emplacement.” “Emplacement is defined by the relations of proximity 
between points or elements. In formal terms these can be described as series, trees, 
lattices” (Foucault, 1998a, pp. 176). “We are in an age when space is presented to us 
in the form of relations of emplacement” (ibid., 177), and in these networks of space 
we take many oppositions for granted; for example, between private and public 
space, work and leisure space, cultural and useful spaces―not to mention central and 
peripheral political spaces. Even though most people nowadays know that the world 
is round, particular parts are still more culturally and politically powerful. I will soon 
address this problem from a historical perspective but, first, I will present Foucault’s 
conception of emplacements, since it is not only physical and authentic places that 
occupy our world. 
Foucault (1967, 1998a) groups as emplacements, firstly, utopias
92
 that are unreal 
places, either ideal perfected societies or their reversal; that is, real places as turned 
around. Secondly, he mentions realized utopias that are incorporated into social 
institutions. He calls these places heterotopias and regards them as the opposite of 
utopias. Between utopias and heterotopias are mixed experiences, as some kinds of 
mirrors that can be both real and utopian. Open and closing times generally restrict 
the entrance to heterotopias, and access may also require rituals and the meaning of 
heterotopias can change over time, mutate, and begin to operate in a new way. There 
are heterotopias juxtaposing several emplacements that are not usually compatible 
and that bring to a site one or several other places; for example, theatres, operas, 
museums, gardens. Asian gardens, for example, represent an ideal world of nature in 
miniature (Foucault, 1967, 1989a). But, one also has to consider that spaces for 
Foucault can also denote normative entities, like social orders, hierarchies and 
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 The word utopia comes from the Greek words ou (not) and topos (place) (Ioanne, 2001). 
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characteristics (see Nilsson, 2008). Even the human body could be classified as a 
space for health or disease (Foucault, 1994).  
As I will show in this chapter, both utopias and heterotopias were common in 
modern Europe. Stories about utopias flourished and influenced philosophical 
writing, especially Rousseau’s. Many heterotopias, such as museums, libraries, 
teahouses, theatres and gardens, had gained popular recognitions. Colonial life, in 
particular the Jesuit colonies in Paraguay, was a rigorously planned activity, a way of 
shaping an ideal society. Rousseau described the contrast between human-made 
heteropias and natural life and preferred the latter.  
Rousseau’s writings contain images of both utopias and heterotopias. Both were 
typical in the 18
th
 century and they are still common in our contemporary time, even 
if somewhat different. Various forms of gardens, museums, and other old types of 
heterotopias are still usual, but today there are also new forms, such as adventure 
parks, and imaginary scenes in films and the Internet. In the conception and 
reconstruction of nature, both utopias and heterotopias are useful metaphors. They 
mark the limits between reality and dreams, between what is allowed and forbidden, 
wished-for and undesirable, and between what is appealing at a distance but frightful 
when approached. In sum, the limit between utopias, heterotopias and real life is 
gradual, and the diverse forms from real life to its reversals becomes apparent when 
we consider the diverse types of natural environments as well as diverse forms of 
human life. With the Foucauldian views of power and spaces in mind, the focus will 
now turn towards Enlightenment discourses and visions, and to utopias built on a 
belief in an illumination of humankind that should gradually lead to perfection. 
 
4.2 Towards Enlightenment, with Nature as Guideline 
 
The so-called Age of Enlightenment
93
 or merely the Enlightenment was a key stage in 
the transformation to modernity that had started earlier in Europe. At this time many 
critical voices saw it as their mission to drag people out from the darkness of the 
Middle or ‘Dark’ Ages in order to see the sun, in line with Plato’s allegory of the 
cave (see Republic, Book VII). The discourses of the Enlightenment dealt with many 
fundamentals of the Renaissance worldview, especially central elements concerning 
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nature. Renaissance questions continued to attract interest, and discourses flourished 
about the earth, nature, human beings, the Creator, equality, and justice. As early as 
the end of the 17
th
 century, growing criticism of previous thinking became evident. 
Criticism extended both outward (geographically), inward (mentally), backward 
(historically), and forward (visionary). These discourses included arguments for 
many divergent truths, and involved writers searching for answers to diverse thought-
provoking questions, comparing, quarreling, and defending their views. Amidst all 
the layers of new knowledge and understanding of reality, interest in educational 
methods arose in order to teach the young generation how to handle all the new 
phenomena and to further accelerate scientific development. But, according to many 
recent researchers, the usually acknowledged conflict between the Ancient and the 
modern, between rationalism and empiricism, is exaggerated, because there was no 
obvious break between religion and science (e.g., Håkansson, 2005).  
It is possible to perceive the Enlightenment as a climactic period that followed a 
time when all kinds of new truths about the world had come to light. It was an 
opportunity to initiate and experiment with changes in many areas, although often 
more was said than done. But it is not possible to summarize Enlightenment thinking 
in any simple or single formulation since the intentions and the ideas of the time were 
diverse. The Enlightenment had two opposing faces: on the one hand, it saw a 
pragmatic acceleration of new ideas and practices, and on the other hand, it 
questioned the strong faith in progress. This second aspect is also called the Counter-
Enlightenment, involving a loud, critical chorus that involved spokespersons from 
philosophy, arts, and politics. But, such criticism was also twofold: for some it was a 
fashion and for others a moral conviction. In addition, most of them spoke a language 
and expressed thoughts that were strongly rooted in the past. In all, it is difficult to 
separate the Enlightenment from the Counter-Enlightenment, and it is better to talk 
about the juxtaposition of Enlightenment strains of thought. The British and 
American word Enlightenment, the French Lumières,
94
 the German Aufklärung and 
the Italian Illuminismo do not designate exactly the same developments, as the 
process took shape differently in different contexts, and thus no consensus was 
reached concerning its essence. Instead of the Age of Enlightenment, we could talk 
about Enlightenment tendencies, involving various conflicting directions and ranging 
in number from singular to plural (e.g., Muthu, 2003; Outram, 1995; Swenson, 2000).   
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 Other French concepts for enlightenment are: l’âge de lumière, l’âge philosophique, siècle des lumières, 
siècle de la bienfaisance and siècle de l´humanité. 
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Rather than attempting some neat definition of Enlightenment, which would 
always be open to challenge or qualification, it is more helpful to think of 
Enlightenment as a series of problems and debates, of ‘flash-points’, 
characteristic of the eighteenth century, or of ‘pockets’ where projects of 
intellectual expansion impacted upon and changed the nature of developments in 
society and government on a word-wide basis. (Outram, 1995, p. 3) 
 
One of the biggest ‘pockets’ was definitively Paris, a place Rousseau repeatedly 
visited, lived in, and left―always with assorted emotions. Paris was, nonetheless, not 
the only ‘pocket’. Europe was a dynamic and developing arena with France and Great 
Britain in the forefront. France, in turn, actually imported many ideas from Scotland 
and England, and due to the Catholic Church many French dissidents spent their 
productive years abroad as writers and translators. Rousseau did not appreciate Paris 
or other big cities; for him they were all similar lodgings for prejudices and he did not 
even want to call himself a Frenchman. Because he was born in Geneva,
95
 he used to 
call himself a Genevan,
96
 even though he spent his later life mainly in France and 
Switzerland. He also lived a while in Italy and was inspired by Italian culture 
(especially music) and Carlo Culcasi called Rousseau a blend of Genevan, Italian, 
and Frenchman (in Sprengel, 1917). However, this is not the entire framework; 
Rousseau also stayed a few years in England and was familiar with English ideas. 
Most of his life he was on the move, living in several locations, having many 
associates, maintaining a lively correspondence, and reading various books. This 
mixture of influences made an impact on Rousseau that was all but clear-cut. In 
addition, he was inspired by old philosophical texts, especially those of Plato, 
Aristotle, the Stoics, Plutarch, the Old Testament, and legends, as well as new 
narratives describing life in non-European regions. Similar fusions of ideas can be 
detected in regard to numerous other intellectuals of this age.  
A central character in the social and individual transformations taking place 
during the Enlightenment was the European male. The question is: Did Rousseau 
belong to the ‘inner group’? Rousseau represented the right gender and his social 
position was somewhere in the middle, between landowners and peasants, and 
between aristocracy and servants. With the diverse stories he wrote he could connect 
and influence people belonging to different classes of society. A place in the central 
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2
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‘hub’ of the time was reserved for those who had connections and money, but not 
necessarily education. Nonetheless, education was not an obstacle and did make 
spreading one’s ideas easier, of course. Rousseau was poor, lacked formal education, 
and his personal relations were often unsuccessful, but he was erudite and a talented 
writer who plunged into all kinds of discourses. To use Scott’s (1992/2006, p. 226) 
expression, he “faced the dilemmas of modern politics and political science with a 
clarity seldom rivaled. He was the first important critic of modernity and liberalism 
within the liberal and modern fold itself.” Many of the debates Rousseau was 
involved in concerned knowledge and nature and they were in no way completely 
novel, but his way of tackling them made him both popular and resented.  
It is, however, quite impossible to point out a special year as starting point or a 
special person as the first one facilitating a change, as the rise of new movements are 
not that simple. It was a fertile time involving a plenitude of thinkers and systems of 
thoughts. Before and during Rousseau’s time many highbrows developed theories 
that they called new systems
97
 (in lat. systema) or new methods,
98
 and all were in 
continuous dialogue that became noisier in its many arguments and counter-
arguments. Rousseau was easily inspired and, therefore, I have chosen a few of the 
influences on his thinking about nature and knowledge that preceded his time and that 
also influenced issues that he confronted in one way or another. Some of the 
discourses that he was involved in still continue, since the modern view has 
uninterruptedly had a bearing on how Westerners have faced environmental and 
education issues. I will describe my task in unfolding the discourses that involved 
Rousseau with the help of Foucault, who writes: 
 
Obviously, it is by no means a matter of determining the system of thought of a 
particular epoch, or something like its “worldview.” Rather, it is a matter of 
identifying the different ensembles that are each bearers of a quite particular type 
of knowledge; that connect behaviors, rules of conduct, laws, habits, or 
prescriptions; that thus form configurations both stable and capable of 
transformation. It is also a matter of defining relations of conflict, proximity, or 
exchange. Systems of thought are forms in which, during a given period of time, 
the knowledges [saviors] individualize, achieve equilibrium, and enter into 
communication.
99
 (Foucault, 1997a, p. 9) 
 
                                           
97
 For example, Comenius, Galileo, Newton, and Linnaeus. 
98
 For example, Descartes and Bacon. 
99
 The italics are original. 
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Nevertheless, in this diverse landscape of thoughts, the concepts “nature” and 
“natural” appeared variously in many contexts. Ideas discussed during the 17th 
century concerning God and humans, and their mutual relation as well as their 
relation to the natural world, survived and developed further in the Enlightenment’s 
agenda. “Nature” and “natural” were not easily interpreted concepts and discussions 
of them were strewn with multiple meanings. Such inquiries dealt with human nature, 
laws of nature, natural rights, and questions such as what or who initiates and sustains 
life on earth. Rousseau maintained: “Our philosophers never fall to display the word 
nature pompously at the beginning of all their writings. But open the book and you 
will see the metaphysical jargon they have decorated with this fine name” (RJJ, p. 
239, note). However, Rousseau was not innocent in regard to such jargon, as I will 
show both in this chapter and later. In conclusion, the roots of the Enlightenment are 
so diffuse, such an extraordinary blend of ideas, that it makes no sense searching for 
the beginning. The ideas were miscellaneous, and with a critical attitude many 18
th
 
century radicals, not the least being Rousseau, scrutinized and knotted these diverse 
ideas, and left them to drift apart again. 
 
Nature as Curiosity 
 
Curiosity about nature was not elicited for the first time during the 18
th
 century. 
Instead, the turning point started much earlier and the breakthrough involving the 
scientific study of nature also occurred centuries earlier. Actually, science was deeply 
rooted in the past. In the early Christian era, belief in mainly the supernatural order 
shaped Western thoughts and culture. But beginning with the 15
th
 century, a gradual 
change of focus took place. In the late Renaissance, Italian humanist scholars restored 
the classical masterpieces of Ancient Greece and Rome, along with treatises about the 
natural world (McClellan, 2006; Shapin, 1996).  
Nature observations and experiments thus became, more frequent in the 17
th
 
century, and this expanding knowledge about the natural world had many 
consequences. From being an inconceivable and magic creation and a source for 
nourishment and important services, the natural world became something to 
manipulate and use for endless human purposes. It became a laboratory, an object of 
study, a collection of merchandise, and a storehouse of useful items. This change did 
not come about rapidly, even though the process at its fastest is called “the scientific 
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revolution.” Scientific change continued apace in the 18th century and began to 
denote a new way of thinking that remarkably involved the role of nature in human 
lives and the place of humans in relation to other creatures, the whole world, and the 
entire universe. Knowledge also experienced a change and a new episteme emerged. 
What we now call the biosciences (botany, zoology, ecology, physiology, etc.), 
geosciences (e.g., geography, geology, geophysics, oceanography), and physical 
sciences (e.g., physics, chemistry, astronomy) had all been collectively labeled as 
either ‘natural history’ or ‘natural philosophy’ during the Renaissance, and no clear 
limit was maintained between a natural world ruled by laws of nature and God’s 
divine creation. There was, however, a distinction between natural history and natural 
philosophy. ‘Natural history’ told the biological story about all the evidence 
embedded in the natural world. It was more than just a story about the past and much 
more than a description of visible features of particular objects; its role was to sketch 
a multifaceted story of all the real situations and legends related to the matters in 
question (plants, animals, etc) (Foucault, 1970). A bird, for example, was not only 
distinguished from others according to its habitat, nutrition, and habits, but also 
according to its role in human life. Animals, plants and stars could all carry a 
heavenly message in form of a symbolic language (Håkansson, 2005). However, 
when classification entered the stage and naturalists started to employ optical 
instruments, natural history started to change towards focusing mainly on visible 
features, as I soon will show. But, still during the Renaissance, one could collect 
knowledge of ‘natural history’ by examining the external world, while ‘natural 
philosophy’ was to evolve into the exact sciences, seeking the “true” answers about 
how nature works by means of experiments in laboratories (Liedman, 1997; Sörlin, 
2004). Nature was studied because the natural world was regarded as one of God’s 
books (Liber Naturae), in which the divine truth was written, according to 
Håkansson, 2005 (see also Harrisson, 2005). The Reformation that resulted in the 
development of Protestantism gave this message a moral significance (ibid.).  
Despite this eagerness for natural philosophy in the 17
th
 century, the search for 
the truth did not merely focus on nature; numerous philosophic, political, and 
educational theories also joined the search. Whereas an increasing number of 
scientific findings challenged the worldview of the Church, the European view of the 
world was still built on a religious foundation mixed with magic and superstition. 
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Consequently, scientific
100
 thoughts from these days can sometimes sound incoherent 
and perplexing.  
Empirical research accelerated at the end of the Renaissance and increasingly 
involved many disciplines. These investigations of the natural world went hand in 
hand with technical innovations, and were increasingly dependent on new optical 
devices, such as the microscope and the telescope, the barometer and other tools for 
measurements, instruments for navigation, and machines for reproducing paintings 
and texts. Instruments became tools of both exploration and expression. Rousseau, 
however, did not need many instruments; his bare hands and other senses were often 
enough for him. The search for connections between the macrocosmos and micro-
cosmos made the clock
101
 an icon of the modern world; it showed the machine-like 
aspects of nature and even the whole universe in miniature (e.g., Comenius, 1628-
1632/1989; Gay, 1966).
102
 Just as God was seen as the creator of the world, the 
clockmaker
103
 was the creator of the clock and, just as all the small parts constituted 
the mechanical whole of the clockwork, human beings, animals and plants were the 
‘parts’ that constituted the world ‘machine’ (Liedman, 1997). From this moment it 
was possible to calculate time very exactly and divide days and nights into distinct 
units. Daily life activities in Europe could be organized, synchronized, and divided in 
both space and time. As everyday life in Europe became dependent on precise 
timetables, then work, study, and leisure time became distinct and were undertaken at 
particular times. Power thus took the form of ‘discipline’ that tried to target people’s 
minds and thoughts and make them live in accordance with a standard way of living; 
that is, it tried to ‘normalize’ them. Such discipline became easily attainable through 
the careful organization of an individual’s work, time, and education.  
 
  
                                           
100
 Earlier, the Milesian nature philosophers (e.g., Thales, Anaximander, and Anaximenes) and Aristotle had 
been engaged with science; however, what we now call “science” is a phenomenon that arose in the 17th 
century. I will follow Henry (2002, p. 6) and apply the world “science” more or less as a synonym for 
“natural philosophy” to imply “the endeavor to understand, describe or explain the workings of the physical 
world.”  
101
 The inventions of gunpowder, compass and typography that Bacon praised are all Chinese.  
102
 The first utensils for measuring of time were non-European, as sundials and water clocks have a very long 
Asian and Egyptian history. The production of mechanical clocks gained speed in Europe when Christiaan 
Huygens constructed the pendulum clock in the middle of the 17
th
 century, and Europe could finally equal 
the Chinese clock that had been created more than 600 years earlier. 
103 As a curiosity I want to mention that Rousseau was the son of a watchmaker.  
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Nature as Utility 
 
During the Renaissance the desire arose to control nature with the help of the new 
scientific knowledge. Recent researchers see Modern nature philosophy as a 
combination of theology and science. The task was to explore and strive to 
understand all things, since it was humans’ mission to explore nature according to the 
divine plan (e.g., Harrisson, 2006; Håkansson, 2005; Matthews, 2008). Francis Bacon 
adapted this purpose and made a devoted effort to strengthen it. In the beginning of 
the 17
th
 century, he already predicted great human possibilities from utilizing nature 
according to the pragmatic results of empirical investigations. According to Bacon 
(1605/1900, 1620/1900), God has given human beings the right to use nature for their 
own purposes. While humans had lost their control of nature through the Fall,
104
 they 
were also granted a tool for getting it back: knowledge. In Instaurata Magna
105
 he 
therefore describes a reformation of science, arts, and human learning in accordance 
with Biblical wisdom (see also Håkansson, 2005). Using the double-meaning of the 
word edifice (build and enlighten, cf., the German word Bildung), Bacon wanted to 
recover knowledge and rebuild it on a proper foundation.  
While Bacon announced that explorations of nature had to follow God’s order, 
the primary goal was to pursue “light-bearing” experiments (those that lead to 
discovery of causes) over “fruit-bearing” ones because God started with the creation 
of the light (Bacon, 1620/2004a, p. 17). He also claimed that humans need to master 
nature again, as had been the case before in paradise, even if this was no easy task; 
even if nature has to be bent and forced into its new glory. He saw nature as a female, 
a mistress, to be penetrated and subjugated. But, he also called for charity in the use 
of knowledge for the benefit of humankind (Bacon, 1620/2004a; Matthews, 2008). In 
this rape,
106
 Bacon thus participated in and inspired the rapid development of modern 
science in which the expansion of European nationalism and emerging capitalism 
came to play important roles. Bacon saw no other difference between civilized human 
beings and the so called ‘savages’107 than technology, but he meant that knowledge 
                                           
104
 “Fall” means here the Biblical story in Genesis about Adam’s and Eve’s sin, an incident that caused them 
to be banished from Paradise.  
105
 The word “instauratio” (instauration) comes from Vulgate (the Latin version of the Bible) and denotes 
both the re-establishment of Jerusalem at the end of time, and the golden Age when David and Salomo ruled 
(Håkansson, 2005). 
106
 Bacon himself used strong sexual and sexist terms when he talked about how to manage nature. 
107
 “Savage” was a vague label (with both a positive and a negative tint) for people living a simple life 
compared to the European standard. Plato has earlier criticized putting those kinds of general labels on 
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about how nature works can guide humans to employ the laws of nature and gain 
control over the unruly resistor. In Bacon’s view, such knowledge comes basically 
through the senses; in comparison, intuition is a primitive relic and not perfectly 
clear. In his Advancement of Learning he distinguishes that the light of nature has two 
significations: firstly, as it arises from the senses, reason, and arguments according to 
the laws of nature; secondly, as it arises by internal instinct, according to the laws of 
the conscience. While the second signification not is reliable, knowledge has to 
discard individual and shared prejudices as well as supernatural ideas (Bacon, 
1605/1900).  
Until then, researchers, in the main, had based their investigations on calculations 
and thought experiments, but Bacon (1605/1900, 1620/1900) emphasized practical 
research methods. Humans easily make mistakes when they perform research, he 
argued, but strict empirical methods built on inductive
108
 approaches can eliminate 
these difficulties. Through this approach he took his position in the ongoing dispute 
concerning whether inductive or deductive
109
 methods (reasoning or experience) are 
superior. Bacon’s ideas are still relevant today, which is why it can be hard to believe 
that the future scientific society Bacon describes in his utopian book New Atlantis
110
 
(1627) was written so long ago. In the quotation below, he envisions advanced 
biotechnology and describes vivisection
111
 and animal breeding. 
 
We have also parks and enclosures of all sorts of beasts and birds, which we use 
not only for view or rareness, but likewise for dissections and trials, that thereby 
we may take light what may be wrought upon the body of man. Wherein we find 
many strange effects, as continuing life in them, though diverse parts, which you 
account vital, be perished and taken forth; resuscitating of some that seem dead in 
appearance, and the like. We try, also, all poisons, and other medicines upon 
them, as well of chirurgery as physic. By art, likewise we make them greater or 
taller than their kind is, and, contrariwise, dwarf them, and stay their growth; we 
make them more fruitful and bearing than their kind is, and, contrariwise, barren 
                                                                                                                                            
people differing from the own culture thus neglecting such differences; in his case the ancient concept 
“barbarian” often referred to uncivilized people (Statesman, 262).  
108 Induction entails a process where a generalized conclusion about an object or event is based on previous 
observations of similar objects or events. 
109 In philosophy a deduction entails a logical process starting from a claim that has to be proved by 
reasoning.  
110
 Bacon’s utopian endeavour in New Atlantis is of an increasing number of researchers counted as a basic 
resource for understanding the shift from early modern political thoughts to modern, but also to the 
emergence of colonialism and nationalism (McKnight, 2006). 
111Vivisection means surgery on live animals in scientific research and was performed already at Bacon’s 
time as experiments on living animals (even without anesthetic). 
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and not generative; also we make them differ in colour, shape, activity―many 
ways. We find means to make commixtures and copulations of diverse kinds, 
which have produced many new kinds, and them not barren, as the general 
opinion is. We make a number of kinds of serpents, worms, flies, fishes of 
putrefaction, whereof some are advanced (in effect) to be perfect creatures, like 
beasts or birds, and have sexes, and do propagate. Neither do we this by chance, 
but we know beforehand of what matter and commixture, what kind of those 
creatures will arise. (Bacon 1627/2004b, pp. 323-324) 
 
While Bacon’s vision was a quest for more knowledge and more highly developed 
learning, it was logical to connect it to the need for education. This was exactly what 
the 17
th
 century educational reformer and theologian Moravian
112
 John Amos 
Comenius
113
 did. While he would agree with Bacon in his eagerness to investigate 
nature, he had an ambivalent relationship with the scientific developments of his day 
and lack of enthusiasm for inductive methods. His judgment was that human 
superiority as a creature lies in education and virtue and, thus, in good manners, 
religion, and faith (Comenius, 1628-1632/1989). The seeds for these attributes are 
given to humans by “Nature” (ibid., p. 69), which was the first condition that the 
humans had to leave because of the Fall and to which they will return, according to 
Comenius (cf., Bacon above). The reason humans have come to this world is to 
promote themselves, the Creation, and God, and to enjoy the qualities that come from 
all these sources (Comenius, 1628-1632/1989). He thus combined realism with 
religious humanism, and united his remarkable educational ideas in a system called 
Pansophia.
114
 Comenius had a vision of a complete unity of knowledge, where 
everything is connected. As with a world of united ‘parts’, there is unified knowledge 
and every human being has to strive to attain this knowledge because knowledge of 
the world brings humans closer to God.  
As a keen admirer of the ideas in Bacon’s Novum Organum115 (Keatinge, 1992), 
Comenius worked out his educational theories with a desire for scientific processes 
combined with the belief that truth is to be found in Scripture (ibid.). As with many 
by the late 16
th
 century, he replaced Aristotle’s physics with the Bible (Comenius, 
1628-1632/1989). Comenius’ educational theory is thus based on a combination of 
the operation of nature and the Bible and has as its main purpose a heavenly life. To 
                                           
112
 The former Moravia is now a region of Czech Republic. 
113
 John Amos Comenius is the Latin name for Jan Komensky. 
114
 From Greek: pan (all) and sophia (wisdom).  
115
 The title Novum Organum Scientiarum refers to Aristotle’s Organon (logical treatises); Bacon thus wrote 
a new organon. 
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prepare for paradise humans have to learn to know themselves and things external to 
them, perform self-control, and focus on God. Humans are images of their Creator, 
creatures endowed with reason and the right to master nature. In turn, creation is the 
mirror of the Creator’s power and is there to awaken human admiration for the 
Almighty. Referring to the Bible (Genesis 2:19, Book of Wisdom 7:17 and Sirach 
5:18),
 116
 Comenius (1628-1632/1989) shows that it is the human task to label and 
understand everything on earth and to wisely utilize it according to the Book of 
wisdom in Apocrypha:  
 
For in his hands are both we and our words; 
All wisdom also, and knowledge of workmanship. 
For he hath given me certain knowledge of the things that are, 
Namely, to know how the world was made, and the operation of the elements: 
The beginning, ending, and midst of the times: 
The alterations of the turning of the sun, and the change of seasons: 
The circuits of years, and the positions of stars: 
The natures of living creatures, and the furies of wild beasts: 
The violence of winds
117
, and the reasonings of men: 
The diversities of plants, and the virtues of roots: 
And all such things as are either secret or manifest, them I know. 
 (The Reader’s Bible, 1951, The Apocrypha, p. 112) 118 
 
The Book of Wisdom is also called Solomon’s Wisdom and in his utopian posthumous 
book New Atlantis Bacon introduces an order named after the mighty and rich 
Hebrew king Solomon. The task of this order is to explore the true nature of God’s 
creation. “In the wisdom of Solomon we find the root idea upon which the Judeo-
Christian culture of the West was based before the Enlightenment” (Hayman, 2003, 
p. 769). In this wisdom, religion, science, and philosophy are parts of the same truth. 
Obviously, both Bacon and Comenius connected the exploration of nature to a 
command written in the same Apocrypha text. Bacon also talks about Solomon’s 
“natural history,” a story about all living things that was not available elsewhere than 
in a utopian society. This unavailability might be why the Apocrypha (from Greek 
                                           
116
 Book of Wisdom is called The Wisdom of Salomon in The Reader’s Bible. According to a Jewish esoteric 
tradition, King Solomon was not only wise, but he also had a deep understanding of the creation (McKnight, 
2006). Both Books of wisdom and Sirach (also called Ecclesiasticus) are included in the Apochrypha.  
117
 In some Bible versions this word is “winds” and in others “spririt.” 
118
 The quoted text is equivalent with the King James Bible (1997, electronic version). Protestant churches 
generally exclude the Apocrypha, whereas the Roman Catholic and Orthodox churches include most of the 
Apocrypha books.  
156 
 
apocryphos that denotes ‘hidden’) has been variously present and variously absent 
from various versions of the Bible over the centuries.
119
 Voltaire (1755/1985) found 
the admiration of the extremely wealthy king Solomon ironic and thought it 
astonishing that such materialistic texts
120
 as those referred to as Solomon’s at all are 
included in the Bible. 
Like Comenius and other 17
th
 century intellectuals, many people living in the 18
th
 
century also had a high regard for Bacon’s strong belief in the power of mind. Bacon 
made them optimistic about endless progress, with nature being manipulated for the 
sake of humans (Roberts, 2007). His ideas inspired the creation of scientific societies 
in Europe
121
 (Attfield, 1994). Rousseau, on the other hand, was not interested in 
studying nature with the aim of utilizing it for human gain. He increasingly opposed 
such initiatives during his lifetime and in his last book, Reveries of a Solitary Walker, 
he strongly defends the studying nature without economic interests in mind. He 
greatly enjoyed botanic explorations, but plants had a value in themselves for him, 
and they were definitely something more than only useful ingredients in medicine. 
“What[!]122 would I cut, grind up, crush these roses, this reseda, this Euphrasia in a 
mortar...” (RSW, 252). Rousseau was first and foremost simply fond of nature and 
enjoyed spending time outdoors. He used botanic gardens for contemplation―to 
forget himself―not to make him think about his body and its illnesses. When he 
wrote about the cultivation of plants and animals in Julie, or the New Heloise, he 
described a growing process that only slightly changes the original nature of the 
organisms. In particular, he often stated that the natural, initial state of things is the 
best possible and that humans destroy everything they handle. Rousseau criticized all 
purposeful changing of other creatures, both animals and humans. That is why he was 
very skeptical of the education of his time, and wanted to take a more 
noninterventionist approach. I will let Rousseau reply to the quotation from Bacon’s 
New Atlantis above with the first sentences from the opening chapter in his book 
Émile:  
 
                                           
119
 The Apocryphic texts were included in the King James Bible from 1611. 
120
 Beside the Wisdom of Solomon, he is believed to be the author of the Proverbs, the Song of Solomon, 
Ecclesiastes, the later Psalms of Solomon and Odes of Solomon.  
121
 In 1662 the Royal Society was established in England to pursue Bacon’s scientific methods (Attfield, 
1994). 
122
 The comment [!] is in the English version (Butterworth, Cook & Marshall, Trans.), but not in OC IV, p. 
1252: “Quoi j’yrois couper, broyer, piler…”  
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EVERYTHING
123
 is good as it leaves the hands of the Author of things; 
everything degenerates in the hands of man. He forces one soil to nourish the 
products of another, one tree to bear the fruit of another. He mixes and confuses 
the climates, the elements, the seasons. He mutilates his dog, his horse, his slave. 
He turns everything upside down; he disfigures everything; he loves deformity, 
monsters. He wants nothing as nature made it, not even man; for him, man must 
be trained like a school-horse; man must be fashioned in keeping with his fancy 
like a tree in his garden. (E, p. 37) 
 
And he develops the same line of thinking further in a passage in Julie where he 
praises nature in its most genuineness in contrast to domesticated, urban or civilized 
forms of nature: 
 
[N]ature seems to want to veil from men’s eyes her true attractions, to which they 
are too insensible, and which they disfigure when they can get their hands on 
them: she flees much-frequented places; it is on the tops of mountains, deep in the 
forests, on desert Islands that she deploys her most stirring charms. Those who 
love her and cannot go so far to find her are reduced to doing her violence, 
forcing her in a way to come and live with them, and all this cannot be done 
without a modicum of illusion. (JNH, p. 394) 
 
Rousseau did not reject agriculture or gardening in Julie, but his view of how to treat 
animals and plants was, as these quotations show, completely different than what 
Bacon envisioned. Bacon’s utopian New Atlantis and Rousseau’s real and beloved St. 
Peter’s Island (l’Isle de St Pierre) that he describes in Reveries do not have very much 
in common. Rousseau’s favorite undertakings were walking, boating, botanic studies, 
and other activities that did not disturb his peaceful state of mind, and he did not 
realize that he had in fact interfered with nature when he settled rabbits from 
Neuchâtel on the St Peter’s Island.124 If humans did not show any interest in his love, 
he offered it to animals. His dog, cat, and canaries were his friends and he nearly their 
slave; and songs of birds inspired his tunes when he composed music (RJJ). In 
Rousseau’s thinking, nature is a harmonious totality, although diverse biological 
species are distinct from each other. Even if he puts humans in an order next to God 
as the most preeminent of all creatures, in the Savoyard Vicar (in Émile) he sharply 
claims that it is not the task of humans to blend organisms in any new ways and 
                                           
123
 Capital letters are used both in A. Bloom’s English translation and in OC IV, p. 245: “TOUT est bien…” 
When I use capital letters in a quotation after this it is because it is so in the original text.  
124
 Settling new species on an island may cause great damage. If the newcomers lack predators, the 
population may grow fast and this may hastily reduce and even eliminate particular native species.  
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fiddle with nature’s harmony. Bacon and Rousseau thus represented two opposing 
views of how much humans should modify the natural world and its elements. The 
former saw nature more or less as an enemy or rival given to humans by God for 
them to compete with and utilize; the latter regarded nature as a friend and a dear 
mother, a proof of God’s virtue. Neither of these views was unique for the 17th and 
18
th
 centuries and many intermediary views did exist. 
Despite not liking experimentations with living things; Rousseau was not 
unaffected by physical laws and other physical inquiries. Ground-breaking 17
th
 
century physical investigations were linked to Nicolaus Copernicus’ findings from 
the beginning of the 16
th
 century, which rejected the geocentric worldview that had 
the earth as the center of the universe and instead gave the sun the central planetary 
position.
125
 Newton completed Copernicus’ and his other forerunners’ research and 
challenged the scientific methods of his day by applying mathematics to the study of 
nature. His work Principia
126
 had a great influence on scientific development and 
shaped a new model for investigating the natural world scientifically by reducing 
empirical phenomena to mechanics ruled by deterministic laws (Molander, 1988). In 
his physical research Newton combined experimental hypothetical-deductive 
approaches with mathematics and created methods that could help humans control the 
natural world (Skirbekk & Gilje, 1993). As with many others of his time, a blend of 
magic, religion, and science inspired Newton’s curiosity. He practiced alchemy (e.g., 
Ioanne, 2001) and studied Ancient chronology, as well as the prophetic and 
apocalyptic books of the Bible (Liedman, 1997).  
Newton’s investigations made it possible to calculate the movements of the 
planets and showed the usefulness of natural philosophy, replacing the static picture 
of the world with a dynamic model. His contemporaries interpreted his physics in 
various ways, and they tried to synthesize his theories with religion. Newton’s 
investigations thus built a stable ground for physics over the next two centuries and 
influenced many other sciences and philosophy. The language of physics entered 
                                           
125
 Copernicus presented his theory in On the Revolution of Heavenly Bodies 1543. Copernicus’ “heliocentric 
worldview” was a revolutionary idea initiated much earlier in other parts of the world, but the idea had a 
lengthy struggle for acceptance in the West. The Greek astronomer Aristarchus of Sámos had already 
presented similar thoughts in the 3
th
 century BC (Skirbekk & Gilje, 1993). Many followers of Copernicus 
worked to convince others of the significance of his ideas, among them Tycho Brahe, Johannes Kepler, 
Galileo Galilei, and Isaac Newton (e.g., Roberts, 2007). 
126 The complete title of this two-volume work from 1687 is Philosophiae Naturalis Principia Mathematica 
(Mathematical Principles of Natural Philosophy), and it contains his three laws of motion, also called 
Newton’s Laws.  
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investigations of the mind and even the soul was ‘investigated’ according to physical 
laws. When Rousseau describes in the Dialogues how the first movements of human 
nature are good but are easily led astray by thousands of obstacles that make human 
beings forget their original destination, he presents this argument using laws of 
motion: 
 
Erroneous judgment and the strength of prejudices contribute a great deal to our 
being thus mislead. But this effect comes mainly from weakness of the soul, 
which―effortlessly following nature’s impulse―is deflected on colliding with an 
obstacle, just as a ball takes the angle of reflection, whereas something that 
pursues its course with more vigor is not deflected, but like a cannonball pushes 
the obstacle away or is destroyed and falls on contact. (RJJ, p. 9) 
 
Similarly, Rousseau describes his self-examination in Reveries using the language of 
physics, this time comparing his meditations with use of the barometer. 
 
I will perform on myself, to a certain extent, the measurements natural scientists 
perform on the air in order to know its daily conditions. I will apply the barometer 
to my soul, and these measurements, carefully executed and repeated over a long 
period of time, may furnish me results as certain as theirs. (RSW, p. 7) 
 
This kind of ‘physical language’ occurs again and again in Rousseau’s writings, not 
the least in Savoyard Vicar where he explicitly expresses his dislike for metaphysical 
theories. And mathematics is a relevant political resource in Rousseau’s The Social 
Contract. Many other 17
th
 and 18
th
 century writers adapted such physical language as 
well, and mathematics was a popular tool in many situations, even in philosophical 
argumentation (see, e.g., Spinoza’s Ethics). The distinction between soul and body 
was undefined and the same laws operated on both. Humans had become objects of 
study, and there was much experimentation with different methods for conducting 
these studies. Consequently, the earlier scientific research methods used for studying 
nature served as models for the emerging human sciences, where humans are both the 
subject and the object of knowledge. 
 
Nature and the Human Mind 
 
Bacon’s strong belief in science was shared by Descartes. He argued that it is the task 
of humans to make themselves the masters and owners of the natural world and 
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utilize it to the benefit of both contemporary and future generations. Every human 
being has a duty to be beneficial, according to Descartes (1637/1993a). But while 
Bacon rejected mathematical and geometrical methods, Descartes was working on a 
new mathematical model (analytic geometry), exploring laws of motion, and creating 
a new outline for a cosmology built on Copernicus “heliocentric worldview” (see 
Descartes 1664/1998b; Iannone, 2001). With mathematics as his prototype, Descartes 
developed his rational philosophic method in early 17
th
 century France. This method 
is a combination of a strict deductive technique borrowed from mathematics, and 
intuitive and skeptical methods for exploring knowledge. Descartes searched for 
knowledge by means of a cognitive procedure that used doubt to undermine common 
sense assumptions and to exclude passions and action from the thinking process. By 
actively trying to question all for granted taken ‘truth’, he made himself ready to 
receive new ‘uncontaminated’ knowledge (Descartes, 1637/1993a). This process he 
compares to pulling down a house and building a new one using some of the old 
building material anew to combine with new knowledge and construct a new house. 
He began his investigation from a decision to search clear knowledge from within 
himself without influences from other sources than his own intellect, and he thus 
decided to doubt all that he formerly knew (ibid.). His doubt was thus an act of his 
will, rejecting all kinds of external influences and effects of the senses.  
From this experience, he summarizes the source of the surest knowledge with the 
famous sentence: Cogito, ergo sum (I think, therefore, I am) (Descartes, 1637/1993a). 
He draws the conclusion that by eliminating the notion of his own body and feelings, 
he can clearly see the truth that he exists as a thinking being. Descartes sought an 
incontrovertible foundation for a new system of knowledge built on pure reason. 
Thus, he combined natural philosophy and Catholicism and developed an 
epistemology where his own reason led him to the truth. His idea that human mind 
can be improved by reliance on its own rational devices had a great influence on 
Enlightenment thinking (Losonsky, 2001). From then on a person could attain the 
truth through the objective knowledge reached by reason; truth was not dependent on 
any self-transforming practice, since the human mind was sufficient in itself 
(Foucault, 2005). Yet, how did Rousseau respond to Descartes’ method?   
In Confessions Rousseau describes how as young lad he had read the logic of the 
Port-Royal group
127
 along with books by John Locke, Nicholas Malebranche, 
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 The Port-Royal group was named after a place near Paris where an important Cistercian convent was 
situated from the early 13
th
 century to the early 18th. It was a spiritual center of Jansenism and followed 
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Gottfried Leibniz, and Descartes. Since he found much contradiction, he 
methodically tried to follow them one at a time with an open mind and thus work 
towards conclusions of his own. He said to himself: “Let’s begin by giving myself a 
storehouse of ideas, true or false, but clear, while waiting for my head to be well 
enough equipped to be able to compare and choose them” (C, p. 199). Therefore, he 
read and gathered ideas, and when he was on journeys or lodged in dwellings without 
books, he started to compare the ideas he had explored and reach his own 
conclusions. In this process, he applied meditations and reveries, and he mixed 
rational thinking with intuition. He even claimed that he compared himself with the 
Orientals. His meditations were not reasonable and sterile, but sweet and illusory 
(ibid.) or, as he himself described it: “He reasons less…but he enjoys more” (RJJ, p. 
121). The objects of his meditations were order, harmony, beauty, and perfection and 
these reveries took place in the most charming of natural sites. 
Being unconvinced by all the doctrines of contemporary philosophers, Rousseau 
decided to search for his own standpoint by meditating (RSW). The meditations he 
undertook resulted in the section Savoyard Vicar in the book Émile. In accordance 
with Descartes, Rousseau performed his meditations in solitude. Rousseau wanted to 
tackle all the questions that concerned him. In Reveries, he calls his investigations 
“the most ardent and sincere seeking that has perhaps ever been made by any mortal” 
(RSW, p. 22), but, honest as he was, he could not deny that he was not completely 
capable of laying aside all the prejudices of childhood nor his most secret desires. His 
conviction was nonetheless good, according to him, even if he did not fully succeed 
as well as he had hoped.  
Before Rousseau entered his meditations, he blamed philosophers for eagerly 
searching for admiration instead of searching for the truth (E). As the root to all 
disputes he found, firstly, the limitation of the human spirit and, secondly, vanity. 
Humans are neither capable of understanding their own limitations nor do they know 
who they are, or how to manage themselves. Therefore, imagination is the only tool 
available for their self-study; but they nonetheless want to penetrate everything and 
discover the truth about the whole world. They cannot accept that the human brain 
may not be clever enough to understand all things, as humans are but a minor part of 
a larger totality. It is not within the reach of humans to completely understand their 
                                                                                                                                            
Augustinian theology. Numerous intellectuals who were sympathetic to the movement made religious 
retreats to Port Royal where they lived in strict piety while pursuing teaching and writing (see, e.g., Bowen, 
1981; Catholic Encyclopedia, 2010; Eby, 1952;). Many of Rousseau’s educational ideas bear a resemblance 
to the Port-Royal teaching methods.  
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relation to the wholeness that is the world. And even if some could discover such 
truth and tell the others about it, others should not believe these persons because 
humans in general are not ready to give up their own beliefs (cf., again, Plato’s 
“Allegory of the Cave”). They hold their own reputations as more important than 
seeking the truth about the world and the criteria of decent living that can apply to all 
humankind, Rousseau claimed.  
So instead of listening to all the supposedly enlightened persons, Rousseau (alias 
“the vicar”)128 starts to search for the light of learning inside of himself. As inspired 
by Descartes’ meditations, the search begins with doubt but soon finds its own route. 
To begin with, Rousseau reviews all his previous opinions, examines if there is 
something worthwhile holding on to, and distils this ‘essence’ from all non-
necessities (E). Then he keeps all the knowledge that he instinctively feels pleases 
him and rejects all other knowledge. He ends up asking: “But who am I? What right 
have I to judge things, and what determines my judgments?”129 The answer is “I 
exist, and I have senses by which I am affected.”130 (ibid., p. 270) This amazing 
answer is not the same as Descartes’ “I think, therefore I am.” After that Rousseau 
wants to determine if he has a pure knowledge of his existence or if he gets it through 
his senses. His conclusion is that his inner sensations and the outer causes and objects 
of these sensations are distinct. Furthermore, since he exists, other entities also exist. 
Consequently, he discovers that there are substances outside his body acting upon his 
senses and they act upon his senses independently of whether they are real or if they 
are only ideas. He calls these external substances “matter” and their parts “bodies.” 
From this he further draws the conclusion that there is no distinction between the 
body’s appearance and reality; the problem rests in his own biased mind. Therefore, 
he said that he agrees neither with materialists nor the idealists (E). Descartes 
separated his thoughts from external influence, whereas Rousseau concluded that this 
is impossible. With this argument Rousseau participated in modern discourse, along 
with others such as Locke and George Berkeley, about whether concrete things have 
an existence independently of whether they are perceived or not (realism), or whether 
the mind plays a primary role in the constitution of the world (idealism), or if only 
material things can exist (materialism). A materialist view totally opposes the most 
                                           
128 I will tell more about the relation between Rousseau and the vicar in the next chapter. 
129 Mais qui suis-je ? Ouel droit ai-je de juger les choses, et qu’eŝt-ce qui détermine mes jugemens ? 
(Pléïade, IV, p. 570) 
130 J’exiŝte et j’ai des sens par lesquels je suis affecté (ibid). 
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extreme idealist view that all things are mental and the world merely a mind 
construction.
131
 Unlike Descartes, Rousseau did not want to suppress the passions 
because he saw them as “the principal instrument of our preservation” (E, p. 212). To 
suppress them is “to control nature” (ibid.) and to reject what God has written in his 
heart and that his conscience, therefore, tells him is right.
132
 
Rousseau is finally convinced about both the existence of the universe and of his 
own mind. He finds out that he has an active understanding of the word “is” and he 
states: “Therefore, I am not simply a sensitive and passive being but an active and 
intelligent being; and whatever philosophy may say about it, I shall dare to pretend to 
the honor of thinking...” (E, p. 272). In addition, he can compare, judge and arrange 
things, but the truth is outside him in the material world. The less of his own he puts 
in the judgments of the material world, the closer he comes the truth—which is 
situated in material nature not in his own reason. When he employs the power of his 
own mind, he brings his sensations together and compares them by attention, 
meditation, and reflection. Matter gives impressions to his senses, and his mind then 
compares and arranges them (E).  
There are definite resemblances between Rousseau’s and Descartes’ 
investigations and conclusions. Both used themselves and their own minds as objects 
of study. Rousseau announced that he wanted to find a rule of conduct for the rest of 
his life and not, like “certain modern philosophers,” study human nature in order only 
to talk knowledgeably about it. Nevertheless, Rousseau, as well as Descartes, narrates 
his meditations in an instructional tone and draws general conclusions. In the 
Savoyard Vicar, Rousseau even says that his system clarifies his meditations (see 
RSW). However, the outcomes of Descartes’ meditations and Rousseau’s are clearly 
at odds. Rousseau does not rely on any independently functioning human intellect, 
but points out the inescapable mutual operation between intellect and sensual 
perception involving other creatures, living and inanimate things, and he addresses 
the resulting problematic that humans always thus deceive themselves. This is a fact 
that Descartes points out, even if he believed it was possible to actively overcome. 
Descartes’ meditations are repeatedly cited, while Rousseau’s are rarely referred to. 
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 There are many views of materialism, realism and idealism, but I can not engage that discussion here. 
132
 Rousseau’s version of the Cartesian meditations seem to have been influenced by Condillac’s sensualism. 
Étienne Bonnot de Condillac, who interpreted Locke´s empiricism in France, was an acquaintance of 
Rousseau’s who was familiar with his writings (C; Cranston, 1983). 
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On the other side, there is a resemblance between Kant’s famous Critique of Pure 
Reason
133
 and Rousseau’s claims. 
 
The Position of Humans in Nature 
 
However, Rousseau saw the human mind as superior to the human body and, like 
Descartes, he often defended in his writing the opinion that humans consist of a 
mortal body and a divine soul. In the Reveries (p. 33) he states: “My body is no 
longer anything to me but an encumbrance, an obstacle, and I disengage myself from 
it beforehand as much as I can.”  Yet, Rousseau’s above meditation shows that he did 
not strictly separate body and soul. Below I will analyze Rousseau’s and Descartes’ 
views in relation to several other, more or less overlapping, ideas. Once Descartes 
said he learns from nature that he is not only in his body like a sailor in his ship, but 
that his self is blended with his body into a unity. Another time he was convinced that 
the body and the soul are distinct and thus held a clear dualistic view of both humans 
and the world. In that situation he divided the world, firstly, into material substance, 
res extensa, situated in the word; and secondly, the thinking mind, res cogitans, as 
situated in the human soul (Descartes 1640/1998a, 1666/1998c). Because of this 
division, people have often blamed him for having initiated a division between the 
human mind and body. But a thorough reading agrees with present day Descartes 
researchers (e.g., M. D. Wilson, 1999; Skirry, 2005) who do not hold him entirely 
guilty for this outlook. It may be a slight exaggeration to accuse Descartes alone for 
the centuries-long dualistic split between body and soul, because on this point he was 
not definite. Skirry (2005) points out Descartes’ claim that sensations require a body 
for their existence. This is true, because sensations are bodily functions; but 
Descartes (1649/1993b) does not mean, on the other hand, that sensations necessarily 
need a soul. Instead, he states that the body can do without a soul since he saw 
animals as merely “mechanical automata” (see Cottingham, 1993). Altogether, 
Descartes admitted that he could not really understand and explain the connection 
between mind and body. While positing the distinction between body and soul, he 
                                           
133 It is impossible to reject the similarity between Kant’s distinction between “Ding für mich” (the thing for 
me) and “Ding an sich” (the thing for itself) and Rousseau’s view of the human incapability to objective 
perception. Kant (1781/2004) maintained that a thing in itself is unknowable because humans are not capable 
of knowing a thing in an absolute sense, regardless of the a priori conditions of knowledge; their knowledge 
and perception must conform with transcendental conditions that apply to all intuition and thinking.  
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also talked in a letter about their union as a third essential category (see Cottingham, 
1993).  
Descartes’ ideas are not especially odd; a view of the human body and soul as 
separated had been present in the Western history in diverse forms long before him. 
During the Renaissance, many thinkers put humans in a position between God and 
animals—between the animal evilness and divine goodness, but also between the 
brute and civilized. The situation of humans was thus paradoxical: they were half 
beasts and half angels (Suutala, 1996; Piltz, 1991). The soul was looked upon as 
rational and good, whereas the body was emotional and evil. There was a shifting 
limit between animals and humans and, according to Erasmus of Rotterdam; humans 
thus have to be educated to become human and to subdue their animal nature 
(Suutala, 1996). Through instruction, humans can become good, rational, and 
humane. Many educational theorists after Erasmus have repeated and varied this 
declaration (see also Chapter Two).  
Descartes compared the human body with a machine, where the body is a fusion 
of many mechanical components and the soul comprises thoughts and passions 
(Descartes 1666/1998c). However, every soul can learn to master its passions if it 
receives good instruction, according to Descartes (1649/1993b), but a soul connotes a 
human being. He thought that all animals
134
 have a body but, unlike humans, have no 
souls, are not capable of reasoning, and thus operate merely mechanically. Reason 
separates humans from animals (Descartes 1666/1998c). Therefore, another 
remarkable division Descartes is accused of, beside the body/soul partition, is the 
difference he stressed between humans and animals. His view of animals as machines 
differ from the earlier Aristotelian view presented in Chapter Two. A Cartesian view 
of animals as material bodies that do not feel pain combined with a Baconian vision 
of the possibilities of vivisections makes research on animals appear rational and 
even defensible.  
But other voices also spoke in the 17
th
 century with other tones than Bacon’s and 
Descartes’ pragmatic inputs. The English philosophers Henry More and John Ray 
both criticized Descartes’ mechanical philosophy forgetting nature’s powerful vigor 
(see also Attfield, 1994; Sörlin, 2004). According to More (1659/1987), there is a 
world spirit, Anima Mundi, present in nature. J. Ray (1707/2007) agreed with Bacon 
that the best way of understanding God’s work is through experiments and 
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 Sometimes Descartes includes humans in the concept of “animals” and sometimes he distinguishes 
between animals and humans. 
166 
 
observations, and he deemed empirical studies superior to book knowledge. In 
addition, Ray described humans as the only creatures capable of virtue and vice, but 
he did definitely not consider the animal body comparable to a machine or to 
clockwork. The movements of living things in nature, including the human body, are 
vital and not mechanical, regulated by final causes and elementary principles, 
according to J. Ray (ibid.).   
Rousseau’s nature theology, exposed in Savoyard Vicar, shows resemblance with 
Ray’s, but even Rousseau called both plants (RSW) and animals (including humans) 
“machines.” However, this does not correlate with his view of humans as possessing 
free will. In the 2
nd
 Discourse Rousseau depicts the natural state of a human being as 
that of an animal—a state that in some aspects is superior to other animals and in 
other aspects inferior but that has advanced qualities that other animals lack. There is, 
however, no doubt that he wished humans should treat animals decently (RJJ; C). 
Every animal has senses, according to Rousseau, and even they have ideas that they 
can combine to a certain degree. In his opinion, the difference between two humans 
can be bigger than between certain humans and beasts, since humans differ from 
other animals only in degrees, and the difference is not in understanding but in the 
possession of free will and the capability for judging, choosing, and resisting. 
Humans explicitly diverge from animals since they are free agents (DPE). Another 
distinguishing feature Rousseau pointed out is the human inborn faculty for self-
improvement (perfectibility). “[A] brute is, at the end of a few months, all he will 
ever be during his whole life, and his species, at the end of a thousand years, exactly 
what it was the first year of that thousand” (ibid., p. 88). But, if a human being falls 
back to a primitive state where she acts only out of instincts (because of aging or an 
accident), she will stand lower than the brutes (DPE).  
In contrast to the dualistic thinkers, Anne Conway (1690/2003) claimed that an 
intimate bond and unity exists between body and soul with no fixed limit between 
them, only a fluent alteration. She saw the body and the soul as the same substance 
since the soul is hurt when the body is wounded, although the soul can be more 
superior in certain aspects—for example, in swiftness, penetrability, and soulfulness. 
Conway angrily rejected Descartes for seeing nature as machinery, and she stated that 
nature is not an insensible clockwork, but a living, sensitive body that is much more 
sublime than a mere unthinking mechanism. Spinoza (1670/1891) also rejected 
Descartes’ view of body and soul as separate substances and claimed, instead, that 
both bodies and souls are attributes of the same substance and that humans know 
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about their own existence through the sensations of their body. Spinoza had a vision 
of one only infinite substance including everything on earth, so that nothing exists 
external to this substance. This view of a divine substance that includes the entire 
universe, called pantheism,
135
shares similarities with certain views of Deism that I 
will describe later in this chapter (see also Chapter Two). Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz 
presented a totally different picture of the world, not only split in two parts, but in a 
countless number of entities or centers of force that he called monads. Each monad 
represents a microcosm and is thus only a part of a great divine plan. Leibniz and 
Spinoza thus had completely opposite theories of reality; Liebniz emphasized a 
pluralistic theory of reality as consisting of many substances, and Spinoza a monistic 
theory with only one substance but with ‘dualism’, in turn, dividing reality into two 
parts. All these systems can include God, either as an external force or as among the 
worldly substances. In the next chapter, I will show how Rousseau further developed 
his ideas about goodness and divinity, but first I will explain the various concepts of 
divine or natural jurisprudence.  
 
Natural Morals and Rights 
 
Many factors accelerated the search for new European constitutions, such as political 
reorganization caused by many wars in both the colonies and the home continent and 
new ideas initiated by the Protestant Reformation and Renaissance ‘humanism’. As a 
result, legislation, questions of morals, and rights became urgent topics. As the 
Europeans learned to know more about the world, curiosity arose about differences 
and similarities among its inhabitants and about the origins of humankind (Geras, 
1999). Issues such as human nature, natural rights, and justice were raised and 
became frequent on the intellectual agenda of the time. A dominant political 
Enlightenment topic with Stoic influence was the ideas of natural laws (jus naturale). 
But, as Rousseau accurately stated, diverse interpretations of the concepts natural law 
and natural right flourished (2
nd
 D), and the two terms were not clearly distinct. 
Consequently, the concepts “natural right(s),” “natural law(s)” and “natural justice” 
could have the same meaning but could also differ or overlap. I will not try to embark 
upon this incongruity here. My intention is instead to give examples of differing ways 
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 Pantheism from Greek pan (all) and theos (God).  
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of entering the discourse as background to Rousseau’s view and I will then employ 
the same concepts as were used by the authors in question. 
All through the Renaissance, a variety of voices had spoken in favor of a united 
world order, a reawakening of the Ancient dream of cosmopolitism. From the very 
beginning the idea was incorporated in Christianity, and the Papacy had repeatedly 
instantiated its tenets in becoming the spiritual leader of the world. Non-ecclesiastical 
humanists
136
 had also talked about cosmopolitism, especially Hugo Grotius,
137
 who 
was upset by the religious wars and constructed a theory of general international laws 
to bring order into the chaos of the world (see Murphy, 1985). He sought to find 
principles of natural law (jus naturale) based on both human and divine authority. 
Because natural law is a theory of a standard justice based on universal reason that 
applies to all individuals, its principles promised common rights and justice for all 
peoples of the world (e.g., Iannone, 2001). In its Christian modification, the Stoic 
account of natural laws became God’s laws and denoted that, following God’s 
initiation, all individuals should love their neighbors. Humans are God’s creatures, 
and since God had equipped them with reason in contrast to other animals, they have 
to follow the laws of nature; that is, God’s laws (Plamenatz, 1969). These laws are 
even obligatory in a state of nature that lacks rulers or political systems supervising 
human conduct. Everyone has obligations towards fellow members of their species 
simply because they are humans. The tool for discovering these rules and acting 
righteously is reason (ibid.).  However, when discussing the philosophy of Spinoza, 
Næss (2002) points out that what we call “reason” today is not a good translation of 
the 17
th
 century philosophers’ interpretation of the word ratio, since they used the 
word to denote choosing in harmony with human nature or conscience, and Spinoza 
used ratio to explain an “inner voice” communicating through emotions.  
Thus, ratio primarily referred to a combination of feelings and reason in the 
human interrelation with the world and increasingly became a logical weapon for 
fighting human passions. According to the English philosopher Thomas Hobbes 
(1651/1998), humans were driven by selfish passions in the state of nature, but it is 
well known that Rousseau did not share Hobbes’ opinion on this point. Hobbes’ ideas 
of natural laws and about the formation of societies differ from Rousseau’s thoughts, 
but Hobbes definitely inspired Rousseau to investigate these issues and influenced 
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 Other voices that endorsed cosmopolitism were for example Dante Alighieri, Gian Battista Vico, and 
Christian Wolff (see, e.g., Conversi, 2000; Murphy, 1985). 
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 Hugo Grotius (Huig de Groot) constructed his theory in 1625. 
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Rousseau, even if Rousseau often argued against Hobbes. A basic problem Rousseau 
raises is that many philosophers started at the wrong end when they tried to define 
natural rights (2
nd
 D). He thought it was impossible to set forth rules for humans’ 
common interest in a social state that is far from natural. According to Rousseau, 
humans living an ‘unnatural life’ and disagreeing about what is a law cannot stipulate 
natural rights: “Knowing so little of nature, and agreeing so ill about the meaning of 
the word law, it would be difficult for us to fix on a good definition of natural law” 
(DPE, p. 80).  
According to Hobbes (1651/1998), humans are born aggressive, always striving 
to be the best. In a natural state, he notices particular inborn features that create 
disputes among the human species members; hate, lust, ambitions, and covetousness. 
Hobbes supposed that humans in a state of nature, without a common leader and 
isolated from society would live in a state of continuous war, neglecting all other 
pursuits, steadily afraid for their own lives. In such a situation of no laws and no 
rights, no person possesses anything. Humans thus strive for peace, on the one hand, 
because of their fear of death and, on the other hand, following their desire for a 
comfortable life. Human reason makes them unite and shape common natural laws. 
Of these laws, Hobbes (ibid., p. 86) firstly defines the right of nature (jus naturale) as 
the freedom of people to use their own powers to preserve their life and do what is 
best according to their own reason and judgment. Such liberty is thus the absence of 
external impediments. Secondly, he defines a law of nature
138
 (Lex naturalis) as a 
general rule and product of reason that forbids humans from acting destructively 
towards themselves or neglecting the proper means of preserving their lives (ibid.).  
In Hobbes’ vocabulary the word “right” means the freedom to act or not, while a 
law obliges humans to act in a particular way. The profound right of nature, then, is 
the freedom to protect oneself with all available means, whereas the profound law of 
nature obliges one to strive for peace. But, when everybody has the right to 
everything, it is necessary to limit individual claims, otherwise there would be 
endless war and nobody would ever feel safe. The second law is the law of the 
Gospel; “whatsoever you require that others should do to you, that do ye to them”. 
(Hobbes, 1651/1998, p. 87) In reversed form, this means that you shall not do to 
others what you do not want them to do to you. The problem with violent behavior 
disappears when individuals willingly transfer their individual rights to another or a 
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group of others in order to attain self-protection. This mutual transferring of the right 
is what Hobbes calls the “social contract” and requires a third law of nature, 
“justice”, or “that men perform their covenants made” (ibid., p. 95). When many 
humans join and transfer their powers in a social contract with a common strong ruler 
they form a state. Hobbes operated with several other laws than these three. Space 
prevents presenting them all here, so I now move forward and deal with Rousseau’s 
and others’ perspectives of natural law and natural rights.  
Rousseau rejected Hobbes’ idea about pre-civilized humans as being in a 
condition of violence, because they had no idea of evilness in such a state of nature. 
After reading the writings of Jean-Jacques’ writings one of the characters in the 
Dialogues, the Frenchman, states as the  “great principle” of Jean-Jacques that 
“nature made man happy and good, but the society depraves him and makes him 
miserable” (RJJ, p. 213). In Note IX in the 2nd Discourse Rousseau also makes this 
clear:   
 
Men are wicked; a sad and constant experience makes proof unnecessary; yet 
man is naturally good;
139
 I believe I have proved it; what, then, can have depraved 
him to this point, if not the changes that occurred in his constitution, the progress 
he has made, and the knowledge he has acquired? (2
nd
 D, p. 197) 
 
But what did Rousseau really mean about man’s natural goodness? Broome (1963) 
interprets Rousseau’s ‘natural good’ as a “passive innocence,” since humans are not 
apt to moral reasoning in the natural state. However, it is notable that Hobbes and 
Rousseau did not agree on what the state of nature entails. And Rousseau neither 
agreed with Hobbes’ strong belief in reason nor did he hold reason as a primary 
human attribute. I will examine this disparity more thoroughly in the next chapter 
where I present Rousseau’s view and I will, therefore, only give a brief foretaste of 
Rousseau’s philosophical anthropology here.  
Rousseau’s search for what is prior to reason and thus is true human nature 
rejected all scientific scholarship. Instead, he intuitively commented on what he saw 
as the most profound human norms. In particular, he found two principles that he 
thought must be prior to reason: firstly, that humans are very interested in their own 
wellbeing and preservation; and secondly, that human beings dislike seeing members 
of their own species suffer. Self-preservation and compassion (pity, la Pitié) are, 
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therefore, human attributes prior to reflection. Thus all the rules of natural law rely on 
these two initial principles while reason develops later. Instead of the law of the 
Gospel, Rousseau draws attention to a more useful maxim of goodness: “Do your 
good with the least possible harm to others” (2nd D, p. 154). Compassion fosters this 
maxim of natural feelings, not sublime aims, he said. Awareness of the other’s 
sensibility, not the other’s intelligence, should guide actions towards others. 
Rousseau claimed that it would not be possible to include animals in natural laws on 
the grounds of intelligence or freedom (2
nd
 D). They cannot ‘know’ natural law, as 
they possess neither knowledge nor freedom. Instead, Rousseau regarded animals as 
sensible and thus he concluded they did have natural rights that entail that humans are 
obliged not to make the animals suffer.  
In Hobbes (1651/1998) definition ‘the laws of nature’ are obligations for 
individuals to behave decently towards others in pursuit of advantages for 
themselves, while ‘the state of nature’ in Locke’s (1690/1997) version is not a war, 
but has from beginning a ‘law of nature’ governing and obliging everyone by reason. 
It is reason that prevents individuals from acting destructively against others. In 
Locke’s mind ‘the law of nature’ requires not harming anybody else—not their 
health, life, liberty or possession—unless justice is owed to an offender of that same 
law. Locke meant that human beings are born free and equal with a right according to 
nature to decide about their own property (their lives, liberties and lands). God gave 
the earth to humankind in common, according to Locke, but everybody received an 
unlimited right to use the land as long as they did not occupy their neighbor’s share. 
Since God made nothing to be spoiled, he has given humans intelligence and 
creativity for utilizing the earth. By use of one’s own labor on a piece of nature an 
individual could receive the right to a portion of that land. “It is labor, then, which 
puts the greatest part of the value upon land, without which it would scarcely be 
worth anything…” (Locke, 1690/1997, p. 26). The resources nature produces are 
worthless in themselves, but the whole chain of labor needed to develop them gives 
them value; actually 99 % of the total value, according to Locke. While humans have 
put a value on gold and silver, they have found out ways of possessing more land 
than anyone needs and when they have joined in societies the role of the society has 
been to facilitate managing its members’ properties, private ownership in particular 
(ibid.). 
Contrary to Hobbes, who paid attention to self protection, Claude Adrien 
Helvétius saw human self-interest as the force of progress. Humans search for 
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pleasure and try to avoid displeasure, and all their efforts strive towards maximizing 
pleasure. When everybody searches for ‘the good’ it is question of desire, and the 
result will be good for all. To know if an action is right or wrong, one needs to 
compare the consequences, according to Helvétius. Thus, he asked if a given action 
brings pleasure or displeasure for the actors. Helvétius ideas were further developed 
by Bentham into the doctrine of utilitarianism (see Chapter Two) and have 
influenced liberal politics. An Englishman who lived and expressed his thoughts at 
the same time as Rousseau and Helvétius, and who is more similar to the latter, is 
Adam Smith. He regarded human self-interest and happiness as the driving forces of 
rational actions and of economic life (e.g., Skirbekk & Gilje, 1993). Social life is then 
like a market where individuals exchange products. Rousseau, in contrast, attacked 
all kinds of egoistic thinking that emphasized self-interest in form of pleasure. 
Equality and freedom, not pleasure, were Rousseau’s main concerns, and his worry 
was how to forge a union where all individuals would protect each other and yet 
remain free. This happens, he said in the social contract, when duties succeed desires 
and humans act rationally in accordance with common criteria. In a society, humans 
have to give up their original freedom, but they receive other advantages instead—as 
long as they do not abuse the situation. From being mostly like a stupid animal with 
natural compassion, human beings became rational when they left the state of nature, 
Rousseau argued. For him freedom was to follow the law one has set for oneself; then 
individuals become their own masters instead of being slaves to their desires. 
Rousseau distinguished two kinds of freedom: on the one hand, natural freedom that 
depends on individual power and, on the other hand, the freedom as a citizen that is 
dependent on the common will. In opposition to Locke, Rousseau argued that 
individuals only have the right to possess the commodities they need for survival; 
but, like Locke, he suggested labor and cultivation as criteria of ownership. However, 
Rousseau did not emphasize accumulating wealth but, instead, thought that wealth is 
enslaving and makes humans unhappy.  
In conclusion, philosophical discourses of the 17
th
 century included diverse 
theories regarding, firstly, how social life had developed; secondly, what the bases 
were for common rules; and, thirdly, how a well-functioning society should be 
organized. The Enlightenment brought with it a belief in an enormous developmental 
capacity of both humans and society. A search for universal laws and ethical 
foundations took place alongside a stipulation of human uniqueness and claims for 
individual autonomy. The ideas recounted above are only a few examples of how 
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differently various political thinkers understood the many issues relating to the 
human community. One saw humans as naturally solitary, another as social; one as 
evil, another as good; one as searching for pleasure, another as rational. And the 
foundational laws of human societies could be grounded on God’s will, ‘natural 
preconditions,’ or common agreements. The shaping of such social laws also was 
connected to the laws of nature and to science. 
 
4.3 Reshaping the World 
 
Science and scientific thinking have always broadly influenced people’s life and 
thinking, and whether science is intertwined with religion or not, it is extensively 
related to politics, both national and between governments. Furthermore, science is 
dependent on financing and often undertaken with the hope of profit. This was also 
the case in pre-modern Europe, whose scientific history is linked to economic 
growth, worldwide commerce, and the birth of strong nation states. And scientific 
curiosity was not unique to Europe. Chapter Two already noted that other areas of the 
world have given evidence of remarkable scientific capacity and the history of 
European scientific development is not only a story about events taken place there; it 
is deeply connected to the exploration and colonization of non-European regions. 
European modernity was in fact created by interaction between the West and non-
West. More and more voices have started to realize that, initially, Europe actually 
was peripheral to the world economy which, at least until the middle of the 18
th
 
century, was Asian-centered (see Mitchell, 2000). Sometimes the colonies served as 
models that promoted change in Europe. For example, Caribbean sugar production 
based on slave trade may have promoted modern bureaucracy and administration of 
labor in Europe, but the whole business was of course rooted in the colonialist’s 
interest and in European strategies (ibid.). 
 
A Divine Order 
 
The pre-scientific past had a remarkable influence on the 18
th
 century thinkers and 
many conflicting ideas flourished side by side (Gutek, 2001). In part, this might have 
made it difficult for curious persons like Rousseau to find stable grounds for their 
thoughts, and this might explain why his arguments often seem inconsistent to us 
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today. Outram
140
 (1995) notes that, despite reformations and new movements, the 
Enlightenment saw neither any decline in religious beliefs, nor any radical shifts in its 
meaning and context. The Catholic Church was in a strong position and did its best to 
manage the growing field of science. Scientific discussions, in turn, had an impact on 
the Church, so the impact could be called mutual. Regardless of tendencies towards 
atheism and dissention, many scholars and writers were careful not to be openly 
antireligious in their books. Galileo was a warning of what can happen. In 1633, the 
Roman Catholic Church forced him to publicly denounce Copernicanism and 
sentence him to spend the rest of his life under house arrest (see, e.g., Deeley, 2001). 
He was not the last of his kind in this respect: philosophes Voltaire and Denis Diderot 
both spent some time imprisoned and Rousseau had to live in exile because of more 
radical religious statements than the Church could countenance. Even though, 
Rousseau’s relation to religion was vague, and even if he mixed various religious 
ingredients, he was conceivably a religious person, and did not argue for atheism. 
Actually, Morley (1891) calls Voltaire, Diderot, and Rousseau true reformers of the 
Catholic Church because their radical writings called into question the most hallowed 
features of Catholicism, particularly the belief in miracles. Diderot attacked the 
Catholic Church for resting on authority and tradition and leaning on a philosophy 
where man is the final cause of the universe (ibid.). Voltaire always spoke very 
ironically of Christian traditions, religious dogmas, credulous reading of the Bible, 
discrepancy between acts and sermons, and so on. The natural religion Rousseau 
defended aimed to evade fanaticism, skepticism, atheism, and egoism (see E). 
Some Enlightenment thinkers, especially in France and Great Britain, were 
Deists: a rationalist religious philosophy that was influenced by scientific thoughts 
and that rejected many well-established elements of Christianity. Rousseau expressed 
his variant of Deism in a section of about 70 pages of the fourth chapter of his book 
Émile, the already mentioned Savoyard Vicar.
 141
 The Deistic view of God connects 
with Aristotle’s concept of a ‘sufficient cause’ as a creator force or Prime Mover of 
the universe, but also to the Stoic philosophy and even to the mechanical thoughts of 
Descartes and Newton (Edelman, 2004). Standing on such a miscellaneous 
foundation, Deism was not a religion as such, but could take various shapes. Some 
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 In this claim Outram refers to Gay, Vovelle, Thomas, Hegel, Adorno, and Horkheimer, 
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 Revelation (or Revelations) is a Book of the Bible including a describing of the end of the world. 
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Deists
142
 believed in God’s moral command and others did not. Another controversial 
subject was the soul’s immortality, whereas there was a more agreed denial of 
Revelation. Some Deists stood closer to Christianity, others closer to atheism (ibid.). 
The Stoic influence pleaded for a life in accordance with nature, commitment to 
universal truths and natural laws, and a view of the wellbeing of humankind as more 
significant than that of individuals. This Deistic view was, on the one hand, the basis 
of a natural religion where God and nature became indistinguishable. On the other 
hand, a more mechanical fraction saw God as an engineer in the machinery of nature. 
The usual Deist comparison was of God as the eternal watchmaker who set the 
universe in motion ticking, but thereafter did not intervene, thus leaving humans free 
to use reason to their betterment. Despite the diverse versions of Deism, its Christian 
roots were nonetheless obvious. However, the purpose was pragmatic; the Deists 
rejected religious dogmatism and intolerance, and advocated equality and religious 
freedom (ibid.). In the Deistic message, a quest for morality stood above sacred 
words, and nature was brought into the center of attention. “Nature became a map for 
salvation as well as political and religious propaganda. It was the garden of God 
where the king strolled” (Barrera-Osorio, 2006, p. 112). Similar to the close relation 
between religious beliefs and natural laws were tendencies towards joining the laws 
of nature with social conditions. Like Rousseau, the Swedish naturalist Carolus 
Linnaeus (1760/1978b) saw nature as a harmonious system created by God, and the 
order in nature could serve as a model for human societies. The physician and 
economist François Quesnay
143
 argued that nature provides humans with the best 
instructions of how to understand welfare and happiness
144
 (Eriksson & Frängsmyr, 
2004). Rousseau spoke about the “body politic” and compared society and its parts to 
the animal body and its organs:  
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 Immediately after the publication of Émile and Social Contract in 1762 the French Parliament decided to 
burn the books and imprison the author. Both the state and the Church banned the books (see C; Broome, 
1963; Dent, 1992). The main reason for this repulsive reaction was the controversial way Rousseau dealt 
with Christianity and the Catholic Church in Émile. After this misfortune, Rousseau had to leave France 
immediately and was not even welcome in his native Geneva.  
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 Quesnay (1694-1774), who was the leader of the physiocrats, wrote articles about economics for the 
Encyclopedia (see later in this chapter). According to the physiocrats all wealth, originates in agriculture, and 
its value increases if nature is productive. The physiocrats emphasized free trade and a tax policy levying 
direct taxes on land ownership (see, e.g., Foucault, 1970). 
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 This kind of thinking is reminiscent of the diverse ideas about systems theory flourishing in the 20
th
 and 
the 21
th
 century—theories in connection with epistemology and sustainable development that Stephen 
Sterling has brought forward using the ideas of Gregory Bateson and Fritjof Capra, among others (see, e.g., 
Sterling, 2004). 
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The sovereign power represents the head; the laws and customs are the brain, the 
source of the nerves and seat of the understanding, will and senses, of which the 
Judges and Magistrates are the organs: commerce, industry, and agriculture are 
the mouth and stomach which prepare the common subsistence; the public 
income is the blood, which a prudent economy, in performing the functions of the 
heart, causes to distribute through the whole body nutriment and life: the citizens 
are the body and the members, which make the machine live, move and work; 
and no part of the machine can be damaged without the painful impression being 
at once conveyed to the brain, if the animal is in a state of health. (DPE, pp. 125-
126) 
 
For ages, humans have sought to understand the natural world and to find some kind 
of reliable order and those who are responsible for maintaining it. Foucault (1970) 
stressed that an epistemological change took place during the classical era that 
replaced the resemblance concept with classification. I tend to agree with this, but not 
completely, because this change was not sudden. The search for resemblances went 
on in parallel with a view of nature as a divided and ordered system waiting to be 
classified. Even in the 18
th
 century, the element theory of Empedocles from the 5
th
 
century BC still flourished. Empedocles operated with a theory in which nature 
consists of four elements: fire, air, water and earth. These were affected by two 
forces, love and hate (Lübcke, 1988; Skirbekk & Gilje, 1993). In his Timaeus (32-
33), Plato describes how the creator formed the universe in a proportional relation 
between the four elements and how he shaped the spherical earth of these same 
elements.  
Linnaeus, who saw nature as a firm system that could be organized in many ways, 
arranged the earth according to three elements: water, earth, and forest (Linnaeus, 
1760/1991b). And he divided the natural world into three, according to him, totally 
dissimilar categories: the kingdom of stones, the kingdom of plants, and the kingdom 
of animals (von Linné, 1749/1978b).
145
 Humankind was the master of them all―the 
reason God had created the rest. But, Linnaeus also distinguished a hierarchical order 
between the other living creatures. In opposition to many others, Linnaeus 
(1760/1978b) argued that the animals uphold the balance in the botanical kingdom 
and thus are created for the sake of plants, while the plants make God’s wisdom 
evident. Human beings manage the animal kingdom, but also the plants, while all are 
created for human sake. Linnaeus thus saw the plants as prior to the animals in 
contrast to Aristotle, and gave them his fullest attention. Linnaeus’ view of plants is 
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reminiscent of Plato’s view in Timaeus (77a-c) where the earthly plants are regarded 
as kin to humans, who are called heavenly plants,
146
 and this might have influenced 
the analogy of education as a kind of gardening (e.g., Comenius called pupils ‘plants’ 
and described the teacher’s role as the gardeners).147  
Botanical gardens became a fashion in the 18
th
 century; this interest was partly 
due to the economical and practical benefit of plants, especially their 
pharmacological importance. Another reason for the widespread interest in plants was 
aesthetic. Rousseau repeatedly agreed with Linnaeus (1737/1991a) that no luxury or 
cultural entertainment in life was more enjoyable than the study of plants. For 
Rousseau, botanical studies were a way of enjoying his being and proving the 
existence of the Divine (see Chapter Five).  
In addition to the belief in a divine order, ideas flourished about a gradual 
progression where all species develop towards a greater perfection.
148
 This steady 
change should happen through revolutions that take the form of huge nature 
transformations affecting the climate and other living conditions. The series of 
revolutions (events) were supposed to be predestinated. It was the Creator who had 
arranged a series of revolutions affecting the whole solar system, a sequence that 
should initiate changes not only in the earthly species but set forth a metamorphosis 
of the whole world from a larva to a butterfly. Nevertheless, according to this theory, 
while new species are born and others disappear, the innate hierarchy between 
species remains and likewise the gap between the foremost species, humans, and God 
(Foucault, 1970, mainly referring to Charles Bonnet).  
The idea of perfection is not equivalent with Darwinism, where mutations 
(spontaneous genetic changes) can give birth to new species; instead the change takes 
place as a result of a designed chain of events. In the 2
nd
 Discourse Rousseau 
elaborates this same idea of a series of stepwise human development with revolutions 
changing its course, but it is not a question of an absolutely positive progression; 
instead, he depicts a process of change that also involves negative effects (more on 
this follows in Chapter Five). To regulate this process towards a virtuous perfection is 
a much more complicated proposition and one of the challenges I will deal with in 
Chapter Six. Rousseau did not calculate perfection to be a feature for animals other 
than humans. 
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 The connection to the gods and heaven is the reason to human’s upright position. 
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 In the Finnish language the word “kasvatus” means both ‘cultivation of plants’ and ‘education’.  
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 Darwin’s and others evolutionary ideas had a strong grounding in this idea of perfectibility. 
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The European Man as the Hub 
 
In the end of the 18
th
 century, cosmopolitan ideas had to fight against growing 
nationalistic ideas, and Rousseau was an enthusiastic defender of the nation state. 
Yet, many of the Enlightenment writers emphasized cosmopolitism, among them 
Montesquieu, who expressed his disagreement with a worldview that prejudiced 
people from other parts of the world on behalf of Europeans (Conversi, 2000). 
Although his cosmopolitan thoughts did not lack support, the idea had no immediate 
influence. Not even every so-called cosmopolitan advocated a global moral world 
order; cosmopolitanism could also denote ‘world citizenship’ in contrast to national 
citizenship. 
Linnaeus was not the only one who regarded Europe as extraordinary. His 
thought reflected a more general opinion of an inconsistent world order, allied with 
opinions of human development built on myths, investigations, and commercial 
interests.
149
  
Anything different from the European norm was often looked upon as strange. 
Europe stood for civilization and maturity compared with other parts of the world 
where both inhabitants and societies were regarded as comparatively juvenile. From 
one view, all races were born different and the Europeans were most godlike; but 
from another view, all humans were born equal and the differences in races were due 
to life conditions. Even though there was a strong belief in Europe as the middle of 
the earth, the idea of equality among all people grew stronger and sharply 
contradicted the practice of slavery (Barrera-Osorio, 2006; Hulme, 1990; Liedman, 
1997). Moreover, while interest in Islamic culture and arts started to flourish, this 
only widened the gaps between Europe and Asia. Many Europeans admired the 
exotic as strange and charming, and employed exotic elements as interesting 
adornments and façades.
150
 This admiration for strangeness did not prevent 
Europeans from trying to conquer and change the rest of the world to suit their 
concepts of culture and civilization. There was undoubtedly a strong inconsistency 
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 This phenomenon becomes obvious in the mapping of the world that placed Europe in the middle of the 
map. Some of the maps from this age are full of information, whether or not anyone had actually studied the 
mapped areas. If the knowledge was insufficient to describe unknown areas, fantasy could do. On some 
maps, unknown sites were simply left empty. These foreign areas were categorized as the land inhabited by 
barbarians, savages, or beasts. The interest in the world had for long been sidestepped by sidereal curiosity; 
galaxies were even better known than the earth (e.g., Liedman, 1997). Lack of knowledge contributed a 
variety of opinions about ethnic and national distinctions that often were false.  
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 One of many architectural examples on this admiration is the Royal Pavilion in Brighton, UK. 
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between viewing Europe as the middle of the earth and searching for lost paradise on 
continents far away. Voyages of exploration had, since the end of the 13
th
 century, all 
functioned as instruments for European control, and explorations of nature served 
many other benefits. Therefore, even if these trips had a strong exploration aim, of 
significant parallel interests often were economic or military benefits (see, e.g., 
Outram, 1995). 
According to Barrera-Osorio (2006), Spanish colonial interest was a remarkable 
initiator of scientific development.
151
 After seven centuries of Arabian occupation, 
Spain had inherited much scientific knowledge to use for mastering the oceans and 
foreign lands. These scientific investigations were especially promoted when the 
Spanish merchants, artisans, and royal officials needed to collect information and 
understand all the new things they confronted on the American continents: strange 
settings, astonishing plants, animals and humans, lifestyles, and so on. Such scientific 
curiosity and knowledge accumulation thus mainly served economic and political 
goals. Bacon had laid down the order for investigations in his New Atlantis: the 
priority of God’s creation was the light (McKnight, 2006). According to Bacon, 
enlightenment through knowledge should be the priority number one on the trips.   
Botanic gardens with foreign plants and animals became small European plots of 
paradise, but these gardens also were found in big cities in the colonies. The 
expectations were enormous for explorations targeting locations where ‘natural 
humans’ were expected to live (Sörlin, 2004; see also Drouin, 1989). After 
Christopher Columbus’ voyage to America, Europeans started to talk about Europe as 
the ‘Old World’ and North and South America as the ‘New World’, something to be 
explored. In the early Enlightenment, the Europeans held America and its inhabitants 
closer to the state of nature and more animal than Europe and the Europeans (Sala-
Molins, 2006), an argument to which the popular “novel savage writer” Baron de 
Lahontan objected (Muthu, 2003, p. 24). Foreign people, animals, and plants gained 
attention as exotic objects for empirical study. Stones, cliffs, caves, and waterfalls 
became fascinating and admirable as lifted from their context and pictured in travel 
stories and paintings. The demands on both books and pictures gradually grew 
towards a larger exactness and objectivity, even when the public preferred a more 
personal style (Sörlin, 2004; Drouin, 1989). In addition to books, letter writing was a 
much-employed way of distributing and exchanging knowledge about foreign natural 
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objects and sites. These voyages were valued as a way to leave old customs and 
prejudices behind and to learn new things. Rousseau’s Émile ends with traveling, and 
traveling also plays an important part in Julie. Traveling was thus both real, and a 
metaphor for how an individual can step outside the common context, take a more 
objective and critical stand, and view new horizons (Van Den Abbeele, 2003). 
Similarly to the Ancient philosophers, the modern world valued the grand voyages 
(or the grand tours) as a terrific way of learning from the biggest of all books, the 
world itself.
152
 But if there was something to win, there was also something to lose. 
Real voyaging was connected to anxiety and great risks of dying or suffering some 
other misfortunes (ibid.). 
Recent researches (see, e.g., Harrisson, 2005) emphasize the immediate 
connection between colonization and diverse messages in the Bible, especially 
Genesis 1:28: “Be fruitful, and multiply, and replenish the earth, and subdue it” (King 
James Bible, 1997). Another argument was the Biblical command to spread the 
gospel about the “true God” to all nations (Harrisson, 2005). Eager explorers 
defended their intentions with biblical arguments and argued that it was their duty to 
search for unknown territories and use the things God had created. Likewise Biblical 
arguments could reinforce dispossession and the right to subjugate people living a life 
that the Europeans found idle and primitive (ibid.). The sacrifices in life were also 
legalized by divine obligation. On the long voyages, a many of the crew and 
passengers were struck by diseases and never reached their destinations, whereas 
others died overseas, among them many young explorers (Sörlin & Fagerstedt, 2004). 
Many foreign seeds met the same destiny as the explorers when they reached the cold 
Northern Europe, and European exploratory vessels brought various diseases to other 
regions that killed foreign populations. As a result of the English occupation of 
Hawaii in 1778, more than 75 percent of the native population of at least 250,000 
persons, maybe much more, died in epidemics over the next hundred years (Sörlin & 
Öckerman, 1998). Besides diseases, the colonialists brought drugs and thus spread 
dependencies among the native inhabitants. But they also brought foreign cattle and 
weeds, and started intensive cultivation of local plants (e.g., tea, coffee, and cotton) 
that damaged indigenous ecosystems. Deforestation and drought led to starvation in 
many places, especially on islands, and several colonial workers gradually became 
aware of what we now term ‘environmental problems’ and started to realize that the 
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native inhabitants might have knowledge that could be valuable (ibid.). But 
knowledge about the colonies did not always reach Europe: “Among all the countries 
of Europe there is none in which so many histories and accounts of voyages are 
printed as in France, and none in which so little is known about the genius and the 
morals of other nations” (E, p. 451). Why did Rousseau make this claim? Because he 
meant that people traveled without knowing how to see and learn from what they 
saw, but also because they did not want to know.  
In Rousseau’s mind so-called civilized people, like the French, were no better 
than the savages. He looked upon all humans as initially equal. Linnaeus, who, like 
Rousseau, taught that it was obvious that humans were relatives of the apes, did not 
share his opinion about the savages, but, like many others of this time, Linnaeus was 
amazed about the big difference between ‘savages’ and educated humans and saw a 
clear hierarchical order among humans (see Linnaeus 1760/1991b). Despite a 
growing European interest in equality and human rights, native people and colonial 
workers could be treated very rudely and it was not uncommon that the status of 
slaves in the French colonies was lower than that of the colonists’ dogs (Barrera-
Osorio, 2006), not to mention the situation for the massive number of people who 
were transported overseas.  
In the 18
th
 century the slave trade reached a significant climax (Klein, 1998; 
Rediker, 2007). Millions of humans met a brutal destiny from forced marches to the 
ships, on the crowded voyages, and finally at their ultimate destinations (Cohn, 1998; 
Rediker, 2007). Beside a huge number of slaves, sailors also met their death at sea at 
the hands of this cruel business. However, such human waste was calculated in the 
prize. A slave ship was a blend of war machine, floating prison, and factory; and all 
the misery was hidden in reports behind tidy statistics in tables and figures (Rediker, 
2007). For Rousseau, slavery made humans into things, instead of viewing others as 
moral agents with rights to be acknowledged as equals (see Dent, 1992). In Julie 
Rousseau has the principal male character St. Preux travel abroad and on his return he 
condemns slavery in plain words:  
 
I have seen those vast and unfortunate countries that seem destined only to cover 
the earth with herds of slaves. At their lowly appearance I turned aside my eyes in 
contempt, horror, and pity, and seeing the fourth part of my equals turned into 
beasts for the service of others, I rued being a man. (Rousseau, 1782/1997, p. 
340)  
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And Voltaire is very sarcastic in Candide when he lets a slave worker in Surinam tell 
about how brutally he and his fellows are treated because of the Europeans’ sugar 
consumption.  
 
When we work at the sugar-mills and the grindstone catches our fingers, they cut 
off the hand; when we try to run away, they cut off a leg…This is the price paid 
for the sugar you eat in Europe. (Voltaire, 1759/1991, p. 62) 
 
The slave in Voltaire’s story relates that he does not know if he has made the 
Europeans happy, but they have definitely not made him happy. The dogs, apes, and 
parrots are thousand times happier, he states. However, it was not possible to live the 
same kind of life in the colonies as in Europe. Gradually, colonial societies became 
threats to European traditions: overseas societies, with their mixed social ranks, 
genders, and skin colors, triggered new conceptions of world order (Mitchell, 2000). 
Although cultural diversity was much greater in the colonies than in Europe, a 
gradual change took place in Europe in this respect, but at an expensive price paid for 
with lives and dignity. There was a growing protest against slavery in the 18
th
 
century, but not until the second half of the century did European political voices start 
to attack the whole colonial project (Muthu, 2003). Besides Rousseau, one of the first 
critical voices was Diderot, and, according to Muthu, this criticism depended on his 
distinct view of human nature, an issue I will clarify later. 
The strengthening of the economy, politics, and science that made possible 
Europe's colonization of the world took place at the expense of ecological problems 
the conquerors caused in their colonies (Sörlin & Öckerman, 1998). Economy, trade, 
and industry became a part of the divine Creation. The Greek word oeconomia means 
housekeeping and was interpreted as God’s housekeeping, thus making economic 
aspirations into a kind of religious ceremony (Frängsmyr, 2004). Thus, economy was 
not just any order; it was a good order, a harmonious organization of the parts or 
qualities of a unit (Faccarello & Steiner, 2008). Linnaeus distinguished between the 
oeconomia divina (also called oeconomia naturae, God´s wise nature order), 
oeconomia publica (political economy), and oeconomia private (individual and 
family economy) (ibid.). In contrast, Rousseau distinguished between general or 
political economy and private or domestic economy (DPE). These hierarchic orders 
were intended to help humans manage natural resources and use them for their 
survival (Frängsmyr, 2004). European societies adapted a new order and the people 
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were nourished by new dreams. Colonization had promoted trade and many political 
spokespersons encouraged free trade (Gay, 1966).   
Since the 17
th
 century, French cities were no longer privileged places in the 
middle of rural areas surrounded by fields, forests, and roads. These cities caused 
problems of many kinds, but they also gave rise to utopias and plans. In these dreams, 
the whole nation became a city with the capital as the city center and roads as its 
streets. A good national organization demanded that the tight city management spread 
into the entire surrounding areas (Foucault, 1989). Thus, city organization became the 
norm and city life the most desirable and admirable. Rousseau was anything but 
pleased with this development. He could not stand the escalation of extravagance 
lifestyles that followed in the footsteps of urbanization and that steadfastly changed 
the European living concept. In this developmental fervor, with its passion for global 
trade and industrialization, the urban lifestyles of the emerging bourgeoisie became 
the norm while rural life, with its lack of economic progress and cultural 
entertainments, was deemed untrendy and sluggish. However, Rousseau never 
tolerated an underestimation of the countryside on behalf of luxury urban life that in 
any case only was achievable for a part of the city inhabitants. The mirror had a cruel 
backside even in the cities and the tendencies towards luxury raised lively ethical 
debates. Rousseau rages against the life of luxury in, for example, his 1
st
 Discourse, 
his 2
nd
 Discourse and Émile. Some saw luxury as a sin whereas others argued that it 
was a human duty towards God to utilize nature (e.g., Frängsmyr, 2004); in 
Rousseau’s opinion, however, luxury was a sign of human degradation (1st D). Using 
strong words, he called luxury the worst of all evils. He associated lavishness with 
hot southern winds attacking the crops with myriads of insects causing starvation and 
death to useful native animals and species. He was actually upset about the unfair tax 
system that made peasants leave their agricultural occupations and move into the 
cities, leaving a most urgent task behind them (2
nd
 D). 
 
The Lost Paradise 
 
Despite colonialism and slave trade, accurate knowledge about other cultures slowly 
reached Europe. In the Renaissance, but also later in the 18
th
 century, a variety of 
ideas meld into romantic stories about the ‘savages’. These ideas got inspiration 
from, on the one hand, traveler-ethnographers’ descriptions of foreign people (e.g., 
184 
 
native inhabitants in North America, south America, Canada, the Caribbean and the 
West indies) and, on the other hand, knowledge about Ancient Greek mythology and 
inhabitants of the mythological Golden Age.
153
 Similar images also came from late 
Renaissance pastoral dramas (see, e.g., Merchant, 1980). Rousseau admired the 
famous Italian poet Torquato Tasso’s epic writings that portrayed a dreamlike life in 
the countryside, a fantastic Arcadia where even sorrow is beautiful, with the days 
filled with music and dance (Sprengel, 1917). On the one hand, non-European 
cultures were looked upon as more primitive, in a lower stage of cultural progress; on 
the other hand, their lifestyle was regarded as more genuine.  
An unfamiliar feature that wakened disgust was cannibalism, and stories about 
this practice flourished. The cannibal was thus a negative antagonist to the noble 
savage. But Michel de Montaigne did not agree with such a negative and prejudicial 
vision (see Montaigne, 1592/1986b). In his essay “On Cannibals,” published at the 
end of the 16
th
 century, he retells a story he has heard about a tribe living according to 
the laws of nature. These people lived a happier life than those of the Golden Age 
poems, he said. Their society has no commerce, no books, no calculations, no 
officials or political leaders, no wealth or poverty, no agriculture, no metals, and no 
clothes. In another essay he uses similar characteristics about people in the New 
World. They have no words for lies, treachery, slander, or envy. Their life is pleasant 
and most of the time they spend dancing. Montaigne does actually not find their habit 
of eating human flesh more barbarian than the many brutal ways the members of his 
own society treat each other (ibid.).
154
 Like Montaigne, Rousseau, who was familiar 
with Montaigne’s essays, also gave a positive picture of ‘savages’, as the next chapter 
will reveal.  
Besides Montaigne, many others wrote both fictive and documentary stories 
about foreign exotic people, sometimes called ‘noble savages’.155 Tahiti became the 
land of such savages, after Louis Antoine de Bougainville’s description of the island 
and its inhabitants. In his Voyage Around the World, he made Tahitian life sound like 
living in paradise. Diderot wrote a contrasting account of Tahitian society in 
Supplement to the Bougainville Journey, where he blamed the Europeans for the 
                                           
153
 Golden Age―an early joyful time of human life described by for example Plato in Timaeus. 
154
 An example of the European brutality is the commonly performed infant murdering (see Heywood, 2004). 
155
 Rousseau is strongly connected to the mythical character of natural goodness, the ‘noble savage’, but 
Rousseau was not the inventor of this myth (Ellingson, 2001). The idea has older roots; and the expression is 
found in a 17
th
 century drama, The Conquest of Granada by the Spaniards, written by John Dryden in 1672 
(ibid.; see also Outram, 1995). 
185 
 
Tahitians’ vices. Voltaire created a fable about the genuine inhabitants of Eldorado in 
his novel Candide.  
It was not only true stories about other foreign lifestyles that fascinated the 18
th
 
century people; both de Bougainville and Voltaire mixed real places with utopian 
visions. Also popular were dream worlds and fictive stories, among them the utopian 
literature genre
156
 that had flourished here and there at least since Plato wrote about 
the sunken island Atlantis in the dialogue Timaeus. A utopia was neither a space nor 
a time, but designed as a means for awakening a reader’s critical judgment (Shklar, 
1966/2006). The purpose of the classical utopias was to show the errors of human 
conduct, instead of blaming God, fate, or nature for social misery, and thus to 
encourage moral reflection (ibid.). Daniel Defoe’s novel Robinson Crusoe157 has 
utopian features; Rousseau appreciated the book and regarded it the only one the 
young Émile needed to read.  
Finding a contrast to the depravity of humans’ natural origins became a 
fascinating concern, and Rousseau like many others read about what kind of people 
the explorers had met and imaged what a ‘natural human being’ or what ‘human 
nature’ might be. Cro (1990) also charges the Jesuit Reductions158 of Paraguay and 
the Jesuit order with practically fulfilling their mission by influencing works of 
writers such as Voltaire and Rousseau. An influential French ethnographer who had 
traveled widely in North America and Canada, living among indigenous people, was 
the before mentioned baron de Lahontan (Muthu, 2003). All these writings about the 
life of the savages reached a broad audience and, among others, they influenced 
Montaigne, Diderot, Voltaire, and Rousseau.  
Rousseau’s 1st Discourse and 2nd Discourse sharply criticize his contemporary 
society for being corrupt and announced a contradictory picture of the natural human 
being. In contrast to Rousseau’s judgment of the savages, and in opposition to 
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 Wellknown utopias from the Renaissance are for example Thomas More’s Utopia (1516) and Tommaso 
Campanelli’s City of the Sun (1623). An example of an ironic social critique is the Spanish writer Miguel de 
Cervantes’ utopian Don Quixote, a work that expresses the impossible dream of the Catholic utopia, and 
depicts Spain in a process of decadence and subject to greed and pride (see Cro, 1990). Part one of Don 
Quixote was published 1605 and part two 1615. 
157
 This book from 1719 is popularly called Robinson Cruose, but the whole title is The Life and Strange 
Surprising Adventures of Robinson Crusoe, of York, Mariner. 
158
 The "Christian Indian State," as the Reductions have been called, were founded in the beginning of the 
17
th
 century in the territory of the present country of Paraguay, the Argentine Provinces of Misiones and 
Corrientes, and the Brazilian Province of Rio Grande do Sul. At most the number of the inhabitants was 
more than 140,000 divided across more than 30 settlements (Catholic Encyclopedia, 2010). 
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Bougainville’s idea about the Tahitians, Diderot did not consider the savages’ as 
living in a natural state (Muthu, 2003), but Diderot was upset about the explorers’ 
behavior: “This Tahitian who you want to treat as a chattel, as a dumb animal―this 
Tahitian is your brother. You are both children of Nature―what right do you have 
over him that he does not have over you?” (Diderot, 1772/1956, p. 118).  Thus, he did 
not classify them as merely good and their society as an idyll without social or 
political problems, but instead stated that both virtue and vice are typical human 
conditions (ibid.). Nonetheless, at this point I want to point out that, despite the fact 
that Rousseau criticized civilization compared with the state of nature, he never 
imagined that there was any way back—although Voltaire blamed him in a letter for 
wanting humans to become quadrupeds again (see Voltaire, 1755/1985). The idea of 
no return was one of those ideas Rousseau called his “principles.” “But human nature 
does not go backward, and it is never possible to return to the times of innocence and 
equality once they have been left behind,” he unmistakably states (RJJ, p. 213). He 
develops the same argument in Note IX from the 2
nd
 Discourse to convince his 
antagonists―obviously without success. What he really means becomes apparent in 
Émile, where he writes,  
 
[A]lthough I want to form the man of nature, the object is not, for all that, to 
make him a savage and to relegate him to the depths of the woods. It suffices that, 
enclosed in a social whirlpool, he not let himself get carried away by either the 
passions or the opinions of men, that he see with his eyes, that he feel with his 
heart, that no authority govern him beyond that of his own reason. (E, p. 255) 
 
Europeans did not just degrade non-Europeans and ‘New World’ natives; women, 
Jews and ‘lower’ social classes also were granted assigned an inferior position (Sala-
Molins, 2006). Eby (1952, p. 309) describes the way the French nobles treated their 
peasants with the words “heartless tyranny.” Rousseau confronted inequality in many 
ways. He ends his 2
nd
 Discourse with a powerful sentence on this subject: 
 
[M]oral inequality, authorized by positive right alone, is contrary to Natural Right 
whenever it is not directly proportional to Physical inequality; a distinction which 
sufficiently determines what one ought to think in this respect of the sort of 
inequality that prevails among all civilized Peoples; since it is manifestly against 
the Law of Nature, however defined, that a child command an old man,
159
 an 
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 This relates to Rousseau’s argument that it was wrong both to command children and to let them 
command (see Émile). The capital letters are original. 
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imbecile lead a wise man, and a handful people abound in superfluities while the 
starving multitude lacks in necessities. (2
nd
 D, p. 188) 
 
Although Rousseau claimed equality, he touched on gender very gently and 
conventionally in comparison to Diderot. While Diderot blamed European societies 
for its almost criminal unequal treatment of women in Supplement to the 
Bougainville Journey, Rousseau’s opposition to urban life involved praising 
traditional family patterns, instead. Like the ‘savages’, women were since long 
classified as closer to nature than European men. Trials against women suspected to 
be witches did not disappear until the beginning of the 19
th
 century, although the 
number of them declined during the 18
th
 century (e.g., Davies & de Blécourt, 2004). 
The definition of women’s role in 18th century society became complicated; they 
were regarded as emotional, naïve, and incapable of reasoning, but at the same time 
they were supposed to be the foundation of the family and the educators of their 
children. The role of women, however, differed completely due to social class. The 
gender problem was not only connected to the hierarchy of civilized to ‘savages’, but 
to social equalities in Europe, and to the enigma of nature in general (e.g., Sala-
Molins, 2006). Rousseau’s opinion on gender earned him many enemies, especially 
among women; and I will return to this issue in Chapter Six. 
In addition to the social critique initiated by stories about ‘savages’, another 
critique favored China over Europe. Among others, Voltaire, Leibniz, and Christian 
Wolff saw Chinese politics as superior to European politics. Leibniz even suggested 
that China should send missionaries to Europe (Muthu, 2003) and Wolff shocked his 
audience at the University of Halle implying that the wisdom of Confucius was 
superior to Christianity (Gay, 1966). Rousseau did not share this view, as becomes 
evident in his 2
nd
 Discourse, where he argues that science has not purified the morals 
in China more than anywhere else. 
 
Fervent Classification  
 
During the 17
th
 century, when natural history was situated between the living beings 
and their names, classification became a form of episteme. Knowing became 
equivalent with interpreting. Classification and ordering became a major undertaking, 
thanks to the written, especially published, word. Language and its publication 
became a tool for exploring, expressing, separating, and naming all living beings. 
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While God created the world through his word and named the creation, Bacon meant 
that humans had to use their minds to understand the universe and govern the creation 
(Matthews, 2008). The ordering was mostly an attempt to separate ‘things’ based on 
differences more than their kinship; in particular, the strange was detached from the 
common (Foucault, 1970). It was also a kind of exploration of a kind of a natural 
economy, where all parts had a place in an entity. It became a human duty to open 
and read the book of nature and interpret it (see Harrisson, 2005, 2006). Reading, 
however, is dependent on words that become still clearer in combination with 
numbers and pictures. Books and letters connected geographic distances, and one’s 
experiences became another’s possession in form of knowledge. Between the acting 
subject (the one experiencing) and the reader (the receiver of the story), the written 
word became a (supposedly) objective stage. Knowledge received by a touch of one’s 
own bare hand or one’s own eyesight was transformed into the impressions of the 
naturalistically written stories, collected materials, and illustrations. The words, the 
examples, and the pictures drew human imagination nearer to exotic places but, in the 
process, increasingly detached humans from real experiences of nature. So did 
mathematical formulas, instruments, and other equipment: while these made many 
natural matters easier to understand, they intervened between authentic nature and 
humans. Although the aim was to create realistic knowledge, nobody could prevent 
the fantasy from drawing its own conclusions. Therefore, in his recommendations for 
the education of children, Rousseau rejected knowledge that took the form of 
representation: 
 
In general, never substitute the sign for the thing except when it is impossible for 
you to show the latter, for the sign absorbs the child’s attention and make him 
forget the thing represented. (E, p. 170)  
 
While the entire natural world was looked upon as an organized unit, despite a 
chaotic first impression, all the parts that made up this general order had to be 
classified to reveal the whole system. One of these parts were the plants and while 
botanic gardens became both a popular study issue and a hobby, more and more 
plants were classified and identifying ever more plants was a way of comprehending 
the natural world better. To know nature was analogous to being able to classify and 
identify species by names (see also Krook, 1979; Drouin, 1989). Also, in Rousseau’s 
opinion, “to allow the study of Botany and reject that of nomenclature is to fall into 
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the most absurd contradiction”160 (BW, p. 99). Why then this eager occupation with 
naming? One primary answer is that a general premise of the Enlightenment was "to 
name is to know." Thus, analysis in all fields broke entities into their parts and named 
the parts. According to Foucault (1970) the answer is that history attained another 
meaning than before; instead of relying on resemblance and searching for unifying 
features (see above), it came to depend on examinations and giving the explored 
items neutral and realistic names. The organizing was now based on visible 
characteristics, instead of functions and invisible features. Sole reliance on 
documents gave way to also creating places where items from nature were juxtaposed 
in collections; for instance, herbariums, museums and gardens. Foucault (1970) 
describes the shift from Renaissance to Enlightenment as the shift from the “theatre” 
to the “catalogue,” a new way of making history where things are connected both to 
the eye and to the words of discourse. Side by side, the stones, plants or animals 
should present themselves under their own names. Instead of telling stories about 
organisms based on what was known and told about them, both truths and myths, the 
new story dealt with strictly objective descriptions. I will let Foucault express it in his 
own words: 
 
Natural history finds its locus in the gap that is now opened up between things 
and words – a silent gap, pure of all verbal sedimentation, and yet articulated 
according to the elements of representation, those same elements that can now 
without let or hindrance be named. (Foucault, 1970, p. 129-130) 
 
According to Foucault (1970), natural history in the 18
th
 century is interlinked with a 
theory of words and is based on language. To know nature, is to know the right words 
that denote the difference between biological species, families, and kingdoms. Here 
again the differences between the natural human being and the civilized, the savage 
and the European man, were highlighted. The common belief was that humans in the 
state of nature had no language (2
nd
 D, EOL). So, the civilized human being could 
organize the whole of nature, the whole world, by communicating with written 
words. In addition to words about the world, maps and other illustrations and the 
things in it came to represent the real world and became objects for scrutiny. The real 
world, including humans, was replaced by an order of representations where words, 
pictures, miniatures, shows, and so on, came to represent reality (see Foucault, 1970). 
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 Nomenclature stands for the naming of organisms in scientific classification.  
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Instead of a connection between human beings and the rest of the natural world and 
the whole universe on the basis of likenesses as expressed in symbolic similarities, 
the connecting points or the joints were shaped through representations. Humans who 
entered the observing stage became both observers of the ‘human’ and objects for 
‘human’ observation. History provided clues for self-understanding and tools for self-
development. Among all the 'things' of the world, humans were regarded as the most 
extraordinary. In his 2
nd
 Discourse, Rousseau saw humans studying humans as very 
problematic. This merging of the studying subject and studied object still makes it so 
difficult for humans to learn to understand their own species. How can one look 
objectively at oneself or one of one’s own kind? 
Script had long been regarded as holy and, as we saw earlier concerning Bacon 
and Comenius, many believed that all the knowledge of the world could be gathered 
in one book. Linnaeus’ interest in the classification of all living things in his great 
catalog Systema Naturae was not only methodical, it was also a mark or proof of 
God’s existence and exceptionality (Munck, 2000), and Linnaeus was actually called 
“the second Adam” (Broberg, 1978).161 However, this project for classifying and 
cataloging of all living things did not produce agreement about how to proceed. Yet, 
Linnaeus’ system was so much simpler and more convenient than all previous that it 
gradually surpassed the others in acceptance and use.
162
 Linnaeus started to see his 
task as one of exposing God’s plan for creation, and he sent a great number of his 
students, especially his disciples
163
 (numbering around twenty), on long hazardous 
trips to classify nature around the world (Sörlin, 2004; Sörlin & Fagerstedt, 2004).  
Linnaeus’ undertakings were not merely divine; they also were driven by 
utilitarian interests. According to Linnaeus, God used him to explore creation, 
conduct studies of nature, and make Sweden a wealthy nation, and Europe a rich 
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 “And out of the ground the LORD God formed every beast of the field, and every fowl of the air; and 
brought them unto Adam to see what he would call them: and whatsoever Adam called every living creature, 
that was the name thereof.  And Adam gave names to all cattle, and to the fowl of the air, and to every beast 
of the field….” (The Readers Bible, 1951, The Book of Genesis, Chapter Two, p. 9). 
162
 Linnaeus’ system had many competitors who built their systems on cornerstones different than his focus 
on reproductive organs (see Drouin, 1989; Foucault, 1970; BW). One of Linnaeu’s forerunners was the 
earlier mentioned John Ray, who also had developed a classification system for organisms (e.g., Huxley, 
2003). 
163 One of these disciples was the Finnish botanist Pehr Kalm who brought home hundreds of seeds, roots, 
and bulbs from North America and Canada (Frängsmyr, 2004). While most of the collected material died in 
the cold Finnish climate, a large herbarium and many notes remained. Nevertheless, his compilation and 
experience helped him to create a botanical garden and put together a Finnish flora. Like Linnaeus himself 
and many others of his disciples, Kalm had a pragmatic and commercial aim. (Finland was not an 
independent nation at this time, but incorporated with Sweden until 1809.) 
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region. Many seeds and plants were shipped to Europe from various widespread 
explorations for botanical gardens, private collectors, park owners, and medical 
stores. Linnaeus’ international influence was great and his position was like an 
emperor of the botanic empire. But he also attempted to classify and order human 
beings and distinguish them from the other animals (Sörlin, 2004; Sörlin & 
Fagerstedt, 2004; see also Drouin, 1989). According to Foucault (1970), the ordering 
of things during the Renaissance involved a searching for relations of resemblance 
that became noticeable through many types of symbolic likeness. For example, in 
comparison with the belief that a plant’s shape revealed its character or medical use 
(e.g., if the leaf reminded one of a lung, the plant was good for curing lung disease), 
whereas modern classification arranged the plants, animals and things in an order 
based on dissimilarities between their visible features. The description of a specific 
plant should be so precise and general that anyone carefully examining it should 
come up with the same label (ibid.).  
However, Foucault did not think that it was because of a widespread interest in 
botany that plant classification was so popular; more likely was that it was so much 
easier to find names for plants than animals by reference only to visible features 
(Foucault, 1970). It is in general easier to classify plants and they are easily available, 
even if the gardens also contained some animals: 
 
Plants are naturally within our reach. They are born under our feet and in our 
hands, so to speak … Botany is a study for an idle and lazy solitary person: a 
point and a magnifying glass are all the apparatus he needs to observe plants. 
(RSW, p. 64) 
 
It was of course much more complicated to kill and dissect animals than to gather 
plants. Even the cultivation, transport, and storing of plants was much easier, and 
Rousseau colorfully lists the complications related to the study of animals:  
 
To study them [animals] according to their habits and characteristics, it would be 
necessary to have aviaries, fishponds, cages; it would be necessary to force them, 
as best I could, to remain gathered together around me. I have neither the desire 
nor the means to hold them in captivity, nor the necessary agility to chase after 
them when they are at liberty. It will be necessary, then, to study them dead, to 
tear them apart, to bone them, to poke at leisure into their palpitating entrails! 
What a frightful apparatus is an anatomical amphitheater: stinking corpses, 
slavering and livid flesh, blood, disgusting intestines, dreadful skeletons, 
pestilential fumes! (RSW, p. 63) 
192 
 
He ended this recital with: “Upon my word, that is not where Jean-Jacques will go 
looking for his fun” (ibid.). So instead of animal studies, Rousseau’s botanical hobby 
occupied much of his time, and he read Linnaeus and other botanists, collected local 
plants, participated in correspondences about, and in the concrete exchange of, exotic 
plants. In a short letter to Linnaeus (written 1771) Rousseau calls himself a “zealous, 
disciple of your disciples” and, among other things, he writes: “Farwell, Sir; continue 
to open and interpret for men the book of nature. For me, content to decipher in your 
wake some words in the pages
164
 of the vegetal realm, I read you, I study you, I 
meditate on you, I honor you, and I love you with all my heart” (BW, p. 244). He 
even states that he finds more pleasure in Linnaeus “philosophia botanica” than from 
any book about morality (ibid.). But, although Rousseau admired Linnaeus, cherished 
his greatness, and used his classification system, he also blamed Linnaeus for having 
studied nature too much in herbaria and gardens instead of in wilderness settings 
(BW). Linnaeus was a naturalist, and Rousseau would most certainly have agreed 
with Foucault’s description of a naturalist: “The naturalist is the man concerned with 
the structure of the visible world and its denomination according to characters. Not 
with life” (Foucault, 1970, p. 161). However, this is not really fair, because Linnaeus 
also had a profound interest in genuine nature (see also Attfield, 1994).  
 
4.4 New Learning 
 
Bacon’s proposal for new institutions of learning was not an isolated initiative; in the 
early 17
th
 century a network of alternative institutions for higher learning spread all 
over Europe, but were most common in Italy. These research centers were separate 
from the universities and maintained by amateurs. They were a part of the struggle 
for the autonomy of science from the Church, and a reflected the view of time that 
Latin and Greek were the only languages adaptable for scientific communication 
(Bowen, 1981). Despite differences at many levels in Europe, a positive belief in 
education for all flourished. Education became an instrument for transmuting utopian 
dreams into reality. At the end of the 18
th
 century, global competition forced 
European governments to start diverse educational reform programs aiming at 
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 While Rousseau uses the French word feuillet that means both leaf and page, this sentence can have a 
double interpretation (Butterworth, Cook & Marshall’s Note 323 in RSW) and may entail both Linnaeus’s 
books and ‘the book of nature’. 
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producing a healthy, educated population (Parry, 2000). However, the struggle for 
educational reform had actually started much earlier and went hand in hand with the 
fervent reproduction of knowledge and distribution of publications for an 
increasingly literate public.  
Many Enlightenment thinkers believed it was possible to improve human life 
through an education built on in-depth knowledge about human nature. Despite 
considerable concern with education and even many radical intentions and ideas 
concerning education, practical teaching did not change very dramatically. 
Nevertheless, these thinkers got the ball rolling. Education took on a strong position 
in preparing people to live in a way that followed the principles of nature. The natural 
world was represented as pictures, tales, heteropias, and utopias, often as a ‘machine’ 
in a steady process of operation. Learning to control such a gigantic machine was a 
huge challenge. This machine could improve a free and happy human life and show 
the means to a better future.  
 
Vast Knowledge Compilation 
 
The possibilities for making one’s own opinion public were remarkably improved 
when the number of published newspapers and books increased. Print sources of 
knowledge included both popular and scientific issues and reached a growing number 
of readers. However, reading and writing were not widespread; at the beginning of 
the 18th century, a majority of the European population had no education and was 
more or less unaffected by the Enlightenment’s spreading of knowledge about the 
world (e.g., Bowen, 1981; Heywood, 2007). For some, the world was still flat 
(Liedman, 1997) but for those who were able to read and write this planetary view 
was corrected. Yet, many efforts were made to get the masses educated. The tolerant 
intellectual climate of the Enlightenment opened the door, as well, to diverse 
visionaries, pseudo-scientists, quacks (Gay, 1966), and critics of many kinds. 
Sometimes the critical tone was extremely satirical; Voltaire was a master of that 
genre, but not the only one. A growing literature genre included autobiographies and 
novels. In addition to novels and other fiction, discussion of politics, ethics and 
education (etc.) became more widespread and were written in local languages instead 
of Latin. Rousseau, like many others, grabbed the chance to reach a broad audience 
and published his thoughts in various types of books, among them fiction. The novel 
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Julie, or the New Heloise soon became a bestseller; in fact one of the most successful 
international books of its time (Stewart, 1997). Rousseau included most of his central 
philosophic premises in this story that would reach an extended group of readers. His 
attempt with the book was to lay out a model for a domestic moral theory (JNH). 
Among print sources, modern encyclopedias aimed at targeting a broad 
audience.
165
 The immense French Encyclopédie reflected the belief in knowledge 
systematically arranged and unified in one source. The outline was partly grounded 
on Bacon’s division of knowledge and it was published between 1751 and 1780 in 
more than 30 volumes, including 11 volumes of illustration plates. A great number of 
its authors are well-known: the editors Diderot and Jean le Rond d'Alembert, and 
among the authors were, for example, Voltaire, Baron de Montesquieu, and Rousseau 
(see Wilson, 1967/2006). Rousseau was engaged in the project from its beginning 
and wrote articles on music and economics, but later he broke with the encyclopedic 
group. The Encyclopedia was not only a great undertaking for accumulating and 
ordering knowledge; it was also a great attempt at changing the usual ways of 
thinking (ibid.). It was concerned with ethics, political theory, and aesthetics, and it 
opposed religious intolerance and dogmatism (ibid.). But Diderot soon realized that 
knowledge is ceaselessly changing and growing, and that the project could never end 
(Morly, 1891). A tension thus existed between assembling material in an organic 
synthesis and maintaining both an open mind and autonomous thinking.  
Typical urban meeting places for the exchange of ideas were theaters, concert 
halls, and so-called ‘salons’ (Swenson, 2000). The practice involving salons had 
traditions in 17
th
 century court society, especially in France. Aristocratic women 
gathered groups of intellectual people in their homes to discuss literature and 
philosophy. These gatherings were hotbeds for young writers, even those from 
‘lower’ classes; they were places where writers could get comments on their literary 
products before publishing and publically exchanging ideas with other thinkers. The 
salons were thus places where women were in the role of ‘intellectual mothers’ and 
could have an effect on intellectual debate (ibid.). Rousseau was very critical of salon 
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Bacon undertook a large project for a scientific encyclopedia, Instauratio Magna, which was to contain 
130 sections divided into three themes: external nature, man, and man’s actions on nature.  However, only a 
part of this project was completed, but he succeeded in devising a new classification of knowledge. Another 
compiler of an encyclopedia, published in 1630, was Comenius’ teacher Johann Heinrich Alsted.Criticism 
became a verbal weapon in Pierre Bayle’s Dictionnaire Historique et Critique (Historical and critical 
dictionary, published 1697) and an inspiration to the immense French endeavor, the Encyclopédie
165
 
(Encyclopedia), that at first was only intended to be a translation of Ephraim Chamber’s lucrative 
Cyclopedia (May, 2002; Wilson, 1967/2006).   
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practices, but these institutions undeniably gave him the opportunity to become 
widely noticed and in contact with influential people. In contrast to the aristocratic 
salon tradition, other popular meeting places for reading newspapers and books and 
for exchange of ideas were the coffee and tea-houses in European cities that served 
colonial products like coffee, tea, and sugar (ibid.). Other public places where people 
(mostly men) encountered the written word became places for interaction between 
theories and real life. Readers and listeners stood at the intersection between daily 
practice and ideas and had to, on the one hand, interpret texts according to their 
previous experiences and, on the other hand, put the words into action (see Swenson, 
2000). 
 
Education in Accordance with Nature 
 
In the late 16
th
 century, Western education had started to change and deliberations 
aiming at a better world criticized existing educational systems and methods (Bowen, 
1981). Attempts at reforming education were not, however, ever uniformly agreed to; 
instead, they involved a struggle between uncompromising forces, especially the 
churches
166
 and the state, and education easily became a target for religious-political 
conflicts (ibid.). The French Renaissance humanist François Rabelais had already set 
out on a more than thirty-year long attack against Catholic education and created a 
critical atmosphere in France in the middle of the 16
th
 century (ibid.). He suggested 
that education should be more concerned with real life and encouraged a rigorous 
study of the physical world, as well as studies of humans.  
In the 16
th
 century, Montaigne’s Essays included practical and philosophical 
arguments for various areas of life. These made an impression on Rousseau, 
especially on his educational thoughts, and Rousseau mentions Montaigne many 
times in his writings (e.g. RSW). Like Montaigne, he declares that among the few 
relevant books he has read are those of Plutarch, and both Rousseau and Montaigne 
also lean a lot on Plato’s educational thoughts in the Republic and the stories about 
Spartan education Plato presents in the Laws. For Montaigne, studying theories made 
up by others and reading many books does not make a person wise (Montaigne, 
                                           
166
 In England and the German territories the church was Protestant and in southern Europe Catholic, but in 
France both existed (Bowen, 1981).  
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1592/1986a, 1592/1986c). Instead, his proposal was that everybody should trust his
167
 
own philosophy and learn to know himself. But he also argued that the teacher has to 
present diverse views from among which the pupil is to decide. Truth and knowledge 
are common goods and become everybody’s own possession through individual 
judgment, said Montaigne: the best way to test one’s reason is by using it. Education 
should strive to develop this judgment, the freedom to think independently, because 
an education that destroys our ignorance is not enough; it has to make us better 
(ibid.). 
Montaigne (1592/1986a) described his educational method as easy and natural, 
because it includes no violence, punishment, or force and is instead built on reason, 
wisdom, and sensitivity. And he pointed out that not just the soul needs education; 
virtue also requires a healthy and robust body. Education thus involves training both 
body and soul at the same time and with social purposes in mind (ibid.). Montaigne’s 
educational proposals were not a sign of what was practiced commonly; quite the 
opposite. His proposals were a satirical critique of the customary humanist schools, 
teachers, teaching methods, and curriculums. In addition to Montaigne, other critical 
voices also made attempts to transform French education in the early 16
th
 century, 
among them Guillaume Budé,
168
 who influenced the establishment of the humanist 
higher educational institution Collège the France (also known as Collège Royal). But 
the effect of reform work was belated due to the opposition of the strong Aristotelian 
scholasticism that had been inherited from medieval Christendom (Bowen, 1981). 
Another rebel against this scholasticism was the humanist Pierre de la Ramée.
169
 He 
rejected the logic of Aristotle and emphasized deductive reasoning built on 
mathematics as the principal method for reaching the truth. The resulting ‘ramism’ 
was a conflict between religious and political motivations. Ramée was not allowed to 
teach philosophy at the University of Paris, his new ideas met censure, his books 
were burnt, and he was finally murdered in 1572 (ibid.). French education was far 
from stable at this time. 
Education during this period had a threefold purpose, according to Foucault 
(1970): to promote, firstly, rationality in the quest for equal freedom; secondly, 
supernaturalism; and finally, loyalty towards Ancient conceptions. In reality, learning 
                                           
167I use the male pronoun, because in Montaigne’s essay about education, originally a letter, he refers 
throughout to a boy.  
168
 Guillaume Budé is also known by his Latin name Here Budaeus. 
169
 Pierre de la Ramée is also known by the Latin name Petrus Ramus. 
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was about understanding signs and to know was to interpret the things in the world 
with the help of the marks God laid down in nature, in the Scriptures, or as they were 
presented by the Ancient sages. Knowledge was in effect a fusion of the world and 
words. The truth about the world was hidden in the language, and the most powerful 
language was on paper. “Writing … is the active intellect, the ‘male principle’ of 
language” (Foucault, 1970, p. 39). Through written language, limitless number of 
ever-new interpretations of truth and reality steadily came to light. Accordingly, 
Western education consolidated literature as its center of attention.  
Comenius had great faith in the written word. The education he portrayed in 
Didactica Magna
170
 (1628-1632) has a large aim: to be a complete book of how to 
teach everybody everything―women as well as men. Humans are not good, but they 
can be educated to become good and godlike. Nature is the same as God’s 
providence, a good force operating in all human beings with the purpose of bringing 
harmony and love to God. Comenius wanted to organize education into a whole 
where every part interacts like the parts of a tree. The tree metaphor shares 
resemblance with the Biblical ‘tree of knowledge’. For Comenius, humans are born 
with the capacity of understanding the quality of things through the help of their 
senses. Their reason is unlimited, and they can collect knowledge from far away in 
both time and space. A human being is a microcosmos in a big world, the 
macrocosmos. She has all the inherent equipment for illumination. Referring to 
Aristotle, Comenius calls the human mind an empty writing desk (tabula rasa) ready 
to be written on. But, unlike an actual writing desk, there are no limitations for how 
much it is possible to write ‘on’ a human mind. He stressed the resemblance between 
the miniature human soul and the giant world and saw them both as harmonious 
clockworks driven by many wheels. In Comenius’ view, the primary wheel of the 
soul is the will, and desires and affections drive the soul in a variety of directions. 
However, human reason is the key that can end or start motion in one direction or 
another. Education makes human beings humane, teaches them to work, and to use 
the natural world they have received. According to Comenius, schools are workshops 
for the education of humans. Comenius’ education is gender-equal and social; thus it 
is no private matter and should take place collectively in official schools.  
                                           
170
 The title Didacta Magna reminds one of Bacon’s great works Instauratio Magna (Great Renewal). Bacon 
wanted to revolutionize learning with a five-part work, but only two were realized: Advancement of Learning 
and Novum Organum.  
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During the 17
th
 century, there was a conflict in Europe between democratic and 
aristocratic educational policies, and Comenius’ followers represented the democratic 
line (Eby, 1952). Another controversial issue was the education of girls: formerly, 
girls and women had mostly been left out of—even intentionally excluded—from 
general educational practice. An interest in inner mental processes arose in the early 
17
th
 century and led educational reformists like the German Wolfgang Ratke
171
 to 
search for natural educational methods instead of the rudimentary instruction 
practiced in schools of those days. He studied in England and became acquainted 
with ideas from Bacon’s Advancement of Learning. Both Comenius’ and Rousseau’s 
educational systems share similarities with Ratke’s (ibid.). Comenius (1628-
1632/1989) stressed that instruction has to fit human nature and the right phase in the 
pupil’s development. Rousseau (E, p. 34) claims that the education he portrays in 
Émile follows “the march of nature” and should “be suitable for man and well 
adapted to the human heart.” To make instruction more explicable, Ratke, the Port 
Royalists, and Comenius started to use pictures and maps to clarify texts in books for 
children. Comenius envisioned phrases from the Latin language parallel with 
passages in the child’s own language in his Visible World in Pictures172 (Orbis 
Pictus), one of the first illustrated textbooks for children. Nevertheless, Rousseau did 
not illustrate his books or write books directly for children.
173
  
Undoubtedly, Rousseau’s educational thoughts differ considerably from those of 
Comenius, but they also share similarities. When Rousseau states that “plants are 
fashioned by cultivation, man by education,” it sounds precisely like a cut from 
Didactica Magna. Both theorists emphasize harmony as a human goal and reject 
instruction by unpleasant methods.
174
 Bodily health and robustness are other common 
intentions, because for Comenius (1628-1632/1989) the body is the lodging place for 
the divine soul while Rousseau argues that a weak body makes the soul weak. The 
body must be strong to obey the soul like a good servant. The weaker the body the 
more it will rule and house bodily passions (E). However, Comenius’ strict 
organization of education into many separate subjects differs completely from 
Émile’s liberated education. But Rousseau's education theory in Émile applies to a 
fictive character and not as applicable to real-world schooling. Rousseau mentions as 
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 Ratke is also called Ratisch. 
172
 Orbis Pictus was originally written in 1658. 
173
 Rousseau’s Botanical Writings were illustrated by P. J. Redouté in 1805.  
174
 Rousseau objected to learning facts by force, but he emphasized forcefully promoting freedom (more 
about this in Chapter Six). 
199 
 
his model Locke who, like Rousseau, was influenced by Montaigne’s educational 
theories. Locke emphasized that all knowledge is empirical. Like Comenius, Locke 
implies that the human mind is a tabula rasa, an empty place waiting to be filled with 
knowledge.  
 
The senses at first let in particular ideas, and furnish the yet empty cabinet, and 
the mind by degrees growing familiar with some of them, they are lodged in the 
memory, and names got to them. Afterwards, the mind proceeding further, 
abstracts them, and by degrees learns the use of general names. In this manner the 
mind comes to be furnished with ideas and language, the materials about which to 
exercise its discursive faculty. (Locke, 1693/2001, p. 30) 
 
Contrary to Plato and Descartes, Comenius and Locke thus argue that human beings 
do not have any inborn knowledge: humans are not born with any ideas, only an 
ability to produce ideas that represent experiences of reality. Rousseau’s words in 
Émile correspond with Comenius’ and Locke’s view: 
 
We are born capable of learning but able to do nothing, knowing nothing. The 
soul, enchained in imperfect and half-formed organs, does not even have the 
sentiment of its own existence. The movement and the cries of the child who has 
just been born are purely mechanical effects, devoid of knowledge and of will. (E, 
p. 61) 
 
Comenius steadily refers to Seneca and the other Stoics in his Didactica Magna, and 
Rousseau has adapted much from Stoic philosophy in his instructional advice. The 
same is true for Locke who saw unhappiness as largely the individual’s own fault and 
advocated an education that aims at “A Sound Mind in a Sound Body” (1693/2003,  
p. 83) for a happy state in the world. When it comes to desires, Locke wanted to train 
children to deny their desires and long only for what is good for them. Rousseau 
agreed with that and stressed that the best way to make children unhappy is to let 
them obtain everything they want, because when they get all they want, they will 
always desire even more (E).  
In order to educate the pupil’s mind a good tutor is extremely important. While 
good-breeding and prudence are most important for the child, the tutor also has to be 
well-bred and familiar with the world and the country, according to Rousseau. Locke 
wrote down many practical instructional advices in detail in his Some Thoughts 
Concerning Education (1693), and Rousseau included many of them in Émile’s 
world. In opposition to Rousseau´s pupil, who is raised alone with only his tutor’s 
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company, Locke’s pupil is raised in a social environment (the family) with the 
purpose of becoming a gentleman who has learned justice and acceptable behavior. 
Locke (1693/1989) also pointed out that children should learn to treat all living 
creatures well. Good behavior is more important than foreign languages and 
grammar. In Locke’s opinion, education should first train children to love and to 
esteem knowledge and, if they want, they can then be taught how to search for 
knowledge. The instruction of children should be free from pressure. Learning should 
involve playing games: reading and writing have to be fun, Rousseau claimed. 
Rousseau took Locke’s quest for empirical education seriously. Émile not only 
studies nature and learns scientific methods; he has to invent the science himself. 
There are also obvious dissimilarities between the educational thoughts of Locke and 
Rousseau. Locke’s primary education aimed at making the child social, whereas 
Rousseau first focused on freedom and, on that basis, then on the sociality of the 
‘social contract’. I will return to Rousseau’s thoughts about education in Chapter Six 
that concentrates solely on this issue.  
 
Curiosity for the Body 
 
Rise of interest in the care of the body in the 18
th
 century can be seen both as a 
concern for the individual and as a social and economic matter. Healthcare, especially 
in the form of preventive hygiene, can be a sophisticated tool for utilizing the 
individuals’ bodily power maximally for social purposes such as labor; then care of 
the body becomes a political instrument targeting a whole population. Foucault 
(1994, 2000e, 2000f) argues that eagerness for health instruction in the 18
th
 century 
was caused by the awareness that a sick population is unproductive. Society therefore 
needed a means of ensuring that an individuals’ utility constantly increases. In order 
to face this problem the family came into focus as the site for the education of and 
role-modeling for the children. The more healthy children who reached adulthood, 
the better were the country’s profits. But while good health was beneficial for both 
country and an individual, the family became the target for health education through 
a link between the state and individuals (Foucault, 2000f). The strategic 
power/knowledge phenomenon Foucault calls biopolitics was born; a form of 
practice where the human body becomes a productive force and medicine a 
biopolitical strategy. It was in society’s best interest to promote corporally healthy, 
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secure, and productive individuals (Foucault, 1997g, 2000e). The doctor became a 
person with power to control the population by prescriptions concerning food, drink, 
clothes, sexuality, and so on. To secure normality, birth, death rates, and health care 
were included in the political economy as a kind of capital (Simons, 2006). 
In addition to Rousseau’s task of educating an autonomous individual; his books 
Émile and Julie could also be seen as an adapter of the physician model to a larger 
population. For Rousseau, illnesses were unnatural. In the 2
nd
 Discourse Rousseau 
blames civilization for causing illnesses. Life is filled with inequalities where some 
work too hard and others too little, some eating too refined food and others food that 
is too deficient. A life, filled with constant vigilance, sorrow, and fatigue, causes 
diseases that are uncommon in nature, according to Rousseau. The savages were 
healthy until civilized people came and destroyed them with intoxicants (2
nd 
D). 
When he recommends breast-feeding babies, simple vegetarian food, and physical 
activity for older children, he blends Stoic and his contemporary doctors’ advice with 
religious aims in order to bring about healthy and resistant children and adults (see 
E). Rousseau was, however, very restrictive concerning medical care and medicine in 
the 2
nd
 Discourse and Émile; to such a high degree that he regrets it in Reveries. 
Rousseau shared many ideas about children’s’ health education with Locke, but also 
with his contemporary Théodore Tronchin whose education combined theology, 
medicine, and philosophy and whose opinion was that sickness has to be prevented 
with a lifestyle that is in harmony with nature (Sprengel, 1917). Professor of 
medicine Linnaeus also proclaimed a natural lifestyle and preventive healthcare 
under the name of diaeta naturalis (Frängsmyr, 2004), and even Voltaire (1755/1985) 
promoted healthy nutrition. When Rousseau claims that “in foods I would always 
want those which are best prepared by nature and pass through the fewest hands 
before reaching our tables” (E, p. 345) one would easily think the argument comes 
from a current discussion about sustainable lifestyles. 
 
4.4 Conclusion 
 
The question this chapter has tried to answer is What discourses about nature, 
knowledge and education inspired Rousseau? My intention with this chapter has not 
been to paint any complete or even general picture of the time prior to and 
contemporaneous with Rousseau’s life, but to provide a sample of discourse topics 
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related to nature, knowledge, and education. This display tries to trace how human 
beings relation to nature gradually was reshaped during the 16
th
, 17
th
 and 18
th
 
centuries. By providing this context I have intended to show that the natural world 
gradually lost its magical and incomprehensible character and achieved a more 
objective and distant character in the 18
th
 century, following a process initiated much 
earlier. Foucault’s regularity principles, exteriority, reversal, discontinuity, and 
specificity showed the route through a myriad of discourses and discourse clusters 
with themes that included and had inspired Rousseau. The altered position (reversal), 
founded on three views—nature, knowledge, and Rousseau—was a fruitful 
combination that highlighted many interesting links between ideas. Through these 
various sources (i.e., the principle of discontinuity), the widespread use of the 
concept of “nature” became especially obvious. Surely, I could have mixed and 
twisted the material (i.e., specificity) still more, but the study this far has already 
revealed many remarkable things.  
The study confirms that it is impossible to separate the history of philosophy and 
education from the history of economy and politics. Philosophy, education, economy, 
and politics are in such complex relation that their separation is infeasible, and all the 
leading views of nature likewise interact with these areas. Worldly issues thus 
intertwine and connect in patterns that are impossible to separate. Many matters 
connected to the intellectual and practical history of the earth and its inhabitants 
affect the history of education in ways that are similar to the history of philosophy. It 
is these interconnections I have tried to show by means of selected voices. Particular 
philosophers or critics do not necessarily reflect unique thoughts, but some of them 
are talented spokespersons, elaborators, and intermediaries for a great deal of new 
and old thoughts, although historical research never can capture all of them. If 
philosophical discussion, on the other hand, concentrates only on individual persons’ 
ideas and specific elements of their thoughts, the debate easily loses its sense and 
becomes mere hair-splitting. Consequently, by linking different peoples’ thoughts to 
a particular context, it assures a greater understanding of why these persons wrote 
and acted as they did. One problem is, of course, that the task of shaping a framework 
will never end, so the researcher has to put a period somewhere. Rousseau was a 
critical person, but also a creation of his time. He did definitely not shape his 
thoughts in a vacuum. Despite his controversial style, Rousseau was a son of the 
Enlightenment with strong roots in the Renaissance, but his influences came from 
many sources and ages, not in the least the Ancient Greek and Greco-Roman Antique 
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with Plato, Plutarch, and the Stoic philosophers. Rousseau was also not unaffected by 
what took place among his contemporaries; he was very good in seizing upon urgent 
discourse issues and using them in many different and often controversial ways, both 
supporting and opposing issues and ideas with zealous arguments. My intention has 
not been to study the thoughts of those persons that have influenced or argued most 
eagerly with Rousseau, or those who have been most close to him, but more to show 
the diversity of views on the issues under consideration.  
In Enlightenment discourses, the concept of “nature” was central and had a broad 
meaning; it denoted the human character, the natural (physical) world, and the whole 
globe and much of the whole universe as God’s entire creation, since this time saw no 
total cessation of religion. Actually, “nature,” on the one hand, was a word expressing 
an entire matrix, a pattern of something genuine and good, something desirable. On 
the other hand, it was something to conquer with help of reason. “Nature” was thus 
both a noun and an adjective, with both positive and negative values, and had a 
direction that looked both forward (visionary) and backward (historically). When 
“nature” was a name for the material world, it was concrete; if it denoted something 
divine or regarded as a great truth, it was abstract. The word “nature” was definitely 
not used with any consistency. “Nature” could be something good or bad, something 
right or wrong, the whole world or its parts. It became important to get to know, to 
study carefully, and to give order to material nature; a kind of safe way of 
guaranteeing a secure life on earth and taking control of all natural elements. Nature 
studies could entail observations and gathering outdoors, experiments in laboratories, 
mathematic, and philosophical studies. Nature became a model for how to be a 
virtuous and good person and how to organize just and equal societies. God spoke his 
word through ‘the language of nature’. Nature could, therefore, even be a proof of 
God’s existence or at least on the human godlikeness. Nature as a resource in the 
hands of scientists with the perfect methods could open the door to a better world 
where humankind perfects itself (see Passmore, 1970).  
Lähde (2008, p. 215) emphasizes that conceptual indifference can “open up new 
contrast spaces” and that “it was precisely the malleability and confusion in the 
meanings of ‘nature’ which made the word and its derivates (natural right, natural 
law, state of nature, etc.) so useful in the philosophy of Rousseau’s time.” Although 
“nature” was a popular concept, it did not necessarily tie humans to their materiality 
as one among the many animals and as a part of the entire natural world. The much-
favored Renaissance images of the human mind as superior to the body and of human 
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beings as superior to other animals instead grew stronger during the Enlightenment, 
despite numerous objections. The human mind was more than ever the focus of 
attention. Simultaneously, it is obvious that “nature” acquired a strong rhetorical 
power that embraced many fields of interest; for example, science, politics, 
philosophy, and education. The diffuse concept of “nature” continued to be a key in 
modern, up-to-the-minute discourses. But by the Enlightenment, the multiple 
meanings of the words “nature” and “natural” had gradually started to change so that 
the whole natural world could be easier handled and organized. “Nature” was to 
become an object in the hands of ‘civilized’ people, and “the natural” was something 
primitive or exotic.   
Neither religious spokesmen nor philosophers nor novel writers could prevent the 
increasing exploitation of nature, or the cruel treatment of slaves and colonial native 
populations. A general and inescapable obstacle of the Enlightenment is the conflict 
between ethical theories and practice. What is (reality) was separated from what 
ought to be (values) (see von Wright, 1993). Perhaps geographical distances and 
traditional prejudices made the quest for equality difficult to realize politically and 
practically. The colonization, explorations, and exploitations of foreign territories 
were defended with scriptural arguments and connected both to the scientific 
development and to Enlightenment discourses; and it is difficult to consistently 
distinguish what came first, scientific curiosity or the journey, the stories about the 
savages or the thoughts about what a human being is. Colonization and the 
Enlightenment were actually parts of the same project, as Outram (1995) concludes.  
Many of the Enlightenment writers demeaned the non-European’s ways of being 
in the world as immature; the European outlook based on scientific and thus 
objectively verifiable experiences appeared to be the highest form of knowledge. 
Differences from the European standard, however, were regarded as somehow 
incredible and inspired utopian narratives about savages and living in paradise. 
Besides such utopias being substitutes for the real world, an increasing number of 
heterotopias also entered the stage. In this genre, utopian gardens, museums and even 
colonies can be counted.  
There was a noticeable connection between the interest in ‘savages’ and their 
uncivilized lifestyles and the rising interest in childhood education as a necessity for a 
prosperous society. Education was seen as a possible corrective that could bring both 
‘savages’ and children out of their immature state and make them civilized. It was a 
serious attempt to form people to suit themselves to the ‘normal Western standard of 
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civilized man’. Because of widespread illiteracy and limited possibilities for 
delivering knowledge widely, an obvious problem was that the Enlightenment 
discourses actually reached only a minority, so the majority still kept their traditional 
views of the world. Increased education was, however, an answer to this dilemma, 
and the desire to manage the world generated many new power networks where the 
interests in nature, knowledge, and of human beings crisscrossed each other in 
several ways. The hierarchical ordering of the world, the search for legal systems, the 
classification of knowledge, and the classification of nature were forms of the same 
episteme―a shaping of comprehensive order where every little piece would have its 
position in the whole. Even the increased administrative bureaucracy, the strict 
etiquette rules that governed social life, and the clock dividing the days are all signs 
of the same search for world order at an unstable moment; ways of handling 
immediate chaos and fears of an unpredictable future. Among scholars and writers, 
the trust in salvation and miracles was gradually diminishing; neither the future nor 
the past remained stable anymore, although religious speculations and disputes did 
not by any means disappear all of a sudden. This generated much uncertainty and a 
search for future visions where reason, the origin of the lost faith, turned into its own, 
new creed.  
While science started to question the canons of the churches, the thrust in 
technology and science, and the firm organization of the natural world gradually 
emerged as a new dogma, with similarities to religion and its visions of paradise. In 
such a situation, it is surprisingly to find that the strong emphasis of European science 
development might be a brainchild of the Bible, not necessarily the Gospels, but of 
Genesis and the ‘hidden’ Apocrypha texts. An interesting finding in this study was 
the connection between Bacon, Comenius, and the Bible. This correlation harkens 
back to the discussion in Chapter Two and shows that sacred texts may be very 
inconsistent; how they are understood is up to the reader and the interpretation. 
Therefore, they are superb weapons in the mouths and hands of talented rhetoricians. 
While the natural world was looked upon as the second language of God along with 
the scriptural, the “divine order” emerged through “the words of nature” and it looks 
like the transition to a scientific worldview found its strength from religious 
arguments. 
To conclude, the view of nature and knowledge I have presented in this chapter is 
that, firstly, well before the 18
th
 century an increasing number of observations and 
experiments were applied in the study of nature, and during the Renaissance nature 
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and natural gradually attained intense rhetorical power that came to attention in 
scores of discourses. Rousseau participated in many of these discourses, well aware 
of the power connected to the word “nature” (see also Lähde, 2008). Secondly, 
knowledge about nature became a tool that was equivalent to useful political power. 
Thirdly, in the 18
th
 century many efforts went into discovering the divine world order 
and on finding classification labels for all natural beings. The natural world was split 
into parts―a totality built of a huge number of elements, and the task of natural 
history became to distinguish all these particular elements and to order them 
hierarchically. This ordering objectified an earlier mythic natural world and made it 
easier to manage and merchandize things other than nature. Finally this chapter has 
described processes by which European man became the center of the world and 
started to regard other ways of life and other kind of thinking as strange and to make 
efforts to actively reproduce one’s own world order. As one of these European men, 
but a particularly provocative one, Rousseau occupied various spaces and participated 
in many kinds of discourses. The mastering of one’s own mind, to make oneself a 
better and thus more natural person, was an obligation he always stressed, and the 
next chapter will tell more about this issue.  
After this glimpse of Rousseau’s world, where I have tried to put him into a 
context, the next chapter continues with an in-depth study focused on Rousseau’s 
nature ethics. The general discussion about the Enlightenment view of nature and 
Rousseau’s Enlightenment and counter-Enlightenment ideas will be recapitulated in 
Chapter Seven in comparison to contemporary tendencies.  
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5 Rousseau on Nature and Ethics 
 
The previous chapter intended to situate Rousseau in his epoch. It also gave a glance 
at the multiple discourses on the topics of nature and knowledge that transpired both 
before and during the years of his life. The present chapter concentrates mainly on 
Rousseau’s contributions to these discourses and addresses Rousseau’s relationship to 
nature. He called his thoughts a system (e.g., RJJ) and, as already mentioned, in that 
system “nature” and what is “natural” played a crucial role. With his system he 
hypothetically tried to construct a vision of a righteous world order consisting of 
virtuously acting people. In contrast to the way many of Rousseau’s contemporaries 
employed the concepts “nature” and “natural,” these words had a strong ethical 
connotations in his writing. Rousseau focused on both humans’ dependence on their 
fellow beings and how they have to focus on their own role in these relations if they 
want to change the world to a more decent one. His points are, therefore, still 
worthwhile reflecting on today. He clearly exposed modern shortcomings and the 
failure of Western civilization to promote a happier and more perfect life. The aim of 
this chapter is, therefore, to investigate Rousseau’s ethical theory regarding nature as 
articulated in a number of his main writings.  
In this chapter I hope to demonstrate without question that Rousseau’s thoughts 
continue to be relevant to our contemporary ethical discourses on sustainability. The 
way he criticized the society of his time, on the one hand, shares many features with 
some current arguments; but, on the other hand, he combined ethics, nature, 
education, and politics much more powerfully than is common today. With the help 
of Foucault, I will begin by briefly describing the background of the theme and 
outline my approach: briefly, because a more thorough background was the topic in 
Chapter Four and a description of the process plan and how this particular study fits 
into the book as a whole was given in Chapter Three. Secondly, this chapter presents 
the Rousseau texts this particular study leans on the most. Thirdly, and as a necessary 
background, I will explore how Rousseau used the words “nature” and “natural.” 
Without insight as how Rousseau used these concepts, it would be impossible to 
understand the arguments in this chapter. Fourthly, I will continue with the Foucault 
inspired examination of Rousseau’s thinking about humans’ relation to themselves, 
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their fellow beings, and the society, and then I will move in increasingly wider circles 
to study how Rousseau looked upon humans in relation to the entire natural world, 
ending with human devotion to God.  
 
5.1 Background, Procedure and Sources 
 
In the previous chapter, I employed Foucault’s genealogy and focused on power. 
After introducing power as an important element for historical studies, Foucault 
gradually turned his interest towards ethics. In his later works his basic concern 
therefore is the ethical self
175
 and its relation to freedom. Since the study in this 
chapter will be based on Foucault’s approach to ethics and since both Rousseau’s and 
Foucault’s views of ethics share many features, I will start by presenting Foucault’s 
view of ethics.  
 
Foucault on Ethics 
 
When Foucault studied power, his central interest was how knowledge circulates and 
relates to power, and how complex modern power structures incorporate human 
subjects and their self-relation in subtle but effective ways (Foucault, 1986a). In his 
view, the crucial questions were no longer Who I am? (as with Descartes; see Chapter 
Four) or even Who we are in relation to our contemporary time? (as Kant asked 1784 
in the famous article What is Enlightenment?). Yet, Foucault proposed as another 
ethical aim: that we have to refuse to be who we are and not accept the kind of 
individuality that has been forced upon us for ages (ibid.). In the last years of his life, 
Foucault investigated the relation between the subject, knowledge, and truth in the 
Hellenistic and Roman societies,
176
 and how these relations varied and changed shape 
during these ages. A common feature in these epochs was that ethics dealt not only 
with learning rules for how to live, but also included concrete actions that would 
advance a morally good life. When Foucault used the word ethics he referred to the 
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 The Hellenistic Age lasted from the 3
d
 to the 1
st
 century BC; the Roman Empire lasted from 27 BC to 476 
AD. The Stoic school was important around 300 BC and was influential in the Roman Empire before the rise 
of Christianity, and many Roman philosophers followed Stoic principles, among them Seneca, Epictetus, and 
the emperor Marcus Aurelius. Plato lived ca. 428-347 BC, and he influenced Plutarch, who lived ca. 46-120 
AD.   
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way people relate to themselves, and ethics is thus the outcome of work one has done 
upon the self (Simons et al., 2005). With morality, on the other hand, he meant a set 
of values and rules that some authority requires, and when these were prescribed 
more or less openly by agencies such as families, educational institutions, churches, 
and so forth, he talked about moral codes
177
 (Foucault, 1985). Foucault (2005) 
interpreted the word self according to how Plato used it (e.g., in the dialogues 
Alcibiades and the Republic) as entailing an element of bodily, instrumental, and 
linguistic actions concerning the ways the soul uses the body, diverse tools, and 
language. The way the soul becomes a subject of actions relates to the Greek 
khēsthai: that concept entails many relationships one can have with one’s self, but 
also with something else or with other persons. So this relation can be an attitude, 
honoring, worshipping, and so on. To take care of one’s self is to take care of one’s 
soul as a subject and, in the relations of a subject to diverse things, to take care of the 
form of the soul.  
Ethics aimed at the implementation of rules and was thus a reflective way of 
practicing freedom. It was not only about knowing the self, but also prioritizing the 
‘care of the self’ before everything else and taking control of the self, instead of being 
a slave to one’s desires. In the end of the Hellenic era, this self-management 
developed into a lifelong duty for all free men―their whole existence was thus an 
ongoing training (Foucault, 2005). Initially, caring for the self was actually the 
premiere focus, of which knowing the self was a major part. Since ethics and politics 
were seen as connected, the person who wanted to work with politics had to start by 
working with the self. In Plato’s dialogue, Alcibiades care of the self was regarded as 
a necessary political act. 
  
It was a matter of elaborating an ethics that enabled one to constitute oneself as 
an ethical subject with respect to these social, civic, and political activities, in the 
different forms they might take at whatever distance one remained from them. 
(Foucault, 1986b, p. 94) 
 
In Greco-Roman texts, many authors described various forms of caring for the self 
(Foucault, 2005). These forms could refer to cognition, movements of existence, 
activities, and attitudes. The vocabulary of diverse practices such as medicine and 
religion inspired the expression of these overlapping exercises. So, caring for the self 
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could include paying attention to one’s self; that is, a search for answers to the 
question What is my self? thus distinguishing one’s self from other things. This 
relates to turning around towards the self that is like going into a house, leaving the 
outside behind, and focusing on what happens inside (of one’s self). Care of the self 
could also be the act of examining the self; a moral task of actively remembering 
one’s moral duties (e.g., a daily ritual reminder of one’s responsibilities and how to 
make improvements according to them). In his lectures on the course The 
Hermeneutics of the Subject, Foucault compared collecting one’s self with building a 
fortress around one’s self; a kind of active protection against bad influence. Treating 
or curing one’s self could be described as becoming one’s own ‘soul doctor’ by 
performing the treatments that are needed; for example, ‘amputating’ bad habits. 
Freeing or emancipating one’s self entails that one has to detach the self from 
enslavement, and honoring and holding oneself sacred involve showing one’s self 
appropriate respect and feeling shame when needed. The most ideal form of care of 
the self is being one’s own master and thus being happy with one’s self; it is simply 
being fully satisfied with one’s self and enjoying one’s own existence. In Alcibiades, 
Plato noted the care of the self as an important occupation for the young, but the 
Epicureans and the Stoics claimed that it was a lifelong activity (ibid.). They argued 
that the young need to prepare themselves for adulthood and the elderly need to learn 
how to stay young (maintain a young mind). The care of the self was about correcting 
and becoming again what one should have been but never became, because the first 
errors were already served with the nurse-maid’s milk. Therefore, the care of the self 
must reverse the values fostered in the family.  
According to Foucault (2005), modernism brought with it individualization; the 
social bonds disappeared and the emphasis on ‘knowing oneself’ was separated from 
‘care of the self’. It became more important to learn to know the world and love one’s 
self than to care for the self in order to better care for others and the world. 
Knowledge alone became the credo, the immediate access to the truth requiring no 
altered position in the form of self-transformation. A philosophy that includes 
spirituality means that truth is not directly given to subjects in the form of mere 
knowledge (connaisance), but that subjects must transform themselves in order to 
gain access to the truth (ibid.). Foucault distinguished between connaissance 
(knowledge about facts, objective knowledge, to be informed) and savoir 
(philosophical or spiritual knowledge, reflective knowledge, judgment) (e.g., 
Foucault, 2000b, 2005). Savoir involves the subject as a creator of forms of knowing 
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that do not rely merely on theoretical texts and empirical findings but that depend, 
instead, on various practices and institutions. Self-transformation, therefore, involves 
understanding complex relations and causality that may even have historical 
explanations (Foucault, 1997a). Savoir is something more than science, or even 
learning; it is, among other things, about how to live (Lyotard, 1979). When the focus 
on connaissance is complemented with the search for savoir the knowing subject is 
created. Philosophy became disconnected from spirituality somewhere in the 
emergence of modernity, but this break, strongly promoted by Descartes, was not a 
sudden one (Davidson, 1986; Foucault, 2005). An epistemological break between 
factual knowledge and ethics was accentuated when science started to free itself from 
ethical considerations. Rousseau opposed this development. As mentioned in the 
Introduction, ‘care of the self’ does not mean egoism, but comprises a self-cultivation 
that includes caring for ‘the other’; it is autonomy combined with ethical obligations 
(Foucault, 1985). An ethics that cares for others cannot neglect other positions nor 
can it neglect the foundation of life: the earth.  
‘Care of the self’ is, firstly, a complexity that can be described as an attitude 
towards the self, other people, and the whole world. Secondly, it is a kind of attention 
towards the self, a consideration of the person’s own thinking and being. Thirdly, it is 
“a number of actions exercised on the self by the self, actions by which one takes 
responsibility for one’s self and by which one changes, purifies, transforms, and 
transfigures oneself” (Foucault, 2005, p. 11). It is not a question of a marginal 
phenomenon: ‘care of the self’ has been a basic idea in the history of practices 
performed by subjects towards themselves and a foundation for all rationally 
conducted morality in Ancient Greek, Hellenistic, and Roman philosophy, and in 
Christian spirituality (Foucault, 2005). Thus, ‘care of the self’ is a positive self-
training aimed at learning to hold back one’s own egoistic desires for the benefit of 
other people, a kind of altruistic self-exercise. Foucault did not hold ‘care of the self’ 
connected to universal laws and morals built on merely reason, as was the case with 
Kant’s categorical imperatives. Instead, he stresses the development of the 
personality as a process of transgression where the subject learns to distinguish its 
own free choices from choices influenced by other persons in order to avoid the kind 
of normalization that uncritically follows the mainstream. Through his ethical 
approaches Foucault addressed the relationship of individuals to themselves and 
divided these studies into four major aspects: (1) ethical substance that is the relevant 
domain for ethical judgments; (2) the mode of subjection, or the way people are 
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invited/incited to recognize their moral obligations; (3) self-forming activity; and 
finally, (4) the telos,
178
 or the goal towards which self-formatting activity is directed.   
Rousseau, like Foucault, was influenced by Plato, Plutarch, and the Stoics, and he 
also stressed the ‘care of the self’, although he did not use that concept. He spoke, 
instead, about ‘knowing oneself’ and emphasized activities prescribed by this 
tradition. While many modern scholars emphasize that knowledge alone gives access 
to the truth (Foucault, 2005), Rousseau regarded the truth as a result of work on the 
self, a process of self-transformation. He asked for concrete changes, and criticized 
scholars or philosophers who only used their knowledge as personal adornment. 
According to Rousseau, humans are born with a primitive kind of self-love
179
 which 
can subsequently be modified by alien forces and thus become harmful. Humans, 
therefore, have to monitor how this self-preserving, innate love develops. “Since each 
man is specially entrusted with his own preservation, the first and most important of 
his cares is and ought to be to watch over it constantly. And how could he watch over 
it if he did not take the greatest interest in it?” Rousseau asks (E, p. 213). Foucault 
described many forms of ‘care of the self’, but there are interesting common elements 
in the self-focused practices of Rousseau’s and Foucault’s ethics, and their common 
roots make it reasonable to follow Foucault when studying Rousseau’s ethics.  
In what follows I will explain how I have pursued my study of Rousseau’s ethics 
and how he wanted to promote not only a better understanding of the essential human 
being, but also of what the self of a civilized human being is, thus awakening interest 
in a more ‘natural’ conduct. Rousseau describes two distinct ways: one is self-
training, the other training of others, or education. I will examine the first one in this 
chapter and the second in the next chapter. Rousseau’s view of ethics has so many 
similarities with Foucault’s that I will therefore use Foucault’s interpretation of the 
concepts of ethics in my study of Rousseau (see above).  
 
Problematization 
 
The research approach in this chapter is a strategic modification of Foucault’s ethical 
study outline as described in The History of Sexuality, Part Two, but also in 
Hermeneutics of the Subject, a book based on Foucault’s lectures at the Collège de 
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 This self-love that Rousseau called L’amour de soi-même or amour-de-soi I will describe in more detail 
later in this chapter.  
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France in 1981-1982. While Foucault focused his research mainly on instructional 
texts and practices concerning moral conduct, I will, on one hand, study Rousseau’s 
theoretical discussions about how humans ought to act and, on the other hand, briefly 
relate how he managed to live in accordance with these prescriptions in his own life. 
In Chapter Three I have already described how I will employ Foucault’s ethical 
research strategy in what follows, but I will give a short summary at this point to 
refresh the reader’s memory. While Chapter Four answered the first research question 
(I) of the three questions in Part Two, the problem I will now embark upon is to 
answer question II (see also Chapter Three, and Table 2): What were Rousseau’s 
ethics in relation to nature? This is the main question in this chapter and the 
investigation is divided into four sub-questions representing four problematized 
areas:  
1. What is the ethical substance of Rousseau's conclusions about the moral 
conduct of human beings? This question asks about prohibitions and regulations 
against the self; in other words, the way individuals need to actively train and shape 
their own being and their moral conduct. Self-control can be a constant internal 
struggle, but it can also be a constructive development: for example, developing 
affection for or devotion towards nature and what is natural. Foucault calls this point 
of the analysis “ontology”: a study of existence, of the way of being as a special 
standpoint, and in this case a particular position towards what Rousseau regarded as 
natural. 
2. What modes of control (subjection) do humans have to undergo to live in tune 
with their human nature, according to Rousseau? Diverse forces in the society affect 
and regulate human life and, according to Foucault, humans define their position in 
relation to the rules (principles) they have chosen to follow in their various individual 
and social roles. This question thus asks how individuals ought to relate to more or 
less openly expressed social rules or divine laws and how they ought to define a style 
or a way of conduct in relation to these rules or laws. Such rules stipulate how people 
have to look upon themselves and attend to their own thoughts. Did Rousseau mean 
that they had to choose to conduct themselves in accordance with what is ‘natural’ in 
order to become models for others, or just because they needed to look for beauty and 
perfection in their own life, or because they needed to target some other and even 
more profound aims? Foucault calls this point “deontology.”  
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3. What forms of conduct or manners do individuals have to choose in order to 
transform themselves into more 'natural' humans, according to Rousseau? This 
question deals with humans’ self-formation activity towards becoming more naturally 
humans. Do they need to strive to memorize, control, and learn rules regulating their 
own behavior, or do they need to go through constant battles combating their desires 
with the help of ongoing self-examinations? Or can they just suddenly decide to live 
in a certain way? In what terms did Rousseau describe the actions, the techniques by 
which individuals have to transform themselves in accordance with what is natural? 
The different processes of self-formation in which human beings can choose how to 
conduct their actions are what Foucault calls “ascetics.”  
4. What should the ethical goal be towards which individuals should strive in 
actualizing their moral selves, according to Rousseau? This question deals with 
Rousseau’s view of how individuals’ active transformation of their selves (their self-
creation) into ethical subjects should strive towards special aims. The goal of this 
striving, which Foucault calls “teleology,” can, for example, be freedom, insensibility 
against passions, and salvation or eternal peace.  
I will tackle these four aspects across four areas of concern: (1) how persons 
relate to their own selves and to other persons, (2) to society, (3) to the natural world, 
and finally (4) to the Cosmos and the Divine (see Table 2).  
 
Choice of Material 
 
This ethical analysis is based mainly on a few writings that I find fundamental for 
understanding Rousseau’s ethical perspectives of nature. I will start with Rousseau’s 
two essays, A Discourse on the Arts and Sciences (1
st
 D) and A Discourse on the 
Origin and Basis of Inequality among Men (2
nd
 D), including the detailed notes of the 
latter discourse. In these discourses Rousseau basically investigates the topics “state 
of nature” and “human nature” in comparison to “civilization.” Secondly, I will use 
The Social Contract (SC), his great political classic. Thirdly, I lean on the late 
autobiographies, Rousseau, Judge of Jean-Jacques: Dialogues (RJJ) and Reveries of 
a Solitary Walker (RSW). The last main source of literature used is the Émile and 
especially the section Professions of Faith of the Savoyard Vicar (E), a text that 
reveals Rousseau’s view of nature in relation to the Divine. (Since Émile is the main 
source in the next chapter, I will discuss the entire book there.) I have also used some 
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other of Rousseau’s books to supplement and support the above sources when I have 
found it crucial. Finally, I have tried to compare my interpretations with those of 
other scholars’ concerning sensitive or controversial matters. 
 
Two Discourses 
Rousseau’s 1st Discourse is a work that won the first prize in an essay competition 
arranged by the Academy of Dijon in 1750. In the author’s own opinion, it is a warm 
and strong work that, however, lacks order and logic (C). Three years later, Rousseau 
participated in a new competition arranged by the same academy, this time without 
winning any reward. Despite that failure, the 2
nd
 Discourse is still significantly alive 
more than 250 years later. This very powerful essay was published 1755 and has in 
fact been much more read and commented on than the first one. In the short 1
st
 
Discourse Rousseau contests the whole Enlightenment mentality of a strong belief in 
progress that fails to reflect on the consequences of such ‘progresses’. The tone is 
caustic and the personal commitment is clearly evident. Regardless of its size, this 
initial work is nevertheless an opening―the first rudimentary idea of Rousseau’s 
whole philosophical enterprise.
180
 While the first part of the essay is a critique of 
contemporary society and its strong trust in science and arts, and his critical 
arguments are based on an empirical foundation using examples from diverse 
countries, the second part analytically considers both the roots and consequences of 
civilization and gives a small hint of what the first state of nature might have been 
like.  
Rousseau developed this brief image of the “state of nature” from the 1st 
Discourse into a much more detailed account in the first part of the 2
nd
 Discourse and 
presented a genealogy of the whole chronology from the state of nature to a civilized 
society in Part Two. A problem Rousseau seems to have faced is that he wanted to 
both depict the state of nature as a constant status quo, in the form of a utopian 
thought experiment, and historically as a phase that ended and was replaced with a 
new era. So the tricky thing was, on the one hand, to tell a story about two paramount 
opposites: an account of good humans as a utopian vision that contrasted with crass 
reality and, on the other hand, to present a fictive historical developmental line with 
empirical evidence about how humans had damaged the blessed peacefulness of the 
state of nature and thus had brutally changed their own living conditions. Because 
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“nature” has such a profound relevance in the 2nd Discourse, it is of a great 
importance for this book and fundamental to understanding Rousseau’s subsequent 
works.  
The thoughts offered in the 2
nd
 Discourse are both spontaneous and complex and 
their interpretation has long been disputed.
181
 In the beginning Rousseau states his 
intention to write an ageless and placeless story. However, the story is strongly 
connected to its own context and the concerns of that age, but read on another level it 
still has a great relevance today. It is, however, a thorny task to recapture this 
multifaceted work. Lähde (2008, p. 45) calls Part One of the discourse a “radical 
exercise in abstraction” and Rousseau calls it hypothetical. I find it appropriate to 
read Part Two as a hypothetical historical story, as well (see also Broome, 1963; 
Bernstein, 1990), but understood as an allegory revealing perceptions of human 
psychology (see Scott, 1992/2006). My intention is to read the 2
nd
 Discourse as a 
multipurpose blend of thought experiments (see Muthu, 2003) and utopias (see 
Kateb, 1967, 2005/2006) that are verified by Rousseau's knowledge gained through 
ethnographies. In my opinion, Rousseau mainly intended to radically critique the 
lifestyle of his day and to argue that more knowledge and ‘enlightenment’ had not led 
to a more decent society.    
In Broome’s (1963) opinion, Part One of the 2nd Discourse is simply a satirical 
alternative to the first chapters in Genesis and a rationalization of Paradise lost, and 
he frankly suggests that we read the 2
nd
 Discourse ignoring the possibility of 
systematic unity but, instead, to regard it as a sequel to Rousseau’s 1st Discourse. 
Despite the distinctive styles, I also underscore this suggestion, while I find the 
underlying purposes of both documents to be similar, despite a remarkable difference 
in rhetorical style and complexity. The two discourses have also direct connections to 
Émile. The three writings are inseparable and form a whole, according to Rousseau 
(LM). However, Bellah (2002) reads the two discourses in parallel with the Social 
contract as a complex story that is greatly beneficial for understanding the modern 
world. I think this is a profound argument and the same advice applies to most of 
Rousseau’s writings, as they often deal with the same philosophical questions. 
Rousseau himself (e.g., RJJ) declared that he dealt with the same principles in all his 
works. He did not split ethics from politics or education; in his view, they are all 
strongly interconnected (e.g., E). “Those who want to treat politics and morals 
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separately will never understand anything of either of the two,” he said (E, p. 235). 
Consequently, I have decided to interpret the two discourses together, following 
Broome’s (1963) suggestion, as two varied ways of advancing the same basic idea, 
and to compare them with his other writings, especially the Social Contract, 
following Bellah’s (2002) advice, but also in connection with Rousseau’s Dialogues, 
Reveries, and Savoyard Vicar. In my interpretation I will use the five level tool that I 
described in Chapter Three (a physical, a mental, a theoretical, an allegorical, and a 
metaphysical level). 
 
Social Contract 
The Social Contract is a work that is a ‘must’ reading for all students of political 
theory. Yet, it is curious that it can be interpreted and made use of in so many 
diametrically different ways. Democrats, totalitarians, anarchists, communists, and 
other diverse phalanxes have all found something applicable in its thesis. This can be 
due to a certain lack of clarity in Rousseau’s expressions; but the cause can also be an 
inexact reading and a projection of particular ideological purposes into the text, or 
that some contrary truths are dismissed (see Gay, 1987). Rousseau purposefully 
challenged his readers to think (see E), and did probably not realize how effectively 
he created confusion. Shklar (1966/2006) remarks that the Social Contract never was 
meant to be a concrete plan for a better future, but was more of a standard for judging 
contemporary society. “It was a yardstick, not a program” (ibid., p. 231). Whether a 
book is meant as a program or an experimental yardstick clearly makes an effective 
difference; in the latter case, the proposals are not to be taken as concrete plans for 
progress, but only as seeds for reflection. The Social Contract deals a great deal with 
governments and describes various forms of ruling systems and legislative bodies 
appropriate for different conditions. I will not enter that discussion but concentrate, 
instead, on the philosophical ideas.  
 
Two Autobiographies 
At the beginning of 1770s, Rousseau wrote the very special autobiography Rousseau, 
Judge on Jean-Jacques: Dialogues. In this book he discusses the kinds of struggles 
the readers of his books have to face and the risk of prejudicially judging something 
according to what others say rather than basing judgments on one’s own reading or 
investigation. Another type of misjudgment he addresses is judging on superficial 
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appearances rather than on gaining deep knowledge. The book consists of three 
conversations between the two characters, Rousseau and the Frenchman, who discuss 
a third character called Jean-Jacques. Foucault (1998b, p. 43) describes the form of 
the book as a “third-degree language” that has to overcome “three forms of silence.” 
The discussion between the three voices focuses on Jean-Jacques’ person and his 
literary production, and on the content of his writing. The story begins when the 
character called ‘Rousseau’ (representing the second level language) has arrived in 
France from a long stay abroad. ‘Rousseau’ had read all the books written by the 
author Jean-Jacques, while the Frenchman (third level) has not read any of them and 
has only heard all the scandal mongering about Jean-Jacques (first level, but mute). 
The author of the Dialogues, the real Rousseau, expresses his thoughts through the 
book’s character ‘Rousseau’; thus he is partly ‘Rousseau’ and partly the object of the 
discussion, Jean-Jacques. These inter-mingled characters show that the narrative is 
built on a technique called author’s surrogate,182 which simply means that the author 
is also a character in the story and in this particular story his person is even split into 
two characters. Even the reader’s role is tone of both defender and accuser (see also 
Kelly & Masters, 1990). This exceptional construction and Rousseau’s mental state at 
the moment of the writing have inspired researchers to study the book from a 
psychological perspective.  
The Reveries of the Solitary Walker is Rousseau’s last incomplete publication, a 
small and tranquil novel-like book with ten short chapters, ‘promenades’, narrating 
Rousseau’s latter-day life and thoughts, and the foreground for the whole story is his 
natural surroundings. On the one hand, Rousseau describes a human being, himself, 
living peaceful, easy days in the countryside. On the other hand, the solitude is all but 
uncomplicated. Being cut off from society life has a grave tone of melancholy, and a 
basic theme is the power struggle between solitude and society. According to 
Rousseau, it is only God who can be happy alone (E). Rousseau’s secluded self was 
not a pleasant solution; it led him to isolation and destruction. The book has also 
become very popular outside philosophical circles because its imaginative and 
sensitive writing style influenced both the romantic and symbolist movements in 
literature (Broome, 1963). Students of Rousseau’s political thoughts mostly reject his 
autobiographical writings and few scholars have treated them systematically (ibid.); 
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219 
 
for that reason, neither the Dialogues nor the Reveries are cited in a political context 
as often as the two discourses I have employed, but these two autobiographies are 
relevant to my research. I would like to identify the Dialogues as a kind of testament 
to Rousseau’s ethical writings and it has much common with Plato’s Apology (see 
also Kelly & Masters, 1990). The Reveries is also a testament where Rousseau most 
intensely expresses his love of the natural world.  
 
Savoyard Vicar 
The last of the main writings I have used in this ethical study is the section of Émile 
called Savoyard Vicar. It belongs to the most controversial of all Rousseau’s 
writings. Researchers have expressed conflicting opinions about the relation between 
the vicar and Rousseau and whether or not the vicar’s statements actually are 
Rousseau’s (see Scott, 1992/2006). On his early wanderings, Rousseau met two 
priests named abbé M. Gaime and abbé M. Gâtier. In his Confessions, he says that 
they were models for the vicar, but I regard the religious views of the vicar to be 
Rousseau’s own (see also Broome, 1963) and suggest that Rousseau and the vicar are 
primarily the same person and that Rousseau has used the author’s surrogate 
technique in this book sector as he did in Dialogues, maybe to protect him from the 
authorities (if so, it did not protect him enough). Salkever (1977-8/2006) is among 
those who do not agree that Rousseau expresses his own ideas through the vicar, but 
the value Rousseau himself put on this text support the conclusion that the thoughts 
expressed are his own (see RSW). The text can be divided into two parts, the first 
part presents central elements of Rousseau’s natural religion, and the second is a 
strong criticism of dogmatic religions and a plea for religious freedom.
183
 I will 
mainly employ the first part in this study. 
Savoyard Vicar was regarded as a dangerous text, and it led to Émile being 
prohibited by the Catholic Church. The text presents a natural religion that in many 
ways totally contradicts what is holy in the state religion at a time when the Church 
struggled to keep its position. I will deal below with why the reaction to the book was 
so sharp. This is also a text that researchers have often neglected, but it is relevant for 
my study. Similar to Confessions, this text is one where Rousseau searches for 
‘human nature’ and the truth from a more personal angle than in the 2nd Discourse. 
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He explicitly searches for the truth from within. Before the vicar starts his story he 
says: “You shall see me, if not as I am, at least as I see myself”184 (E, p. 266).  
 
5.2 State of Nature and Human Nature 
 
A crucial aim of many of Rousseau’s writings was to identify and explain human 
nature; that is, to describe humans’ original state, the human character unaffected by 
society. To find this ‘human nature’ Rousseau also aimed at exposing the state of 
nature in its most initial and pure state, although he did not in fact clearly distinguish 
between ‘state of nature’ and ‘pure state of nature’. The ‘human nature’ topic that he 
first addressed in his 1
st
 Discourse was to become a basic undertaking in his 2
nd
 
Discourse. Rousseau also brings this issue into consideration in a lesser degree in 
other books, although, as already stated, most of his writings are more or less clearly 
connected. It was not unique for him to discuss the ‘state of nature’ because the 
concept had already provoked both philosophical and theological interest before 
Rousseau wrote his 1
st
 Discourse.  
As already mentioned, Rousseau was familiar with literature of voyagers who 
portrayed native people from the colonies (see, e.g., Muthu, 2003). However, while 
he did not think these people lived in a pure state of nature, he clearly admitted that 
the stories enriched his thinking (e.g., Note VI in 2
nd
 Discourse). Thus, with this 
knowledge about ‘savages’ and hypothetically reflecting on how humans would act in 
a state of nature, Rousseau worked out his theory. He wanted to show how humans 
differ from other animals and what would be typical for a non-civilized human being, 
thus portraying human nature as uninfluenced by civilization. Rousseau made up the 
story in a way that involved all the social and cultural influences that might have 
changed human character (Muthu, 2003).  
By ingeniously stepping back in time, he used his imagination and tried to draw a 
picture of a state of living that was completely the opposite of the society in which he 
lived and that he disliked so much―modern Europe’s metropolises, especially Paris 
(see also Lähde, 2008). His undertaking was to describe human beings as undamaged 
by civilization, a situation that he neither thought existed then nor had existed 
anywhere at any other time. So, by drawing a picture of the antithesis to his current 
situation, he might have aimed at shaking up and maybe even generating a synthesis, 
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 “Vous me verrez, sinon tel que je suis, au moins tel que je me vois moi-même” (OC, IV, p. 565).  
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a social model that might be implementable in practice. Basic to this world order are 
humans who are more natural, who to a greater extent act in accordance with their 
innate faculties. He also searched for more natural human relations, natural societies, 
and natural connections to God. 
It is quite obvious that the way Rousseau describes the ‘state of nature’ is also 
greatly inspired by Plato’s Statesman. In this dialogue, Plato describes the first 
human living conditions as rather similar to Rousseau’s picturing of the state of 
nature. In Plato’s myth, the initial human state had no wars and no conflicts.185 On the 
question of whether humans are naturally good or evil, Rousseau first states that, 
initially, humans are neither good nor evil, as they have no knowledge and no 
depravity. However, in a note he declares that humans are naturally good: “Men are 
wicked, a sad and constant experience makes proof unnecessary; yet man is naturally 
good, I believe I have proved it…”186 (2nd D, Note IX, p. 197; see also RJJ and 
Chapter Four in this book).  
In a natural state, humans live in the present and care about what takes place in 
their immediate neighborhood. In comparison to the reflections of civilized people, 
they do not care about the whole world (2
nd
 D). The first and pure state of nature is 
prior to all purposeful social and moral relations between human beings. In that state 
humans lack no more than basic needs (e.g., hunger, sexual desire) and have neither 
moral needs nor conscious regard for their fellow beings. In the state of nature, 
humans are free but only in a natural sense, compared to reasoning and moral humans 
who are free to make moral choices (see also Scott, 1992/2006). When Rousseau 
says: “To will, and not to will, to desire and to fear, must be the first, and almost the 
only operations of his soul, till new circumstances occasion new developments of his 
faculties” (DPE, p. 88), he talks about freedom to choose food, shelter, and the like.  
Rousseau criticized other writers for having rejected the study of the state of 
nature; studies that could have revealed the foundations of human society and made 
the discussions about natural rights less complicated (2
nd
 D). In the two mentioned 
discourses, he hypothetically describes an ideal situation that might have existed 
before human beings became corrupted by society, and he is well aware of the 
paradoxical human position he portrays and in which he is personally situated. On the 
one hand, humans have left living in paradise and have become enlightened through 
                                           
185
 This was the Golden Age when Cronus (one of the 12 Titans, children of Uranus and Gaea also called 
‘Mother Earth’) ruled over the universe. 
186
 “ … l’homme eŝt naturellement bon… ”  (OV III, p. 202).  
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education Thus they are capable of reflecting on and writing about this lost heaven. 
But there is no key that unlocks this forever hidden knowledge, and there is so much 
they still do not understand.
187
 This ascension to a higher consciousness, on the other 
hand, brought humans into a situation where they hardly could know themselves and 
their own inner life anymore. In this situation it was difficult for them to investigate 
human nature by studying what was easily at hand, namely themselves. Rousseau 
was nonetheless convinced that he was capable of such insights, in contrast to others 
who looked at the state of nature from their own standpoint—that is, from a civilized 
view—and therefore ended up with false conclusions (see 1st D).  
 
Genealogy of Human Being 
 
Rousseau claimed that he was the only one who managed to step aside from his own 
reality, and he describes how a gap between the natural human being and the 
culturally deprived human being developed. In order to provide an overview of the 
whole story, I have compressed the dreamlike landscape description in Rousseau’s 1st 
Discourse into a short narrative in my own words. The dramatic ending originates 
with the 2
nd
 Discourse.
188
 
 
Once upon a time there was a beautiful coast, where nature flourished. In 
that place natural human beings resided. They were innocent, poor, and 
undamaged. All of them were equal and lived alone in similar lodges. The 
gods
189
 kept an eye on their undertakings and they lived a happy life. With 
primitive passions they focused on themselves, aiming mainly at self-
protection. Their love of self
190
 was a good and absolute feeling by help of 
which the souls of the inhabitants maintained their original natural 
characters. Overall, it was an absolutely wonderful nature paradise in which 
to live.  
But one day, their love of themselves became contaminated by errors 
and prejudices and was deflected by thousands of obstacles and it was thus 
misled. They took the gods and put them in temples. Still later, humans 
                                           
187
 We still lack relevant answers for many of the questions Rousseau struggled with, despite advanced 
archeological and paleontological research techniques. 
188
 The story is a distillation in my words.  
189
 “At first men had no kings save the gods, and no government save theocracy... It takes a long time for 
feeling so to change that men can make up their minds to take their equals as masters, in the hope that they 
will profit by doing so” (SC, p. 61). 
190
 ‘Love of self’ means here amour-de-soi that I will soon describe. 
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drove away the gods and moved into the temples themselves or in residences 
like temples. This was the peak of vice, when the arts and sciences started to 
develop, and it meant a catastrophe for the humans’ willingness to fight for 
their own territories, to cultivate the land, and to combat their own morality. 
The conveniences of a life of luxury made humans lazy. In that situation the 
humans developed education, but it failed to promote responsibility. And 
although they learned to formulate difficult sentences, they did not manage 
to recognize the truth from its opposite, as already at an early age they had to 
learn all kinds of unnecessary things instead of their most important duties. 
And when humans then developed the art of printing they started to 
duplicate the most stupid thoughts.  
The most problematic was not humans’ increased evilness, but their lost 
confidence, their forthrightness had vanished. The human outer image had 
become incongruent with the inner; the inner selves were hidden behind a 
common façade as modern society required more and more conformity. 
Gradually it looked like every individual was cast in the same mould. 
Friendship, real esteem, and trust were replaced by jealousy, suspicion, fear, 
and falsity, even if all such callousness was hidden under an untrustworthy 
politeness. It became an art to skillfully show disregard for others and one’s 
own brilliance appeared through the disparaging of others. Due to this 
human rivalry the improvement of the arts and science correspondingly 
depraved their morals and this was reflected in human conduct. Finally, all 
of civilized life was ruined. And so the story ends. 
 
The thought experiment of the life in the once so beautiful paradise thus ends very 
sadly. This sad conclusion shows Rousseau’s judgment about the state of the18th 
century (but it could as well be our own time). The story that resembles the tale of the 
Fall, has its own merits and a strongly moral and ironic message. Rousseau claims 
that the history yields similar pictures from many parts of the world with very few 
exceptions. Egypt, China, Greece, Rome and Constantinople have all witnessed how 
the development of either the sciences or the arts (or both) has corrupted people (1
st
 
D). “If the Sciences purified morals, if they thought men to shed their blood for the 
Fatherland, if they animated courage; the peoples of China should be wise, free, and 
invincible” (ibid., p. 10). In this respect, Rousseau saw Sparta as an ideal in contrast 
to the corrupted Athens. Athens condemned Socrates to die, he who knew that the 
greatest knowledge was to know that he knew nothing. Socrates would probably have 
met the same disrespect in the 18
th
 century France, but instead of being poisoned he 
would have been scorned (like Rousseau), according to Rousseau (1
st
 D). 
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First Revolution 
In the state of nature, Rousseau described, human beings had to develop the talents 
they needed for survival (2
nd
 D). They became strong, because only the strongest had 
a chance of surviving; they learned to use weapons they found in nature, such as 
stones and twigs, and to struggle for food with other animals including their species 
fellows. While some humans became bold and others anxious, some fast and other 
slow, some big and other small, these physical inequalities made them compare 
themselves with other animals and to regard themselves superior to them. And when 
people found that other humans behaved similarly, they started to imitate each other 
by adapting certain manners and following those rules of conduct that seemed most 
beneficial. Thus mimesis (imitation) was born. Lähde (2008) announces the paradox 
of physically unequal humans living a naturally equal life, but I think Rousseau was 
well aware of this problem: it set competition into motion. Imitation is natural for 
humans, but in society it turns into vice (E).  
This chain of enlightenment led to what Rousseau calls the first revolution, when 
humans established families, built their first lodgings, and introduced property. In the 
2
nd
 Discourse he rather vaguely suggests that a revolution was initiated by some 
external event, some kind of natural catastrophe or the like that jeopardized the 
solitary life and thus led humans to join in groups.  
 
I suppose men to have reached the point at which the obstacles in the way of their 
preservation in the state of nature show their power of resistance to be greater 
than the resources at the disposal of each individual for his maintenance in that 
state. That primitive condition can then subsist no longer; and the human race 
would perish unless it changed its manner of existence. (SC, p. 8) 
 
A consequence of this revolution was the birth of sentiments like love and the 
division into male and female temperaments and occupations. Rousseau, however, 
does not explain how women gave up their hitherto equal position and became 
oppressed by men (see Okin, 1979/2006). Did this take place voluntarily? How did 
patriarchal society arise? Rousseau has no answers to these questions. Humans 
started to compare and compete with each other and destroyed their innocent 
happiness. It became important to strive for recognition, and wrongdoing and lack of 
recognition caused revenge and conflict. Despite such quarrels, Rousseau’s regard for 
this stage is somewhat contradictory: it is the most excellent, a golden age, or, in 
contrast, a synthesis between the pure state of nature and civilization. There was still 
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no great economic imbalance and, at least initially, this stage was a pleasant time. But 
a distinct competition between people and groups started to emerge due to their 
different dispositions and values, though this tension did not yet manifest all the 
disadvantages of the next stage (see Muthu, 2003). 
 
Second Revolution 
Inequality rose when one individual started to collect more property than others and, 
thus, the need for labor was created (2
nd
 D). This brought about the second 
revolution, when humans invented metallurgy and agriculture. Rousseau explains 
how, after the second revolution, “natural or physical inequalities” led to “moral or 
political inequality” that depended on ownership. Because it became important to be 
recognized as outstanding in aspects like beauty, strength, and intelligence, humans 
without such superior qualities had to pretend they possessed outstanding features. 
Therefore, reality and appearance diverged, and ownership became a new way of 
showing one’s superiority. The only way to enlarge one’s own property was on 
behalf of somebody else’s, and this paved the way for still more competition and 
rivalry where wealth was distinguished from poverty and mastery from slavery. 
When much of the earth was occupied with societies in this stage, wars occurred as 
nations and societies in different stages struggled in bloody battles.  
Rousseau disagreed with Hobbes that some are born rulers and others are born to 
obey (SC). Everybody is born equal in Rousseau’s social theory. Political society was 
born in a common agreement, a social contract, where both the chosen rulers and the 
people agree to follow the laws they have jointly created, laws that bind their union. 
Likewise, those chosen to be magistrates put the common interest before their own 
personal wishes. Due to differences between individuals and their social interactions, 
different models of government were established. Those most unequal and far from 
the state of nature created monarchies; if some members were superior to the others, 
they chose aristocracy; and the most equal and natural built on principles of 
democracy. In this stage the people preferred to give up their freedom for strong 
rulers and equality thus decreased. Rousseau (2
nd
 D) noted that those authors who 
believe that human nature is evil regard this stage in the development of humankind 
as the initial stage and dismiss the previous state of nature.  
Rousseau depicted the decrease in equality in three stages (2
nd
 D). Firstly, the 
establishment of the laws and the right of property; secondly, the institution of 
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magistracy; and thirdly, the conversion of legitimate into arbitrary power. The first 
epochal change caused the split into rich and poor people, the second into powerful 
and weak, and the third into master and slave. Being last, the third stage can be 
changed only by a new revolution. At best, a third revolution could change the course 
of the development of mankind to a more decent one―to a society built on a social 
contract derived from the general will, not the particular wills of all.
191
 But, Rousseau 
did not believe that this social form could ever come to be. It would require that all 
society members should be able to manage their selfishness and agree on the common 
good. Subsequently, Rousseau depicted a cyclical history of altering birth and 
destruction that is reminiscent of Ancient Greek philosophy, Hinduism and Native 
American religions, and which is unusual among Western cultures that usually 
consider history as linear. Rousseau’s picture of, on the on hand, the perfect human 
state (the state of nature), and on the other hand, a perfect social state (the golden 
age) are more hypothetical visions than real aims. Sustainable development could 
perhaps be compared with Rousseau’s dream of a perfect society, and the prophecy 
of nature’s collapse the antithesis. Seen as an imaginary vision, sustainability is a far-
reaching aspiration for the good life that can be modified along the route.  
 
Natural contra Civilized 
In Rousseau’s dichotomous story, the savages occupy a middle position.192 While he 
still found the Europeans to be the most civilized people in the world, he might have 
failed to spot advanced civilizations in many other regions of the world.
193
 However, 
Rousseau was aware of this ignorance and addresses the need for more knowledge 
about people from other regions than Europe. He is actually ironic about viewing 
Europe as the center of the world and recommends studying foreign peoples instead 
of the scholar’s eagerness for examining only foreign plants and stones. Rousseau 
was aware that, however they look, all humans share many similarities that are 
universal for all humankind,
 
but he did not know about the distinction between apes 
                                           
191
 I will deal with the topic of the social contract and general will later in this chapter. 
192
 The savages of America had not yet reached the second revolution stage, according to Rousseau. (2
nd
 D) It 
is obvious that he was not well-informed about the farming Indians in Northern America or that the South 
American Inca Empire was a highly developed society, but lacking a written language. 
193
 He probably did not know much about particular areas of Northern Africa, such as Egypt, and regions in 
Asia, for example, and China (although he mentions China as an example in the 1
st
 Discourse), Japan, Arabia 
and the Fertile Crescent. 
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and humans.
194
 While Rousseau attributed spoken language to social variables, he 
found the animal language of gestures superior to the spoken as a means of rapidly 
expressing feelings and thoughts. And he was convinced that savages could never 
learn to prefer civilized life over their solitary life in the forest, and would remain 
unworried about needing improvements. Why should they favor a life where 
everybody struggles only for living a comfortable life and being admired by 
others?
195
 
Human history did not stop in Rousseau’s “Golden age.” Fascinated by ambition, 
humans started to admire power and thus risk their freedom (2
nd
 D). However, this 
ambition began when humans first began to compare physical inequalities. Other 
inequalities, such as nobility, power, and wealth, are all consequences of natural 
inequalities. In two long sentences Rousseau expresses his fury against such 
inequalities in society.  
 
I would show how much this universal desire for reputation, honors, and 
preferment which consumes us all exercises and compares talents and strengths, 
how much it excites and multiplies the passions and, in making all men 
competitors, rivals, or rather enemies, how many reverses, how many successes, 
how many catastrophes of every kind it daily causes by leading so many 
Contenders to enter the same lists: I would show that it is this ardor to be talked 
about, to this frenzy to achieve distinction which almost always keeps us outside 
ourselves, that we owe what is best and what is worst among men, our virtues and 
our vices, our Sciences and our errors, our Conquerors and our Philosophers, that 
is to say a multitude of bad things for a small number of good things. (2
nd
 D, p. 
184) 
 
Rousseau finishes his litany by arguing that the most mighty and rich would not feel 
happy if inequality ends because their happiness depends on being superior to others. 
This means that the competition will never stop and that there will always be those 
who want to triumph over others. 
                                           
194
 He had heard stories about Pongos and Orang-Outangs and distinguished them as two different species, 
and supposed they might be humans; at least he did not find them less unlike humans than some of the 
uneducated explorers, he ironically commented. ‘Orangutans’ are now classified as Pongo pygmaeus and the 
word means ‘man of the jungle’ and many of the characteristics of Rousseau’s pure state of nature are 
reminiscent of the special life of these animals. These apes live solitary and peaceful lives in the trees and 
their children do not stay with their mothers more than a few years until they have learned to manage on their 
own.  
195
 He drew these conclusions from stories he had heard about unsuccessful trials to acclimatize savages in 
Western societies (see 2
nd
 D, notes).  
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In Rousseau opinion, virtue lacked profoundness and had become a façade hiding 
emptiness; it was merely a display of pretentiousness (1
st
 D). People followed strict 
rules of conduct and behaved artificially instead of using their own reason. Neither 
outer appearance nor inner thoughts had made them more decent than the poor and 
uneducated people living a simple life close to nature. “[A] vile and deceiving 
uniformity prevails in our morals, and all minds seem to have been cast in the same 
mold: constantly politeness demands, propriety commands: constantly one follows 
custom, never one’s own genius” (1st D, p. 8). Robust and strong human beings 
should not need a lot of displays and pretty phrases to demonstrate who they are. The 
natural humans that Rousseau depicted were not profoundly different or better than 
his contemporaries, but they did not hide behind all kinds of camouflage or pretend to 
be other or greater than they were. They communicated their intentions openly, 
according to Rousseau (1
st
 D).  
Civilized people, in comparison, hide their opinions behind a mask of polite 
words without any other meaning than to conceal their malicious and envious 
feelings. They seek their own glory by steadily discrediting others, instead of letting 
compassion bring them together. Side by side, praising each others with words, they 
live their lives in an endless competition. The more sciences and arts have developed 
the more natural virtues have been forgotten. Manners have taken the role of morals. 
Humans have developed the arts, sciences and luxury because of their depravity and 
idleness, not because of their cleverness. Luxury is the opposite of virtue, Rousseau 
claimed. When wealth is the ultimate goal, virtue is definitely sidestepped. Instead of 
virtue and ethics, money and wealth have become the aims of politics. Thus even 
human life is calculated in money (1
st
 D). Luxury corrupts the rich and the poor 
simultaneously, one because of possession, the other because of the yearning it raises. 
Thus both become slaves of their desires and of public opinion. A basic rule of 
equality would be that no citizen should be allowed to be rich enough to buy another 
citizen and not so poor that they have to sell themselves (SC). However, virtue is not 
inborn for humans. Not wanting to harm anybody is typical but virtue amounts to 
overcoming base inclinations and it is not intrinsic but develops in connection with 
society (Kelly & Cook, 2000). “Virtue does not consist merely in being just, but in 
being so by triumphing over one’s passions, by ruling over one’s own heart” (LF, p. 
267).  
Rousseau saw savages as still living in a happy state, uninfected by civilization 
and its sciences and arts, and he thought that humans would be better off without the 
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ever-expanding knowledge that had become an end in itself (1
st
 D). Just as a caring 
mother takes a dangerous weapon from the hands of her child, according to 
Rousseau, nature had tried to prevent humans from science. For that reason, humans 
are born unlettered. It would have been a total misfortune if they had been born 
learned. While the masses lack the satisfaction of having their immediate needs met 
and are denied moral dignity and recognition as fellow creatures with equal rights, 
others satisfy their vanity with things that are utterly unnecessary for daily human life 
and survival (ibid.). Rousseau was upset by all the inequities civilized life causes. 
Civilized life not only brought harm to the poor, who suffered because of shortage, 
but also to the rich, because of their greed: 
 
Compare without prejudice the state of Civil man
196
 with that of Savage man, and 
determine, if you can, how many new gates in addition to his wickedness, his 
needs, and his miseries, the first has opened to pain and to death. If you consider 
the mental pains that consume us, the violent passions that exhaust and waste us, 
the excessive labors that overburden the poor, the even more dangerous softness 
to which the rich abandon themselves, and cause the first to die of their needs and 
the others of their excesses. (2
nd
 D, Note IX, p. 199) 
 
Nature has tried to protect humans from the sciences, those dangerous weapons in the 
hands of such vain and narcissistic creatures, according to Rousseau. The sciences 
were acceptable if people did not become so occupied with them that they neglected 
more crucial human needs. He did not, nevertheless, attack education per se and 
downplay all knowledge, but the superficial route it had taken. Rousseau, in 
consequence, called the mind of the savages “limited” (2nd D, Note XI). Humans are 
born predestined for perfection, but they have free will and can choose how to use 
this aptitude. If humans do not use it wisely they are lead to their own downfall. Free 
will is no ungovernable will that allows them to do whatever they like (Dent, 1988).  
The source of greed is the need to be recognized as superior, to be able to shine, 
according to Rousseau. Natural humans were satisfied with a life for themselves; they 
did not need others recognizing and adoring them and, hence, they made their 
decisions independently, without any others’ opinion; in other words, they were 
naturally free. While the civilized life is reduced to a façade of conformity, all decent 
human qualities have become empty appearances. In addition, the increased 
accessibility of goods and arts generated complicated social rules. Rousseau did not 
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 In French “l’homme Civil” (OC III, 202). 
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like all these general and unwritten rules
197
 and was definitely not convinced that the 
new lifestyle increased human freedom. Civilized humans have forgotten who they 
are; their own existence is camouflaged both from themselves and in order to impress 
others (2
nd
 D). They have given up their freedom and are trapped in their own chains. 
 
Here everyone does the same thing in the same circumstance: everyone moves in 
time like the marches of a regiment in battle order: you would say that they are so 
many marionettes nailed to the same plank, or pulled by the same string. (JNH, p. 
205) 
 
Rousseau was especially critical of the urban lifestyle. In Julie, St. Preux (one of the 
leading characters in the novel) expresses his opinion about life in Paris:  
 
[I]t is unbelievable how regulated, measured, weighed everything is in what they 
call etiquette; whatever is no longer in the sentiments, they have put into rules, 
and with them everything is rules. If this people of followers were full of original 
characters it would be impossible to know about it; for no man dares to be 
himself. One must do as the others do, is the primary maxim of wisdom in this 
country. That is done, that is not done. This is the supreme pronouncement.
198
 
(JNH, p. 205)  
 
Rousseau saw goodness and virtue as complementary. For him, to know one’s limit 
was natural goodness. Whereas goodness makes one follow one’s own inclinations 
without harming anybody else, virtue allows individuals to overcome their own 
inclinations and succeed in benefitting the welfare of others (Kelly, Masters & 
Stillman, 1995). Virtue is not only being just, but a matter of combating one’s own 
passions (LF). Civilization promotes greed: good persons have few needs; they are 
enough in themselves. When Rousseau blamed the sciences and arts for having made 
humans live a lie, it is the Platonic difference between reality and appearance that he 
echoes. In the 1
st
 Discourse, Rousseau depicts two interesting gaps. Firstly, he 
exposes the gap between speaking well and acting well that connects to the gap 
between rhetoric and praxis in environmental education discussed earlier in Chapter 
Two. Secondly, he explains the gap between an educated person and a good person 
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 This idea about general rules that enslave people can be compared with Martin Heidegger’s theory about 
‘das Man’, the comfortable neutral existential mode that allows an individual to be both all people and 
nobody at the same time. The theory means, in short, that people tend to act as people in general; one enjoys, 
one has an opinion, one makes—but none is responsible (see Heidegger’s Being and Time, 1996, see also 
Chapter One in this book). 
198
 The italics are original. 
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that relates to the initial gap discussed in Chapter One; namely, the gap between 
knowledge and action. Thirdly, he identifies a gap between appearance and mental 
states, which means that people often deceive; they live a lie.
199
  
The conclusion Rousseau draws from his depiction of human history, is that a 
country where nobody breaks the law, but always act in accordance with the common 
harmony, does not need laws or any officials (2
nd
 D). However, ambitious and 
cowardly individuals are always willing to risk their fortune and either obey or 
command. According to Rousseau, society does not appreciate honesty and praises 
virtuous sounding speech instead of virtuous living. For Rousseau, virtue is not just a 
matter of ethical rules; it is more a moral practice than a study. The truth is written in 
our own hearts if we are willing to search for it. A proper action does not necessarily 
go hand in hand with knowledge. We do not need to strive for tributes and a good 
reputation. Instead, we can do our utmost to act well.  
 
5.3 Human Relation to Self and Others  
 
Rousseau paid more attention to moral conduct than to ethical disputes and attacked 
the philosophers and ‘learned’ scholars for their inconsequential dissipations. He was 
very concerned about the way humans relate to their own being, a problematic 
relation that dictates their social behavior. The preconditions are good, but the 
outcome is mostly bankrupt. He wanted to challenge the way humans constitute 
themselves as ethical subjects. A basic task of his was to expose what it means to be 
human and he wanted to discuss this issue and inspire others to undertake self-
transformation. As with Foucault’s (2005) descriptions of Ancient ethics, Rousseau 
related the concept of “know your self” to “care of your self”: one has to know the 
self in order to take care of it. For Rousseau, human life was about knowing oneself, 
knowing one’s fellows, one’s society, and what life all is about. However, mere 
knowledge was not enough: the knowledge had to lead to self-transformation that 
could generate a better life lived in common with others. Socrates had wanted to be 
the gadfly who stung the horses to run (see Plato’s Apology, 30e). Likewise, 
Rousseau obviously wanted to trigger his contemporaries, especially the Parisians, to 
care less about wealth, appearance, and knowledge for purposes of showing off and 
                                           
199
 This problem is more obvious than ever at this moment in the early 21
th
 century when it is possible to 
create your own virtual ‘second life’.  
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to care more about their moral conduct. Like Socrates, Rousseau wanted others to 
care for themselves and make their selves more morally perfect. The art of governing 
one’s self was, for Socrates, connected to the art of governing society (Plato’s 
Alcibiades, see also Phaedo, 115c). The relation between self-training and the joint 
shaping of more decent and equal societies is also obvious in Rousseau’s thoughts. 
Such training starts with training of the body, continues with the soul, and the 
ultimate ideal should be good societies built of and by good citizens who all care 
most about the common good.  
 
Two Modes of Self-image 
 
All humans are somehow sensitive, according to Rousseau. “Sensitivity is the 
principle of all action
200
.... God himself is sensitive since he acts” (RJJ, p.112). 
Sensitivity is twofold; one aspect, the physical and passive part, has self-preservation 
and the survival of the human species as its aim, while the other is moral and is 
actively attends to other human beings. This attention fluctuates in intention and can 
be either a positive attraction or a negative repulsion. Nature generates positive 
sensitivity and it strives to nurture human beings through love and gentle enthusiasm, 
while negative sensitivity makes them constrict each other through hatred and 
malicious passions. In Note XV in the 2
nd
 Discourse Rousseau introduces the 
concepts of amour-de-soi-même
201
 and amour-propre. Amour-de-soi (shorter form of 
amour-de-soi-même) produces positive sensitivity and makes individuals search for 
what is good for them, whereas amour-propre can degenerate and produce either 
positive or negative sensitivity.  
Amour-de-soi  
Rousseau took amour-de-soi to mean a natural inborn feature that helps all animals 
protect themselves and safeguard their own survival. In a state of nature where there 
is no opportunity to regard the other individual’s actions as intentionally evil, no one 
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 “La sensibilité eŝt le principe de toute aĉtion” (OC I, p. 805). 
201
 It is difficult to translate Rousseau’s concepts of amour-de-soi and amour-propre and many alternatives 
have been offered. Broome (1963) translates amour-de-soi to Self-Interest and amour-propre to Selfish-
Interest, but to avoid confusion, I will use the French terms. Rousseau was not the one who invented these 
concepts. For example Aristotle and Augustine discussed the self-love issue. Likewise, all major religions 
emphazise some kind of self-love. According to Buddhism, humans reach Nirvana when the distuinguish 
between false and true self-love, and the Bible commands humans to love their neighbors as they do 
themselves. (Amour-de-soi and amour-propre are always italized in E) 
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can be insulted. When a beast steals food from humans they can feel anger, but not 
indignation because they know or feel that the animal only acts instinctively. 
“Amour-de-soi[-même] signifies a concern, a care, to look to, guard, preserve and 
foster one’s own personal well-being, guided by a clear sense or idea of what the 
well-being of oneself comprises and requires” (Dent, 1988, p. 20). This concern for 
one’s own well-being is thus not equivalent with egoism or vanity, but is only a drive 
for actual self-preservation. It is not wrong that living creatures strive to safeguard 
themselves; it is something healthy and favorable.   
 
[T]he first movements of nature are always right. There is no original perversity 
in the human heart. There is not a single vice to be found in it of which it cannot 
be said how and whence it entered. (E, p. 92) 
 
Whereas Rousseau’s use of amour-de-soi can be regarded as a constant norm in 
contrast to the socially stimulated amour-propre (Bernstein, 1990), it is not constant 
in its appearance. It changes according to the constitution of the person. There is 
nonetheless a solid core of care for one’s personal good, independent of the shifting 
varieties of amour-de-soi.  
 
Amour-propre 
Amour-propre, in contrast, is an artificial sensation relative to a social condition. It 
can be described as a concern to be something—an individual—for others and to be 
reciprocally engaged with others. Amour-propre arises “from social relations, from 
the progress of ideas, and from the cultivation of the mind” (RJJ, p. 113) and it makes 
humans strive for an extension of their natural being through recognition and 
admiration. Amour-de-soi is gentle and loving and reaches out for one’s own 
happiness. If it is deflected into amour-propre by some complication, it can turn into 
a negative feeling that aims at harming others (RJJ). Comparison nourishes amour-
propre that, in contrast to amour-de-soi, is a love of oneself for being unique and 
different from others. In its “inflamed”202 form, amour-propre entails feeling superior 
to others; it is a kind of pride in oneself for being better than others (RSW, see also 
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 In Émile Rousseau writes that one can “inflame” (qu’enflamer, OV IV, p 540) a child’s amour-propre (E, 
p. 247). Consequently, Dent (1988) uses the adjective ‘inflamed’ when he talks about a bad amour-propre 
and Bernstein uses ‘deformed’ in contrast to ‘benign’ forms of amour-propre. Rousseau claims that “hateful 
and irascible passions are born of amour-propre in contrast to “gentle and affectionate passions” that are 
born of amour-de-soi (E, p. 214). 
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Dent, 1988). While amour-de-soi is satisfied when basic needs are satisfied, inflamed 
amour-propre starts to compare and command others and measures itself in relation 
to others, resulting in struggle and superiority. This is an endless process: the higher 
one rises above the other, the more eagerly the individual struggles ever-more 
upward. (RJJ) In contrast, amour-propre cannot survive in solitude where nothing 
nourishes it; honest social individuals suffer in social situations and because they are 
always searching for truthfulness they cannot accept false impressions. This was 
Rousseau’s own experience: “I am my own only when I am alone. Apart from that I 
am the plaything of all those around me” (RSW, p. 85). Accordingly, amour-de-soi 
fosters benevolent feelings in contrast to amour-propre that, in the worst case, 
produces hate and anger. Inflamed amour-propre brings about self-alienation (E), and 
humans become strangers from themselves, their own proper needs, and their 
purpose, and thus they start acting unnatural (Dent, 1988). But, as Dent (ibid.) and 
Bernstein (1990) both point out, amour-propre does not always need to become 
inflamed; it can take another course. This is also what Rousseau states in Émile: 
 
This amour-propre in itself or relative to us is good and useful; and since it has 
no necessary relation to others, it is in this respect naturally neutral. It becomes 
good or bad only by the application made of it and the relations given to it. (E, p. 
92) 
 
If it was possible to unmask civilized humans and put aside all social influences in 
the form of prejudices and bad habits, they would come close to the natural state. 
Repeatedly, the natural human being is seen as a symbol for what modern humans 
would be like if all the social and artificial elements were removed from their selves; 
or, rather, if these elements could be avoided from the very beginning. It is 
civilization that fosters amour-propre damagingly; in itself it is merely the human 
“being-for others,” according to Bernstein (1990, p. 71), who compares Rousseau’s 
concept of amour-propre with Hegel’s concept of “self-consciousness.” When 
interpreting amour-propre as self-consciousness, humans’ full awareness of 
themselves becomes dependent on social interventions. This was actually Rousseau’s 
intention, too; to make humans aware of their own dispositions, and he never denied 
that humans’ natural role was to live in a society. But, if society was corrupt and 
made humans expand negatively, their socialization had to be corrected. But when 
Rousseau used the concept of consciousness (without self-) he entailed, like Plutarch 
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(see Foucault, 2005), an inner voice that participated in internal discourse with the 
self and tried to say what is right (see E). 
The pressure of commonly held prejudices in society is a strong force to fight. In 
his Dialogues Rousseau talks about amour-propre, using the word “game,” and 
indicates a practice that nurtures prejudices. “One wants to guess, one wants to be 
perceptive. It is the natural game of amour-propre: one sees what one believes and 
not what one sees. A person explains everything according to his prejudice…” (RJJ, 
p. 64). True passions are replaced with diverse interests, and the folly of amour-
propre, vanity, suppresses the passions even more.   
Consequently, amour-propre has its origin in social relations, while amour-de-soi 
flourishes in a state of nature. The more humans move away from a natural life, 
where their main occupation is to satisfy immediate needs, the more amour-propre is 
promoted. And the more enlightened the society is, the more advanced are the means 
of amour-propre, according to Rousseau. Education or enlightenment does not 
prevent the growth of harmful competition but, instead, only promotes inflamed 
amour-propre that enslaves and alienates humans from themselves. Amour-propre 
that has taken that route simply makes humans live a lie. “Slaves and dupes of 
amour-propre, they live not to live but to make others believe they lived” (RJJ, p. 
214). When amour-propre is met equally for everyone, the equality is perfect (Dent, 
1998/2006). Rousseau did not reject competition, as long as the target was not to 
exceed the other in anything else than unselfish good deeds. People who behaved 
decently all had the right to be honored. 
Besides amour-de-soi striving for self-preservation, natural humans are also 
equipped with an intrinsic sense for realizing that their fellow creatures are similar in 
their sufferings (2
nd
 D, Note X). Rousseau called this sense la pitié (compassion, 
pity). When reason regulates compassion and modifies amour-de-soi, humans will 
develop their humanity and virtue. When the activity of amour-de-soi is tempered by 
compassion, it aims at protecting the survival of all of humankind. Compassion is in 
the state of nature what laws, morals, and virtues are in civilization. Inflamed Amour-
propre, on the other hand, rebels against reason and deflects humans from following 
their own instinct
203
 or what is natural. (RSW) Pity entails that everybody has an 
innate desire to care for another human being because of the other’s vulnerability, 
regardless of class, position, or other such condition. The help one gives, however, 
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should not be built on a longing for benefit, gratitude, or compensation; only on a 
love for the other (Dent, 1998/2006; E). Otherwise inflamed amour-propre is the 
ruling passion. Kant obviously build on the same idea in The Metaphysics of Morals 
where he accentuated the duties humans owe to each other: 
 
To do good to other human beings insofar as we can is a duty, whether one loves 
them or not; and even if one had to remark sadly that our species, on closer 
acquaintance, is not particularly lovable, that would not detract from the force of 
this duty. – But hatred of them is always hateful, even when it takes the form 
merely of completely avoiding them (separatist misanthropy), without active 
hostility toward them. For benevolence always remains a duty, even toward a 
misanthropist, whom one cannot indeed love but to whom one can still do 
good.
204
 (Kant, 1797/1996, 6:402) 
 
Human Distinctiveness 
 
It is not rationality, according to Rousseau, that divides humans from other animals, 
but the human capacity for freely chosen action. Nature rules over the animals and 
directs them to act in particular ways; humans, instead, have the power to choose for 
themselves and to decide if they will obey nature or not. On the other hand, deprived 
humans are not capable of listening to nature anymore, and they engage in 
exaggerations that destroy their lives. Every animal has ideas gained through its 
senses, but only humans have free will that is a spiritual talent and all but automatic. 
Another distinction between humans and brutes is the human ability for self-
improvement, perfectibility.
205
 Rousseau did not deny that humans have an intrinsic 
drive for improvement of some kind, even though this drive would not inevitably lead 
to a better future. He indicated that this drive, perfectibility, is already a dormant 
faculty in the state of nature and, although an intrinsic natural trait, it can be further 
improved by education (e.g., RJJ). Lähde (2008, p. 96) argues that by perfectibility 
Rousseau “refers to the potential of developing novel faculties, and it seems to be 
mostly latent in the pure state of nature, whereas this unnamed mimetic ability refers 
to the way natural men can learn to imitate the behavior of other animals.” “Other 
animals” obviously also includes other humans. Mimetic ability (ability to imitate) is 
connected to instinct (nature) and perfectibility to reason: “only perfectibility truly 
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 Rousseau was not the first who introduced the term perfectibility, although he contributed to its 
application (see Chapter Two).   
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removes humans from the realm of instinct and mimetic behavior” (ibid., p. 97). 
Humans can learn from experience to control their environment and to change their 
behavior and thus increase their benefits (Dent, 1992). In an extended situation free 
will regulates conduct; it enables or holds back actions. Another feature of amour-de-
soi is that it makes individuals satisfied with who they are and ready to live in 
accordance with the will of their Creator (ibid.). A problem that makes changing 
one’s life course such a great challenge is that most people do not know in their 
innermost being what they want. In that situation, life becomes not only a struggle 
with others, but also an internal battle with one’s self. Even Rousseau personally 
experienced many conflicting interests (e.g., RJJ). A third distinction is that humans 
have a spiritual soul. Humans are the only creatures that are capable of improvements 
both as a species and as individuals. In the state of nature, humans, like other animals, 
see and feel. The first operations of the human soul are to will and not to will, to 
desire, and to fear. Desires lead humans towards knowledge and improvements, and 
they desire what they physically want (2
nd
 D, Broome, 1963). 
Amour-de-soi can be latently expansive in seeking to reinforce our being, even in 
senses other than of satisfying immediate needs; humans simply seek to make the 
most of their beings (Cooper, 2004/2006). I think we cannot deny some kind of 
expansion in Rousseau’s state of nature at this point. However, I agree with Dent 
(1992) that Rousseau did not mean that amour-de-soi was replaced by amour-propre 
when humans became social, but that amour-propre was one route amour-de-soi 
could take. Mutual support, on the contrary, strengthens amour-de-soi and sustains a 
positive expansion of amour-propre. Human interactions are, however, seldom that 
unselfish. Instead, when humans extend their relations, they experience their own 
worth through their superiority to others. They start to claim recognition for 
ascendancy instead of equality (Ibid.). In Reveries Rousseau talks about his expansive 
soul that can extend out to other objects and make him even forget himself. But if he 
did not get any response, he felt alienated from himself. This way of being occupied 
with the external world was congenial to him, but he nonetheless felt uncomfortable 
with himself and others and restlessly moved around. “I was entirely devoted to what 
was alien to me; and in the continual agitations of my heart, I experienced all the 
vicissitudes of human things” (Rousseau, RSW, p. 69). In the situation Rousseau 
describes, he did definitely not find his life superior to others, but he tried to cope 
with his own situation and accept the life as it had taken shape, even though he felt 
unloved by all people. But, he had learned “to bear the yoke of necessity without 
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murmur” (ibid., p. 71) when he realized that his reactions to others was rooted in his 
amour-propre. Turning back to himself, Rousseau was satisfied with being good 
within his own framework of values, and he called this state “the natural order” (ibid., 
p. 73). But he stated that his Stoical acceptance is not his doing but should be 
attributed to his enemies. They had made him indifferent to adversity, but he 
nonetheless struggles and overcomes their evil with his strength. In a world too 
unpleasant for Rousseau, he fled to the imaginary realm he had created in accordance 
with his heart. His withdrawal from other people and their wickedness drove him to 
the natural world:  
 
The moment I slip away from the retinue of the wicked is delightful, and as soon 
as I find myself under the trees and in the midst of greenery, I believe I am in the 
earthly paradise and I savor an inner pleasure as intense as if I were the happiest 
of mortals” (ibid., p. 76).  
 
A little later he continues: “It is only after having detached myself from social 
passions and their sad retinue that I have again found nature with all its charms” 
(ibid.).  While humans have this expansive drive, their beneficial amour-de-soi can be 
overwhelmed by inflamed amour-propre that has a tendency to grow in the direction 
of vice. Then humans easily consider the world as being filled with obstacles to 
overcome (Cooper, 2004/2006). When they want to be all they are and even more, 
they soon start to see life as a race. Expansion is nourished by strength or power and 
accrues both in amour-de-soi and in amour-propre (ibid.). While amour-propre 
strives for external expansion, amour-de-soi extends towards one’s own being and 
leads to the enjoyment of one’s own existence. Strong souls can expand positively, 
while the weak strive for self-fulfillment through and on behalf of others (E), and 
positive self-esteem can be a driving force for positive development.   
 
Self-esteem
206
 is the greatest motive force of proud souls. Amour-propre, fertile 
in illusions, disguises itself and passes itself off as this esteem. But when the 
fraud is finally discovered and amour-propre can no longer hide itself, from then 
on it is no more to be feared; and even though we stifle it with difficulty, we at 
least easily overcome it. (RSW, p. 73)  
 
I read from Rousseau that the more aware individuals become of their own 
shortcomings, the more confidently their self-esteem can develop and the less 
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egoistic and exaggerated is their self-esteem. And, like Dent (1988), I consider the 
encouragement of recognition by others as essential for the development of self-
esteem (Österlund & Wolff, 2006). If amour-propre develops negatively, it seeks 
dominance and mastery over others; but it can also take another direction, as its basic 
purpose is solely a wish for recognition by others (see Dent, 1988; E). The education 
of the fictive pupil Émile involves a situation or a space that corresponds to the state 
of nature. Rousseau’s description of Émile’s education is a thorough account of how 
Rousseau looked upon the possibility of avoiding inflamed amour-propre. Small 
children are provided with amour-de-soi and education has to strive to protect them 
from influences that would convert their positive self-relation to an inflamed amour-
propre and make them compare themselves with others and become nourished with 
pride, vanity, or a destructive self-image.  
When Rousseau talked about the ability of humans to extend their being, he saw 
this ability as a power humans possess in contrast to animals. Such extension is, 
however, not directed towards any particular end (Cooper, 2004/2006). Children in 
particular have a strong desire to extend their own being. This extension takes the 
shape of creativity and activity, since children are predestined to experience the 
concrete world (ibid.).  
 
In the state of power and strength the desire to extend our being takes us out of 
ourselves and causes us to leap as far as is possible for us. But since the 
intellectual world is still unknown to us, our thought does not go farther than our 
eyes, and our understanding is extended only along with the space it measures. 
(E, p. 168)  
 
When amour-propre is involved, a desired object is desired mostly as a means for 
reaching an extended being, but this does not necessarily mean that expansion is 
reached when the desired is filled. In The Nicomachean Ethics, Aristotle argues that 
the perfect aim is something worthwhile choosing for its own sake and not because of 
some narrow instrumental aim. Happiness and freedom are perfect aims and thus 
independent and limitless. Freedom in this sense (as a perfect aim) is not selfish, but 
altruistic. A problem arises when the desire to extend one’s being is manifested 
through gaining possessions. Then life becomes nothing but an endless struggle for 
having things, where our possessions enslave us. While Rousseau pointed out that 
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living is acting, Cooper (2004/2006) distinguishes between having and doing,
207
 
where “having” is an extension through possessions, and “doing” is, instead, an 
extension of one’s own existence. Referring to Aristotle, Cooper takes “having” to 
entail external goods, while “doing” entails an activity undertaken for its own sake or 
merely for the experience as its own end. We become enslaved when the desire to 
own things controls us.  
Another extension of one’s own being is the desire for self-mastery; virtue is a 
kind of self-overcoming, where one part of the self manages to rise above another. 
The active moral part of the self, the true self, rules. Pity can also be seen as a kind of 
extension, and among its consequences are friendship, patriotism, and citizens 
identifying with each others, family members, romantic love, desire for knowledge 
and understanding (Cooper, 2004/2006). Dent (1992) does not look upon the way 
Rousseau depicts the problems humans face when they become social as 
hopelessness, but he argues instead that Rousseau wanted to show that humans are 
definitely very dependent on good relations with others. Rousseau’s intention for 
detailing the complexities of human relations was, according to Dent, to show that we 
need to focus on our relationships and on ourselves as parts in these relations if we 
want to change the world into a more decent one.   
In Rousseau’s opinion, “the study suitable for man is that of his relations” (E, p. 
214). This is an occupation that ought to start when humans begin to understand 
moral criteria for relating to others, and has to last throughout life. Mutual 
recognition, where both parts live in harmony without controlling the other, is the 
ideal situation. In extreme situations, on one hand, humans are totally isolated and 
left on their own and driven to choose solitude; on the other hand, they give up their 
selves to be wholly controlled by others (Dent, 1988). Left totally alone, not 
recognized by anybody, they become nothing and their existence as social beings 
end. But, if one considers the quest for recognition from a Foucauldian power 
perspective, we realize that the real life situations are much more complicated than 
this hypothetical play between extremes and ideals. While human conduct is a 
complexly co-operative network, it is not immediately obvious who is controlled by 
whom or what. And when Rousseau suggested a negative education, at least one of 
his intentions might have been to show that solitude and withdrawal from social 
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pressure help one get a clear view of one’s own situation, contribute to caring for the 
self and to figuring out who one is and what one really wants and needs. This self-
training helps to free one’s self from prejudices and to understand what direction 
one’s own will wants to take. In other situations, the cure could be to spend time with 
others and learn to know one’s self through the other in a reciprocal ‘giving’ and 
‘being given’ (not taking) condition. And, in such reciprocating situations, amour-
propre ensures that the individual is met and honored as a particular being with its 
own wants and abilities (see JNH, see also Dent, 1988). Amour-propre interacts with 
self-knowledge and makes humans who they are. The desire for extending one’s 
being can be given proper direction through self-transformation or education, 
according to Rousseau. Collective extension is emphasized through active 
participation in society or in family life. The inborn capacity for extension is 
launched in infancy and lasts the entire life. But, self-transformation is an occupation 
for adults (though it may need guidance) while education is for directing the young.  
 
5.4 Being Social 
 
[B]y first going back to the state of nature, we shall examine whether men are 
born enslaved or free, associated with one another or independent. Whether they 
join together voluntarily or by force. Whether the force which joins them can 
form a permanent right by which this prior force remains obligatory, even when it 
is surmounted by another. (E, p. 459) 
 
Rousseau depicted humans in the state of nature as solitary individuals living without 
any stable residence (2
nd
 D). They did not cultivate the earth; such an occupation did 
not make sense if anyone could come by and confiscate the crop. In Rousseau’s 
mind, no one chooses work before leisure if work does not confer advantages. The 
land had to be divided before cultivation could be an intelligent undertaking. In 
Robinson Crusoe, a book that Rousseau so much appreciated (E), Crusoe had 
developed many kinds of industry even before he got a companion—partly because 
he needed the things he produced, but also because he is bored and, of course, in part 
because he is already civilized and used to tools of all kinds. Rousseau did not 
address overcoming boredom as a motive for work. The state of nature he depicted 
included tranquility, but this state was not monotonous. The use of language is 
another extension Rousseau argued has its origin in collective life. It must have taken 
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a long time to develop all languages and the words needed to express abstract ideas, 
according to Rousseau, a skill that he argued that animals will never learn
208
 (2
nd
 D). 
Not all contemporary researchers would agree with this argument. 
 
The Family 
 
The family is often seen as the original model for political societies; a political leader 
is the analogue of the father and the people his children. Rousseau warned against too 
easily drawing superficial parallels between states and families. He saw a big 
difference between the way a father loves his children and is repaid by love, and the 
condition of a political leader whose only advantage is the pleasure of ruling (SC). 
Family love is an expression of extensive being, according to Cooper (2004/2006), 
where family members and citizens who identify with one another can be seen as 
extending their being towards each other. But civilized society is not developed from 
the model of fatherly power, according to Rousseau, because the duties and rights of 
the state and the family are so different. The father is only the master of his children 
as long as they need his protection; afterwards they should be independent and equal. 
In Rousseau’s view human beings are predestinated for freedom, but they need care 
and support to strive for and maintain their own freedom. No parents have the right to 
deprive their children of their freedom, and this applies to others, as well (DPE). In 
Rousseau’s opinion, to say that a child of a slave is born a slave is the same as to say 
that human beings are not born as humans (2
nd
 D), although the innate traits of a 
savage and a child are compatible (see also Scott, 1992/2006; Starobinski, 1988). In 
short, Rousseau held that since everyone is born free, slavery is contrary to human 
nature and does not exist in the state of nature. Accordingly, when children are in a 
natural state—that is, in a state where no slavery exists—no child can become a 
slave, even if its parents are slaves. Likewise, no one is born a master with an innate 
right to rule (E).  
In the family, Rousseau depicts the father as the one who commands; power is 
not equally divided between the father and the mother. However, the father has to 
listen to “the voice of nature” and “guard himself against depravity, and prevent his 
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natural inclinations from being corrupted” (DPE, p. 125). The father is the manager 
of his entire household, including wife, children, and servants. Children have to obey 
their father, first of necessity and later of gratitude. It is also their task to take care of 
their father when he gets old (DPE). Rousseau, nevertheless, repeatedly addresses 
customs that give fathers the right to choose both professions and partners for their 
children, thus neglecting their children’s own aptitudes and aspirations. He accuses 
fathers for the suffering they cause their children because of their own craving for 
money (2
nd
 D, Note IX; JNH). 
In Julie Rousseau created an image of a happy family life where friendship, 
openness, and shared responsibility prevailed. The adults in the novel mutually strive 
to make their home cheerful and provide models of friendly behavior for their 
children. In addition to parents, there are also other people
209
 involved in the tranquil 
family life and all adults treat each other honestly and respectfully. The women do 
not ‘own’ their children,210 but shar the responsibility, so that they have two mothers, 
Julie and her close friend and cousin Claire, to love and to receive love. The adults 
cultivate the self much in line with what Seneca described: they live a gentle life in 
the countryside, participate in the peasant’s life, share their time between intellectual 
and rural activities, and write diary-like letters exposing their inner struggles and 
feelings (cf. Seneca in Foucault, 1997e, 2005). The practice of the self was a 
collective undertaking, where one rule was to always be frank and to assist one 
another in the care of the self (cf., Foucault, 2005).     
 
The Social Contract and the General Will 
 
Rousseau supposed that humans in their natural state united because this was their 
only way to survive. Yet, as his primary concern the question arose of how free 
humans, focusing on their own wellbeing and survival, could agree on common rules 
while still protecting their own interest (SC). In this stage of his reasoning Rousseau 
starts creating his idea of a social contract based on the general will. He brings into 
consideration a stage of social development than was not immediately apparent and 
posits this as preliminary stage of the development of human societies (see 2
nd
 D). It 
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is a model of how humans could be both united and remain free. But, to understand 
this reasoning, it is necessary to restrict the interpretation of the word “free” to an 
explanation that comes close to what was called “positive freedom” in Chapter One. 
The “freedom” Rousseau talked about was human freedom that takes form through 
self-realization as moral and rational beings with natural inclinations both as 
members of the human species and as unique individuals. In addition, he argued that 
they have equal rights as members of society. However, while no one has priority for 
membership, society based on equality depends on reciprocal duties everybody has to 
fulfill. This is, so to speak, the price individuals must pay for the advantages of social 
life. In Rousseau’s own words: 
 
These clauses, properly understood, may be reduced to one—the total alienation 
of each associate, together with all his rights, to the whole community; for, in the 
first place, as each gives himself absolutely, the conditions are the same for all; 
and, this being so, no one has any interest in making them burdensome to others. 
(SC, p. 8) 
 
When all individuals thus give of themselves and what is theirs (their persons and 
powers) for the general will of which they are only a part, they are repaid to their 
individual benefit. A “moral and collective body” is then shaped (SC, p. 8-9). 
Rousseau used to call this union the “body politic” and describes it using the human 
body as comparison.
211
 He saw the Sovereign as a united body of power consisting of 
all the citizens in a state ruled by the common general will of all. The will of the 
Sovereign drives from the common general will of all and is directed implementing 
that will; the commitments are mutual and everybody is treated equally. However, 
some individuals have personal interests and yet want to enjoy the benefits of their 
citizenship, even if they are not willing to fulfill their duties as citizens (SC). These 
turn out to be what are called “free riders.”212 Such individuals think only of their 
own best interests and are not willing to take responsibility for the common interest 
that allows them to enjoy such benefits over the long run. They leave the ‘payments’ 
they owe society to the others. When sorting out who shall pay the costs of the 
polluted environment in contemporary societies, the dilemma of ‘free riding’ often 
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occurs. A great many people want a clean environment, but they neither want to 
participate in the costs nor sacrifice their living standards. But Rousseau argued that 
those who do not obey the general will must be forced to by the whole of society. 
This is what Rousseau calls the key to the “political machinery.” Everyone has to 
assent to the social contract and become part of the general will that is collectively 
social both in its aims and its essence (SC). “He who wills the end wills the means 
also, and the means must involve some risks, and even some losses” (SC, p. 16). 
Humans who have left their natural state can no longer blindly follow their desires; 
they have to reason and think about what is best for all and for themselves in the long 
run. In Rousseau’s own words:  
 
Although, in this state, he deprives himself of some advantages which he got 
from nature, he gains in return others so great, his faculties are so stimulated and 
developed, his ideas so extended, his feelings so ennobled, and his whole soul so 
uplifted, that, did not the abuses of this new condition often degrade him below 
that which he left, he would be bound to bless continually the happy moment 
which took him from it for ever, and, instead of a stupid and unimaginative 
animal, made him an intelligent being and a man. (SC, p. 10) 
 
What, then, is lost when they take on the role of citizens? It is the natural liberty to do 
and to take whatever they like. Yet, they get something in return: civil liberty and the 
right to their possessions. In addition, they gain moral liberty. As a part of the 
sovereignty, prescribing and following the laws amounts to liberty or autonomy. This 
amounts to being the master of one’s self instead of a slave to one’s own desires. 
Those who think they have the right to rob others of their land are slaves to their 
greed. Even though humans are born with natural differences (physical and mental), 
they become equal through the social contract and the rights it advances. To protect 
one’s own life and rights, one has to be even willing to pay with one’s own life, if 
needed.
213
 ‘Citizens’ are politically active members of the state; others cannot act for 
them. Being a citizen implies making an equal contribution to society, formulating 
the rules that organize the life shared with other citizens, and being protected by all 
other citizens in this role (SC; see also Dent, 1992). When particular members of the 
society are treated as secondary to the laws of the state, they are called “subjects,” 
according to Rousseau (SC). Individuals who have subjected themselves to the 
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general will obey themselves; when they obey the sovereign they become freer under 
the social contract than in the state of nature (E).  
 
At once, in place of the individual personality of each contracting party, this act 
of association creates a moral and collective body, composed of as many 
members as the assembly contains votes, and receiving from this act its unity, its 
common identity, its life and its will. This public person, so formed by the union 
of all other persons formerly took the name of city, and now takes that of 
Republic or body politic; it is called by its members State when passive. 
Sovereign when active, and Power when compared with others like itself. Those 
who are associated in it take collectively the name of people, and severally are 
called citizens, as sharing in the sovereign power, and subjects, as being under the 
laws of the State. But these terms are often confused and taken one for another: it 
is enough to know how to distinguish them when they are being used with 
precision. (SC, p. 8-9) 
 
Common laws protect the citizens and aim at the most profound goods, freedom, and 
equality, according to Rousseau (SC). Yet, there is a problem because all the citizens 
do not necessarily know what is good. Following Aristotle, Rousseau (SC, p. 60) 
states that “men always love what is good or what they find good; it is in judging 
what is good that they go wrong.” Free action depends on two variables: the will, and 
ability. Deeds are thus dependent on both a wish and a capacity to act. Freedom and 
justice are not always given first priority. But the lawgiver is well aware that there are 
forces other than laws that sustain society: the power of habits, such as customs and 
public opinion that are engraved in the minds and hearts of the citizens (SC). These 
forces create the vision of what is worthwhile seeking because of its ‘normality’ and 
signifies what Foucault calls “governmentality,” a disciplined mentality for being 
governed. But in a perfect social state, this disposition need not result in anything 
negative. In an ideal state, citizens who are free from inner conflicts uphold the social 
contract by constantly transforming and reshaping society (Shklar, 1966/2006). Yet, 
Rousseau points out that the general opinion fluctuates from place to place and 
individuals can be exposed to different alternatives in different settings (JNH). In 
reality, in large societies, like big cities with many people living close to each other, 
the social impact makes individuals reject their innermost nature, whereas natural 
settings have the opposite effect, according to Rousseau (ibid.).  
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5.5 Humans in the Natural World 
 
Nature was the site for Rousseau’s natural individual and the natural society. He saw 
natural sites as places where amour-de-soi resided and as places where inflamed 
forms of amour-propre were avoidable, and regarded them as retreats from 
arrogance, pride, and jealousy (see, e.g., RSW). Despite his deep political 
considerations, Rousseau has been called a romantic, and nobody reading the 
beginning of the following quotation, can disagree with this attribution. He sought 
individual and social harmony, both in a broader philosophical perspective and in his 
own life. Nature was situated deeply in these visions, and while natural humans were 
a part of his vision of nature, he did not always find them there. The end of the 
quotation shows that the world seldom fulfilled his dreams.  
 
When the ardent desire for that happy and sweet life which flees from me and for 
which I was born comes to enflame my imagination, it always settles itself in the 
Pays de Vaud, near the lake, in the charming countryside. I absolutely need an 
orchard by the side of this lake and no other; I need a firm friend, a loveable 
woman, a cow, a little boat. I will not enjoy a perfect happiness on earth until I 
have all that. (C, p. 127) 
 
This story tells about how Rousseau dreamed of enjoying his existence, and of only 
extending his being benevolently. On the other hand, real life in the natural world is 
not equivalent to visionary projects concerning it, and its occupants were not 
necessarily to his taste, even if the place was. Perfect harmony is only a chimera. He 
continues: 
 
I laugh at the simplicity with which I have gone to that country several times 
solely to seek this imaginary happiness. I have always been surprised to find the 
inhabitants there, above all the women, of a completely different character from 
the one I seek. How ill-matched it seemed to me! To me, the country and the 
people with whom it is covered have never appeared to be made for each other. 
(C, p. 127-128) 
 
When Rousseau described the natural world, he was not only talking about a place for 
rest and recovery, he was, on the one hand, also depicting a divine system of sublime 
or transcendent landscapes and, on the other hand, describing something quite apart 
from him, a site filled with pieces laid down for empirical investigation and use. 
Sometimes it also sounds like he regarded the natural world as a close friend―the 
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best and most trustful of them all. The natural world was the perfect space for 
reveries; moments of joy merely for their own sake (see RSW). In Dialogues he 
describes the natural world in his ideal world very poetically: 
 
All nature is so beautiful there
214
 that its contemplation, inflaming souls with love 
for such a touching tableau, inspires in them both the desire to contribute to this 
beautiful system and the fear of troubling its harmony; and from this comes an 
exquisite sensitivity which gives those endowed with it immediate enjoyment 
unknown to hearts that the same contemplations have not aroused. (RJJ, p. 9) 
 
This describes nature as a system having intrinsic value; for those who are passionate 
enough to be attached, it is a place to enjoy one’s own being. Elsewhere in the same 
book, he depicts the scenery of the natural world with a list of many attributes: 
“Beautiful sounds, a beautiful sky, a beautiful landscape, a beautiful lake, flowers, 
odors, beautiful eyes, a gentle look...” (RJJ, p. 114). All of these qualities contributed 
to Rousseau’s wellbeing, but it is unclear if the eyes and the look come from another 
human being, a bird, Mother Nature, or something else. He writes about one spring 
when he repeatedly took long morning walks to listen to the nightingale, but the birds 
alone could not awaken his feelings. He needed the entirety of the forest, water, and 
solitude to enjoy the birds―a harmonious unity.  
 
But enlivened by nature and arrayed in its nuptial dress amidst brooks and the 
song of birds, the earth, in the harmony of the three realms,
215
 offers man a 
spectacle filled with life, interest, and charm―the only spectacle in the world of 
which his eyes and his heart never weary…and through a delightful intoxication 
he loses himself in the immensity of this beautiful system with which he feels 
himself one. (RSW, p. 59) 
 
Rousseau not only enjoyed the natural world aesthetically and sympathetically, he 
was also curious about damage to it. Leaning on de Buffon’s216 writings, Rousseau 
pointed out the problems with zealous tree cutting for fuel and other purposes and the 
destruction of cultivated land due to overuse. In the 2
nd
 Discourse, in one detailed 
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 “There” refers to Rousseau’s utopian vision. 
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 The three realms: the kingdom of stones, the kingdom of plants, and the kingdom of animals (von Linné, 
1749/1978a). Compare with Chapter Four. 
216
 Georges-Louis Leclerc de Buffon was a French naturalist and author. His major work is Histoire 
Naturelle in 36 volumes published between 1749 and 1789 contributed to Enlightenment literature. In this 
work he describes a nonreligious biological and geological history of the earth.  
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sentence, he powerfully describes the means by which humans (he uses the word we) 
have made themselves so miserable: 
 
When, on the one hand, one considers men’s tremendous labors, so many 
Sciences investigated, so many arts invented, so many forces employed; chasms 
filled, mountains leveled, rocks split, rivers made navigable, lands cleared, lakes 
dug, swamps drained, huge buildings erected on land, the sea covered with Ships 
and Sailors; and when, on the other hand, one inquires with a little meditation into 
the true advantages that have resulted from all this for the happiness of the human 
species; one cannot fail to be struck by the astonishing disproportion between 
these things, and deplore man’s blindness which, in order to feed his insane pride 
and I know not what vain self-admiration, causes him eagerly to run after all the 
miseries of which he is susceptible, and which beneficent Nature had taken care 
to keep from him. (2
nd
 D, Note IX, p. 197) 
 
Accordingly, nature is seen as a force that prevents humans from being foolish. Later 
in the same note, Rousseau also addresses of the many health problems that result 
from a modern life style. Similar health care and hygienic arguments are common in 
the educational advice given in Émile. This was not unique because, at this time, 
health was important for the growing populations of European countries (see, e.g., 
Foucault, 2000e). Air quality was especially of great concern; polluted air and water 
were both seen as pathogenic. Rousseau was well aware of health risks such as 
contaminated food, dangerous medicine, or air pollution and he emphasized that 
humans can make mistakes and purposely cause damage. The modern lifestyle is 
fragile and dishonesty, unconcern for life, and other consequences of greediness 
damage the human body.  
 
If you think of the horrendous combinations of foods, their noxious seasonings, 
the spoiled provisions, the adulterated drugs, the villainies of those who sell them, 
the mistakes of those who administer them, the poisonous Utensils in which they 
are prepared; if you attend to the epidemics bred by the bad air wherever large 
numbers of men gathered together…  (2nd D, Note IX, p. 199) 
 
Following this, Rousseau discusses large-scale damage from such events as fires and 
earthquakes. It is worthwhile noting that in the same year the 2
nd
 Discourse was 
published, 1755, an earthquake followed by a tsunami and a fire took place in Lisbon 
and killed around sixty thousand people. His detailed description of this event 
concludes with a judgment about how nature hits back against irrepressible humans, 
an argument that is still used in environmental debates: “you will sense how dearly 
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Nature makes us pay for the contempt we have showed for its lessons” (ibid.). 
Mother Nature seems to indiscriminately punish her children collectively. What does 
Rousseau mean by “the contempt we have showed her lessons”? In the subsequent 
text it seems as though he simply insinuates that humans intrinsically know how to 
act but do not act in accordance with this knowledge. At the very least he meant that 
some enlightened individuals have kept quiet about despoliations and neither 
informed others about issues such as the sanitary and medical irritants of warfare and 
shipping nor about all the brutal costs of birth prevention (2
nd
 D, Note IX). Their 
inflamed amour-propre is stronger than their compassion. Later on in Note IX 
Rousseau’s continues to reveal his frustration over injurious vocations, among them 
mine work where the minor has to handle such dangerous materials as lead, copper, 
mercury, cobalt, arsenic, and sulfur arsenic. It was obviously already known during 
Rousseau’s time that work with these materials could be dangerous. In Reveries he 
also expresses his dislike for the dangers of underground mining compared to 
peasants and shepherds who work in the fields and meadows.
217
  
Rousseau claimed that nature has predestined humans to be healthy (2
nd
 D). 
Civilized life is, therefore, not in order with nature, and instead makes humans 
rundown and sick. It is not only humans that suffer from civilization. Domestic 
animals are in even worse condition than wild animals. But this is not easily cured; 
everywhere, both civilization and comfort are increasingly required or demanded 
(JNH). When Parisians go to the countryside, they live the same life as in the city, 
thus actually bringing so many utensils and servants that one could say they take all 
Paris with them. Rousseau concluded that “they never know but one manner of 
living, and are ever bored with it” (JNH, p. 493). 
Rousseau found humans superior to other animals, but humans have moral duties 
towards aimals and do not naturally eat meat. In Notes V and VIII in the 2
nd
 Discourse 
Rousseau attempts to prove that humans initially are vegetarians. Rousseau uses the 
shape of the human teeth and the alimentary canal as evidence, but also draws upon 
testimony from narratives of both Ancient and recent voyages. In Émile, he also 
recommends vegetarian food for children. Through the ages many others have tried to 
prove the same, using similar arguments. Plutarch
218
 (trans. 2007), for example, 
ironically states that humans would be capable of catching animals with their bare 
hands and eating them raw if they were carnivores. Unique to Rousseau’s claims is 
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 This was before chemical fertilization and pesticides became common. 
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 Plutarch lived about 45-125 AD. In Swedish language Plutarch is called Plutarchos. 
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that he thought that humans probably could have stayed in the state of nature if they 
would have eaten only vegetables, as he regarded vegetarians as more peaceful than 
carnivores. So, we could say that, according to Rousseau, it was not the apple, but 
spilling the blood of other animals that caused the Fall. However, he most certainly 
thought that humans had no other choice the moment this habit was born. 
 
5.6 Nature for Worship 
 
In Classical Greece, in Hellenistic Greece, and during the Roman time there were 
traditions of both purification and concentration of the soul before contact with the 
gods, but also when encountering the truth (Foucault, 2005). Other techniques were 
withdrawal from the world into one’s self to avoid sensations and disturbance, and 
practicing the endurance needed to bear hardship and resist temptations. When 
Rousseau wanted to meditate or otherwise withdraw from society he went to natural 
sites. He carried out both his reveries and active purifications of his soul on long 
wanderings in the countryside, and he tried to encourage others to engage in more 
walking, as well (see, e.g., E). But he could also stay motionless in a drifting boat 
(RSW) or dream under a tree (1
st
 D). According to Plato (in Alcibiades, 132b-133c) 
to know one’s self, one needs to look in a mirror. In a similar vein, Rousseau writes:  
 
Now our mind is like the eye that sees everything and does not see itself at all, 
unless it is by reflection when it looks in a mirror. The secret for knowing oneself 
and for judging well about ourselves, it is to see ourselves in others. (UC, p. 3)  
 
Plato even stated that the best mirror is the divine element in another’s eye, but 
Eusebius of Caesarea
219
 said that one needs to look into a brighter mirror, one that is 
better than one’s own eye in judging the quality of the soul, and this mirror is God 
(see Foucault, 2005): only God gives wisdom (sōphrosunē). But the Stoics and 
Cynics maintained that when the soul contemplates itself, it participates in divine 
reason and recognizes both its own divine nature and the divinity of its thoughts 
(ibid.). Rousseau’s best divine mirror was the natural world, the site that reveals the 
existence of God. For him the natural world showed order and was beautiful, a 
harmonious entirety built on reason. “The greatest ideas of the divinity come to us 
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from reason alone. View the spectacle of nature, hear the inner voice. Has God not 
told everything to our eyes, to our conscience, to our judgment?” (E, p. 295). 
Rousseau’s epithet “the hidden language of nature” is interesting to compare with 
Demetrius’220 who distinguished between useful knowledge (that affects human 
existence) and un-useful knowledge (about the external world). Demetrius argued 
that nature clearly exposes all things that can make humans better. What humans 
need to know is that they have nothing to fear from each other or the gods and that 
the world is the common dwelling place of all humans. This knowledge can 
transform the subject and generate the individual’s ethos or mode of being in ways 
that are more important than ornamental knowledge which brings only cultural 
pleasure. Real knowledge affects all of the human existence (Foucault, 2005). So 
according to both Rousseau and Demetrius, nature shows humans what they need to 
know. Like the Epicureans and the Cynics, Rousseau searched in nature for 
knowledge that could transform and improve human existence. Knowledge of nature 
and of the self was not separate, but linked so that self-transforming knowledge was 
born in the interaction between knowledge of nature and knowledge of the self 
(ibid.). The hidden secrets could be revealed for those who were ready to search 
inside themselves. 
Rousseau saw the natural world as a proof of God’s being. God was male while 
nature was female (Mother Earth) (see, e.g., E, LF), he felt the presence of this 
mother: “and the countryside itself would have less charm in his eyes if he didn’t see 
it in the attentions of the common mother who takes pleasure in adorning the 
dwelling place of her children” (RJJ, p. 114). God, the male, reveals Himself through 
his work, the female nature. 
 
I perceive God everywhere in His works. I sense Him in me; I see Him all around 
me. But as soon as I want to contemplate Him in Himself, as soon as I want to 
find out where He is what He is, what His substance is, He escapes me, and my 
clouded mind no longer perceives anything.
221
 (E, p. 277) 
 
While Rousseau had to struggle all his life with the choice between solitude and 
social life, nature was a retreat back into his self, a place where he felt safe and 
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 Demetrius was a Cynic philosopher and friend of Seneca.  
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 In OC IV the pronoun is also he, but not with capital letters: “J’apperçois Dieu par tout dans ses œuvres; 
je le sens en moi, je le vois tout autour de moi, mais sitôt que je veux le contempler en lui-même, sitôt que je 
veux chercher où il eŝt, ce qu’il eŝt, qu’elle est sa subŝtance, il m’échappe, et mon esprit troublé n’apperçoit 
plus rien » (OV IV, p. 581). 
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whole; a place to briefly pause and think without distraction. Nevertheless, he did not 
regard solitude as the most natural or optimal way of being, but would have preferred 
to share time with dear friends and beloved (RJJ, see also JNH). For a sensitive 
person, however, it can be easier “to live alone in a desert than alone among one’s 
fellows” (RJJ, p. 118). He saw contemplation as a tool for the soul to find inward joy, 
since every human is determined to be happy, although other people try to destroy 
that happiness. Especially late in his life, nature was his domicile. In Reveries he says 
that the hours he spends alone and meditating are the hours he is his own master and 
what nature meant him to be. Nature is the truest human element. When merged into 
the natural world, humans are sufficient in themselves, like God.   
“I feel ecstasies and inexpressible raptures in blending, so to speak, into the 
system of beings and in making myself one with the whole of nature” (RSW, p. 61). 
In the previous chapter I described Rousseau’s meditation that resulted in the 
conclusion that “I exist and I have senses through which I receive impressions.” This 
was not the final end of the vicar’s meditations; he went on and thus I will now 
continue to describe those further reflections. The vicar had carefully chosen the time 
and place to make his speech to the young Rousseau (the author here is split into two 
persons: the vicar and his young listener). This took place on an early summer 
morning on a hill above the river Po. Probably not coincidentally, I immediately got 
the same impression as Brome (1963) that this situation has a resemblance with the 
Biblical ‘Sermon on the Mount’222 (in Matt. 5-7), but it can also be read allegorically 
as a way of taking a detached position and looking objectively at oneself, or even a 
way of observing one’s self in Mother Nature.  
 
In the distance the immense chain of the Alps crowned the landscape. The rays of 
the rising sun already grazed the plains and, projecting on the fields long shadows 
of the trees, the vineyards, and the houses, enriched with countless irregularities 
of light the most beautiful scene which can strike the human eye. (E, p. 266) 
 
It is a scene filled with sentiment and strong admiration for the glories of nature. 
Broome compares the whole story with the Fall and Redemption, as the vicar’s 
profession (declaration of faith) is preceded by two stories where both the young boy 
and the vicar confess their earlier immoral living. The vicar’s223 meditations had 
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 The vicar is the one who utters the central arguments in this text, so I will let him speak instead of the 
author himself (although I already said that I see him as Rousseau’s alias). 
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hitherto revealed for Rousseau that he exists and has sensations. And further, he has 
the power of mind that collects his sensations and by which he compares sensations. 
He is unsure whether to call this power “attention” (attention), “meditation” 
(méditation), “reflection” (réflexion), or something else (E, p. 271; OC IV, p. 573). 
But this power is in him and not in things perceived and it forces him to react; but the 
next step, acting on this reaction, is up to him. This means that he not only has the 
capacity for sensing, but also an intellect that can act purposefully. He has now 
proved that two forces act upon human beings; one of them is out of their power to 
handle, the other is not. Humans have the free will to choose. In contrast, the vicar is 
unsure whether other animals have this ability. Rousseau has said elsewhere that 
there is some difference between humans and other animals in this respect (e.g., 2
nd
 
D), but he is definitively sure that inorganic matter cannot move without any external 
cause. In Reveries he uses these words:  
 
I see nothing in any animal but an ingenious machine, to which nature hath given 
senses to wind itself up, and to guard itself, to a certain degree, against anything 
that might tend to disorder or destroy it. I perceive exactly the same things in the 
human machine, with this difference, that in the operations of the brute, nature is 
the sole agent, whereas man has some share in his own operations, in his 
character as a free agent. The one chooses and refuses by instinct, the other from 
an act of free-will: hence the brute cannot deviate from the rule prescribed to it, 
even when it would be advantageous for it to do so; and, on the contrary, man 
frequently deviates from such rules to his own prejudice. (DPE, p. 87) 
 
Thinking beings act, reason, judge, and choose and, therefore, they exist, but these 
abilities are not possible for the other ‘things’ of nature (E). The universe is ordered 
in determinate form as regulated by the natural laws. The vicar continues pondering 
about why non-human matter moves and who or what set forth these movements and 
give them direction. The vicar is convinced that the natural state of an inorganic 
object is stationary and it does not act until somebody acts upon it. Then, he examines 
the difference between acquired and voluntary motions and concludes that voluntary 
motions exist, and he takes the movement of his own arm as an example because the 
arm belongs to a person who has free will. Nevertheless, the natural state of other 
matter is a state of rest lacking power of its own. Something or somebody must have 
put such bodies in motion, he decides. Such movement thus depends on some 
external cause, as these bodies cannot move of themselves; thus, there must be a will 
that starts the universe and puts the natural world into motion. And if a will is the 
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motive that moves matter and if this motion, in addition, follow rules about such 
movement, there must also be a guiding reason. Without understanding how 
everything works, the vicar perceives all nature as a system where all its parts 
function in harmony. 
  
I do not know why the universe exists, but that does not prevent me from seeing 
how it is modified, or from perceiving the intimate correspondence by which the 
beings that compose it lend each other mutual assistance. I am like a man who 
saw a watch opened for the first time and, although he did not know the 
machine’s use and had not seen the dial, was not prevented from admiring the 
work. “I do not know,” he would say, “what the whole is good for, but I do see tht 
[sic] each piece is made for the others; I admire the workman in the details of his 
work; and I am quite sure that all these wheels are moving in harmony only for a 
common end which it is impossible for me to perceive. (E, p. 275) 
 
The perception of the natural world is not enough to grasp the whole entirety of the 
‘creation’ and, thus, there has to be an intellect224 behind all things, according to the 
vicar. Unless prejudices abandon the conception, the evidence for this manifest 
harmony appears through “our inner sentiment”225 (ibid.). In this concord all species 
are distinct and ordered to serve each other and to coexist as each other’s means and 
aims. These thoughts of Rousseau were not unique, and they correlate with later ideas 
about ecosystems.
226
 This complete plan cannot be caused by chance, with intelligent 
creatures coming into being as a mere coincidence. There has to be an independent 
will that moves the universe and orders all matters, and the vicar calls that being God. 
The vicar thus claims that it is not the task of humans to understand what God is. 
227
 
The vicar’s next step is to find out his own relation to God. The first thing he 
makes clear is that human beings are the highest of all creatures; they are the ones 
who can understand all the inter-relations and interactions of the natural world and 
relate them to themselves. They are the ones who are next to God. However, when 
the vicar starts to consider human life, he is no longer filled with admiration. What he 
sees around him is total chaos. Humans struggle between two forces: one leads them 
towards eternal truths and justice while the other makes them a slave of their own 
senses and desires. This conflict makes him wonder: 
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I said to myself: “No, man is not one; I want and I do not want; I sense myself 
enslaved and free at the same time. I see the good. I love it, and I do the bad. I am 
active when I listen to reason, passive when my passions carry me away; and my 
worst torment, when I succumb, is to sense that I could have resisted.” (E, p. 278-
279) 
 
Humans do not need to search for hell beyond death; it resides already on earth in 
evil hearts. It is their unlimited desires that are the roots of evil. The vicar 
categorically protests against materialistic theories that do not believe in a human 
soul and accuses materialists of neglecting their inner voices. He states that no other 
creatures are active in the same sense as are humans, who have the power to choose 
whether or not they want to follow their consciences. And their inner voices rule over 
their decisions, although they are not always capable of acting in accordance with 
their wills. They are free because of their remorse but slaves because of their 
passions. Their freedom disappears if they neglect to listen to their consciences when 
they act wrong. Human intelligence is the power to choose and judge and judgment 
rules their will. The ability to judge is an intrinsic quality. One’s primary choices are 
those that are good for one’s wellbeing. Humans are by nature able to sense their 
immediate needs. Without opportunities to make their own choices, God would have 
made humans stupid, and humans thus suffer when they make bad choices and 
misuse their abilities. It is their greed that leads to human ruin. Human life is only a 
half a life if they neglect their souls and only follow their immediate desires. The fact 
that humans have free will makes them responsible for their actions, and their vices 
cannot be blamed on divine providence. But Rousseau argued that individuals cannot 
disturb the general world order by abusing their freedom. He did not imagine how 
much humankind would eventually disturb the natural world when he wrote: “The 
evil that man does falls back on him without changing anything in the system of the 
world, without preventing the human species from preserving itself in spite of itself” 
(E, p. 281). Rousseau seemed to believe that humans could neither harm the survival 
of other species nor extinguish all of humankind. This was long before nuclear 
weapons, climate change, and other threats to the fate of humanity.  
Good humans, according to the vicar, are good towards their kin, and God shows 
his goodness when he upholds that harmony. The vicar does not mention human 
behavior towards other creatures. It seems to primarly be God’s task to watch over 
them. God is justice; injustice is the fault of humans. There is a gap between the 
conscience, the true human leader, and desires that are ruled by instinct. Humans 
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need to listen more to what their conscience tells their hearts than to the desires that 
inform their senses. When humans are good they are happy with themselves, while 
evil humans try to flee from themselves and cannot enjoy life anymore; mocking 
laugher is their only pleasure. All humans, regardless of when and where they live 
and what faith they worship, have an intrinsic capacity for justice and virtue, and that 
capacity is their conscience, according to Rousseau. The truth is written in the 
humans’ hearts; but they have to learn to distinguish between attained ideas and inner 
feelings because feeling comes before knowledge. “To exist, for us, is to sense; our 
sensibility is incontestably anterior to our intelligence, and we had sentiments before 
ideas”228 (E, p. 290). Humans have sentiments that suit their nature and these 
sentiments are innate. By “feelings” the vicar means love for one’s wellbeing, fear, 
pain, fear of death, and craving for comfort.  
The conscience is a product of humans’ relationships to themselves and to their 
fellows (E). Yet, to know the good is not the same as to love it; when humans learn 
about goodness
229
 their feelings lead their conscience to seek it. It is their conscience 
that makes humans godlike: without a conscience they are almost like animals. Even 
if ruled by understanding and reason, they would lack principles and guidance. In this 
Rousseau criticized the belief that knowledge and reason are the only ways to the 
truth because studies do not bring about moral conduct. That depends on an intrinsic 
feeling in the human heart. Virtue is more than love of moral order; virtue is moral 
conduct. The difference between good and evil is that the good accepts the divine 
order and cares about the whole of mankind, but evil arranges an order in according 
with its own will. Why do all humans not follow their conscience if it subsists within 
everyone? It is because conscience speaks the forgotten language of nature, says 
Rousseau. To become able to bridge the gap between knowing the good and acting 
rightly, humans need education.  
 To summarize Rousseau’s religious thoughts: God started the movements of 
nature. He makes Himself evident through the intelligent comprehensiveness of his 
system, the whole natural world. Humans cannot completely understand God and 
how all things are arranged. They are not intelligent enough for such speculations. 
When humans have tried to recognize God they have made him in their own image. 
Humans are closer to God than all other creatures, and the natural human being is 
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 In French: “Exiŝter pour nous, c’eŝt sentir ; notre sensibilité eŝt inconteŝtablement antérieure à nôtre 
intelligence, et nous avons eu des sentimens avant des idées” (OV IV, p. 600). 
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 In French “le bien” (OC IV, p. 600). 
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closer to God than are civilized humans. Even if humans share God’s virtue, they 
have their own will and can choose virtue or vice. The closer their will is to God’s, 
the more natural it is, and the more virtuously they act. The virtuous voice of God 
speaks through the human conscience, and: “He has given us reason to discern what 
is good, conscience to love it, and freedom to choose it” (JNH, p.561). To serve God 
is not primarily a question about thinking and talking, not even about praying. It is 
about actually fulfilling one’s duties towards Him.   
When reading Savoyard Vicar it becomes obvious that Scott (1992/2006) is right 
when he calls Rousseau’s view of human nature and the development of humankind a 
comprehensive picture of what it entails to be a human being. In Savoyard Vicar 
Rousseau develops his thoughts about natural religion and this is a text that, 
according to Rousseau, was an extremely crucial summary of his philosophical 
thoughts (see RSW). I also find the text to be an overview of the ethics I described 
earlier in this chapter. In a letter to Voltaire, Rousseau depicts God as totally 
impersonal. God’s concern is the whole world and its entire species as a whole. He is 
not concerned with particular individuals. The order of the whole is the most 
important and thus the survival of the species comes before individual lives. God has 
given us life but does not care about how each one of us spends her or his life. 
Humans are good because they share in a totality that is good due to the goodness of 
its providence. Rousseau is apparently more interested in how humans treat each 
other and the natural world than with the impressions they make on God (LV). The 
human aim is to throw away the veils of civilization and become more natural and 
thus more godlike. Rousseau thought that he had reached that state at the end of his 
life, when he writes in Reveries: “[H]ere I am, tranquil at the bottom of the abyss, a 
poor unfortunate mortal, but unperturbed, like God Himself” (RSW, p. 6). He was 
alone and no longer cared about worldly matters; he wanted to spend his last day 
conversing with his soul. The meditations during his daily walks were times when he 
felt “I am fully myself and for myself, without diversion, without obstacle, and 
during which I can truly claim to be what nature willed” (ibid., p. 9). 
 Cooper (2004/2006) argues that Rousseau extends his being and overcomes 
“civilized self-consciousness” in the stories he tells in Reveries. On the one hand, 
Rousseau identifies with the harmony of nature and meditates and dreams in order to 
lose his self amidst nature. He thus becomes sensitized and experiences the divine 
system. He feels one with nature; he becomes a part of something greater than his 
self. On the other hand, this is a satisfaction with self in the very moment, being what 
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one is and nothing more; it is a kind of narrowing space and time (ibid.) and of 
existing in the very moment. Nevertheless, in Émile et Sophie Émile remembers what 
he learned as a child: not to dream about doing one thing while he already is occupied 
with something else, because this is to be nowhere. He worked, therefore, during the 
day and dreamed in the evenings.   
According to Scott (1992/2006), Rousseau speaks about the first providence 
metaphorically as a picture of a positive character, nature, in contrast to the evils of 
society created by humans. In Letter to Voltaire, he describes God as the most 
perfect, just and wise being that is possible, and as something totally different than 
what the priests make of Him (LV). God is an ideal of the highest morality, 
something to try to live up to: He brings hope (ibid.). Viewed in that light, Rousseau 
posed an alternative to Hobbes’ negative pictures of humans as initially evil and of 
Locke’s social order where human rights are prior to human duties. Rousseau’s 
picture, then, is a reversal of the image of a life where individual desires promote a 
steady development to the visualization of social change of a more responsible 
character. But God is not nature; He is its animator, the spirit that holds up the world 
(E). Rousseau distinguishes between the religion of the state and that of the 
individual, and the latter has no altars, rituals, or rites. Christianity as a spiritual 
religion is problematic; it does not bind citizens firmly to the state and is more likely 
to be in opposition to society and the social contract. If religion brings about faith in 
an afterlife, it provides no striving for better conditions on earth: despite their 
troubles and disorders, everyone can hope for being rescued from their slavery the 
day they die.  
Rousseau does not first and foremost suggest a state religion, although many 
interpret the last book in the Social Contract as doing so. What he writes is that a 
state can have a common religion if that religion is free from dogmatism and upholds 
the moral realm. But he also declares that the Sovereign can set up “a purely civil 
profession of faith of which the Sovereign should fix the articles, not exactly as 
religious dogmas, but as social sentiments without which a man cannot be a good 
citizen or a faithful subject”230 (SC, p. 65). This is more a question of civil morality 
than of institutional religion. However, some form of religion can be beneficial to 
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 “Il y a donc une profession de foi purement civile dont il appartient au Souverain de fixer les articles, non 
pas précisément comme dogmes de Religion, mais comme sentimens [sic] de sociabilité, sans lesquels il est 
impossible d’être bon Citoyen ni sujet fidelle [sic]” (OC III, p.468). 
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maintaining social harmony. According to Rousseau, a society needs a few simple 
common rules. Among them are: 
 
[t]he existence of a mighty, intelligent and beneficent Divinity, possessed of 
foresight and providence, the life to come, the happiness of the just, the 
punishment of the wicked, the sanctity of the social contract and the laws: these 
are its positive dogmas. (SC, p. 66)  
 
He mentions one negative dogma, intolerance, which can occur both in civil and 
religious forms and “which is a part of the cults we have rejected” (SC, p. 66). All 
religions are to be tolerated as long as they do not threaten the duties of the citizens 
(SC). Thus, he did not deny the afterlife, but he did not hold it as the main goal of 
life. For Rousseau, religion should not be based only on rationality; he emphasized 
the need for emotional involvement. But Edelman (2004) suggests that Rousseau’s 
religion only served the pragmatic political goal of shaping unity in the state based on 
shared devotion. He may be right. In Letter to Franquières (p. 266-267) Rousseau 
claims that “to root out all belief in God from the heart of man is to destroy all virtue 
there” and he argues that removing God would lead to more evil. However, when 
Rousseau praises nature and asks how something that well-organized could be 
possible without a divinity, it sounds as though he believed in God. Moreover, in 
Savoyard Vicar he keenly objects to atheism. Again we encounter a paradox, and a 
picture that is all but black and white. 
 
5.7 Answers to the Inquiry 
 
The main question studied in this chapter is What were Rousseau’s ethics in relation 
to nature? I will deal in order with the sub-questions and then return to the main 
problematic.  
1. What is the ethical substance of Rousseau's conclusions about the moral 
conduct of human beings? According to Rousseau, all individuals have to search for 
what is natural inside them and listen to their own hearts. Rousseau saw always a 
conflict between amour-de-soi, the natural love towards oneself, and amour-propre, 
the socially created self-relation. The feeling for the natural, instinctual amour-de-soi 
is contaminated by ages of civilization and the genuine human being is hidden behind 
a thick and multilayered veil. We do not know who we are; we think we know, but 
261 
 
are not sure (see E), so our challenge is to find our innermost being. For adults who 
are focused on their lifestyles and the values of their society, the search for 
genuineness is a difficult task. Through his own example Rousseau wanted to show 
that an individual has to consider life as a constant struggle with the outer world 
(society) and with the inner temptations that society promotes. Humans are born good 
and have free will to choose the good rather than evil. Therefore, acting good is 
natural but to become virtuous humans have to choose the good as a duty. “There is 
no happiness without courage nor virtue without struggle. The word virtue comes 
from strength” (E, p. 444).231 If happiness came without struggle it would not be so 
valuable. Goodness lasts only as long as one takes pleasures in it, but being virtuous 
demands more effort. Only God is virtuous without struggle, while humans become 
free when they become their own masters. To master their passions, humans need to 
learn to know their limits (E).  
2. What modes of control (subjection) do humans have to undergo to live in tune 
with their human nature, according to Rousseau? According to Rousseau, it is 
important to stand up for what is natural and morally right and not try to hide 
between conventions and common rituals. He asked for moral behavior, not for 
ethical rules that lack practical implications. In this respect he had to struggle and 
thus made himself uncomfortable in most groups. Always trying to follow one’s own 
ethical rules, thus talking and acting as he felt was right, was met with disdain. When 
he acted in accordance with his beliefs, the reaction was the same, and when he tried 
to compromise or failed to follow his principles he was accused of being inconsistent. 
The only way out was withdrawal and non-participation. Nevertheless, Rousseau 
found that the best way for humans to feel comfortable and at ease with themselves 
was to act in accordance with their own inner nature, without comparing themselves 
with others or trying to be more than they actually are. 
3. What forms of conduct or manners do individuals have to choose in order to 
transform themselves into more 'natural' humans, according to Rousseau? At the age 
of forty, Rousseau decided to live a more natural life, to give up struggling with 
worldly matters, and to start to live day by day. “I forsook the world and its pomp; I 
renounced all finery: no more sword, no more watch, no more white stockings, 
gilding, or headdress, a very simple wig, a good coarse cloth garment, and, better 
than all that, I eradicated from my heart the cupidity and covetousness which give 
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value to everything I was forsaking” (RSW, p. 20). He resigned his post, moved to 
the countryside and started to make his own living by copying music. From that 
moment he also spent considerable time alone in natural settings. But, this change 
was not only external; it was also a moral awakening that he calls “a great revolution” 
(ibid.): “I eradicated from my heart the cupidity and covetousness which gave value 
to everything I was forsaking” (ibid.). He began to feel the absurdity in humans’ 
judgments; he also felt he could not agree with the atheism that many philosophers 
preached, which he was not even sure was their own belief. Rousseau wanted dearly 
to become more aware of his own beliefs; that is, to know himself better. At this 
stage he undertook the meditations he describes in Savoyard Vicar. Even though his 
ideas were controversial and caused him many doubts, he remained faithful to them 
for the rest of his life, and during this period of revival he struggled to live virtuously: 
“I will be happy if by the progress I make with myself I learn to leave life not better, 
for that is not possible, but more virtuous than I entered it!” (RSW, p. 27). Rousseau 
not only sought a more natural moral conduct in his own life, he also wanted provide 
a model for others. Sometimes he thought that it was possible for others to free 
themselves of prejudices and to develop their moral judgments through self-training. 
In Reveries he even states that one day his thoughts would create a revolution among 
humans “if good sense and good faith are ever reborn among them” (RSW, p. 23).  
Rousseau faced the difficulty that people trying to live in accordance with nature 
struggle with today, namely how to follow rules that are not commonly followed in 
society; that is, the difficulty of choosing the most natural lifestyle while also living 
together with the other members of society who follow other rules. He was aware of 
the conflicting multiple roles humans struggle with; that an individual is not one, but 
many roles. These roles change from context to context and when acquiescing to the 
will of others, individuals start to neglect their own inner wants. Given the variety of 
other wills and the diverse forms taken by one’s own will, the whole of life becomes 
a struggle between different wills. Anyone actively involved in environmental 
protection and struggling to choose an environmental friendly lifestyle has had to 
deal with this dilemma. In all his writings Rousseau tried to stimulate others to act 
more naturally; that is, to live modest lives without superfluous luxury, lives where 
the present need for survival takes precedence over focusing endlessly on extending  
being by means of unnecessary possessions and presenting false, unnatural façades. 
However, he also saw the ongoing human conflict between being free and being 
social, since his personal dilemma was always one of conflict between solitude and 
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social life. Society both corrupts and awakens responsibility and compassion. 
Solitude increases freedom, but life is not worth much without friendship and love.  
4. What should the ethical goal be towards which individuals should strive in 
actualizing their moral selves, according to Rousseau? In Rousseau’s opinion 
humans are born with free will. Everyone has a free choice to join the race or step 
aside. He was convinced that he had been born uncorrupted then subsequently 
confronted by the dishonesty and depravity of other people (RSW, p. 55): “If I had 
remained free, obscure, and isolated as I was made to be, I would have done only 
good, for I do not have the seed of any harmful passion in my heart.” The desire to 
extend one’s being can, if done negatively, result in mastery over others. In a positive 
sense it can lead, instead, to self-mastery. With the goal of becoming satisfied with 
one’s own being, humans can strive to carry out a virtuous life. Cooper (2004/2006) 
interprets this struggle for goodness as one part of the self taking power over the 
other, where the good and true self takes the leading role. Cooper’s ideas are 
reminiscent of Plato’s description of the struggling parts of the soul. Rousseau 
claimed that he had searched for knowing his own being more eagerly than anyone 
else. Instead of studying the natural world to know more about it than others or 
speaking knowledgeably about human nature, he wanted to know himself. The aim of 
his writing was not to become famous; instead, he sought to widen his own sagacity. 
(RSW) But the extension of one’s being was also a process of perfection; a matter of 
becoming ever-more godlike and fulfilling one’s role in society, in the greater totality 
of Mother Nature (E). Civil society (la societé civile), with all its obligations and 
duties, definitely did not suit Rousseau. Therefore, as an old and disillusioned man, 
Rousseau stepped apart from society and chose solitude, and the only option he 
offered Julie was death:  
 
The land of illusions is on this earth the only one worth living in, and such is the 
void of things human that, with the exception of the Being who exists in himself, 
the only beauty to be found is in the things that are not. (JNH, p. 569) 
 
Nevertheless, for example in Émile, Rousseau offered a more optimistic and hopeful 
vision, a vision he nevertheless rejected in Émile et Sophie. Although his hope was 
fragile, he believed in (or at least hoped that) some degree of human perfection 
moved towards both more enlightened human beings and better human societies, at 
least temporarily. This is noticeable in his visionary works, although he often wrote 
as though steered by rage.  
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5.8 Conclusion 
 
The main question in this chapter is: What were Rousseau’s ethics in relation to 
nature? Before I start to conclude the crucial elements in Rousseau’s ethics, I have 
some pivotal points to draw. Firstly, when I called this chapter “Rousseau on nature 
and ethics,” I wanted to emphasize that nature is the foundation of Rousseau’s ethics. 
Secondly, “nature” and “natural” are two concepts that arise from the same idea: 
anything that is in a state of nature is natural, so nature is much more than the natural 
world (a physical unity); it is also a state of being that is innate for all living creatures 
and the entire universe. Thirdly, the totality that is Rousseau’s concept of “nature” 
has a clear, divine dimension that cannot be neglected in the interpretation of his 
ethics. Okin (1979/2006) blames Rousseau for using the concept of “nature” 
selectively to depict a one-sided view of a state he found good for humankind and 
recommends that Rousseau’s views have to be read critically.  
As mentioned earlier, no matter how beautifully Rousseau wrote about the state 
of nature, he never thought that a return to this blessed hypothetical state was a 
realistic option. Whether we want to or not, it seems inherent in human nature to 
progress, although the speed of such progress may vary according to environmental 
circumstances that humans cannot totally ignore. There are, of course, many points in 
Rousseau’s thoughts that cannot be taken seriously, but also many statements and 
recommendations that are as topical today as they were in the 18
th
 century. Scott 
(1992/2006, p. 227) points out that the most fundamental question is not if Rousseau 
was right about human nature, but that “he forces us to rethink how the essential 
questions of political theory are related.” In general, contemporary political theory is 
not interested in discussing aspects such as justice, fairness, and progress in relation 
to human nature (ibid.). But, for Rousseau these components were definitely allied 
and thus they need to be included in contemporary discourse about sustainability. 
Rousseau had an ambivalent relation with “reason”; he saw it in both a positive and 
negative light. For him reason without compassion was dangerous (cf. Næss, 2002). 
He argued that humans need passion in order to see and react, to bother about the 
welfare of others, and about the course of the world. He wanted people to care about 
each other, not just strive for their own advantage, and to take close note of what 
happens in their immediate surroundings. He never understood how people could cry 
when watching tragedies at the theater but not react to real misery in their 
neighborhood (E). For him, ethics was a practical endeavor, and he wanted to teach 
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people to care more about the happiness of people next to them than about abstract 
virtues.  
Rousseau is unfairly associated with “back to nature” (see the previous chapter). 
His intention should instead be described as a summons for everyone to live in 
accordance with their inner nature. “Let us return to ourselves,” was what he meant 
(E, p. 287). He suggested that those who know how to speak can attend to big issues, 
while most humans are more suitable for concrete actions. However, concluding that 
Rousseau’s point was that we can relax and leave ruling and investigation to the 
brilliant intellects would be a misreading that misses his ironical point. To the 
contrary, he encouraged vigilance towards discussions of important issues. Even if 
Rousseau agitated for genuineness and simplicity, he did not suggest blindness and 
foolish trust. He never rejected reason as a crucial drive, only corrupt reason; he saw 
reason as a means towards the truth (Kelly, 2001). But, according to Rousseau, it is 
not possible to reach truth unthinkingly or merely theoretically, because truth is not 
an impersonal construction: it is rooted in the human mind. Truth is to be grasped by 
love and tenderness (ibid.); science without virtue is worthless. “His constructive 
impulse was not a longing for an Eden to complement a self-engendered vision of 
hell, but to delineate a human world fit for human life, where paler grey may, with 
good fortune, preponderate over darker” (Dent, 1988, p. 7). What Rousseau wanted 
so much was a world where individuals were recognized by others as ends worthy in 
their own sake, not as means to another’s wellbeing. Society should be an agreement 
on equal terms, not a matter of hierarchical control. Rousseau claims that politicians 
concentrate their efforts on money and consumption. They value people like cattle 
and only see their value in what they consume (2
nd
 D). 
 In Rousseau’s opinion, humans are parts of nature in many ways and their 
original state is natural. On the other hand, he wanted humanity to stand for 
naturalness and moral conduct. For him, caring about nature was caring about what is 
natural, and it definitely required more than words; it was to become more natural 
through a kind of self creation. A natural relation to self is living in accordance with 
what is intrinsic for human beings that is in accord with nature. It is to free oneself 
from unnatural desires and, thus, is about the supremacy of self over one’s self that is 
self-management (cf. Foucault, 1985, 2005). Rousseau was not a mere subject 
considering and studying objective reality. He was a living being with a philosophical 
system and a burning desire to live his philosophy himself. Yet, he also cared about 
what today we call the “natural environment.” But, for him, the natural world and 
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humans were joined, not separate. He saw humans within nature and nature within 
humans.  
Rousseau thus never gave up the idea that human beings are originally good, but 
at the end of his life he was wounded and upset by all his own unsuccessful 
relationships. Rousseau felt that he had been the victim of other’s amour-propre. He 
was an extremely sensitive person and never could forget all the injuries he had 
suffered. I do not want to speculate on whether this was an infirmity he suffered; such 
a conclusion would too easily allow ignoring the powerful statements about 
humankind that Rousseau offered. He presented a vision of a new world inhabited by  
a new kind of human and that vision was, in one way, overwhelmingly profound and, 
in another, completely realistic and understandable. Starobinski (1988) is nonetheless 
sardonic about Rousseau’s fascination with the Platonic distinction between 
appearance and reality. However, Rousseau followed Plato and shaped contrasting 
pictures: on one hand, pictures of the existing and what he called “corrupt” society 
and, on the other hand, visionary and virtuous pictures. Rousseau is one of the few 
who have dared to take the veil from his face and become a truth teller. He was 
definitely aware of the contrast between the real world and visionary ones, and 
pointed out that while the former is limited, the latter are infinite (E). Even though he 
could imagine the virtuous life, it was not within reach for him any more than for 
others. Rousseau was convinced that he had not purposefully harmed other people, 
with exception of some stupidity in his youth; he was, therefore, certain about his 
own goodness but not always of his virtuousness (e.g., RSW.). His shortcomings 
become obvious in his autobiographical Confessions, Reveries, and his many letters. 
He had struggled and tried to act virtuously, and he was not always aware of his own 
limitations and weaknesses. However, sometimes he was extremely conscious for 
that he had put desire prior to duty, 
 
[F]or there is none at all [virtue] in following our inclinations and in giving 
ourselves the pleasure of doing good when they lead us to do so. But virtue 
consists in overcoming them when duty commands in order to do what duty 
prescribes, and that is what I have been less able to do than any man in the world. 
(RSW, p. 51) 
 
Rousseau realized how difficult it is to act virtuously against one’s own will. A habit 
of virtue promotes dutiful action (RSW), but one of Rousseau’s main problems was 
how to bridge the gap between his theories, his system of thoughts, and reality (see 
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also Broome, 1963). His fascination was an ideal world where all humans are good 
and act virtuously; no inflamed amour-propre exists in this utopian world, only 
peaceful amour-de-soi and decent amour-propre. Where inflamed amour-propre is 
present it drives our own and others’ passions into collision and soon loses its correct 
direction. Individuals may be dissuaded from acting virtuously if others take 
advantage or mock them because of their virtue. Virtuous actions are nourished by 
the constructive recognition of self, whereas negative recognition alienates people 
from themselves, so they see themselves as strangers (RSW). One way to avoid 
indignation and insult is to withdraw and be alone, to fly away on the wings of 
imagination from the evilness of other people. But, Rousseau also offered other 
alternatives: a life of mutual cooperation in constituting a more virtuous and happy 
society that is promoted by an appropriate education. 
Whether Rousseau was more gifted than others, he unmistakably believed that he 
had a mission to make his ideas public (see Broome, 1963) and most of his writings 
have some kind of instructional tone. In Émile, Rousseau states that he was not suited 
for practical instructional work as a tutor, so instead of doing the work himself he had 
to teach others what ought to be done. Writing books was his way of instructing the 
public; teaching others new truths and correcting their false opinions (see IM). A 
sharp pen is also a political tool, and his writing tone is often somewhat mean-
spirited. One of Rousseau’s writing techniques was the use of paradox. It is easy to 
blame Rousseau for contradictions between his actions and ideas, but maybe it is our 
own cultural background that makes us look for contradictions, splitting “nature” and 
other concepts, and always finding some incoherence in Rousseau’s arguments. 
Maybe it is the human situation, instead, that is so contradictory. Rousseau examined 
himself and found that true happiness rests inside each of us, and to be free is, 
therefore, to be independent of other people’s opinions. The problem was that not 
even he could neglect other peoples’ judgments. Broome (1963) accuses Rousseau’s 
attempts at living in congruence with his own system as representing a lie. I would 
not agree with this argument because I believe that Rousseau really tried; but he was 
both alone in his attempts and trapped in his own time. He wanted so eagerly for 
humans to be good or at least to try to become better, but he realized that his 
theoretical project was doomed to failure. It has always been easy to discredit those 
who fail when they try to perform what others know is right but do not have courage 
and will to attempt (see Irvine, 2006).  
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Rousseau’s ethics encourage reflections on what it means to be a human being 
and under what conditions we need to live our life if we want to be happy. Moreover, 
he can help us realize that even if the human need for self-satisfaction is infinite, 
planet earth has a limit and so does acceptable distributive injustice. Rousseau’s 
ethics are connected to governmental affairs and the political claims delivered by 
Rousseau’s sharp arguments are well-worth considering. Rousseau can undoubtedly 
awaken contemporary considerations about education in relation to nature. In Lévi-
Strauss’ opinion,  
 
[H]e also restored for us its [ethics’] ardor, burning for the last two centuries and 
forever in this crucible, a crucible uniting beings whom the interests of politicians 
and philosophers are everywhere else bent on rendering incompatible: me and the 
other, my societies and other societies, nature and culture, the sensitive and the 
rational, humanity and life. (Lévi-Strauss, 1973/2006, pp. 205-206) 
 
In the beginning of the next chapter, I will discuss the art of government. Instead of 
demanding obedience to the law and earthly or heavenly sovereignty, government 
uses diplomacy to fulfill its goals. The ruler is thus better off with knowledge about 
human life more than weapons or wisdom. Instead of maintaining obedience through 
laws and with the help of military weapons, education becomes an unseen weapon of 
manipulation. In this situation Rousseau’s education becomes paradoxical. The 
chapter will concentrate on education by employing Rousseau’s texts related to 
education, and it tries to disclose the core of Rousseau’s educational theory and the 
methods he proposed for teaching his ideas to a varied audience. That core entails 
how to promote perfectibility by fostering autonomy, morality, equality and 
happiness, and it is definitely not easily done.  
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6 Nature in Rousseau’s Educational Philosophy 
 
The previous chapter dealt with the role of nature in Rousseau’s ethics. This chapter 
will focus on how Rousseau included those ethics in his educational thinking. As 
previously mentioned, Rousseau saw his thoughts as a complete system. In this 
system, nature had a significant position and so did education. He saw education as a 
route towards a better world and thus as an instrument for, or rather a process 
towards, perfection. This chapter will discuss that process. 
  The organization of my study of Rousseau’s educational theory is similar to that 
used for my study of his ethical theory. My approach is thus once more a trial of a 
modified version of Foucault’s method for studying ethics by means of history that he 
developed in History of Sexuality, and I have tailored the division I used in the ethical 
study anew to fit the educational study. To begin with, then, I will briefly describe the 
stepwise design I will employ in the study of Rousseau’s educational thoughts. Yet, I 
have to suggest that the reader who wants a fuller description of the research should 
re-read sub-chapter 3.3. Secondly, I will also discuss the texts that served this 
particular study. Thirdly, I will examine Rousseau’s thoughts concerning education, 
beginning with what he meant about the “natural” education of human beings and of 
citizens, and then move towards how he wanted to promote humans’ relation to the 
natural world through education, ending up with how humans could be encouraged to 
develop devotion to God. To sum up: in this chapter I will briefly present the research 
method, discuss the background and reading sources, and then give a step by step 
interpretation of Rousseau’s educational philosophy and how it relates to nature and 
what is natural. 
 
6.1 Background, Procedure and Sources 
 
To situate Rousseau’s entire ethical discussion in a broader discourse, first I need to 
provide some brief background. I will do that by help of Foucault and will present a 
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far-reaching system of government that he called governmentality
232
 and will 
introduce how Rousseau contributed to this system. During Rousseau’s lifetime, 
citizens were regulated and ruled by an increasing number of governmental 
techniques (the section about economy in Chapter Four is also relevant here). There 
was a rapid development of disciplines concerned with the management of human 
life, such as health, housing, and migration. The human body became a part of the 
production machinery. The life of Homo sapiens entered into an order of knowledge 
and power that measured and controlled the life process. Human biological existence 
became an economic variable, a factor in production. But, still there was a need for 
moral regulations. 
 
Governmentality 
 
[P]ower relations, governmentality, the government of the self and of others, and 
the relationship of self to self constitute a chain, a thread, and I think it is around 
these notions that we should be able to connect together the question of politics 
and the question of ethics. (Foucault, 2005, p. 252) 
 
While Rousseau painted the optimal and happy state of nature in terms of a genuine 
human nature, Foucault presented a provocative picture of a normalized society that 
tries to squeeze all citizens into the same mould. Unbelievably, these two pictures 
have something in common. How could this be? Because when Rousseau strived for 
the “natural,” he painted a picture of an ideal society and tried to promote the 
perfection of humankind through education, and thus he participated in the shaping of 
the ‘normal’ using the same technique. Society’s rules should permeate everyone’s 
entire being. 
Nevertheless, let me start with how this normalization takes place. In Foucault’s 
(e.g., 1978, 2000a) vocabulary, the concept governmentality entails a tactical ruling 
by means of knowledge about what needs to be ruled. This understanding is a result 
of a transformation of the state of justice into the administrative state in the Middle 
Ages. It leans on a complex form of power consisting of series or systems of 
processes and techniques. The growing population was governed with the help of 
statistics developed by the mercantile tradition that had developed the tools for 
controlling and mapping the life of the population and its labor. From the middle of 
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 The neologism ’governmentality’ is a combination of government and mentality. 
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the 16
th
 century until the end of the 18
th
 century, a series of political treatises 
flourished revolving around ‘the art of governance’. The target of governance was 
multidimensional and dealt with how to govern oneself, originally an issue with Stoic 
tradition, the Christian theme of the government of souls and lives, the government of 
children through education, the government of the family and, finally, of the state. 
Foucault distinguished two lines in this process: firstly, a political and administrative 
line and, secondly, a religious line. Of these two courses of action, one leads toward 
state centralization and colonial administration and the other towards eternal 
salvation. A major study in this diverse discourse was Machiavelli’s The Prince. The 
book, first published 1513, deals with the leadership of a prince, and it gave rise to 
many ideas concerning leadership. The governmental task of the prince and his 
relation to the state had broad implications and inspired discussions about the leaders 
of the state, the head of the family, the superior of a convent, and the teacher of a 
child. Of all the possible forms of leadership in a state, three became central: the art 
of self-government involving morality; the art of governing a family, termed 
economy; and, finally, the political science of ruling a state. Rousseau contributed to 
discourse about all three issues. Foucault (ibid.) also connected Rousseau’s A 
Discourse on Political Economy to the establishment of an art of government where 
the government of the family and all its members is compared to the government of 
the state: 
 
To govern a state will mean, therefore, to apply economy, to set up an economy at 
the level of the entire state, which means exercising toward its inhabitants, and 
the wealth and behavior of each and all, a form of surveillance and control as 
attentive as that of the head of a family over his household and his goods. 
(Foucault, 2000a, p. 207) 
 
Before the 18
th
 century, it had already become popular to discuss how to transfer to 
the state level the art of governing that a father exercised when he governed his wife, 
children, and servants and tried to increase the family’s wealth. The “family” 
gradually became more politically interesting because of the possibility of governing 
the state through its families (Foucault, 1978, 2000a). This involved a shift of 
thinking from holding the family as a model of government to making it an 
instrument of governing. At the same time, a new science was born that focused on 
the relationship between population, territory, and wealth. The target of governing 
was not only a territory or humans; it was all kinds of ‘things’. These included 
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wealth, resources, and territories and their particular qualities, such as climate and 
fertility, and even customs, ways of thinking, health, and so forth. Other than as a 
resource for human exploitation, nature was not included. The art of government 
became a matter of ‘political economy’. With this change of focus, the problems of 
discipline and sovereignty had not disappeared but were still central. What was 
remarkable in this governing, as Foucault (ibid.) saw it, is that the object of 
government, the people, formed an active part in the process since they engaged in 
self-government. Individual freedom thus implied self-government and this freedom 
became both a result of and an instrument for state government (Simons & 
Masschelein, 2006). As expressed in Foucault’s own words, “[t]his encounter 
between the technologies of domination of others and those of the self I call 
“governmentality” (Foucault, 1997b, p. 225). By various normalizing methods of 
measuring, examining, categorizing, and educating this comprehensive kind of 
government aimed at creating ‘norms’ for modern individuals (see Taylor, 1986). 
Yet, this governmentality had no face; it was a power that resided in all members of 
society and reflected their relationships in a way that required all individuals to 
objectify their own selves (ibid). As stated before, Foucault (e.g., 1997g) used the 
concept biopolitics to describe the fact that the human body became an object for 
power/knowledge, and its diseases and treatment became a political element as early 
as the 17
th
 century. 
Rousseau’s ethical thoughts and ideas concerning the human nature, politics, 
education, religion, and many related issues need to be viewed against this 
background. His answer to this problematic was to offer a critical system in which 
nature and what is natural are central. But he was also a promoter of the idea of 
governmentality and his project was to shape an ideal vision of the perfect society. 
Yet, at the same time, Rousseau’s vision shared some principle features of what was 
common in the society he wanted to criticize. Education was one exercise of power in 
any extensive system of governmentality.  
 
Education beyond Childhood and Generations  
 
When Rousseau focused on education, he participated in a discourse along with other 
18
th
 century authors such as Locke, Condillac, Montesquieu, Voltaire, Hélvétius, 
Diderot, and numerous others. Moreover, like them, he touched on education in 
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several of his writings, although the main topic was often something else. At a first 
glance, his varied approaches to the topic may appear contradictory. As an example 
of how his ideas can seems to strain in opposite directions, in Considerations on 
Government in Poland and A Discourse on Political Economy he recommends a state 
education, while in Émile, or on Education
233
 and Julie, or the New Heloise, a private 
education is extolled. Nonetheless, to be fairly judged these diverse thoughts have to 
be considered in their context and thus understood in relation to the targeted aims of 
particular writings. In this regard, it is also worth keeping in mind that Rousseau’s 
thoughts about education in Émile as well as in other works not only deal with 
schooling; they deal with the total nurture of humans from birth to adult life and thus 
involve a primary form of what we now call “lifelong learning.” In addition to the 
role of education in individual lives, he also considered the function of education in 
the dynamics of state politics and society. Rousseau stressed that children need to 
study their relation to things, then, when they grow old enough to become moral, they 
need to study their relation to others, a task that lasts one’s entire life (E).  
 
Problematization 
 
The research approach in this chapter is similar to the previously mentioned 
modification of Foucault’s ethical studies. I will study Rousseau portrayal of an 
education that makes individuals more natural and thus fit into a natural society, the 
natural world, and a natural deity. I will also relate these conclusions to the way he 
tried to fulfill them in his own life. Although in Chapter Three I have already 
described how I employ Foucault’s ethical research strategy to my study of 
Rousseau’s educational thinking, I will give a précis here (see Table 2).  
The main question I will address is number III: What is the role of nature in 
Rousseau’s educational philosophy? I will try to reply to this third research question 
using the outcome of the second question (number II, described and answered in 
Chapter Five) and thus develop new problematic that connect Rousseau’s ethics to 
his view of education.  
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 In this book Émile (italics) denotes the book, and Émile the boy in that story, and I adopt the same 
principle with the book Julie and the character Julie. 
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1. What is the essence of a natural education, according to Rousseau? This is the 
‘ontological’ aspect, asking what the main premises are that are the foundation of 
Rousseau’s ‘education in accordance with nature’. How did Rousseau regulate what 
education is in relation to other forms of social impact and how, in general, was 
education practiced at his time? 
2. What did Rousseau believe that education could do to encourage people to 
adopt particular norms or rules regarding their relationships to nature? The 
‘deontological aspect’ deals with how education can improve human development 
towards special goals. This question relates to Rousseau’s ideas about perfectibility 
and is concerned with the goals of education, that, according to Rousseau, should 
encourage people to act more responsibly or genuinely towards his images of “human 
nature” and what he thought was “natural”? 
3. Can education promote conduct that is more in tune with nature and, if so, 
how? In contrast to the previous consideration of ‘what’ norms concerning nature 
education should encourage, this ‘ascetic’ aspect concerns ‘how’ to promote self-
transformation and purposeful action towards something better. Of interest is the kind 
of conduct that might lead to a transformation of individuals and society. Another 
aspect is how to inspire a person to be willing to choose what is good. 
4. What are the aims of an education that promotes the development of more 
natural humans? The last of the four sub-questions, the ‘teleological’ aspect, plainly 
asks what Rousseau saw as the fundamental direction of education. Towards what 
does ‘an education in accordance with nature’ strive? What are its individual, social, 
and global aims?  
 
Choice of Material 
 
The analysis of Rousseau’s educational theory is based on two books, an essay, and a 
collection of letters. He wrote three books simultaneously between 1756 and 1761 
(Broome, 1963; Dent, 1988) and they were published between 1760 and 1762:  Julie, 
or the New Heloise (Julie, JNH), Émile, or on Education (Émile, E), and The Social 
Contract (Social Contract, SC). One can assume, therefore, that Broome (1963, p. 
50) is right in seeing them as “the outcome of the same surge of creative energy.” 
Instead of the Social Contract that I have already drawn from in the previous chapter, 
here I will combine Émile and Julie with a political text that gave birth to the Social 
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Contract, namely the essay Discourse on Political Economy (Political Economy, 
DPE). The two books Émile and Julie and the Political Economy essay also all show 
direct connections to the two discourses (1
st
 and 2
nd
 Discourses) discussed in the 
previous chapter.  
In the books Émile and Julie, Rousseau created hypothetical instruments and 
utopian versions of life activities that aim at a better society in accordance with what 
he thought is most natural for humans (even when living in a society). To this end, he 
describes the education of a child, the organization of family life, parenthood, 
marriage, friendship, vocational training, and work. In the essay Political Economy 
he draws a picture of a forthright state politics where education is included in its basic 
economic and political principles. The entire book Émile (from which I used the part 
Savoyard Vicar in the previous chapter), is the main source of this chapter. While 
Political Economy and especially Julie deal with a variety of issues, I will 
concentrate my reading of them on the parts dealing with education. The fourth 
source is a botany dictionary and a compilation of letters on the topic of botany, 
collectively called Botanical Writings (BW). Since Rousseau also discussed 
education in many other writings, I will use other sources as needed, even some of 
those I used in Chapter Five, especially the Social Contract and Reveries. Continuing 
my practice in Chapter Five, I will try to compare my understanding of Rousseau’s 
education with other scholars who have discussed his ideas. I will start with the main 
source for the study in this chapter, Émile, or on Education that is one of the most 
legendary books on education ever written in the Western tradition. 
 
Émile, or on Education 
Rousseau described Émile as a project that took him twenty years of thinking and 
three of writing (C). He called it the keystone of his philosophical construction 
(RSW) and “his greatest and best book” (RJJ, p. 23). In Émile, Rousseau sketches a 
thought experiment in the form of a hypothetical educational proposal. He wanted to 
challenge established educational methods and describe a strategy that follows “the 
march of nature” and that is “suitable for man and well adapted to the human heart” 
(E, p. 34). When Rousseau outlines the purpose with his project in the Author’s 
Preface, he attacks the contemporary form of learning for being more destructive 
than educative and states that “the art of forming men, is still forgotten”234 (E, p. 33). 
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 “(Q)ui eŝt l’art de former hommes, eŝt encore oubliée” (OC VI, p. 241). Compare the word “form” with 
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In the first chapter he writes, “Plants are shaped by cultivation, and men by 
education”235 (E, p. 38).  
Yet, Rousseau did not write Émile to be acted upon word by word; he did not, 
therefore, write a typical ‘method’ book intended as a practical educational tool, 
although he addressed Émile to a kindhearted mother. In Lettres Ècrites de la 
Montagne (Letters Written from the Mountain), Rousseau asserts that his intention 
with Émile was never to describe a method but to outline a new education system for 
the wise to reflect on (see OC III). However, the book is not only about education; it 
is “a treatise on the original goodness of man” (RJJ, p. 213) and shows how the initial 
goodness of humans changes if vice and error are let into their minds. As stated in 
Chapter Two, he did not deny that one of his great influencers was Plato (see E) and, 
when reading Émile, this becomes obvious.  
Indeed, one can ask what kind of book Émile is? Actually, there are many 
suggestions. It is sometimes referred to as a novel (e.g., Kroksmark, 2003; von 
Oettingen, 2001). Bendixon (1929, p. 73) specifically called Émile an “educational 
novel,” while Goethe (according to Kroksmark, 1989, p. 76) called it “a pedagogical 
nature gospel” (Wolff’s trans.). Since Rousseau also composed music, Bardy (1996) 
compares Émile with a symphony and depicts the book as “an ocean of ideas about 
life and the human being.” The book is also described as a “thought experiment” 
(e.g., Kroksmark, 2003; Johnston, 1999). I prefer to classify Émile as ‘a philosophy 
of education operating in part as a thought experiment,’ and I do not deny that it also 
has utopian features. The story is grounded on the idea of a better world of tomorrow 
and pictures an education that could make this dream come true. Rousseau illustrates 
his educational theories with a thought experiment describing the education of the 
fictive pupil Émile. This thought experiment is not the center of attention in all 
chapters of the book, but it is intermingled with his other theories in an interesting 
fusion.  
Because of Rousseau’s complicated writing style, readers might miss important 
points (see, e.g., Gay, 1966; Vanpeé, 1990/2006). Vanpée emphasizes that Émile has 
been reduced to a literary ’work’, instead of letting the reading constitute an 
education in itself. She, therefore, suggests the readers cast themselves into the 
pupil’s situation and become participants in Rousseau’s pedagogical lessons. Only 
then can readers fully start to recognize the problems of education as ‘social 
                                                                                                                                            
“build” and the German word “Bildung.” 
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 “On façonne les plantes par la culture, et les hommes par l’éducation ” (OC IV, p. 246).  
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transmission’ and appreciate the narrative’s allegorical dimensions. Salkever (1977-
8/2006) defends a similar view, and refers to Jugement sur la Polysynodie (OC III) 
where Rousseau states that the readers have to learn to read and not the authors to 
write coherently.
236
 He thus demanded more of the reader than of himself. Dent 
(1988) also argues that any contradictions may be within the reader; that it makes no 
sense to blame Rousseau for paradoxes if they were writing tools intended to trigger 
careful reading. Was it not Rousseau’s intention to encourage alternative thinking by 
readers? Moreover, are readers to blame for misunderstandings rather than the author 
for supposed inconsistency? One thing is sure: Rousseau will never give us an answer 
to those questions. We only have to accept that there are numerous ways to read 
Émile. Yet, Løvlei (2008) states that paradoxes have an educational function by 
forcing the transformation of thinking, even if they may be a plague for those who 
search for clear-cut answers. 
Besides being a new way of writing, it is possible to identify many other 
hypothetical purposes that engendered Émile. Inspired by the various aims Lähde 
(2008) distinguished in his reading of the 2
nd
 Discourse, I have tried to search for 
what might have generated Émile. Among the issues I believe Rousseau wished to 
highlight, beside the transformation of reader’s thinking, are: advancing a vision of a 
better society; contrasting a more ideal education with the existing one; 
demonstrating social contradictions and injustices; participating in the educational 
discourse of his time (especially to argue against the educational theories of Locke 
and other scholars); and lastly, highlighting the importance of childhood. These aims 
are so intermingled that totally separating them makes little sense. Nevertheless, they 
are individually useful in illuminating the layered meanings of the story. And it is 
quite obvious that Rousseau’s intentions were political, although he tried to make the 
actual political education of children invisible until they reached the age of 15, the 
time of what he called “the second birth.”237 So, although practical education before 
that age may seem impartial, the purposes were not indefinite. The book exists on all 
the levels I described in Chapter Three: physical or actual (it actually often deals with 
practical educational questions), mental (it deals with dreams and thoughts), 
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 Rousseau also talks about the problem with consistency in a long note in Émile, and he admits that he 
often contradict himself. In his defense he writes: “Definitions could be good if words were not used to make 
them (E, p. 108n). 
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 “We are…born twice: once to exist and once to live; once for our species and once for our sex” (E, p. 
211). 
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theoretical (the entire approach is a thought experiment), allegorical (it has a high 
symbolic level), and metaphysical (Savoyard Vicar). 
Rousseau definitely wanted to point to politics, social contradictions, and 
anomalies, and to make people discuss and reflect more on educational matters. 
However, with Émile, Rousseau was more interested in awakening an interest in 
general principles than with giving strict instructional prescriptions. Émile is more 
than a pedagogical argument; Rousseau also addresses many other kinds of social 
problems in Émile than education, and his criticism of formal religion was not 
accepted without hesitation (see Chapters Four and Five). When writing Émile, 
Rousseau hypothesized a general overview of education. He wanted to give an idea 
about an education that would be very different from what was conventionally 
practiced. He argued that the existing education relied on false premises about 
childhood and therefore pointed in the wrong direction. He wanted to portray an 
education built on other grounds, namely on what children actually would be able to 
understand, which in turn would lead to a more equal and good society.  
 
Julie 
Rousseau painted many parallel utopias in order to inspire his readers to judge their 
society. Besides Émile, which describes the solitary education of a young boy, Julie 
depicts family life and domestic education. Julie is a philosophical love story written 
as a novel and is structured in the form of letters between two lovers that point to 
individual and societal aspects in addition to education.
238
 The author’s intention to 
provoke the reader becomes obvious in the Second Preface of Julie. According to 
Rousseau, a novel has to use ordinary language, expose taken for granted maxims, 
and please and engage the readers. “[A] Novel if it is done well, at least if it is useful, 
is bound to be hissed, hated, decried by fashionable people, as an insipid, 
extravagant, ridiculous book; and that … is how the world’s madness is wisdom” 
(JNH, p. 15-16). Rousseau wanted to set another tone than the one that characterized 
the big cities; he wanted to draw an alternative picture that should be followed by 
common people all over the country. The picture he draws in Julie shows simple 
daily life on a small farm situated in a beautiful natural surroundings. The life of the 
few characters offers no fashionable pleasures, but their common actions are filled 
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 Julie is sometimes also referred to as ‘a collection of letters’, but is mostly called a ‘novel’. 
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with honesty, friendship,
239
 love and respect for each other. Rousseau also does not 
hide his utopian intentions. In his Dialogues, he clearly states that he wanted to 
portray personas that he felt he could love.  
The “New Heloise” in the title relates to the legendary and tragic love story of 
12
th
 century philosopher Pierre Abelard and his pupil Heloise. Their marriage had 
been cruelly attacked, they were separated, and Abelard’s published account of their 
sufferings was a passionate correspondence between man and wife. As with this true 
love story,
240
 Julie is also a story about desire and redemption, about saintly living 
and the choice of spiritual ambition over worldly passions (see Stewart, 1997). It is a 
story embodying desire, reason, locality, values, and beliefs. The portrait of the 
characters can also be read as allegories of different states of mind where particular 
dispositions are given to each character (see Chapter Three). In addition, it is a 
struggle between body and soul, men and women, since Rousseau had an ambivalent 
relation to both sexual experiences and gender.  
Julie not only connects to Émile, the Social Contract, and the discourses: 
comparing Julie to Confessions reveals clear connections between these two books, 
as well. The story begins with a letter in which Julie’s young tutor, St. Preux, declares 
love for his young student. The story goes on to describe the growing love between 
the two and the time they spend together in educational situations that also involve 
Julie’s cousin Claire. In this respect, the initial context is an educational situation. 
The book also contains a section of approximately 20 pages where Julie and her 
husband Wolmar explain the principles they follow when they instruct their children. 
This part of Julie is very much in line with Émile and of great interest for the analysis 
provided in this chapter. 
 
A Discourse on Political Economy and Botanical Writings 
The essay A Discourse on Political Economy was written for the Encyclopedia, 
where it was first published in 1755, and later separately published in 1958. This text 
contains thoughts about how to educate citizens and make them into active 
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 Without pointing to any direct connection, I cannot avoid comparing the way Rousseau talks about 
friendship in Julie with the way Aristotle describes virtuous friendship in his Nicomachean Ethics.   
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 In Chapter Three, I wrote that even if the narrative in Julie is fictional and on the surface a love story, 
much of Rousseau’s basic philosophy lurks beneath the surface. Undoubtedly, the story relates to Rousseau’s 
own life and love affairs as a young man and as he was writing the novel (sees C). However, I do not find 
this connection relevant to my purposes, and have instead concentrated on what emerges from the story, 
either directly or indirectly, in relation to education.  
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participants in society. It bears comparison to Émile, written a few years later, that 
deals with the education of an individual. 
Though not well known today as a botanist, botany was nonetheless one of 
Rousseau’s favorite activities. This becomes obvious from his Botanical Writings that 
include a dictionary of botanical term and letters from Rousseau’s correspondence 
with other persons interested in botany, and the so-called Elementary Letters of 
Botany to Mme Delessert are guidance for her instruction of her daughter. These 
letters are especially of interest for this study, because they deal with the actual 
practice of nature education.  
 
6.2 Creating the Natural Individual  
 
The foundations of education are three, according to Rousseau: nature, men 
(humans), and things (E). The natural foundations of education entails the inborn 
physical and physiological inclinations that are beyond the influence of instruction; 
the education of humans entails that they can be brought by others to use their own 
inborn features; and the role of things in education entails education through the 
experiencing of objects. The world around becomes familiar through the direct 
experiences of one’s senses, not through the representations of pictures or models.  
Other people—educators—can only partly intrude into education about things. If 
the teaching of the three ‘masters’ (nature, things, and humans) conflict, the person is 
poorly educated (E). If they are in harmony, the person is well-educated. For 
example, a hasty education neglects nature and leads children to become independent 
too quickly; this actually risks making them reliant on others. In the end, Rousseau 
wanted children to become members of society; responsible, not selfish. In Émile 
Rousseau argues: 
 
Natural man is entirely for himself. He is numerical unity, the absolute whole 
which is relative only to itself or its kind. Civil man is only a fractional unity 
dependent on the denominator; his value is determined by his relation to the 
whole, which is the social body. Good social institutions are those that best know 
how to denature man, to take his absolute existence from him in order to give him 
a relative one and transport the I into the common unity, with the result  that each 
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individual believes himself no longer one but a part of the unity and no longer 
feels except within the whole.
 241
 (E, p. 39-40) 
 
This might at first sound like a paradoxical contradiction of Rousseau’s other 
thoughts in Émile. Is it not foolish to want to educate somebody as a holistic being 
only to become a mere fraction of a greater entity, thus making someone who is 
independent in effect dependent? Did Rousseau not emphasize freedom and 
autonomy? If so, what is this about?  
Viewed in the light of Rousseau’s educational agenda in Émile, he simply means 
that persons need to strengthen their wholeness before they can be a part of the 
greater entities of society and humankind. If we read Émile as part of Rousseau’s 
overall vision, we will also recognize that a just society requires more than only one 
good member, like Émile; his education has to be the model of a larger goal and must 
be repeated by others. Parry (2001) correctly maintains that Rousseau rejected an 
education that repeats the vicious circle and that he wanted to replace it with one 
more virtuous (see above). While the parents and others involved in the child’s 
upbringing are infected by their own amour-propre, the tutor is the one who can 
break the vicious circle (Broome, 1963). This is achieved by keeping Émile apart 
from society where others could contaminate him. He is therefore prevented from 
imitating a bad political model. The only models Rousseau allowed the young Émile 
were the natural world and its ‘things’, according to Rousseau. However, the 
importance of the tutor was not to be overlooked. Because Rousseau regarded the 
child as intrinsically good, a negative education holds the child back and protects it 
from mistakes, instead of affirmatively teaching virtue and forcing the child in a 
particular direction. Such ‘negative’ education was intended to prevent Émile from 
significant social impact while still a child. He wanted to grant Émile time to grow 
slowly, so he could first feel his innate freedom as an individual and live a life more 
in line with the animal features in him than a life influenced by what culture offered. 
“[H]e must respond only to what nature asks of him, and then he will do nothing but 
good” (E, p. 93). He should not be socialized, then, until the innate amour-de-soi 
condition has become strong enough to combat the pressure of social contaminants. 
Negative education “consists not at all in teaching virtue or truth but in securing the 
heart from vice and the mind from error” (E, p. 93).  
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If you could do nothing and let nothing be done, if you could bring your pupil 
healthy and robust to the age of twelve without his knowing how to distinguish 
his right hand from his left, at your first lessons the eyes of his understanding 
would open up to reason. Without prejudice, without habit, he would have 
nothing in him which could hinder the effect of your care. Soon he would become 
in your hands the wisest of men; and in beginning by doing nothing, you would 
have worked an educational marvel. (E, pp. 93-94) 
 
Instead of residing in a corrupt environment that confronts him with criticism and 
reprimands, Émile lives an innocent but isolated life with his tutor. Rousseau states 
clearly at the beginning of Émile that he wants to show what humans would be 
without the self-contradictions that are obstacles to happiness. Thus, the best route to 
human happiness is not what educators do, but what they leave undone; their non-
action. Mimesis is natural for humans, but it is damaging in society, moreover, 
children easily imitate bad habits. The maturing process must be delayed so that 
children are capable of understanding abstract concepts and moral reasoning before 
they are confronted with challenges to their happiness. The quantity of knowledge is 
less important than encouraging the children’s own thinking and judgment. Self-
knowledge and self-control are the first things a child needs to learn. However, the 
picture of the tutor’s role in Émile shows that teaching is not so much about non-
acting (an attitude of ‘letting go’) as much as it is a matter about hidden guidance , so 
it only seems like the tutor would not act. Parry (2001) calls this “defensive” or 
“protective” education (p. 252). 
 
Let him always believe he is the master, and let it always be you who are. There 
is no subjection so perfect as that which keeps the appearance of freedom. Thus 
the will itself is made captive. The poor child who knows nothing, who can do 
nothing, who has no learning, is he not at your mercy? Do you not dispose, with 
respect to him, of everything which surrounds him? Are you not the master of 
affecting him as you please? Are not his labors, his games, his pleasures, his 
pains, all in your hands without his knowing it? Doubtless he ought to do only 
what he wants, but he ought to want only what you want him to do. He ought not 
to make a step without you having foreseen it; he ought not to open his mouth 
without your knowing what he is going to say. (E, p. 120) 
 
While Rousseau often used allegories, the relation between the child and his tutor can 
also be read as a miniature of the relation between the citizen and the law, in order to 
make the readers realize that they might need to submit to the general good before 
they have the right to enjoy the benefits of society. One can even interpret Émile as 
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an allegory for adult human self-improvement (what Foucault called ‘practice of the 
self’ or ‘taking care of the self’) in which (in Platonic language) the rational and 
strong part of the soul teaches the desiring and weak part to distinguish between 
artificial and natural needs. It came as a surprise to Rousseau that anyone would take 
his account of Émile’s education as a manual. If we want to understand at least a little 
of the book we have to give up the idea of realism. However, if Rousseau intended to 
incite thought, contradictions become challenges that trigger thinking. Obviously, 
Rousseau provocatively wanted to address the irresolvable conflict between 
individual freedom and social responsibility. But when Compayré (1958) states that 
Rousseau wanted to build a wall around Émile, I prefer to say that Rousseau wanted 
to ensure that nobody cut off Émile’s wings before he was ready for full-fledged 
flight. Rousseau’s main purpose was the education of an individual who is free but 
also responsible. Freedom has to be constantly re-claimed throughout life, but the 
process requires continuous participation in actualizing the general will (see Affeldt, 
1999/2006). By “freedom” Rousseau meant freedom from one’s own subjugating 
passions and the craving to obey social pressure. It was not a freedom to do whatever 
one likes but, rather, freedom from slavery of all kinds, what Kant called “positive 
freedom” (see chapter One).    
In Affeldt’s (1999/2006) opinion, the paradoxical quandary of using force to 
make another free is a problem Rousseau encounters throughout his philosophical 
experiments. This philosophical position challenges, for instance, Plato’s allegory of 
the cave
242
 (ibid.). As with the Social Contract, Émile presents also two options: the 
familiar corrupted and enslaving state and a contrasting state of equality and freedom. 
“In this way, philosophy, as Rousseau understands it and writes it, works to force the 
individual to change, to turn towards the possibility of humanity and freedom” (ibid. , 
p. 419). This was probably Rousseau’s primary view of education: to force 
individuals towards freedom, not by changing them in a predicted way with respect to 
the aims, but by a process that builds on their natural inclinations and strives for a 
voluntary self-transformation. Émile is, therefore, not a blueprint, but a thought-
provoking poem, an educational work that aims at the reader’s transformation. 
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 See Plato’s Republic, Book VII. See also Chapter One in this book 
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Childhood as an Aim 
 
Disappointed with how children were raised, Rousseau’s wished to display the 
childhood and the individual child, according to the idea that the other, the child, is 
new. Every child is unique; it is thus the teacher’s task to learn to know the child and 
adapt education to the child’s particular aptitudes. According to Rousseau, education 
has to be sensitive to the needs of children and not focus only on their future lives as 
adults. Why train children only for adulthood at a time in history when half of them 
would never reach that age, asked Rousseau.
243
 Rousseau already mentions this need 
to acknowledge childhood as an end in itself on the first page of the preface of Émile:  
 
Childhood is unknown. Starting from the false idea one has of it, the farther one 
goes, the more one loses one’s way. The wisest men concentrate on what it is 
important for men to know without considering what children are in a condition 
to learn. They are always seeking the man in the child, without thinking of what 
he is before being a man. (E, p. 33-34) 
 
Rousseau considered education from the child’s view; children should be aims in 
themselves and childhood a crucial time and aim in itself, as well (E).  By dividing 
the period from birth to adulthood in four stages: infancy (0-2 years), childhood (2-12 
years), pre-puberty (12-15 years) and adolescence (15-20 years) Rousseau showed 
that children, not just adults, should be included in the concept of “human,” and that 
each stage of the developing human has its own character that needs to be identified 
and addressed by education. He emphasized that it is easier to cultivate children than 
to cultivate adults, since the younger they are the less they have been prejudiced by 
society’s ills. While each stage is important, the most precarious time in human life is 
from birth to age twelve. This period is crucial to human development, though 
impossible to try to force the children to learn something they do not understand. The 
tutor’s role is primarily to be a good model and arrange beneficial learning 
experiences. Since it is so very difficult to get rid of any prejudices acquired during 
this period, children need to be protected from bad influences. Therefore, this time 
has to be the primary time for training and developing the capabilities of children and 
for getting them to sense the world from their own perspectives. After this joyful but 
not idle period the child will be ready for focused study and work.  
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 The high child mortality was a cruel fact in the 18
th
 century France (see Bowen, 1981; Heywood, 2007). 
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Even though Rousseau argued that the child is born good, he recommended 
beginning education immediately after birth (JNH). Childhood has its own way of 
acting and sensing and every child is a unique personality. However, but that 
personality cannot expand in the right direction without skilful guidance; natural 
dispositions need cultivation. Because education has to fit each child’s unique 
personality, education starts with careful observation to determine the child’s 
character and to plan instruction. Before children become mature, they need the 
freedom to be childish. No one can enforce the maturation process; it has to take its 
own time. This will not happen before the body has gained strength and, therefore, 
children have to be free to move before they grow old enough to sit still and reflect. 
Their first source of learning is their own body (E). Before they reach the age of 
reason, they have to learn to respond to their own hands, feet, and eyes. The well-
functioning mind arises from the receptive senses of a well-functioning body. Using 
the language of reason with small children is futile since they cannot reason yet. 
Wise education not only starts with recognizing a child, but the child. The child’s 
own character may not be changed or force-fit to suit preordained goals. In a sentence 
that contains a clear contradiction, he states:  
 
In addition to the constitution common to the species, each individual brings with 
him at birth a particular temperament which determines his genius and character, 
and should be neither changed nor constrained, but formed and perfected. (JNH, 
p. 461) 
 
This might sound inconsistent: is it possible to form something without changing it? 
Can education perfect somebody without any vision of the direction? Rousseau was, 
almost like Plato, sure that there is a goodness that is common for all humans and 
about which all non-corrupted humans can agree (see SC or DPE). However, 
Rousseau’s aims can be seen as universal and ‘natural’, but also as indefinite. 
 
Each advances more or less according to his genius, his taste, his needs, his 
talents, his zeal, and the occasions he has to devote himself to them….We do not 
know what our nature permits us to be. (E, p. 62)  
 
The virtuous circle of Rousseau’s thought experiments depicts education as a process 
that aims at a steadily transformed society rather than at a predetermined end (Parry, 
2001). Education has to make students capable of leading their joint lives effectively. 
Humans are not born with equal capabilities but educational goals nonetheless need 
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to strive towards equal opportunity in society. “Everything works together for the 
common good in the universal system” (JNH, p. 462) and in this system all humans 
have their own appointed place. The role of education is to find the right order, not to 
correct nature since nature is always right. It is not possible to change others unless 
one changes their temperament; but it is possible to make persons pretend that they 
are other than they are. However, there are always situations where they will return to 
their inner dispositions (JNH). What does this mean? In Rousseau’s own words: 
 
Once again the question is not to change the character and bend the natural 
disposition, but on the contrary to push it as far as it can go, to cultivate it and 
keep it from degenerating; for it is thus that a man becomes all he can be, and the 
nature’s work is culminated in him by education. 244 (JNH, p. 464)  
 
The child should be prevented from the errors and prejudices and “pushed” in the 
opposite direction. It is not the adult’s view of the world that should be central, but 
the child’s own experiencing of the environment. The adult calls forth the child’s 
own self-directed learning. It does not take place without the adult’s careful choices, 
but the child is “provoked to freedom”245 as an individual who has the aptitude for 
becoming autonomous
246
 (Benner, 2001; Oettingen, 2001; Uljens, 1998, 2002). 
Oettingen (2001) sees this provocation as a crucial educational principle throughout 
Émile. I agree, because Rousseau’s main interest was to encourage the child to 
become independent. Children want to learn because they are born with an aptitude 
for perfectibility and the free will to choose their own lives. Rousseau saw the child 
as a companion who possessed various capabilities but as too weak to make use of 
them without guidance. He was, however, very much against forcing children to learn 
a lot of facts; they should be encouraged to become curious rather than accept 
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 “Encore une fois il ne s’agit point de changer le caraĉtere et de plier le naturel, mais au contraire de le 
pousser aussi loin qu’il peut aller, de le cultiver et d’empêcher qu’il ne dégénere [sic]; car c’eŝt [sic] ainsi 
qu’un homme devient tout ce qu’il peut être, et que l’ouvrage de la nature s’acheve [sic] en lui par 
l’éducation” (OC II, p. 566). Please, pay attention to the verb poussare that is the intransitive form of pousser 
(push). 
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 Dietrich Benner uses the German term Das Prinzip der Aufforderung zur Selbsttätigkeit and Uljens the 
Swedish principen om uppfordran till självverksamhet. The word Aufforderung is difficult to translate into 
English. Uljens (2002) talks about “provocation to self-reflection.”  I will use the concept “provocation to 
freedom,” since I see the process as more than thinking; it is also about activating and thus includes 
“provocation to self-activity.” Benner (2001) also sees Aufforderung zur Selbständigkeit as both reflection 
and action. Williams (2001) suggests “summon” and “call” as translation to Fichte’s Aufforderung. 
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knowledge as fixed and final. Education should not be a matter of forceful pulling but 
of pushing with appropriate force. With the word “push” Rousseau meant that 
education should encourage children to start making their own judgments and to 
move according to their own aims instead of pulling them towards the aims 
educator’s have for them. The unbiased educator can show directions, but the future 
shows the final ends, because students must be allowed to participate in the creation 
of their own futures. Nevertheless, the strength of the push could not be the same for 
every child. While humans are born with various aptitudes, they need to learn to use 
these aptitudes wisely and not to try to expand their self-caring at the expense of 
others.  
 
To one genius you must give wings, to another shackles; the one needs to be 
goaded, the other held back; the one needs to be encouraged, and the other 
intimidated; you should sometimes enlighten, sometimes stupefy (JNH, p. 464). 
 
Émile as a Reverse  
 
A critical stance towards education is also obvious in the 1
st
 Discourse; there, 
Rousseau claims that the children of his time are not learning what is essential for 
life. Large institutional settings are destroying them; they can hardly speak their own 
language and instead speak a language nobody uses anymore (viz., Latin). 
Generosity, justice, moderation, human kindness, and courage are unfamiliar to them, 
and they do not learn to separate truth from delusion, although they are capable of 
deception that hides their profound ignorance. Schools also neglect the native country 
and God. It is better that a child plays than wastes time learning useless facts, 
according to Rousseau. Neither words nor pictures can compensate for experiencing 
the natural world. Words are easy to repeat, whether one understands them or not, 
and art cannot promote a virtuous education. When reading books, the author steps in 
between the content and the reader and this impedes the child’s own thinking (Parry, 
2001). Not only words, but also pictures and sculptures represent perversions of 
minds, says Rousseau who was upset that children encounter such images in their 
immediate surroundings even before they can read (1
st
 D). It is easy to make use of 
the child’s memory, but this is not an intelligent use of their childhood, and it is 
definitely a question about education by use of force—but a force that neither aims at 
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an education that is good for its own sake or for any higher future aim, such as 
freedom or goodness. 
 
Force a child to study languages he will never speak, before he has even learned 
his own; make him constantly rehearse and parse verses he does not understand, 
the whole harmony of which for him is only in his fingers,
247
 muddle his mind 
with circles and spheres of which he has not the faintest notion; overwhelm him 
with a thousand names of cities and rivers he constantly mixes up and learns 
anew each day; is this cultivating his memory for the good of his judgment, and is 
this whole frivolous learning worth a single one of the tears it costs him? (JNH, p. 
475) 
 
Everything children see and hear make impressions, and the objects displayed for 
children should therefore be chosen carefully. In order to teach Émile humaneness 
and love for his fellows, Rousseau, the tutor, provided him with occasions that 
allowed him to experience models of decent behavior. Actions not words were 
central. Children’s vices all come from bad models; this is preventable by keeping 
them away from things and people that can destroy their innocence and it spares them 
from establishing prejudices. Instead of filling the children’s’ brains with all kinds of 
information to be recalled, Rousseau argued that children need to know their duties as 
human beings and how to live in accordance with both their natures and as part of 
human nature in general.  
 
All the first moments of nature are good and right. They aim as directly as 
possible toward our preservation and our happiness, but soon lacking strength to 
maintain their original direction through so much resistance, they let themselves 
be deflected by a thousand obstacles which, turning them away from their true 
goal, make them take oblique paths where man forgets his original destination. 
Erroneous judgment and the strength of prejudices contribute a great deal to our 
being thus mislead. (RJJ, p. 9) 
 
Born Free 
 
Rousseau argued that childhood ought to be a time of liberty not of restraint. Until the 
18
th
 century, the habit was widespread of wrapping infants like mummies so they 
could move neither their arms nor legs to keep them warm and make their body 
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 This refers to the habit of counting syllables on the fingers (see Stewart & Vaché, 1997). 
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strong. Older children were also often raised by a strict regime of authority to show 
respect (Heywood, 2001). Children are active and need to use their bodies to climb, 
run, and play outdoors, protested Rousseau, furious over the Parisian paradigm of 
sending infants to wet nurses in the country and not giving them a loving upbringing 
among their own family members (E). Upper class children seldom saw their parents 
(Gay, 1966; Heywood, 2007). From the wet nurses a girl was sent to a governess, 
then to a convent, and finally pushed into a marriage (Gay, 1966). Adults often 
treated older children as miniature adults; they were dressed like adults and were 
expected to understand the same subjects and be interested in the same things as 
grown-ups. Nurses even bound the heads of the children to make them look more 
mature (Eby, 1952; Bowen, 1981). Education strived to transfer knowledge to the 
following generation and the child’s task was only to imitate and memorize. Lacking 
better methods, adults tried to teach children morals by means of punishment.  
Beginning with the early 18
th
 century, a child was shaped by strong powers and 
objects for conflicting wills. Many images of children flourished in Europe, and 
children were considered to be somewhere between innocent angels and small devils. 
Very often, however, they were thought of as in possession of origin sin, and the sin 
of Adam had to be hammered out (Heywood, 2001). The child’s weakness and the 
allocation of power in the child’s education are central elements in the education of 
Émile. According to Rousseau, small children lack power but have a lot of energy 
and thus need to lead a physically active life.  
 
Before prejudices and human institutions have corrupted our natural inclinations, 
the happiness of children, like that of men, consists in the use of their freedom. 
But in the case of children this freedom is limited by their weakness. (E, p. 85) 
 
Nevertheless, along with increased age, their strengths grow, and they become more 
independent. The educator’s role is to give children freedom but restrict their misuse 
of it for their own selfish benefit (E). Children should be encouraged to do more on 
their own and demand less of others. Neither the tutor nor the child should command 
the other. Émile is not allowed to use more power than he possesses and thus cannot 
demand that others serve his selfish wishes. True happiness is reachable if the desires 
and the power one possesses are congruent.  
 
[I]t is in diminishing the excess of the desires over the faculties and putting power 
and will in perfect equality. It is only then that, with all the powers in action, the 
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soul will nevertheless remain peaceful and that man will be well ordered. (E, p. 
80) 
 
The more the children experience the more they learn to desire and hope to satisfy 
their wants. But this is an endless race because they will only have to confront ever-
new desires. “Thus one exhausts oneself without getting to the end, and the more one 
gains on enjoyment, the further happiness gets from us” (E, p. 81). Rousseau calls 
lies, vanity, envy, and even anger “vices born of slavery” that act against nature. 
However, he does not expect that these vices can be prevented; instead, he suggests 
that children should be encouraged to face and combat these obstacles in order to 
strengthen their ability to reject them in the future.  
In Julie, Rousseau promotes an education that makes children free, patient, 
affectionate, and docile, rather than creating rebels who try to dominate adults. 
Rousseau points out that the difficulty in teaching children is that adults are always 
more powerful, regardless of whether the adults are servants or parents. Children 
need to learn that adults serve them out of compassion, not out of duty. Children 
should not learn that servants have the duty to serve them; they should meet their 
caretakers and educators with humility, thus inspiring a proper longing for becoming 
increasingly independent (JNH).  
In this respect, the prospect of increasing freedom becomes a crucial goal of the 
child. Although Rousseau appreciated childhood and wanted children to live a happy 
life, he points out in Julie that an enlightened mother does not try to give her child 
immediate pleasure but, instead, is more aware of the abilities her child will need to 
thrive in the future. Crucial, then, is that under no circumstances should children be 
allowed to rule. They have to understand that they are dependent on others for their 
wellbeing. Children thus have to learn to show love, “for one loves by making 
oneself loved” (JNH, p. 468). Love is a mutuality born of equality. However, children 
do not stand on equal ground with adults when it comes to their ability for reasoning, 
and thus they need to be prevented from believing that they know more than adults do 
and from having their vanity grow by expecting every little word they utter to be 
admired and applauded by adults (JNH). Such self-importance can cause children to 
think they are better than others are and can lead them to seek constant attention. 
Humans have to learn from the beginning to spare their words, not to speak nonsense, 
and to act responsibly.  
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Rousseau strongly argued against the custom of correcting children with 
punishments and forbiddances, and he completely opposed Locke’s conclusion that 
the child should be bent and forced to obey. Émile’s education is not cruel, but it is 
purposeful and it is without doubt manipulative, although the methods are 
extraordinary. For Rousseau children are naturally free and their freedom should not 
be overruled, at least not openly so they experience that they are being manipulated. 
He wants Émile’s guidance to take place by help of clever means that prevent the 
child from noticing that learning situations are arranged. Émile is taught to suffer the 
consequences of his own actions; for example, he has to sleep without a window 
when he has scratched the glass with a ball, but he is not beaten. However, being 
made to sleep in a cold room could also be considered to be cruel punishment. Bloom 
(1978/2006) finds ironic Rousseau’s formula that the child must always do what he 
wants to do but he should want to do only what the tutor wants him to (see E). 
Bloom’s claim makes it sound like the tutor was obsessive, however, and gives an 
oversimplified picture of Rousseau’s educational endeavor.  
However, it is not so far from what Rousseau says in Émile, namely that the 
impression should be given that the student is the master; education thus shall seem 
free even though it is calculated to direct the child’s own will. In Heywood’s (2007, p 
40) opinion, creating this illusion of freedom is even manipulative “to a degree that 
now seems shocking.” I agree, but perhaps Rousseau’s actual intention was to shock 
his contemporary readers. We can, on the one hand, excuse Rousseau for being a 
better educational philosopher than practitioner and might call his examples flawed. 
On the other hand, the education of Émile can also be taken is an example of what 
Foucault called “governmentality.” Émile is led to believe that he is free even though 
he is being subjected to governmentality. If we experimentally imagine that Émile 
lives under virtuous circumstances, his will then becomes a part of the general will 
through the social contract. If, on the other hand, society misuses his will, it can be 
subjugated towards ends he would not otherwise seek. An education that develops his 
own will makes him free and thus ready to reply independently to social demands.  
Does this then in truth mean that Rousseau wanted to encourage the educator to 
endorse freedom through force? In a way, yes, because the adult is stronger. Is this 
doable? Schaffar (2008) states that the paradoxical problem with endorsing freedom 
with force is mainly theoretical and disappears in practical educational situations, but 
Rousseau’s Émile is an evident example of how complicated this is. Émile is a 
masterpiece that problematizes this paradoxical problem. In noting that education 
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based on the idea that an individual is free but the teacher is the one who controls 
how to use this freedom, Kant, whose educational lessons leaned on Rousseau’s 
Émile, raised the “education paradox” as a problem in On education: 
 
One of the greatest problems of education is how to unite submission to the 
necessary restraint with the child’s capability of exercising his freewill—for 
restraint is necessary. How am I to develop the sense of freedom in spite of the 
restraint? I am to accustom my pupil to endure a restraint of his freedom, and at 
the same time I am to guide him to use his freedom aright. Without this all 
education is merely mechanical, and the child, when his education is over, will 
never be able to make a proper use of his freedom.
248
 (Kant, 1803/1900, p. 29) 
 
Løvlie (2008) says that Rousseau neglected this pedagogical paradox and promoted 
both freedom and the establishment of rules for Émile. I think Rousseau actually had 
the unambiguous intention of using Émile to highlight the paradox of forcing 
somebody to be free. He preferred to be a man of paradoxes more than a man of 
prejudices. Oettingen (2001) addresses another side of the same paradox in 
Rousseau’s education, namely that ‘humans have to learn to become humans’. Yet, if 
we read Émile in light of the 2
nd
 Discourse this is no paradox because what Rousseau 
wanted was to educate the children he regarded as humans in the state of nature to, on 
one hand, remain natural and thus good and, on the other hand, to become civilized 
and responsible members of society. It was not enough only to become a human 
being, but also humane, and therefore, he wanted to force Émile to become free. This 
means that the child should be educated so he is prepared some day to face both his 
own intrinsic and animal nature and to reflect on his role as a member of society. 
Denying either requirement means not being a free member of human society. Kivelä 
(2004) notes that education has to address humans at both an individual and a social 
level, and should not see these different dimensions as contradictions, but as two 
innate and complementary forms of human life. I do not agree with Schaffar (2008) 
that we can solve the paradox in practical situations or with Kivelä (2004) in his 
argument that, at least theoretically, we can solve the paradox. Instead, I see the 
paradox Rousseau put on the table as a conflict that creates an intellectual anxiety. 
This anxiety opens the doors for educational researchers and practitioners to continue 
searching for better ways of educating new generations. However, it also shows that 
education, ethics, and politics are three branches of the same tree of human 
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intercourse (see Benner, 2005; Uljens, 2008). The initial problem is how to regulate 
but also stimulate individual growth towards a freedom that is wed to social 
responsibility. Benner (2005) calls this paradox a foundation of education because the 
educator can set in motion learning processes that the child never could achieve 
without help of an adult. Awareness of the paradox can operate as a warning signal 
that prevents education form becoming indoctrination. 
Rousseau’s forceful route to freedom can be compared with how Foucault, in 
Kant’s, footsteps declared that enlightenment could be considered as a way out, a 
situation where individuals start questioning themselves, other people, and seeking to 
understand how various issues are related in the present day (Foucault, 1997h). Such 
an ethos opens the gates towards maturity, although humans probably never will 
become fully mature. Freedom is not doing whatever one wants; it demands 
knowledge, self-understanding, and following accepted codes of behavior (see 
Nilsson, 2008). One has to learn to manage one’s desires and passions to avoid 
dominating others, to respect their freedom. A freedom that allows anything is no real 
freedom. Freedom needs to be reshaped all the time. Then the modern project 
becomes a kind of attitude where individuals create themselves as responsible parts 
of the societal whole. No one can be educated directly into freedom but only to 
choose freedom. This happens when the individuals learn to have a critical attitude 
towards possible prejudices, commonly accepted ‘general norms’ and ‘obligations’, 
and also towards themselves and their own self-creation (see Foucault, 1997h). In 
Émile, however, Rousseau could ignore these paradoxes because the situations he 
created were not real, but ideal. Moreover, as ideal pictures they could portray 
visionary directions rather than serving as models to be slavishly followed.  
Nevertheless, I would be willing to agree with Løvlie (2008) that Rousseau had 
difficulties solving the conflict between freedom and manipulation. Rousseau chose 
Sophie for Émile, and he had painted an attractive picture of her beforehand in order 
to really catch Émile in a trap. But, when reading Émile et Sophie it seems as though 
it was Rousseau himself who was caught in the trap; for some reason, then, he 
decided to reshape the happy end in Émile. Émile’s and Sophie’s happy marriage 
ended in Paris. Isolated with few friends and no support, and surrounded with people 
with completely different values, they were not able to live in accordance with what 
they had earlier learned was right. It is not enough to have learned good principles; 
people need continuous sustenance because there are always forces that will incline 
one to act in other directions. In safe groups, members can support and encourage 
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each other to act decently. Mutual care and responsibility grows when appreciating 
and recognizing each other. 
 
Recognition 
 
The understanding of Amour-propre helps us to understand who we are, according to 
Rousseau. On the one hand, amour-propre lets us ‘discover’ who we are; on the other 
hand, it helps us to ‘make’ or ‘construct’ ourselves (O’Hagan, 1999/2006). That 
means that amour-propre helps us use our own ‘natural’ qualities to transform 
ourselves and become more than what we were at birth. O’Hagan holds ‘reflection’ 
as a key component of amour-propre, and he does not see reflection as something 
solitary but, rather, as depending on common forms of mutual recognition.
249
 Other 
people recognize what is worth recognizing. Therefore, amour-propre is a tool for 
both self-understanding and self-improvement, and it works through the process of 
recognition. Amour-propre is nourished because “[i]n the play of interaction one 
seeks to find oneself in the eyes of others” (O’Hagan, 1999/2006, p. 340). However, 
this nourishment is positive only if the others yield a true reflection of the person. 
Conversely, if the reflecting-others are corrupted, amour-propre will develop 
negatively. However, individuals who do not trust such others anymore cannot gain 
positively from their recognition but are turned away instead (O’Hagan, 1999/2006). 
Without trust in others, humans can turn to themselves, but lose the source of self-
knowledge if they are left alone (ibid.).  
 
He loves men because they are his fellows, but he will especially love those who 
resemble him most because he will feel that he is good; and since he judges this 
resemblance by agreement in moral taste, he will be quite gratified to be approved 
in everything connected with good character. He will not precisely say to himself, 
“I rejoice because they approve of me,” but rather, “I rejoice because they 
approve of what I have done that is good. I rejoice that the people who honor me 
do themselves honor. So long as they judge so soundly, it will be a fine thing to 
obtain their esteem.” (E, p. 339)  
 
Amour-propre can also be dangerous if used to uphold destructive social interactions 
and control. It acts in combination with habits, laws, and social order, and affects all 
human life (e.g., E, JNH). When Rousseau discussed the education of women, he did 
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 With his theory of recognition Rousseau seems to have cultivated the seed of this idea that Hegel, 
Honneth, and many others have furthered developed (see, e.g., Honneth, 2003). 
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not mitigate the ill effects of amour-propre to the same degree as he did in his 
education for Émile. 
In Affeldt’s (1999/2006, p. 424) opinion, Rousseau does not actually mean that 
individuals have to be “forced” to freedom, but “encouraged, attracted, invited, 
incited, and the like but not literally forced.” This sounds like a most probable 
interpretation of Rousseau’s view, and it correlates with Benner’s (2005) and 
Oettingen’s (2001) reading of Émile. Likewise, it correlates with Benner’s (2005) and 
Uljens’ (1998, 2002) educational interpretation of Johann Gottlieb Fichte’s 
Aufforderung or “provocation to freedom” mentioned earlier. Fichte noted that 
individuals do not become free by themselves; both recognition of and inspiration by 
others are needed for individuals to become conscious of their freedom. An 
individual has inherent potentials that can be encouraged, but they also grow when 
recognized by others. This indicates that both acknowledgment and encouragement 
from others are needed to develop a person’s full potential. Conversely, through 
recognizing and encouraging others, individuals become aware that self-limiting their 
own freedom advances the freedom of others. Unlimited freedom for everybody is 
actually not possible and, for that reason, encouragement by recognition is a 
responsibility owed to others (see Uljens 2002, 2004a; Williams, 1992; Österlund & 
Wolff, 2006). Provoking others to freedom, however, leads to recognition of one’s 
self by the other. Self-reflection and  self-creative activity may be promoted in 
educational situations so that the learners exceed themselves by becoming capable of 
doing and understanding more than they would without expectations and 
‘provocation’ from others (Uljens, 2002, 2005). In encouraging such situations, 
individuals consequently grow mentally and intellectually because they are 
acknowledged as possessing the potential to grow, instead of being left on their own 
or abandoned. Rousseau especially emphasized two kinds of growth: self-governance 
and morality.  
In Rousseau’s view, recognition also includes its opposite: when necessary, to 
neglect paying attention. This means that when children cry only for attention, the 
adult can stop this habit by not showing such attention. This requires, however, that 
the adult has learned to interpret various reasons for crying (JNH). Children need to 
be recognized for their own natural qualities, instead of admired or criticized in 
comparison with others. In Émile, Rousseau wants to ensure that his pupil only meets 
people that recognize him properly; that is, who let him appreciate that he is good in a 
mainly human way. Rousseau does not want Émile to pretend to be something more 
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than he is and that others pay attention to him for his pre-eminence. Émile has to 
remain innocent, or, in Rousseau’s word “natural.” As an element of amour-propre, 
recognition then plays a basic role in the development of the individual’s self-
confidence. Parents, teachers, nursemaids, and others have to meet them with dignity 
and benevolently care for them solely because they are individuals with innate rights 
as human beings. This is, however, not to say that they have to be ‘spoiled’. To the 
contrary, children need to learn to treat others decently, regardless of social class or 
occupation. Others will take care of them and love them when they are repaid with 
love because love is mutual and has to be earned (E, JNH). 
 
The Education of Women 
 
Although Rousseau’s opinion was that all humans are born equal, when it came to the 
education of women, Rousseau was largely conservative and women have argued 
against his education proposal for girls and women ever since Mary Wollstonecraft’s 
indignant critique in the 18
th
 century (see, e.g., Wollstonecraft, 1792/1992). She 
attacked him angrily for not noticing that women have the same capability to think as 
men. Rousseau’s educational book bears the title Émile and only one chapter of five, 
the last one, deals with women’s education through the imaginary girl Sophie who 
was to become Émile’s wife. While Rousseau wanted to educate Émile to be 
independent, the same did not apply to Sophie. Her education was in many aspects 
the opposite of Émile’s. Sophie was raised in a social context and learned about 
religion at an early age because her task was first to follow her mother’s religion and, 
when married, her husband’s. Émile was to be strong and active, Sophie weak and 
passive. The ideal woman Rousseau portrays in Émile is a gentle angel made for 
pleasing her man. While Julie is a gentle character, she is also clever and knows how 
to control her family members and servants, and how to create a happy, small 
community. However, first she has to obey her father, who made her abandon her 
passionate lover and, after him, she had to obey her much older, emotionless, and 
rational husband because Rousseau meant that “[w]oman is made to yield to man and 
to endure even his injustice” (E, s. 396). In many ways Julie is a kind of female saint, 
a martyr to her own maternal love, and before she died she spent a kind of “last 
supper” together with her family (the symbolism is strong in this section of the book). 
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Rousseau repeats the view of women that was typical of his time (see, e.g., 
Heywood, 2007), but his view is not completely biased since he states in the 
beginning of the fourth chapter in Émile that “[t]hose who regard woman as an 
imperfect man are doubtless wrong, but the external analogy is on their side” (E, p. 
211). In Rousseau’s opinion men and women are similar in that they are both 
humans, but they have distinct social roles. They “ought to act in concert, but they 
ought not to do the same things” (ibid., p. 363). The two shall be one; but if they 
become two it will lead to disaster (see E & S). Sophie’s education thus has relevance 
for Rousseau’s political theory. Still, it is largely in contradiction with the education 
of men and does not aim at fostering a free individual who takes care of herself. In 
fact, it is quite the opposite (see also Okin, 1979/2006). 
It is impossible to discuss Sophie’s education in depth here, although it has 
relevance for Rousseau’s philosophical system. Even if Rousseau’s view of women’s 
education sounds unfair today, he saw the family as the place where sound social 
relationships could be built (see also Spring, 2006).  
 
[A]s though the love of one’s nearest were not the principle of the love one owes 
the state; as though it were not by means of the small fatherland which is the 
family that the heart attaches itself to the large one; as though it were not the good 
son, the good husband, and the good father who make the good citizen! (E, p. 
363) 
 
As shown above and in Julie, a woman’s role in the family was crucial to Rousseau’s 
social theory (see also, e.g., Lange, 2002). The mother should be the first caretaker of 
her children. McMillan (1982) interprets Rousseau’s call for the “natural” as a 
standard for judging many social practices, and she defends Rousseau’s biological 
view of women as the ones who deliver children, and regards both the family and 
society responsible for children’s’ upbringing. Motherly love should expand and 
make the children love their family, and as a result, the children should also learn to 
love their country (Spring, 2006).
250
 The woman’s role is to prepare her son for 
education, and the father’s role is to educate him (JNH). In a first lengthy note in 
Émile, Rousseau stresses the first education provided by the mothers as being the 
most important. Nevertheless, Rousseau credits Émile’s wife with wisdom when he 
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says that even if her name was not Sophie,
251
 she would still be worthy of having that 
name (Kelly, 2009).
252
 
 
6.3 Educating the Citizen  
 
In Émile, Rousseau wanted to put his finger on social contradictions and anomalies 
and make people discuss and reflect on not only educational issues but also on 
general social and political topics. Rousseau’s writings clearly show his disgust for 
what he called “depraved” or “corrupt” society. But, could there be another option? 
As discussed in the previous chapter, the 2
nd
 Discourse depicts a hypothetical 
‘state of nature’, an initial condition of humankind and describes how the initially 
good human being gradually becomes more and more influenced by society and starts 
to act egoistically and improperly. There is a clear resemblance between Rousseau’s 
ways of describing the development of humankind and that of the child. As 
humankind developed (according to Rousseau’s genealogy of humankind in the 2nd 
Discourse), it resulted in various social organizations and in increasingly complex 
political, economic, and cultural units. The education of human beings therefore had 
two goals for Rousseau: on the one hand, humans had to be educated for their own 
sakes as autonomous members of humankind and, on the other hand, as members of 
society who interact with their fellow humans. To be more specific: Rousseau’s 
anthropology has two dimensions of nature; one is species related and individual 
(human beings) and the other is social (citizens). On one hand, humans are already by 
nature good, both for their own sake and for the survival of their species. They act in 
a way that promotes their own survival. However, to become socially and thus 
morally good, they need education. The whole idea of education thus represents a 
conflict between the education of individuals and the education of the members of 
society.  
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Individual contra Social Good 
 
Rousseau faced many problems with this dual educational aspiration. Firstly, he did 
not find it wise to teach a child to become politically conscious as long as the child 
was incapable of abstract reasoning. If children could reason, they would not need 
any education, he said (E). Secondly, it did not seem right for him to transfer taken-
for-granted political opinions from a depraved society to a child. He did not even find 
it suitable to raise the child in society, for the child would then obviously imitate bad 
role models. Moreover, before children learn to know the world, they need to know 
what natural humans are like; otherwise they will easily be corrupted. The tutor has to 
create situations that nourish children’s sensibility and increase their compassion so 
that they will suffer with those who suffer and have pity for fellow beings and 
animals. Thus, children extend in a humane direction, which is the opposite of what 
might happen if they instead admired wealth and people in superior positions (Ibid.).  
As with many other ideas of Rousseau,
253
 this resembles a recurring fall and 
redemption cycle. Rousseau associated a politically healthy society with morally 
healthy society members who actively and responsibly maintain the common good 
(see Broome, 1963). This implies that citizens understand that their own good 
depends on the common good. To promote this understanding, they need education; 
the children have to learn to be good by people they love, so they become responsible 
citizens and voluntarily choose to act in accordance with the general will. 
Remarkably, when Rousseau used the expression “good” in this respect, he meant a 
moral goodness (virtue) that can be developed through education, not the inborn 
“natural goodness” that is a kind of neutral lack of vice with a hint of pity.  
“The strongest is never strong enough to be always the master, unless he 
transforms strength into right, and obedience into duty” (SC, p. 4). While force is a 
physical power, it cannot have any moral effects. “To yield to force is an act of 
necessity, not of will—at the most, an act of prudence” (ibid.). There is no duty to 
obey other humans simply because they hold more power. Then the opposite would 
also be an option: if one does not obey, the other loses power. While force does not 
create right, one is obliged to obey only legitimate powers. No humans have natural 
authority over others. Legitimate powers are created through agreements, not by 
force. When every society member is ruled by the interest of amour-de-soi they 
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jointly act according to ‘the general will’ that is a common agreement, a contract; and 
when they are ruled by amour-propre the result is ‘the will of all’ that includes many 
different wills, which in reality means that only some members of society get what 
they want since the possibilities are limited. Consequently, ‘the general will’ is 
indistinct from ‘the will of all’. If humans ever are going to arrive at a better society, 
they have to improve their commonly held aspirations (see also Broome, 1963). A 
government can hardly rely on mere obedience; it thus has to transform individuals in 
line with what it wants, or, as Rousseau put it: “The most absolute authority is that 
which penetrates into a man’s inmost being, and concerns itself no less with his will 
than with his actions” (DPE, p. 130). Then individuals will gradually become what 
their government wants. This clearly correlates with Foucault’s concept of 
“governmentality.”  
The short supplemental story in Émile, called Émile et Sophie, totally changes the 
successful conclusion of Émile. The glorious life that Rousseau envisioned for the 
young couple and their child failed to materialize, and Émile was once again as alone 
as he was at the beginning of Émile. Their shared family life first encountered 
tragedies and then the family moved to Paris to start anew; but there they became 
alienated both from themselves and from each other, and their shared life ended when 
Sophie betrayed Émile. Why did Rousseau reverse the pleasant picture he earlier had 
painted? Nobody knows for sure; one can only guess. Firstly, he might have wanted 
to play with the readers and again show this contrary situation in order to trigger their 
thinking by showing that the end is never definite. Secondly, he might have wanted to 
show that even a good education cannot always protect someone from a sorrowful 
life, although it provides a foundation for helping people to bear their miseries and to 
get on with life. When Émile had to work as a slave, he performed his task with Stoic 
calm. Yet, he had left his homeland and could no longer participate in the civic life. 
He could not even raise his own child, had given up his business, and the only thing 
he had left was his self-love, his amour-de-soi. All passions and pleasures were gone, 
but he still had peace in his heart. “Freedom is found in no form of government; it is 
the heart of the free man. He takes it with him everywhere” (E, p. 473). They can sell 
his body, but never his being. Nevertheless, solitude is not the best alternative, as 
long as it is possible to be a part of a society. “I had to seek whether I was still that 
man who knows how to fill his place in his species when no individual takes an 
interest in it any longer” (E & S, p. 705). When the one he loved most betrayed him, 
he could no longer live in the family group, not even in the country. His only 
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alternative was to give up his status as a citizen and family member and become 
merely a species member; to go back to his natural state and begin anew. When Émile 
was complemented with Émile et Sophie, the vicious circle was complete. 
Thirdly, perhaps Rousseau wanted to show that a small family is very vulnerable 
without any social network; people who can encourage each other to hold onto ethical 
principles and to help each other care for themselves. Émile actually blames his tutor 
for having abandoned him and Sophie. The book Émile ends with the sentences:  
 
As long as I live, I shall need you. I need you more than ever now that my 
functions as a man begin. You have fulfilled yours. Guide me so that I can imitate 
you. And take your rest. It is time. (E, p. 480)  
 
In Julie, the family includes persons in addition to the nuclear family; both 
servants and friends take part in family life. But, even with this many people 
supporting each other, this story also ends tragically. Both stories show how 
important it is to keep the passions alive. Human relations are supported by 
sentiments; rationality is enough for managing material life economically, but 
friendship, education, and partnership are upheld by love. And Rousseau points out: 
“[O]ne must not cease being lovable if one wants to be loved always” (E & S, p. 
697). Mutual respect and recognition uphold sustainable human relations. Émile’s 
amour-propre had received a very hard setback in Émile et Sophie, and the only thing 
he could turn to was his amour-de-soi. However, inflamed amour-propre brings 
about self- alienation (E).  
Fourthly, the story might want to demonstrate that either Émile’s or, perhaps, 
Sophie’s education was a total failure. It was Sophie who betrayed, and this made 
Émile abandon his family and his native country. However, Émile read in “the depth 
of his heart,” that it was he who had earlier treated Sophie with coldness and realized 
that he had thus betrayed himself in the first place. Fifthly, when picturing people 
Émile and Sophie met in their desperate situation, the story might want to show how 
difficult it is to live a decent life when confronted with others’ biases. Others might 
judge us according to their prejudices before grasping the situation or might 
manipulate us into their own ‘bad’ habits.  
The education Rousseau proposes is complicated because it is secretly controlled. 
Freedom and control are two political counterparts in Rousseau’s educational 
thinking. According to Gay (1966), it is a problem about authority, since Rousseau’s 
intention was to resolve the paradoxical tension between the sovereign and the 
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citizen. When humans give up their natural freedom for the common good, they 
become both the rulers and the subjects and start making the laws they then obey. 
Thus they remain masters over themselves and free, according to Gay. However, the 
way Rousseau describes how government has to transform individuals requires that 
the government directs them through its own conduct. Rousseau doubted that 
complete freedom was ever likely. Lanson nonetheless expresses Rousseau’s idea 
like this:  
 
[Rousseau] applies himself to transforming Émile’s innocent instincts into 
reflective kindness, to have take root in him the spirit of liberty and the spirit of 
equality that will make him incapable of ever being oppressed or an oppressor. 
(Lanson, 1912/2006, pp. 20-21)  
 
Émile should be forced to become a citizen by adopting general rules, but the 
complementary story Émile et Sophie showed that even if Émile had to give up 
everything else, no one could rob him of his freedom. The most important aim of 
Rousseau’s education was not to teach Émile particular knowledge or skills, not even 
understanding or attitudes, but to live whatever life would bring about: 
 
One ought to teach him to preserve himself as a man, to bear the blows of fate, to 
brave opulence and poverty, to live, if he has to, in freezing Iceland or on Malta’s 
burning rocks. You may very well take precautions against his dying. He will 
nevertheless have to die. And though his death were not the product of your 
efforts, still these efforts would be ill conceived. It is less a question of keeping 
him from dying than of making him live. To live is not to breathe; it is to act; it is 
to make use of our organs, our senses, our faculties, of all the parts of ourselves 
which give us the sentiment of our existence. The man who has lived the most is 
not he who have counted the most years but he who has most felt life. (E, p. 42) 
 
Educating the Will 
 
Rousseau’s “first principle of public economy” (DPE, p. 127) is the general will. Like 
a human body ‘the body politic’ is in a possession of a will, and this will is the 
‘general will’ that is the ‘voice of the people’ and, in fact, also ‘the voice of God’ 
(DPE). ‘The general will’ expresses the common good and stipulates what is best for 
all members of the state. This ‘body’ consists mainly of many smaller groups, but 
their vested interests are not necessarily congruent with what is best for the rest of the 
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‘body politic’. A paradoxical problem, however, is that good governments need good 
citizens and vice versa, according to Rousseau. A government that strives for 
goodness has to lean on and be aware of the general will. It has to be distinguished 
from particular wills that are striving for singular ends and these particular wills need, 
therefore, to become congruent with the general will. Education is fundamental to 
bringing about this result; citizens have to be taught to be good by people they love 
so they can voluntarily choose to act in accordance with the general will that then 
becomes a duty. Rousseau was skeptical of having compassion for all the people of 
the world; he saw a limitation to human kindness. Instead, he believed in small states 
(like Geneva or Sparta) and making people loving their family members and their 
country.  
From being almost a wild animal, the child has to become a member of civilized 
society. Inborn natural freedom will change to the freedom of an extended being. 
Rousseau obviously struggled with how to educate children to be autonomous and at 
the same time make them responsible citizens. In Émile he solves the problem by 
declaring that we have to choose either to create human beings or citizens; it is too 
difficult to combine these two aims. He thus first embarks on the endeavor of 
educating Émile to become an autonomously thinking and acting individual, and only 
thereafter a citizen. Rousseau’s so called ‘negative’ education is, however, not a 
freedom from direction or restraints; it can also be a freedom by force.  
In the Social Contract Rousseau states that those who refuse to follow the general 
will need to be forced to be free, and in Émile he speaks about a “well-regulated 
freedom”254 (E, p. 92). According to Rousseau, individuals cannot contribute to the 
society without contributing to themselves and, thus, everyone’s wellbeing and 
society’s wellbeing are interdependent. Therefore, the general will is initiated from 
everyone as applicable to everyone. Freedom comes to exist in society when 
individual wills match the general will, and those who do not understand what is best 
for all have to be forced to act in accordance with socially accepted rules (SC) until 
they understand that obedience to the general law is a criterion of their own freedom 
(DPE). Human justice and liberty depend on the law: the social contract depends on 
mutual agreement and no one can put selfish interests above the law (ibid.).    
While freedom is about willing, good education cannot miss its purpose; it has to 
encourage the development of the student’s own will. Education for independence 
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and a will to be free promote happiness, since real happiness resides inside of us and 
cannot be removed by anyone else. Rousseau thus turned his attention away from his 
ills and searched for happiness inside himself, because “the source of true happiness 
is within us and that it is not within the power of men to make anyone who can will to 
be happy truly miserable” (RSW, p. 9). A goal of education must be to make 
responsible group members of the children; that is, to make them social, so they 
become equal and thus clear-cut parts of the whole. However, it is not enough simply 
to be a member of a group; another crucial purpose of education is to make the 
individuals at one with themselves. Humans must act as they speak, know what 
course they ought to take, and live in peace with themselves without internal conflict. 
Rousseau did not offer a direct route to a good society, but he pointed out, 
instead, that education is a slow process that must begin when children are young. He 
also concludes that education should not destroy the ‘natural state’ of children and 
deprive them of their passions: citizens without passion will be worthless. Such 
passions are to be directed in the form of love for one’s country instead of toward 
other matters, so that individuals can identify with a greater and common whole and 
not concentrate only on their own desires (DPE). 
 
Promoting simplicity and equality 
  
The precondition for willingness is freedom. But what does this mean? Is forcing 
somebody to be free a contradiction? The dignity of humans can be realized only 
among free people, according to Rousseau. A government that wants respect and 
obedience to the laws from the citizens has to show them respect in return. Laws 
should be like guarantees of common freedom. A government that aims at justice for 
all members of society at a material level has to divide material possessions justly so 
that every one can live comfortably (distributive justice).
255
 This means, among other 
things, that the government has to prevent both accumulation of goods and poverty, 
and it has to promote respect for laws, patriotism, and responsibility to the general 
will (SC, DPE). Since the real world is limited, it is a human duty to be humane; 
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therefore, it is necessary to restrict one’s personal requirements (E). Rousseau 
heatedly argues for these ideas in a very long sentence:  
 
The unequal distribution of inhabitants over the territory, when men are crowded 
together in one place, while other places are depopulated; the encouragement of 
the arts that minister to luxury and of purely industrial arts at the expense of 
useful and laborious crafts, the sacrifice of agriculture to commerce; the 
necessitation of the tax-farmer by the mal-administration of the funds of the State; 
and in short, venality pushed to such an extreme that even public esteem is 
reckoned at a cash value, and virtue rated at a market price: these are the most 
obvious causes of opulence and of poverty, of public interest, of mutual hatred 
among citizens, of indifference to the common cause, of the corruption of the 
people, and of the weakening of all the springs of government. (DPE, p. 134) 
 
The principle of re-distribution has nonetheless been a problem in modern times, 
since politics and economics have been included in a global agenda, while interest in 
economic justice has not extended beyond national borders. And nature has been seen 
as a limitless resource to be exploited by those who have power and money.  
In Political Economy, Rousseau’s education follows another track than in Émile. 
This essay suggests that children should be raised together in public educational 
institutions. He argues that this is the only possibility for making them cherish each 
other and getting them to follow the general will of society. Such public education 
was most certainly what Rousseau had in mind, but the actual situation with such an 
education led him to write the experimental book Émile as a surrogate for the proper 
political education that deformed amour-propre had prevented (Bernstein, 1990). 
Rousseau held that the public education of his time corrupted youth because it strived 
towards two contradictory ends, fostering both individuals and citizens, thus failing 
with both (E). Rousseau criticized Jesuit education for not teaching children what is 
essential for life. They have not learned to separate truth from delusion, he said, 
although they are capable of an argumentation that disguises important issues beyond 
recognition (ibid.). Generosity, justice, moderation, human kindness, and courage are 
thus not familiar to them. Both the native country and God are neglected.  
Rousseau has been criticized for choosing Émile from the aristocracy, but this 
was a strategic choice that he defended by claiming that poor children do not need 
any education because they cannot change the situation into which they are forced. 
Today this sounds very strange, but it has to be viewed in the context of 18
th
 century 
rural living and of Geneva’s handicraft society at the time. Rousseau highly valued 
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small city-state and rural living, handicrafts and farming; and Émile learned both an 
artisan’s trade and agriculture. In a letter written many years before Émile,256 
Rousseau also highlights his view of education. “I would not make them into either 
authors or office people. I would not train them to handle the pen but the plough, the 
file or the plane, instruments that make one lead a healthy, laborious, innocent life, 
which one never abuses in order to do evil and which does not attract enemies when 
one does good” (C, p. 552). This critique was a critique of existing practice. If we 
read Émile as a critique of social conditions in 18
th
 century Paris, we can easily 
defend his choice of Émile as an aristocrat. In 18
th
 century France social inequalities 
were enormous. Most people were poor and often went hungry, while the aristocracy 
and the churchmen were well off, and luxury and extravagance increased among the 
wealthy. “In general the upper classes despised the lower, and treated them with 
contempt and cruelty. The nobility looked upon the peasants as a lower order of life” 
(Eby, 1952, p. 312). It was common that upper class children demeaned the servants 
who took care of them (E). Rousseau saw it as his task to try to prevent the 
increasingly numerous bourgeoisie from copying the extravagant life style of the rich. 
In this situation, he believed that the obstruction to social improvements was the way 
the rich brought up their children and saw the biggest challenge in the education of 
the rich. In Rousseau’s opinion, it was more important to educate the wealthy than 
the poor and teach the rich simplicity and to live a more modest life. He imagined (at 
least as a thought experiment) that it would be possible to adjust social conditions by 
an education that could change the behavior of the aristocrat’s children and thus make 
new generations more humble; a virtuous circular process would operate and generate 
change. Yet, Rousseau also foresaw a revolution and said he wanted to prepare the 
rich for future poverty. With his gentle but incisive wit, Rousseau states that it is 
much more likely that the poor will become rich than vice versa.  
 
The noble become commoners, the rich become poor, the monarch becomes 
subject. Are the blows of fate so rare that you can count on being exempted from 
them? We are approaching a state of crisis, and the age of revolutions. (E, p. 194) 
 
Rousseau’s Émile can also be seen as a critique of contemporary theoretical 
arguments, and thus as a general critique of Locke’s political philosophy. In such a 
light, Émile becomes a polemic against Locke’s liberal recommendation for 
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economic individualism based on competition. According to Rousseau, the doctrine 
of capitalism endangered the development of a humane society, decent relationships, 
and equality. Therefore, children should learn to become unselfish and know what 
their immediate needs are, so that they can distinguish needs from superfluous 
desires. Freedom, then, is wanting only what is in the common interest of all, where 
the individual will becomes subjugated to the general will of all (see Spring, 2006).  
 
6.4 Education about the Natural World 
 
In the 18
th
 century, belief in scientific truth gradually influenced education, but 
Rousseau found scientific investigations hazardous and claimed that they often lead 
students astray and that the possibility of such educational harm thus could outweigh 
searching for the truth, especially since the search for truth is so difficult (e.g., 1
st
 D). 
When we find truth, he states, the problem of how to use it emerges as still trickier. 
“Are we, then, destined to die tied to the edge of the well into which truth has 
withdrawn?” (1st D, p. 16). When it comes to the education of children, there is only 
one science: the duties of men. To become good was the primary aim and Rousseau’s 
education thus ranks the development of morality and understanding of oneself above 
everything else. Consequently, Rousseau valued science as less important than virtue 
and he despised science in the form of theoretical speculation. Knowledge should be 
the result of experience not theories. Thus, from the beginning, Émile did not learn 
through others or by help of various books and technologies but needed to realize 
how authentic things actually function. He was not to become a source of faultily 
understood second hand knowledge; “the harm is not in what the pupil does not 
understand but it is in what he believes he understands” (E, p. 182). Émile ought to 
learn to judge things for himself before he learns how others judge them. It is false 
beliefs that are harmful.  
The quality of his learning is much more important than the quantity; he should 
not learn things superficially but thoroughly. Émile has more or less to invent natural 
laws again by responding to his tutor’s ingenious but covert guidance and the sites for 
such explorations are nearby in the child’s own natural environment. “The issue is 
not to teach him the sciences but to give him the taste for loving them and methods 
for learning them when this taste is better developed” (E, p. 172).  
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Before he can start studying science or morals, he has to train his body and his 
senses. Émile’s body should become robust so the senses are able to judge well. He 
should train his body by swimming, jumping, running, throwing stones, playing 
games like billiards and tennis, and develop his senses by measuring, counting, 
weighing, and the like. The tutor ought to put Émile in natural settings from early 
morning to late evening to watch sunrise and sunset, listen to the birds, and to enjoy 
the activities of wildlife. Moreover, Émile and his tutor even went outdoors in the 
middle of the night so that Émile could feel comfortable in darkness and in order to 
train other senses than sight, especially touch. The life of nature is in congruence with 
the human heart and has to be experienced directly. In addition to promoting 
experiences and studying science, nature is the only and original model for art and the 
child should thus practice drawing and explore geometry outdoors (E).    
As was obvious in the two previous chapters, Rousseau greatly appreciated the 
natural world and liked to spend time in it. Natural scenery provided aesthetic 
experiences, but he speaks more highly about plants than he does about other 
elements of nature. Plants were absolutely his favorite natural interest. His zeal for 
plants reminds one of the descriptions of the creation Plato presents in Timaeos where 
the plants are akin to human beings. Rousseau does not describe how to study other 
parts of nature as profoundly as botany, but he emphasizes in Émile that the child 
should primarily be raised outdoors and should be allowed to run around and use his 
limbs to explore his natural surroundings.  
Rousseau had two great interests that absorbed him, music,
257
 and botany. In the 
fifth and the seventh walks in Reveries Rousseau thoroughly expresses his liking for 
plants and conveys his interest in botany. He appreciated plants merely as living 
matter, for their intrinsic value, not because of the uses humans could make of them. 
Wandering around in nature led Rousseau to notice the diversity of colors, shapes, 
and odors. Botany “is a study of pure curiosity and which has no other real utility 
than that which a thinking and sensitive being can draw from the observation of 
nature and the marvels of the universe” (RSW, p. 156). 
Rousseau makes it very clear that botany was an undertaking that diverted his 
mind and made him feel happy and peaceful. He loved to stroll in mountains, hills, 
woods, and fields searching for interesting plants. Nevertheless, he also found 
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Rousseau’s visionary ‘system’; it was congruent with his love of a harmonious life in accordance with 
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pleasure in studying them carefully with the help of hand lenses, thus exploring their 
structures in detail.  
 
It is said that a German did a book about a lemon peel; I would have done one 
about each type of hay of the meadows, each moss of the woods, each lichen that 
carpets the rocks; in short, I did not want to leave a blade of grass or a plant 
particle which was not amply described. (RSW, p. 43) 
 
I have already mentioned that Émile not is an educational manual, but Rousseau has 
contributed to practical education through his writings about botany. He diverted 
botanical interest from the herbariums and collections to the outdoors and introduced 
the study of botany to women and children (see BW; Kelly & Cook, 2000). He also 
organized and participated in botanical expeditions and communicated and 
exchanged seeds and plants with other both professional and amateur botanists.
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And although he preferred local flora, he was not totally unfamiliar with exotic, 
imported species. For practical reasons, he chose to follow Linnaeus’ plant 
classification system built on the plants’ reproductive organs (ibid.). When he first 
learned to use this system, he applied it very enthusiastically (RSW). However, he 
stated that Linnaeus’ system is a good choice if one wants to study plants one already 
knows, but because this system is complicated, it is not suitable for novices (BW). 
Yet, he also showed an interest in other systems, especially the so-called “natural 
method” invented by Antoine-Laurent de Jussieu. In his Elementary Letters on 
Botany to Mme Delessert, Rousseau follows Jusseiu’s system (see Kelly & Cook, 
2000).  
Rousseau regarded classification as necessary when studying plants. Even if 
having knowledge about plants not is equivalent with knowing them by name, he 
argued that it is so much easier to develop knowledge of botany if common 
terminology facilitates the communication. To know names of the distinct species of 
plants is not enough, however; one also needs terms to make the classification 
possible. Rousseau realized that amateurs also have to learn the language of botany if 
they want to study plants methodically, and his Fragments for a Dictionary of Terms 
of Usage in Botany shows that he practiced what he preached and wanted to share his 
terminology with others. He rejected the arguments that botany only is a science of 
words that trains the memory to remember names. It must definitely not be allowed to 
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become merely a science about words, he wrote. In the letters to Mme Delessert
259
 he 
explains that botany for children should include teaching them classification and 
structures, and train them to pay closer attention. However, Rousseau always placed 
authentic experiences before the words. Children need to learn to see before they can 
name what they see, he argued. In addition, while such education has to be fun, they 
also need to learn. Moreover, if one really wants to learn to know a particular flower, 
he recommends that they study it from a bud until its maturity fruit, thus following 
the entire unfolding of its growth. It was not practically possible for Rousseau to 
teach Mme Delessert and her daughter directly, so instruction had to take place 
through correspondence. However, he expressed clearly that he would have preferred 
to join Mme and her daughter to study the plants together in their natural locations. In 
his letters, Rousseau nonetheless tried to encourage and praise Mme’s learning and to 
promote the teaching of her daughter (BW). 
Botany was, according to Rousseau, suitable for all ages, an activity that calms 
the passions, nourishes the soul, and fills it with valuable sources of contemplation. 
As a method, he suggested a patient and not too ambitious start. Mme Delessert’s 
daughter needed first to learn vegetal structures and the organization of plants to be 
able to go further in her studies: “It is only a question of having the patience to begin 
at the beginning” (BW, p. 131). So, Rousseau instructs Mme in detail how to 
distinguish plant families, how to differentiate the various parts of the plants, like 
roots, stalks, branches, leaves, flowers and fruits, and how to identify all parts of a 
plant, for example the corolla, petals, and pistils of flowers. He did not teach Mme 
everything with the purpose that she, in turn, should instruct her daughter in a similar 
way, but pointed out that children need to be taught in accordance with their age and 
gender (!) and guided to make discoveries on their own. Besides Rousseau, nature 
itself should be Mme’s first botany teacher. Thus, she is advised not to consult books 
until she has become acquainted with the authentic plants. The instruments needed to 
examine plants are simple enough to fit in a pocket: a magnifying glass, a needle, and 
a pair of scissors. After studying plants for a while, it was time to begin a herbarium, 
and Rousseau gave careful instructions about procedures and needed equipment. 
Gradually the time came to learn the plants’ names in Latin. A common language 
makes the correspondence with botanists from all nations easier and it is easier to 
avoid confusing species and using long descriptions, according to Rousseau (BW). 
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Learning Latin as a part of botany studies was not pointless because then the 
language was for practical use. 
There is sometimes an equal zeal in Rousseau’s botanical undertakings as in his 
utopian visions of the good society. It is a lifelong
260
 passion pursued without 
compromise. In the Seventh Walk in Reveries, he wants to become acquainted with all 
known plants of the world. Starting from a few local plants, his ambition is to collect 
all the plants of the sea, the Alps, and all the trees of the Indies in his herbarium. But 
mostly he was more realistic. The minimum number of plant species Mme had to 
learn, according to Rousseau, was about 200. Nevertheless, he wanted her either to 
send the plants to him so he could identify them or to employ a gardener or 
apothecary who could show them to her, because “[t]o study nature agreeable and 
usefully, you must have its productions before your eyes” (BW, p. 172). Rousseau 
regarded nature itself as the best book about nature, and encourages studying plants 
without uprooting them. Empirical studies should come prior to theorizing and it was 
best for someone who was already familiar with plants to lead such studies. Even as 
an old man, Rousseau appreciated outdoor lessons by a ‘master’ and, besides 
instruments for studying botany, expeditions should also include an array of 
equipment to make nature trips pleasant experiences (BW). The expedition group had 
to be prepared to make coffee in the woods and for reading floras and other books, 
and playing games if stuck indoors because of bad weather.  
With increased age, Rousseau gradually abandoned botanical books and 
classification guides: “Nomenclature and Synonymy comprise an immense and 
painful study: when one wishes merely to observe, instruct, and amuse oneself with 
nature, one does not need so many books” (BW, p. 215). Books are useful if one is 
willing to learn to observe, according to Rousseau, who dreamed of writing a botany 
book of pocket size. On the other hand, since one already knows plants, the only 
things needed to engage the alert wanderer are plants growing in the backyard and 
nearby. They offer pleasure to the solitary wanderer. When winter arrives and there 
are no flowers to find, the study of mosses and lichens begin. “[T]he greatest charm 
of botany is to be able to study and know the nature around one rather than in the 
Indies” (BW, p. 231). Having read too many books and collected too many plants, 
Rousseau realized that he had changed an amusement to an addiction something he 
regretted when old (BW). 
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6.5 Educating for Love of Nature as a Reflection of Divinity 
 
Nature is always honest, and humans are those who lie, according to Rousseau. 
Humans utilize nature and find signs and symbols for something that not is visible. 
Nature shows herself to humans as she is, and the first and foremost objects of study 
are plants (BW). The botanist studies their tissues, shapes, organization, life, growth, 
and other obvious aspects, and so did Rousseau. But, despite his trust in empirical 
knowledge, Rousseau often got excited and started to praise the elegance of all the 
plants that covered the earth. When a plant is dead it becomes merely organic, but 
before that, it exposes divinity: 
 
[I]t is in the examination of this brilliant adornment, it is in the study of this 
profusion of riches that the botanist admires with ecstasy the divine art and the 
exquisite taste of the worker who fabricated the robe of our common mother.
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(BW, p. 250) 
 
Besides becoming aware of the work of God, Rousseau also saw nature studies and 
especially botany as a way of combating the passions and of feeling at ease with 
oneself:  
 
The more the mind clarifies and instructs Itself, the more peaceable the heart 
remains. The study of nature detaches us from ourselves, and elevates us to its 
Author. It is in this sense that one truly becomes a philosopher; it is in this way 
that natural history and botany have a use for Wisdom and for virtue. To put our 
passions off the track with the taste for beautiful knowledge Is to chain love up 
with bonds of flowers. (BW, p. 173) 
 
God has given plants as food to humans and other animals, not as drugs and remedies 
for disease (BW). The work of God has been careful, especially when it comes to the 
plants that serve as food. Therefore, he has protected the blossoming of important 
nourishments like legumes that have their seeds sheltered in pods. Yet, wild plants 
are those that came originally from God’s hands, and therefore, Rousseau wants to 
study plants in the wild instead of in gardens. To feel most comfortable among plants, 
Rousseau did not want to think about earthly matters related to the body, like 
illnesses. He wanted to merge with all of nature. Rousseau sought refuge from an evil 
world in the bosom of Mother Nature, but he realized that this is not easy for all:  
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To give oneself up to such delicious sensations, it is necessary only to love 
pleasure. And if this effect does not occur for all those who are stuck by these 
objects [fragrant odors, intense colors, the most elegant shapes], with some it is 
due to a lack of natural sensitivity and with most it is because their mind, too 
preoccupied with other ideas, only furtively gives itself up to the objects which 
strike their senses. (RSW, p. 59) 
 
A great deal of sensitivity is needed to merge with nature: 
 
The more sensitive a soul a contemplator has, the more he gives himself up to the 
ecstasies this harmony arouses in him. A sweet and deep reverie takes possession 
of his senses then, and through a delightful intoxication he loses himself in the 
immensity of this beautiful system with which he feels himself one. Then, all 
particular objects elude him; he sees and feels nothing except in the whole. Some 
particular circumstance must focus his ideas and close off his imagination for him 
to be able to observe the parts of this universe he was straining to embrace.  
(RSWs, p. 59) 
 
Rousseau’s religious thoughts deal with two principles. One is active, God, and the 
other is passive, nature. The active force of God is an absolute power and is what 
combines and modifies matter (LF). Being in nature was, for Rousseau, like being a 
child in a (holy) family; he was in the bosom of the kind and caring mother with the 
father watching over them.  
 
6.6 Answers to the Inquiry 
 
Below, first I will answer the secondary questions of this chapter and, finally in the 
conclusion, the main question. I will start with the first secondary question.  
1.  What is the essence of a natural education, according to Rousseau? This 
question asks for the ontology of Rousseau’s educational credo. It is obvious that 
Rousseau built his hypothetical education in Émile on the foundation of human nature 
and thus on amour-de-soi as a natural inclination of humans. But, since humans 
cannot stay in the state of nature, he also considered how this naturally self-absorbed, 
though not negatively selfish, individual could extend its being and convert this self-
centeredness into an altruistic and civil awareness. Rousseau elaborated this process 
using Émile, who was kept from prejudices and vices until he was old enough to 
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reason because Rousseau saw it as extremely crucial to first strengthen the boy’s 
amour-de-soi. Émile’s first task was to learn to know himself and to judge the world 
around him using his own body and senses; the second step was to make his amour-
propre take a positive course, so he learns to love instead of hate, to long for virtue 
instead of vice. The essence of education was to learn what is right or wrong, and to 
learn to live both as an individual and as a member of society. Rousseau, however, 
did not believe that an individual could be morally involved with the entire world and 
become a citizen of the world but that one could become an active member of a 
smaller society and learn not only to understand the consequences of egoistic conduct 
but also to struggle against desires that could harm the common good.  
2. What did Rousseau believe that education could do to encourage people to 
adopt particular norms or rules regarding their relationships to nature? The 
deontological aspect in Rousseau’s education is interested in the keys to a natural 
education. When it comes to the education of Émile, the key is ‘negative education’ 
until the age of twelve. Rousseau did not want Émile to adapt social rules 
unreflectively but to follow nature and what is natural. After that he would gradually 
be introduced to society more to watch than to participate, so he learns to judge. The 
role of the nurses and mothers should be to love and care for the small children who 
thus learn through watching and imitating what it entails to be a social being. Since 
one learns to know one’s self when mirroring oneself in another person, the 
educator’s role is to show the children positive attention and to let them feel that they 
are recognized for who they are. Then they can build a decent amour-propre and thus 
receive an accurate picture of both their own and others’ strengths and weaknesses 
and become capable of handling the struggles that always will reside inside of them. 
The educator’s role is also to trigger children’s curiosity so that they can learn 
through their own experiences and start to ask questions about what they experience. 
The sites for education are mostly those in the natural world and learning takes 
generally place without books or equipment. The educator arranges learning 
situations and brings the child to exiting places and events; but it is the child who 
should be inspired to discover first-hand and to want to know instead of being told. 
Education should be useful, but childhood must not be sacrificed on behalf of future 
adult life. It needs to be a joyful time of its own during which the child learns useful 
knowledge, not knowledge learned for its own sake. Rousseau did not appreciate 
knowledge for showing off; he had other aspirations. Modern education that 
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promoted learning for showing that one is learned was definitely not Rousseau’s 
interest. 
3. Can education promote conduct that is more in tune with nature and, if so, 
how? While Rousseau has been seen as a spokesperson for the revolution,
262
 it is 
interesting to reflect on whether or not he intended his education to actually make a 
difference. I will argue that he definitely did. The child should be forced to be free. 
Education should not be simple transmission, however, so that the children only 
repeat what the teachers have told them. They should be encouraged to become aware 
of prejudices, recognize injustice and inequalities, and seek what they sense is right. 
Rousseau not only wrote about how to educate the young, he wrote to make the 
adults (the readers) see things in another light, and thus start to combat their own 
prejudices and learn to become better persons. His writing style was a strategic 
choice, a stylistically developed adult education. He obviously wrote his books with 
the transformation of readers and perhaps of society as a crucial aim.  
In this regard, Rousseau had a strong belief in education as a tool for societal 
transformation and wanted to point out the necessity of a new, innovative education 
that contrasted with the general practice of his time. Parry (2001) shows that 
Rousseau used education to solve central dilemmas in his political philosophy and 
thus became engaged in a virtuous circle where a transformed human being could 
create a transformed society that transforms humanity, and so on (see also Broome, 
1963). This dream of an education that keeps a virtuous circle spinning is probably 
coterminous with attempts at purposeful education, since purposeful perfection of the 
individual has been seen as a means of a more perfect society, and vice versa. Value 
laden education, such as religious, political, and environmental education, is 
nourished by this kind of dream. The virtuous circle is in contrast with the vicious 
circle that reproduces present-day values and practices and thus ‘corrupts’ society 
(Parry, 2001). Social transformation demands that the virtuous circle is constantly re-
constituted. Otherwise, it becomes a normative transmission towards a limited and 
predestined end. Given that Rousseau recognized the connections between the 
organization of society and the management of the individual (both self-mastery and 
education), a steady reorganization of many dimensions has to take place in order to 
change from a vicious to a virtuous circle. As question 2 (above) shows, transmission 
and transformation go hand in hand. 
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4. What are the aims of an education that promotes the development of more 
natural humans? What Rousseau saw as the prime purpose of education is 
completely obvious. He stated this so many times. To perfect humans towards virtue 
is the main goal of Rousseau’s education. Another very crucial purpose is to make 
them free. However, freedom is primarily a question of willing, so a good education 
is one that compels students to desire freedom. The general will is the average will of 
all citizens, the one that in the end serves the interest of all people without 
prejudicing any one. From the very beginning, children need training in virtuous 
behavior so the general becomes their sense of duty, a duty they will intentionally 
choose to act upon, according to Rousseau. With his view of education, Rousseau did 
not encourage people to strive for a heavenly life but, instead, to learn to enjoy a 
modest life, without wealth and luxury. Instead, he wanted people to live a life filled 
with marvelous experiences of the natural world in which humans sense their own 
nature and experience being part of a greater entity. He wanted to educate responsible 
members of society who are simultaneously aware of their own earthly limitations as 
natural beings among others.  
 
6.7 Conclusion 
 
The main question that this chapter tries to answer is: What is the role of nature in 
Rousseau’s educational philosophy? Rousseau recommended an education that was 
in “accordance with nature” as the only true one for the human heart. Nevertheless, it 
is readily apparent that Rousseau’s educational theory incorporates both normative 
and biased elements and it is definitely not free of problematic aspects. Rousseau’s 
utopian education focuses on equality and justice. Does it really do away with the 
adult authority? And is the education proposed in Émile truly non-manipulative? The 
instruction of Émile undoubtedly depends on covert control. Rousseau probably did 
not want to sketch Émile’s education as the only alternative. However, he wanted to 
experimentally envision an education where the imagined child, Émile, should be as 
little contaminated by society as possible and thus have a chance to develop at his 
own pace. Delaying influences from other children and adults, the tutor restrains 
Émile from developing features that could make him behave improperly towards 
others. He is not allowed the chance to acquire social qualities in groups and to share 
belongings, strive for joint aims, or learn to follow shared rules. Neither shared 
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success nor failure become familiar to him. Rousseau foresaw that a natural education 
would not be easy (E). Yet, he wanted to propose a hypothetical direction, a vision of 
a better society, not to lay out an effortless road.  
Rousseau states that humans can be happy if they solve all their contradictions 
and if everyone promote both their own happiness and the happiness of others (E). 
Humans pursue too many things and forget their basic task: to be humans. Therefore, 
education needs to endorse modesty and contentment. The educator’s task is to 
unearth the intrinsic “human nature” from every individual and to encourage children 
to be what they intrinsically are: children! They need to live a happy childhood, 
without undue concern for the future of humankind, until they are mature enough to 
understand such adult problems. However, can isolation and manipulation lead to a 
contented freedom? If, according to Vanpée’s suggestion, we read Émile without 
prejudice as a personal experience, it becomes quite possible that Rousseau was well 
aware of the paradoxical element in trying to endorse the development of the child’s 
individual freedom with the help of the tutor’s controlling power. With this method 
the tutor attempts to take responsibility for the child’s upbringing without the open 
humiliation of corporal or psychological punishment, even though Rousseau also 
failed in depicting this as an ideal approach. The narrative Émile et Sophie that is a 
kind of dénouement to Émile illustrates both the successes and the failures of even an 
exceedingly well-intentioned education. This short story cannot be neglected, 
whether it was an afterthought or a dilemma Rousseau intended his readers to face. I 
agree with Schaffar (2008) that many practical situations require that the educator 
intervene in children’s use of their own willpower, but this does not dissolve the 
paradox. One power still combats another, and then the adult, being more powerful, is 
usually the winner―for better or worse. We cannot always resolve the paradox if we 
start viewing it as a situated practical problem because many of the dilemmas 
involved are too far-reaching to be solved only in specific situations. They require 
following some general guidelines. In building these guidelines, the child needs help. 
The quest for sustainability is such a dilemma (or challenge), and in order to 
understand how to solve this dilemma, children need means more than ends.  
However, human freedom is limited and no one has the right to meet their own 
needs at the expense of others’ right to their freedom, which is why children have to 
learn that their own wants should not deny the right others have to fulfill their needs. 
The young do not automatically understand this, but need guidance that can steer 
their quest for, and right to, recognition in a direction that is best for all. While the 
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answer about what is “best” depends on various internal and external circumstances 
discussed earlier (especially in Chapter Two), the educator’s choices are difficult and 
rarely self-evident. Nevertheless, the adult is more experienced and thus has to be 
responsible for making them.   
Émile’s education is definitely preferable to an aggressive promotion of moral 
behavior, but if a negative education is not achievable, we have to be satisfied with 
the second best alternative. Education is always responsive to some kind of a political 
agenda, but the more politically predisposed an education is, the more risky it 
becomes. A major challenge is that it is not possible to make education neutral 
because educators cannot escape their own values and children are easily influenced 
by such supposedly covert or tacit values. Children might be protected from 
prejudices until adolescence if they can be kept away from various influences, as 
Rousseau tried to do with Émile. However, this requires an educator who is 
uncontaminated by society, without any biases. However, Rousseau is very aware 
that finding a totally neutral and unspoiled educator is not very likely; in fact, to be 
honest, it is impossible. Even if Émile’s tutor was Rousseau himself, he is portrayed 
as an idealized vision of a teacher. Following Rousseau literally is not completely 
possible; one has to compromise. However, Parry (2001) is right when he states that 
Rousseau never given to compromise; he left that task to his readers. This is an 
identifying mark of Rousseau’s writing technique―he left the final tailoring to 
others. Yet, he argued that a zealous political education too early in a child’s life can 
have an effect opposite than is intended, and so can an excessively laissez-faire 
option (E). A caring and loving educator does not leave anything to chance. Since 
humans generally do not want to work on their freedom, the educator has to demand 
it (see Affeldt, 1999/2006).  
Many people have read Émile as a credo for an education without discipline or 
restrictions, a progressive, child-centered education. But this was not Rousseau’s 
intention; he opposed both pampering and harshness and the child should neither 
command nor be commanded. Again, Émile does not contain definitive practical 
advice but, rather, offers thoughts for reflection.  
While reflection and preparation precedes every trial of implementing 
hypothetical ideas, such preparation allows for many solutions. The possibility of 
successful implementation increases or decreases depending on the experimenters 
and the procedures they choose. Carefully considered, Rousseau’s manipulative 
education has pros and cons. As an intentional process involving development as well 
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as control, education is always situated on the line between freedom and 
indoctrination, and there definitely are many risky steps to consider―a condition that 
Rousseau sometimes fails to meet, probably intentionally. However, Heywood (2001) 
gives us hope when he argues that we never can underestimate the power of the child. 
Likewise, Uljens (2004a) argues that education would be most ideal if children could 
be influenced to learn entirely according to their own immature interests. However, 
he states that an individual cannot become a cultural creature without guidance. This 
is in line with Kant and his version of the educational paradox (see above). Humans 
are born free, but they need guidance to become civilized human beings and thus 
‘humane’. I think faith in the power of education, even an imperfect one, was one of 
Rousseau’s visions. Children should be encouraged to autonomy, and they need to 
learn to recognize and avoid objectionable influences. Rousseau’s philosophy thus 
strives “to force the individual to change, to turn towards the possibility of humanity 
and freedom” (Affeldt, 1999/2006, p. 419). Total equality would secure the same 
amount of freedom for everyone; then no one’s freedom can be endless, and no 
education having such a goal can be without risk. Education always involves risk and 
the avoidance of risk creates two new risks: the risk of failing to develop critically 
thinking iconoclasts and the risk of preventing brilliant new ideas from emerging 
because of their uniqueness. Nothing changes without taking risks, and Rousseau 
confronted this human dilemma. Instead of blaming Rousseau for paradoxes and 
irrelevance, we simply have to take his paradoxes and allegories for what they are 
and open-mindedly make use of them in educational practice. Could such an attitude 
perhaps make Rousseau’s ideas more useful even today when the challenge of 
education is global equality and globally shared responsibility for both humankind 
and other parts of nature? I will discuss this question in the next and final chapter. 
  
320 
 
 
 
 
 
  
321 
 
Part III 
Back to the present 
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7 Rousseau, Foucault, and Contemporary  
Educational Challenges 
 
In the beginning of this book I described the writing process as making a loop 
because the story ends where it started. This way of unfolding a story is also typical 
for voyage narratives, and for fictive voyages and educational novels 
(Bildungsromanen). However, this is a book and not a novel, and it describes an 
exploration that starts from the contemporary challenges of environmental education 
and sustainability and returns to the same urgent theme. I have traveled backward in 
time and visited spaces and listened to thinkers who have something interesting to 
add to the present discussion of sustainability in hope that it could lead to a deeper 
understanding of the topic and help answer my complicated research questions. So, 
the time has now come to return, wind up, and conclude the whole story.  
The winding-up process starts with a summary of the findings from the entire 
study by following the trail of the book. As a second issue, I will discuss the 
relevance of these findings in depth; in particular how the urgent topic of human 
being’s relation to nature and sustainability challenge both ethics and education. In 
the third move, I will evaluate my research strategy, and the fourth move is the final 
closure. 
 
7.1 The Research Process and Findings  
 
The central interest in this research has been the contemporary educational challenges 
of human being’s problematic relation to nature and the quest for sustainability. The 
research has focused on the contradictory place of humans as a part of nature at the 
same time they are members of socio-cultural communities. My first attempt in this 
chapter is to briefly summarize the outcome of the entire research starting from the 
outcomes of the particular studies presented in the diverse chapters. Since each 
chapter ended with a long conclusion, this review avoids repeating details.  
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Part One 
 
I started my study with the claim that education in most cases has not managed in 
tackling environmental problems adequately. In order to test this claim, first I studied 
how the relation of humans to nature has been dealt with in education and how 
education has been used to bridge the gaps between knowledge and action in relation 
to sustainability issues. The first focus in sub chapter 2.1 was, therefore, a study of 
the thematic educational endeavors called environmental education and education for 
sustainable development. The outcome of this particular study shows that 
environmental education has been developed and gained prominence over the last 40 
years, but there is still much to do before environmental education has succeeded to 
the point that it become unnecessary and has reached a point where a balanced role 
for human life on planet Earth has become an integrated part of all education. 
Environmental education is a specific sub-field of education and not usually 
mandated. Thus, its influence on human conduct has hitherto been marginal. We 
know for sure that environmental problems have not diminished as a result of 
environmental education; too many people in the world still do not value nature or 
sustainability strongly enough to be willing to act appropriately. Even if it was 
possible to evaluate all attempts at environmental educational and to note positive 
results (i.e., more environmentally responsible conduct), the gap will remain until 
environmental issues become the focus of everyday action by all people. Many 
people know at least something about the state of the world and what actions are 
needed to overcome inequality and environmental problems, but they do not act in 
accordance with that knowledge.  
After the study of environmental education in sub chapter 2.1, I entered on a 
philosophical quest and searched for the ethical obstacles that have made the relation 
of humans to nature so complex. So, in chapter 2.2 I identified a number of possible 
scapegoats. That study put on the table a few major issues that might have had an 
impact on humankind’s relation to nature. These problems are various dualistic biases 
and educational shortcomings, but also Christianity and its vague and complicated 
message about the role of humans in relation to the rest of nature. As a final concern, 
the study also discussed whether humans’ self-relation might be a crucial dilemma. 
The outcome of this second particular study was that it is difficult to find one single 
root or even a few definitive roots that demonstrate why the relation of humans to 
nature has developed in a direction that has caused contemporary environmental 
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problems. All these suggested scapegoats seem to be more or less interlinked and 
related to many other aspects for regulating human life and the natural world. 
Geomagnetic, climatic, and other physical factors influence life on earth, but so do 
politics and economics. The suspicion was raised, however, that environmental 
problems strongly relate to the last scapegoat, human beings’ self-relation. This is a 
core that, in turn, relates to a network of other problems and shows how education 
has dealt with ethical problems historically. Therefore, I was motivated to further 
historical investigations and started to identify a broad-based condition involving the 
effects of power and control, a complexity that connect the present to both history 
and the future.  
These intrinsic problems prompted me to a historical route whose outcome 
constituted the second part of the book, because I wanted to limit the study to a 
particular era and all threads seemed to have roots not only in Ancient history, but 
also in the Enlightenment and the modern project. Since the investigation suited for 
this study had to be one that could delve beneath the surface of both my topics, nature 
and education, I decided to choose two headstrong representatives of two different 
modern epochs to help me tackle the problems. After careful consideration, I chose to 
let Rousseau and Foucault take the stage. 
 
Part Two 
 
I created the approach of Part Two after having studied the most crucial of 
Rousseau’s and Foucault’s basic works. This second approach, as described in 
Chapter Three, is built on a set of methods I created with the help of Foucault’s 
studies of genealogy and ethics. My study of Rousseau started by situating his 
thoughts in their historical, social, and philosophical contexts. Chapter Four thus 
describes the sources of Rousseau’s authorship, not simply in order to search for 
roots, but also to show the complexity and diversity of the discourses that motivated 
Rousseau’s thinking. In this chapter, the main question is What discourses about 
nature, knowledge, and education inspired Rousseau? My study of Rousseau’s 
context is influenced by Foucault’s genealogy and utilizes his regularity principles. 
While this particular study of Rousseau in relation to earlier and contemporary 
writers brought many unexpected connections to the Western view of nature and 
education, I had to allow the chapter to grow much longer than I initially had 
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intended. It became obvious that the concepts of “nature” and “natural” were 
powerful rhetorical weapons in Enlightenment discourses. Because these concepts 
had various meanings, especially as used by Rousseau, they generated debates and 
touched both individual lives and all of society. The modern European project made 
the entire natural world into a resource, and knowledge about nature became a 
powerful means for exploiting both humans and the natural world all over the globe. 
Rousseau was a zealous and exceedingly critical participant in various discourses 
about “nature” and “natural” and actively employed these concepts in a variety of 
ways.   
After having recounted Rousseau’s context in Chapter Four, I started to study 
Rousseau more thoroughly by focusing on the role nature plays in his ethics. The 
study presented in Chapter Five was created with the help of Foucault’s ethics and it 
became apparent that Foucault’s methods were a good choice because Platonic and 
Stoic philosophy, as well as the biographies of Plutarch, all link some of Foucault’s 
and Rousseau’s thoughts, thus making it possible for me to ask ethical questions 
when analyzing Rousseau’s writings that are similar to those Foucault employed 
when studying Ancient sexuality. The main question of the fifth chapter is: What 
were Rousseau’s ethics in relation to nature? Through his diverse writings dealing 
with ethics, Rousseau showed how the modern project had complicated the human 
situation. With a glimpse of what a natural human being might be, Rousseau wanted 
his readers to step out from what he saw as artificial frameworks and to reflect on 
humans’ innermost needs and desires.  
According to Rousseau, humans are in many ways a part of nature and their 
original conduct is in accordance with nature. Therefore, he wanted humanity to 
stand for ‘naturalness’ and moral conduct. To care about nature was, for him, a matter 
of caring about what is “natural,” and it was definitely something more than a matter 
of words. It meant becoming more natural in a kind of self-creative process and, thus, 
living in accordance with what is intrinsic to being human. Self-management was a 
way of freeing oneself from unnatural desires and of developing into a more perfect 
being, according to Rousseau. His intention was also to give visions of a virtuous life 
and to motivate his fellow creatures to strive towards ever-more perfect conduct. Yet, 
he did not believe that humans could ever reach a final state of perfection because 
only God can be unconditionally virtuous. The main task for ethical development, 
according to Rousseau, is to enhance mutual relations between humans so that every 
individual is treated with dignity and recognized as an equal being with the same 
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rights to freedom as anyone else. This entails that freedom is a right that everyone 
can work for and strive towards. Real freedom was, for Rousseau, the ability to 
manage one’s own desires, an inner requirement that no one else can do. He wanted 
to trigger his readers to self-criticism, to reflect on themselves and their own lives in 
relation to the external world. As methods, he recommended self-training and 
education. 
Chapter Six shows how Rousseau dealt with the topic of education and it follows 
a process that I worked out in accordance with the approach in the ethical study 
presented in Chapter Five. This time the main question was What was the role of 
nature in Rousseau’s educational philosophy? When discussing Rousseau’s ideas 
about education it is important to remember that he presented a hypothetical vision, 
not a prescription for action. As already stated, he did not believe that humans could 
ever become perfect, but he believed (or at least wanted to believe) that they are 
capable of moral perfectibility and thus wanted to show a vision of an education that 
could lead towards increasing perfection. Rousseau called his hypothetical education 
“natural” (e.g., E, p. 52), and this natural education had to be adapted to the child’s 
own character. Until the age of twelve, education was more a question of holding 
back of fostering than of promoting the development of any particular talents. An 
education based on withholding rather than on supporting socialization and gathering 
of knowledge, he called negative.  
But, the age limits in Émile do not need to be seen as actual (see Dent, 1988); the 
book also can be read as an allegory for an adult’s self-education. What Rousseau 
wanted to point out was that humans from an early age become contaminated by the 
prejudices of others and thus start to reproduce vices they have learned from others. 
Therefore, the educator’s task is to encourage children to be what they intrinsically 
are; to let them live happy childhoods, without concern for society or the future of 
humankind, until they are mature enough to understand such problems. This does not 
mean that he wanted the children to be ‘spoiled’ by permissiveness; quite the 
opposite, he taught that human freedom is limited and cannot be extended at the risk 
of others’ reciprocal right to their own freedom. The supreme aim of education is that 
students should become free and should allow others their own freedom, as well. 
Humans need to learn that the fulfillment of their own desires must not hinder others 
from similarly fulfilling their desires. Everyone’s rights as part of humanity are equal; 
therefore, everything is not available to everyone, and one’s desires need to be 
limited by mutual concern for the desires of others. The young do not automatically 
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understand this; they therefore need guidance that can steer their demands in 
directions that are best for all.  
Rousseau liked to express his critical thoughts through paradoxes, and he noted 
the paradoxical task of education: it has to both allow the other’s innate freedom and 
make the other free. He argued that people have to be forced to be free. This can be 
interpreted as the duty of teachers who care for their students by encouraging them to 
care for who they are so they can become responsible and committed citizens who 
care for the good of all. According to Rousseau, a good citizen is a decent person 
who treats her or his fellows, family members, and friends well. Education starts 
from birth and self-education throughout adult life is a basic requirement of a more 
just society in which everyone is prepared to participate in the creation of a good 
society for all. So, what Rousseau pleaded for was actually a lifelong moral 
education. I will return to this issue soon, because after this summary of the particular 
studies described in Chapter Two to Six, I will now present the findings that will 
answer my main question. 
 
7.2 The Main Research Inquiry 
 
The main research focus of the entire book was, (a) What ethical dimensions are 
challenged by the enigma of sustainability? and, (b) What kind of education do these 
dimensions require? Since the approach has been stepwise, I will use the findings 
from all the other studies to answer this twofold question and emphasize my 
standpoint. The answer to the first part of the question is that the enigma of 
sustainability challenges three human dimensions. These three dimensions are similar 
to three spheres of an individual’s personal and social development that Sauvé (1999) 
distinguishes: (1) the sphere of the self, where people develop their own identities; 
(2) the sphere of otherness, where an individual interacts with others; and (3) the 
sphere of one’s relation to the biophysical environment. Of these three spheres, she 
sees the third as the basic sphere for environmental education; however, it is 
conveyed through the second sphere of social relations. The three dimensions of 
sustainable development (ecological, economic, and sociocultural) overlook the 
sphere of the self. The earlier, popular normative models of environmental education 
(see Chapter Two) noted that problems on the individual level often neglect the social 
influence; however, the problem of improper actions is not avoided if we abandon 
329 
 
normative attempts and thus also neglect the individual sphere. Environmental 
problems are due to what takes place on the individual, social, and ‘natural’263 levels. 
Humans shape their relation to nature through their view of themselves, of others, 
and of the entire planet. These ethical dimensions are, however, not separate or 
hierarchical; all the three interact. This is the answer to the first part of the main 
research question (a) in this book: The sustainability enigma challenges humans’ 
view of themselves, their view of others, and of the natural world. 
Another point Sauvé (1999) raises is that environmental education has to be 
integrated into formal education and she therefore calls for partnership in the 
educational community. This call for integration is not unique in debates about 
environmental education. However, my claim is that educational integration is not 
enough. Should it not be of fundamental importance for humans to learn to live 
together on the earth? Is it a primary or a secondary concern to make life on earth 
satisfactory for all humankind?  
The sustainability enigma calls for an education that encourages a good human 
life, with well-functioning and decent communities adjusted to existing physical 
circumstances. It needs to be an intrinsically ‘good’ education that is an education 
that is good for its own sake (see Chapter Two). Such an education makes a 
difference, and can promote self-transformation. This is, in short, the answer to the 
second main research question: (b) Environmental awareness is a basic educational 
concern and needs an education that offers both basic and diverse knowledge about 
the world, but also that triggers self-transformation through ethical reflection and 
mindfully responsible action. What an acceptable life is on all three dimensions 
(individual, social, and natural) is the task of education to reflect on and discuss. How 
to move from theories to practice is another. To describe the conclusions of my 
complete study more precisely, I will now present the three ethical dimensions and 
simultaneously discuss some basic educational principles that the sustainability 
enigma challenges. 
 
  
                                           
263
 Instead of using Sauvé’s biophysical environment concept, in the following I will simply use the words 
“nature” or “the natural world” as synonyms to her concept. 
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The Sphere of the Self 
 
The first ethical dimension that is challenged by the sustainability enigma is the self. 
According to Rousseau, humans have cut themselves off from nature and have taken 
control over the whole planet. In addition, they have started an endless race among 
their own species (see Lévi-Strauss, 1973/2006). By neglecting the common good 
and taking self-interest as the highest principle, human conduct has promoted a 
vicious circle, according to Rousseau. The price for this vicious conduct is that 
humans have lost their selves. Following both Ancient philosophy and Rousseau’s 
and Foucault’s interpretations, the first human task should be to know one’s self and 
to learn to care for the self in order to understand one’s role as an unique person in 
both society and the natural world. All parts interact and every move has an impact 
on all the other levels. Humans jointly create economics, politics, culture, and other 
interactions, and all these common undertakings have an impact on individuals as 
much as on the natural world.  
Following Foucault (2005), the biggest error of history was basing human 
conduct merely on knowledge (connaisance), and when humans gave up searching 
for the truth through self practice and active self-transformation. The ‘care for the 
self’ and ‘care of others’ were replaced with ‘knowing the self’, others, and the whole 
world, but not on understanding one’s innermost being and relation to the world. Yet, 
all of Western civilization is still stuck in that mistake. Unless humans can learn from 
the consequences of their own errors, even on a personal level, and find their way 
out, they cannot create an education that prioritizes a more equal sharing of the 
world. To protect one’s private space is to protect one’s freedom, to be connected to 
one’s thoughts. Care of the self is the foundation for care of others and of the natural 
world. If humans treat themselves and their own kind like objects, they also treat the 
rest of nature the same way. 
Foucault (1967) saw his epoch as one that not only has to deal with whether there 
will be enough room for all humans to live in, but also whether there are places to 
sustain all the elements for being human. He saw an increasing risk that the sacred 
limits between family space and social place, private space and public space, and 
space for leisure and work all have became more and more stretched to the breaking 
point. The concept of “governmentality” was Foucault’s term for how human life 
becomes infiltrated by power constellations that are meant to govern so effectively 
and secretly and that control so cleverly that humans believe that they act out of their 
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free will, thus becoming alienated from their true selves. Rousseau’s education of 
Émile can also be seen as representing such a system, since he theoretically talked 
about freedom, but in practice manipulated the child covertly. While Émile and the 
Social Contract depicted ideal people and ideal worlds, Rousseau found himself 
trapped in his paradoxes and showed how dangerously narrow the separation is 
between manipulation and freedom. 
Humans are born with an inclination to be free, but they are dependent on their 
fellow beings for their mere existence when young. Educators can forge a path to 
freedom in the sense that the students are led to understand their weaknesses and 
strengths in relation to other humans and to the rest of nature. According to 
Rousseau, this means that humans need to learn what their basic needs are as humans 
and to base their decisions on their own elementary needs. They also must understand 
the need to restrict their needs if their own needs deny anybody else’s needs, since 
every one shares the right to fulfill their freedom as fully developed humans. Yet, 
freedom also entails freeing one’s self from bonds that enslave—both one’s 
unrealistic desires and pressure from others. This freedom depends on self-
understanding. In contemporary society, various kinds of social control have become 
ever-more plentiful and sophisticated. Various commercials and communication 
technologies help support this governing system, since they come between humans in 
the most intimate of ways. Even with a long educational tradition, today human 
communication and interaction seem to be more controlled than ever before; 
controlling mechanisms are with us nearly everywhere. Other persons are reduced to 
words, pictures and voices, and the totality of being humans disappears. This system 
is at the same time transparent and closed; many secrets are exposed while others 
remain hidden. The methods are both weak and strong, because no one is protected 
from abuse, while criticism becomes ever-more powerful.  
The initial human right to freedom is threatened daily since influential powers 
intrude into homes, schools, and young children’s innermost intimate worlds and 
interfere with the creation of their self-image. Computerization leads children directly 
into the cyber world of hyper-reality. Bauman (2007) is anxious about the trend of 
living a second life on-line, a life where individuals market and sell themselves like 
objects to attract recognition. He describes this as subjectivity fetishism, a condition 
where humans have to steadily search for being recognized as either extraordinary or 
as living up to a particular standard (being normalized). Rousseau would have said 
that young people today are made ‘slaves’ in a very early age. They become slaves of 
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both the marketplace and their own desires. The phenomenon is another example of 
what Foucault called “governmentality.” The young generation is being incorporated 
into the world economy, and they do not know what their own will is in relation to 
the will of others. The more unrestricted freedom society allows its children, the more 
these methods will demolish the creation of pure self-consciousness and limit the 
possibilities for developing into free, mature beings. Unrestricted freedom will not 
facilitate the struggle for the wellbeing of nature and a common good life that offers 
equal opportunities for people all over the world. When adults cooperate in all kinds 
of businesses that influence children’s needs and desires, they collectively reject the 
innate right of children to freedom. Rousseau kept Émile apart from society and bad 
influences until he was mature enough to judge what was taking place around him. 
The aim of this holding him back was a step in the education of Émile towards 
freedom.  
An adult cannot purposefully withdraw from society for self-education. 
Individuals are never free from social pressure. However, like Jesus (if we read 
Sermon of the Mount as an allegory and symbol for reflection) or Rousseau’s alias, 
the Savoyard Vicar, humans can step aside and reflect on themselves and their own 
undertakings and try to free themselves from prejudiced and biased influences. “It is 
a matter of placing ourselves at a point that is both so central and elevated that we can 
see below us the overall order of the world of which we ourselves are parts” 
(Foucault, 2005, p. 282). Humans who are in contact with the whole universe and 
who contemplate the processes and secrets of nature can control their actions and 
their own thoughts, according to Stoic wisdom. With the concept of “thought,” 
Foucault meant just this human ability: that humans can step back from a particular 
way of reacting or acting in order to analyze their own conduct objectively and to 
question its meaning, goals, and conditions. “Thought” is no inborn a priori talent, 
but a reflective action that generates freedom and self-transformation. And self-
transformation in form of care of the self includes the difficult task of unlearning and 
becoming rid of bad habits learned from parents, teachers, and other influences. 
Rousseau wrote about ‘negative education’ because he knew that unlearning is more 
demanding than learning new talents. In line with Foucault, the most crucial human 
undertakings are based on personal self-transformations combined with the 
cooperative invention of better modes of life than those that have failed. However, 
this can only happen when humans dare to look back at their past actions, identify 
their errors, free themselves from the traps of prejudice, and search for new solutions. 
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A non-sustainable life has not come about all of a sudden and will not be overcome 
without effort. We cannot build an equal world, one that is culturally and socially 
sustainable, without getting to the foundations of both our self-relations and our 
relations with others. “A reflexive relationship to oneself can be constitutive of a 
morality understood as an aesthetical style of living, but only a relationship to another 
person can give it an ethical meaning” (Oksala, 2002, p. 278). 
 
The Sphere of Social Interaction 
 
The second dimension that is challenged by the sustainability enigma is mutual 
relations among humans. Rousseau’s concepts of amour-propre, ‘extended being’, 
and ‘perfectibility’ do not refer to contemporary psychology but can still be used to 
discuss present-day social troubles in relation to the idea of sustainability. Contrary to 
Rousseau’s thoughts, it is now widely known that humans are intrinsically social 
animals. Like other animals, small children enjoy spending time in nature where they 
have so many opportunities to use their entire body and all their senses. But, from the 
first, this happens in mutual relations with siblings and others in the child’s vicinity. 
Unlike most other animals,
264
 humans have an inner force that extends them forward, 
and education builds on this principle. Humans are willing to improve themselves and 
learn not only to become proper members of their society by adopting its rules and 
common ways of conduct, but also because they want to improve and thus ‘become 
more than they are’―sometimes in a way that can work against the sense of 
community. It was also Rousseau’s opinion that humans are easily dissatisfied with 
their own existence and that they therefore want to become better than they are. In 
Rousseau’s opinion, this makes all of life paradoxical since humans have to 
continuously struggle between being unique and being ‘somebody’, or vanishing into 
the masses and becoming ‘nobodies’. In Émile et Sophie, he demonstrates the 
problem of creating a decent life in solitude and pointed to the need for the support of 
others. Marginalization and distress are always at risk for those who go against the 
tide. Most people might know that it is right to act responsibly towards the earth, but 
they do not; they may even denigrate those who chose another concept than the 
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 Contemporary researchers are investigating animal intelligence and learning. Plotkin (1994) argues that 
many animals can think rationally and have a culture through which they share knowledge.  
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money-oriented. However, an education that strives for a good self-relation 
strengthens the inclination to act responsibly.  
The education of Émile was not intended to be a precise route towards a given 
end; his education aimed at making him ready to face various possibilities and to 
manage whatever eventualities arose. This is actually also in line with Klafki (1997a, 
1998) and Scott (2009), who want education to focus on building capacities for living 
in a future world, even if the world of tomorrow is unknown. The crucial variable, 
then, is how humans live together (ibid.) and how they adjust to changing physical 
and material circumstances. But it is not only about adaptation. When Rousseau and 
Foucault talked about self-training, they meant that humans can purposefully step 
aside and reflect on the conditions of which they are a part. Does this mean that one 
has to become more critical? In one sense yes; but in another sense it entails 
something more. Criticism can easily be directed against problems that others cause 
and thus blame other persons for their irresponsibility and systems for their 
malfunctions. Another kind of criticism sees every subject as part of a larger 
complex, one in which everyone’s power and choices also impact general customs 
and general conduct. Such criticism thus incorporates self-criticism and a will to 
change not only the common rules, but also one’s personal conduct. Yet, mutual 
recognition can enhance each individual’s moral improvement. 
The self-centered individualism of modern Western culture is well recognized. 
However, Rousseau’s ethics calls attention to the need for mutual recognition. To feel 
most alive, humans are dependent on social recognition; but when humans’ craving 
for such recognitions grows limitless, they start attempting to become everything to 
everyone, instead of experiencing their own existence as limited beings. Humans 
need to improve, but this need can easily steer them in the wrong directions, making 
them search for fulfillment of their desires in ways that makes them still more 
miserable and even less alive, according to Rousseau. A problem is that humans are 
too easily mislead by false attachments and illusory hopes and thus do not understand 
the limits of their extension; they want to be more than humans, he argued. For 
example, in the 2
nd
 Discourse he claims that civilized humans want to be the sole 
master of the entire universe. He thus asked for moral reforms that could reshape 
human understanding and ambitions. Beneficial recognition affirms the other as a 
unique being with intrinsic and equal rights to live and be loved. Affirmative 
recognition nourishes virtue, according to Rousseau, whereas negative recognition 
makes humans self-alienated; they start looking upon themselves as strangers (RSW). 
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One way of resisting such indignation and insult is to escape the other’s evilness by 
choosing solitude, becoming invisible, or by changing oneself according to others’ 
requirements like a chameleon. In its most developed form, the concept of 
“recognition” entails acknowledging another as having the equal right to be free and 
use her or his particular potentials for the common good. It involves a reciprocal 
process where individuals grow as a result of looking at themselves in the mirror of 
another human being. They learn to love when love is reflected. 
Humans can be encouraged to act independently and make good choices. 
Sustainability can, nevertheless, not be forced on people. It has to be their personal 
preference in order to make sense to them. Like Émile’s education, therefore, the end 
has to be left open. According to Benner (2005), Rousseau and his followers in the 
German Bildung tradition (see Chapter Two) have emphasized educational 
approaches that are neither uncritical nor critical, and thus neither based on tradition 
nor on promoting a particular position (e.g., a particular political view). These 
theories do not merely focus on teaching and learning, but also on Bildung. The 
French Enlightenment influenced German educational theories developed during the 
18
th
 and 19
th
 century that applied the concept of Bildung. The concept is difficult to 
interpret but can be described as a transformation that takes place both individually 
and by interaction in social contexts. However, in this tradition, the crucial role of 
nature that Rousseau defended has been lost (see Peltonen, 1997; Wolff, 2006b, 
2007). Likewise the entire educational endeavor has lost the self-transformative 
principles that once were obvious in the Bildung tradition. A reconstructed Bildung 
tradition could have much more to offer education that struggle against the effects of 
unsustainably living if the three dimensions (the relation to self, others, and the 
natural world) I have described were all emphasized.   
As an answer to the educational paradox that Rousseau raised, also influenced by 
Kant, Herder, Fichte, and Schleiermacher, Benner (2001) promotes an education that 
he calls non-affirmative. The principle of this educational approach is neither 
dogmatic nor anti-authoritarian. It is an education that sees the students as individuals 
who are given opportunities to advance (Bildsamkeit
265
), but the capacity for 
maximum growth requires outside aid. Without education, individuals would not 
know enough to claim freedom (Uljens, 1998, 2002). Humans not only need to be 
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 Bildsamkeit has no direct translation in English; a near concept is “educability.” However, Bildsamkeit 
relates to a person’s capability to be actively involved in a process, not only a person’s capability for being 
educated. 
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provoked towards freedom, they have a right to it. However, for any advancement to 
happen, the students have to want to take part in the educational process. The entire 
educational processes take place in interaction with an educator who gives the student 
recognition as a person who has the potential for growth, and it provokes the learner 
to participate actively in the learning situation (Benner, 2001). The teacher is the one 
who, as Rousseau said, “pushes” the students forward and ‘provokes’ them to 
become responsible in their own learning process. This idea leans on the belief that 
humans are innately free and thus unpredictable. However, the provocation to learn is 
also possible without a teacher or master. Children can even provoke each other; but, 
I will claim, it is almost impossible to provoke oneself without influence from 
somebody even if only indirectly (e.g., watching others can provoke to actions). 
Humans have the capacity to change, and that change can be both self-initiated and 
steered by other sources (Benner, 2005).  
It has always been seen as desirable to intentionally change persons when they 
are most malleable; but a non-affirmative education strengthens the students’ own 
capability for actively developing in their own direction by taking charge of their own 
will. Such students are thereby provoked to both self-direction and transformation 
that go beyond instruction and that encourages questioning the teacher’s view of the 
world. The educational task is to strengthen the will of the students to question and 
deliberate and that encourages them to independent experimentation and trials. The 
students are encouraged to adopt a critical position both towards themselves and 
regarding the various contexts in which they find themselves (Benner, 2005). 
According to Benner, the role of education is not only to prepare for a profession and 
a life in a productive economic system, education should also promote the shared life 
of humankind and, thus, the welfare of the planet. In that situation, various forms of 
human practice cannot be separated and hierarchically ordered; thus, as Benner 
suggests, education, ethics and religion have the same importance as politics, 
economy, and art (ibid.). By avoiding distinctions according to disciplines, education 
avoids prioritizing any human interest over others and thus empirical, theoretical, and 
aesthetic knowledge are regarded as equally important. That all human fields of 
practice are equal interesting, but this “equivalence theory” also has to be understood 
in relation to context and temporality and raises questions about whether the 
economy today or tomorrow is more important, and in which parts of the world the 
protection of nature is most critical. 
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The global, political and economical systems become more and more interlinked 
and so complicated that the average being, lacking in economic or political insight, 
cannot understand how these systems work. In particular, the world economy is too 
complicated to understand without an education in economics. It is hopeless to try to 
promote change without understanding how things interact, without questioning the 
fundamental systems and values on which our society is built. Sustainable 
development is visualized through three dimensions. Ecology relates to harmonious 
conditions in nature, economics to human labor and use of resources, and 
sociocultural to human traditions and interactions. The three dimensions are not 
comparable. Ecology is the study of ecosystems; economics is a science and an 
activity that is a central part of the sociocultural dimension.  
Many theorists have tried to identify various forms of human practice by which 
humans search for meaning in their existence. For example, Friedrich Schleiermacher 
distinguished labor, politics, education, and religion; and Eugen Fink highlighted 
labor, play, love, death, and mastery (Uljens, 1998). Benner (2005) divides human 
practices according to the six aforementioned non-hierarchical basic phenomena: 
economy, ethics, politics, art, religion, and education. All these fields of practice span 
ages and generations; they coexist in complex patterns but seldom harmoniously, and 
they are neither predetermined nor hierarchically ordered. These six fields of 
practices are articulated in turn through four existential forms: a corporal form 
(Leiblichkeit), freedom (Freiheit), historicity (Geschichtlichkeit), and a linguistic 
form (Sprachlichkeit), according to Benner (2001). These four forms explain human 
existence as limited by an organic body; not as a machine, but as a sensitive and 
concrete being that relates to itself and others on a corporal level. Freedom offers 
possibilities for choosing and influencing human history and interacting with others 
through various forms of language (ibid.). Such freedom, however, is not total 
because humans interact and influence each other. To be a citizen is a privilege, not a 
punishment, but it is also not to be taken for granted. As with other good things, it 
comes at a price, and that price is commitment, responsibility, and participation. 
One’s interests cannot be promoted at the expense of someone else’s interests. 
Rousseau’s “social contract” was a commitment to the importance of considering 
everyone’s interests. 
Education that challenges sustainability and combines ideas of Rousseau, Benner, 
and Foucault can be described through the hour glass metaphor as an education that, 
firstly, cares about the presence and develops a critical ethos towards daily life and 
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one’s world today. Secondly, such an education emphasizes problematizing the past 
and questioning old myths and errors that confuse our present situation. Thirdly, 
through discussions and vision the future is problematized. The world is faced 
through diverse perspectives, such as micro and macro, close and distant, familiar and 
strange. Neither science nor history are taken as the full truth, but are critically 
compared with actual politics and ethics. Theories are juxtaposed with practice. 
However, social problems have to be reshaped to suit the educational situations that 
give students possibilities for participating (Oettingen, 2001). Rousseau shaped 
visions while Foucault was a non-utopian; a compromise could be to create concrete 
utopias that face the sustainability enigma with current and real prospects. 
Even if utopian, Rousseau did not believe in any fixed governmental system since 
human conditions do not support any persistent world order (SC). In his vision of a 
virtuous circle, the circle is constantly reshaped. Thus, even if he was a vision shaper, 
he was obviously aware of what could be called a major myth of both politics and 
education: the myth of progress towards a perfect human state. “A man has been 
made for a community of equals, but has not found it. Can we image a community 
that is made for men?” asks Kelly (2008) interpreting Rousseau. Probably not; Kelly 
calls Rousseau one of the greatest realists ever, and although many have called him a 
philosopher of hope, his profound faith was often negative. There is no original sin 
and human nature is good. But, when living in a society, other’s opinions are so 
influential that a person becomes depraved. The individual becomes overly 
influenced by other opinions and thus gradually becomes corrupt.  
Rousseau and Foucault both believed that neither most people nor the entirety of 
humankind  are capable of becoming morally perfect but that they can transform 
themselves and make their common living conditions better. The perfect human was, 
for Rousseau, a vision to aspire to, and the ‘practice of freedom’ Foucault maintained 
in his late days also gives hope of the possibility of moral improvement. Without 
vision there are no lights illuminating human roads; life becomes a matter of random 
choice. Yet, because Rousseau shaped views of an unrealizable ideal, people 
interpreted his thought differently. When trying to shape concrete conditions from 
idealistic models, the direct result may turn out dangerously. His models are not 
meant to be more than thought provoking. Benner’s view of human activities as non-
hierarchic encourages multidisciplinary approaches in education. Nonetheless, I do 
not think all human activities can be put on the same, equal level because the 
foundation of everything else is humans’ undeniable relation to nature.  
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Education has to strengthen the understanding for what it means to be a biological 
creature that has the natural world as its habitat. However, it is the role of education 
to encourage discussions about how human life should be lived in order to be good 
and about whether sustainable development is a good aim, given the contradictions it 
faces. On the one hand, humans hear that they have to act responsibly and decently 
towards all people of the world and towards the entire earth, and have to save 
resources and live simpler lives. On the other hand, they need to consume to keep 
economic production dynamic. It is not possible to attend to a vicious and a virtuous 
circle simultaneously and to promote sustainability with one hand and non-
sustainability with the other. 
 
The Sphere of the Natural World 
 
The third ethical dimension that is challenged by the sustainability enigma is the 
natural world. Along with the shift of discourse from nature conservation towards 
sustainable development, the center of attention in politics has turned from nature to 
society. In Caring for the Earth published by IUCN, UNEP, and theWWF 1991 the 
interpretation of the concept “sustainable development” is “improving the quality of 
human life while living within the carrying capacity of supporting ecosystems” (p. 4). 
This interpretation highlights humans’ dependence on nature and differs from the 
focus on human needs proposed by the Brundtland Commission: “Sustainable 
development is a development that meets the needs of the present without 
compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own needs” (World 
Commission on Environment and Development, 1987). In the beginning of this book 
I declared that I would employ the word “nature” as a basic concept since my opinion 
is that it has been neglected and sometimes nearly banned in discourses about 
education for sustainable development. The healthy operation of nature is, however, a 
precondition for a vital human life. Many other species can survive humans but still 
are very vulnerable to environmental change and need clean water and fresh air. 
Willamo (2005) asks whether we can learn to understand the principles of 
sustainability if we do not understand our own basic nature, if we forget that we are 
nature. Following Rousseau, it is not enough simply to understand that we are nature: 
we have to intensively sense it and actively work on it.  
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As shown in Chapters Two and Four, humans have a tendency to split their own 
being into soul and body; they then neglect the bodily element and typically treat it as 
merely a package for the soul (even if this package has to be as handsome as 
possible). Denying that humans are part of nature complicates human life and makes 
it more difficult for humans to support the survival of the entire earth. Rousseau 
talked about the soul and the body as indistinguishable and he emphasized humans as 
part of nature. Later research has made it abundantly clear that a human being is an 
animal among others. Humans are nature, they are animals born with an instinct for 
self-preservation, just like other animals. Rousseau called this instinct amour-de-soi, 
an instinct that entailed a ‘self-love’ as a kind of ‘desire to be’266 that guarantees 
one’s self-protection and survival. Even after Darwin and many others have tried to 
show that a human being is an animal, the fact has not been generally accepted; it has 
been a hard lesson to learn. Rousseau maintained that humans are born with 
sensations, and to sense is to live and to be aware of one’s own existence. To respond 
to these sensations is to act ‘naturally’, according to Rousseau (E). He therefore, 
stressed that children have to be offered possibilities to use, train, and strengthen their 
sensory capacities before the influences of others begin to corrupt them. Rousseau 
opposed making children marionettes that mindlessly act out adult’s whims and 
prejudices. Education implies avoiding harmful influence on the children and 
encouraging them to use their senses and their bodies (E). 
Rousseau recommended an education that lets children be childish, strengthening 
their senses and limbs, and letting them largely act on the basis of their spontaneous 
perceptions. The period Rousseau reserved for this ‘negative education’ is childhood, 
but he also stressed the need for adults to withdraw from society in order to avoid 
social influences and superfluous desires and, instead, to enjoy a solitary existence in 
natural settings. He saw the countryside, mountains, lakes, and fields as retreats into 
the self. Rousseau’s own experiences made him believe that it is natural for humans 
to go on foot, rest under a tree, and eat uncomplicated food produced in one’s own 
neighborhood. He did not see it as a retreat to a more uncivilized state but a slowing-
down needed to become aware of one’s being and to learning how to enjoy life more 
thoroughly. At the same time he saw the solitary life as a way of reflecting on one’s 
self as a person, of elaborating one’s own ideas, and of taking care of one’s self. It 
was not a flight from responsibilities, a passive ‘letting go’, that Rousseau 
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 Cf. ”libido,” a psychoanalytic concept used by, e.g., Sigmund Freud and Carl Jung and “Eros,” from 
Greek mythology used in philosophy by, e.g., Plato and Herbert Marcuse. 
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recommended—except in his later days when his reveries almost read like surrender. 
In his old age, Rousseau simply recommended a lifestyle in harmony with nature, a 
kind of lifelong enjoyment of one’s own existence that ignored the competitive 
pressures of society. 
“Nature” is much neglected in today’s education as a topic for its own sake, and 
the role of humans as part of nature is likewise ignored. The natural world has 
become a resource for human use and humans have given themselves the right to 
decide the destiny of other species. Rightfully, Bonnett (2007) questions the kind of 
sustainable development that is focused on sustaining nature for human exploitation 
and aims instead of securing possibilities for humans to improve themselves and to 
develop their ways of dealing with the whole of nature. At best, humans want to 
improve on behalf of the rest of nature. Then “perfectibility” is taken as a technical 
term rather than a moral one. But, according to Rousseau (e.g., RSW) and Bonnett 
(e.g., 2007), humans need to learn to love nature for its intrinsic value. And nature 
resides inside every human being. Nature’s intrinsic value has often been raised as a 
feature of environmental ethics, in contrast to the basic principle of sustainable 
development, namely the human-centered anthropocentric prejudice that is deeply 
rooted in Western society. According to this prejudice, humans can ignore other 
organisms’ needs for appropriate habitats and life supporting conditions when they 
interfere with human life. Without doubt a problem hides in the concept of 
sustainable development. 
 
7.3 Evaluation of the Research Approach 
 
At this stage it is time to step back and evaluate the complete research process and 
critically discuss certain interesting findings. There are many alternative ways that I 
could conclude this research. I could have just described what Rousseau, Foucault, 
and others have said as objectively as possible in relation to my main question. Or, I 
could have tried to interpret their sayings in an accurate way. A third alternative 
could have been to try to juxtapose them or to confront them with each other to create 
either excitement and conflict or consensus. A forth alternative could have been to 
attack them critically. As a fifth way of ending, I could have used the texts to lay out 
blueprints and to prescribe how best to protect nature and to promote sustainability 
through education. However, instead of these alternatives, my strategy has been to let 
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the findings transform my own understanding of what possibilities these texts can 
bring to our contemporary situation. Consequently, it is not the texts themselves that 
have guided my writing, but the thoughts they have inspired. I have attempted to put 
urgent questions on the table and to use history as a mirror for the present. I share 
Rousseau’s and Foucault’s conclusions that available theories need to be reshaped 
into practice by the practitioners themselves. Ethical principles and practical advice 
seldom fit between the same covers. Theories need to be reflected on, discussed, and 
implemented in accordance with the particulars of situated contexts.  
My first strategy to approaching nature and sustainability in relation to education 
was to examine how education of the previous decades has dealt with these issues 
and to study a few possible causes for the unsustainable status of the world we face 
today. This first approach showed many educational weaknesses and shortcomings, 
but the hunt for scapegoats especially explained the complexity of our contemporary 
dilemmas. As discussed in Chapter Two, the connection between Christianity, 
Ancient Greek philosophy, and our contemporary environmental problems seems 
anything but self-evident. However, close readings of early modern books and letters 
undertaken by researchers like Harrisson (2005, 2006), Håkansson (2005), and 
Matthews (2008) show that the emergence of a new way of interpreting Scriptures 
(especially the Old Testament) as rather exact commands instead of earlier customs 
of reading them as symbolic language, has had an obvious effect on the way humans 
of the Western world have treated nature including each other and how they have 
used both humans and other creatures “in the name of God.” We cannot blame the 
message of Christianity or any other religion for the course of the unsustainable route 
of human conduct. But an obvious scapegoat is to be found in the way many 
development enthusiasts have interpreted and used the words of any sacred writing as 
powerful tools for serving selfish and commercial interests. 
I admit that I could have performed the first studies presented in Chapter Two 
more thoroughly and systematically, but I am not so sure that the outcome would 
have been much different. The major result of the first part of my study was that it 
showed the complexity of the environmental problems and the big challenge 
education has to face in meeting them. My first critical approach in Part One led me 
directly into the second strategy, and Part Two was a turn to the modern era. To get a 
satisfactory picture of how Rousseau thought about education in relation to nature, I 
had to employ more of his and others’ writings than I had first intended. I did not 
know when I started that these topics were so central to his writings. Digging into lots 
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of different material, however, is in accordance with Foucault’s research models. 
However, in utilizing so many sources, readers may blame me for superficiality. I 
agree that I might have gone into more depth on some points, but this would have 
deflected my chosen inquiry and might have bored some readers. The study of 
Rousseau’s and Foucault’s thoughts offered inspiring themes, useful methods, and 
apposite theories. Foucault’s approach helped me to see things in a new light and to 
relate to the topic of my research diversely and creatively. If we return to the 
hourglass of modernity, with Rousseau allegorically as the waist, we can see 
postmodernity as a new, although not that remarkably different form of modernity. 
And in the postmodern critique, Foucault
267
 emerges, as Rousseau did in his time, as 
someone who is both a child of his age and a noisy and headstrong opponent who 
diverged from both the mainstream line and its critique, taking his own course at 
whatever cost. And, like Rousseau, Foucault leaned on history, participated in the 
transformation of his presence and himself by his words, and left those who remain 
the task of taking care of his brainchildren.  
In Rousseau’s thinking, ethics, nature, and education are strongly entwined, but 
despite his high-minded principles, he showed signs of being both a hedonist and an 
ascetic. He significantly participated in the shaping of the preconditions of modern 
society and in the constitution of modern humans. He was a loud voice both for and 
against; a child of his time on the topics of good and bad, and his example shows that 
it is impossible to step free from one’s own context. Even protesting has to consider 
ethical conflicts from the perspective of both society members and as particular 
persons. Like the Mona-Lisa’s smile that fascinates because nobody knows exactly 
why she is happy, Rousseau’s texts attract and communicate because no one is fully 
convinced about what his intentions really were. In any case, the dialectical outlines 
and seeming paradoxes do not make the reading less inspiring. The main problem 
may not even be how he wrote, but how to read him. It is possible to distinguish 
Rousseau’s writing technique as a particular way of writing philosophy and of 
considering and lecturing on education in a way that could transform the reader’s 
thinking. It was dialectical rhetoric intended to trigger the reader’s critical reflection. 
Maybe the issue of how to write about education is worthwhile considering today. 
Foucault was on the same track when he wrote about history. Both Rousseau and 
Foucault used literary expressions that could push the language to its limits, even 
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 Foucault never called himself “postmodern;” others gave him this description.  
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beyond. Their language presented contradictions and reached spaces where the 
untouchable and abandoned reside. However, as an author Rousseau was present in 
most of his writings while Foucault sought to let the language speak for itself. Both 
presented themselves as unconventional, unwilling to be comfortably categorized, 
and neither of them answered to the name “philosopher.”  
I have tried to not let their uniqueness stand in the way of a reasonable outcome, 
but these authors’ exceptionality has not made the work easier; conversely, it made it 
much more gratifying. While the point of departure was critical, self-reflexivity and 
self-criticism have been essential elements in the research process. It has offered 
many unexpected events and wonderful discoveries. Among the many surprises in 
this research was the connection Rousseau and Foucault shared through Stoic 
philosophy. Another interesting feature of this study is, without doubt, Rousseau’s 
many contradictions that, in turn, have exposed contradictions in my own way of 
relating to the world. Facing these contradictions has been a difficult but exciting 
challenge, but Foucault’s methods have led to this confrontation. A journey shared 
with these two thinkers has not at all been dull. While Foucault, like Rousseau, 
wanted to motivate his readers, he also wanted to prompt researchers to follow his 
advice, both in terms of how they saw themselves and how they viewed their 
research. However, while Rousseau regularly instructed others, Foucault rejected the 
philosopher's role as a legislator who told others how or what to think. Foucault's aim 
was to challenge others to self-transformation without giving any strict guidelines. It 
might look as though Rousseau might have been trying to make others change in 
particular ways; but if we read his texts as allegories, such a strong intention 
disappears. The limit between an authoring and a self-activating voice is thus never 
stable, and neither Foucault nor any other thinker manages to write with complete 
impartiality. Many have blamed Rousseau for not living according to the principles 
he articulated. Yet one can ask, is incongruity between acts and words a reason to 
stop listening to the speaker, or is the search for another’s shortcomings and 
imperfection only a way of hiding our own unwillingness to confront difficult 
choices? If we only listened to love songs written, played, and sung by people who 
are faithful lovers, there would not be many songs left to listen to. Rousseau’s ideas 
do not lose their significance because of his personal shortcomings.  
My research has lived and changed shape due to the findings, and I gradually 
realized that my intuition to juxtapose two headstrong persons was a good choice. 
The combination of Rousseau and Foucault was inspiring and opened many doors. 
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But, I can now unveil that a third interesting person was involved in my initial plan: 
Mary Wollstonecraft. However, blending three such strong characters in the same 
book would have been a much too difficult undertaking. Nevertheless, I have not 
discarded her, but have saved her for a subsequent work. Moreover, it appears that 
considering her perspective will reveal new perspectives for education in relation to 
nature and sustainability. My study of Rousseau will also continue, and I am 
especially interested in Julie, or the New Heloise, which is deep enough for its own 
study. The same is the case for many other of Rousseau’s books, as well, especially 
Émile. Therefore, I recommend that other educational researchers, especially those 
who still have not found their mission or want exposure to some new directions, take 
part in the endless project of discovering what Rousseau has to offer. I will also 
continue to re-read Foucault. His methods and theories stimulate new ideas again and 
again, and are useful in many research fields. And to repeat, both Rousseau and 
Foucault write very attractively, even if differently.  
My reading of old books has not been a way of interpreting them anew, but of 
reading them in a new way and in relation to a new context; not with the intention of 
reaching the same horizon as the authors in question, but to rise above the horizon 
and daring to fly. I could have done many things otherwise. Firstly, I could of course 
have chosen a totally different way of studying the educational challenge of 
sustainability. Secondly, I could have studied Rousseau and Foucault in another way 
and searched for more divergence rather than agreement. Thirdly, I could have 
limited my study both vertically (with fewer dimensions) and horizontally (following 
a shorter time span). A more strict limitation could have found fewer and deeper 
conclusions, but my more expansive outline instead indicated various traces worth 
following. For that reason, this diverse work can be seen as groundwork that opens 
into a longer exploration that I will eagerly share with interested companions.  
 
7.4 Final Conclusion 
 
The main question in this book has been what ethical dimensions are relevant to the 
enigma of sustainability and what kind of education these dimensions require. I will 
end this book with a short answer to this complex question, building on my 
understanding of Rousseau’s with the help of Foucault. A human’s life has three 
basic dimensions: as an individual, as part of a society, and as a biological creature. 
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All three dimensions are interdependent because they are interlinked and they interact 
constantly. Humans are complicated beings and all of their life dimensions are 
interrelated, including all their social interactions. To live responsible and free lives, 
humans need to understand and manage their own individual desires and 
requirements, and to feel comfortable they also need an understanding of their mutual 
interactions (personal relations, but also politics, economics, art, etc.), and the 
interrelationship between humans and the natural world. It is difficult to manage life 
on earth in its contemporary status. Western education has basically concentrated on 
humans as objectively studying the world from the outside, either for knowing facts 
(empirical interest) or interpreting (hermeneutic interest), or for changing its 
conditions (critical interest). Nevertheless, they cannot learn to manage matters 
external to themselves if they do not first know themselves. A sustainable life on 
earth builds both on humans’ accurate understanding of their role on this planet and 
on a willingness to act responsibly. Such an understanding is built through a process 
that involves themselves, other people, and the rest of the world—both humanly 
created cultural elements and the natural world.  
What kind of practices of education do these dimensions call for? Education has 
previously built on knowledge about what it entails to be a human being as a distinct 
individual and as a social creature; thus, such knowledge relies on subjective, inter-
subjective, and objective aspects. Education has not, however, managed to provide 
humans with the competence demanded by life on earth. Instead, it has made them 
forget their earthly bonds and has promoted a belief that they are more than or above 
nature. The old Greek word logos has been interpret narrowly as word or rationality, 
not in its initial meaning uttered by Heraclitus as a logical order of the universe. 
Human life on earth, the only natural habitat for earthly creatures, calls for awareness 
of this order through an education that emphasizes the human role as a biological 
species. The problem is how humans can learn to improve their common life without 
crossing the limit of what the natural world can tolerate. For a rational being, this 
limit requires ethical deliberation. Knowledge about the world exists on the human 
border where nature and society meet; education and ethics can try to overcome and 
break down this border. But this is no easy task since the border is built of prejudices 
and errors, and the creation of this dysfunctional border has taken thousands of years. 
Since Rousseau’s time, education has been included in the social attempt to 
control the inhabitants of a state. Education has thus been a part of a comprehensive 
social policy. However, education has not attempted to encourage critique and 
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management of the systems of which it is a part. If we consider the diverse fields of 
human practices as non-hierarchically interrelated, as Benner suggest, in plain words 
this means that education cannot only deliver theoretical knowledge about the world; 
its task is also to promote practical knowledge about how such theoretical knowledge 
relates to one’s own life and to various sectors of society. The role of education is 
then also to train practical reason to consider the ethical conditions for mutual human 
undertakings and to identify the limits and terms nature sets for human life, limits 
which may contradict the Enlightenment dream of steady progress. Viewed this way, 
education has to offer both theoretical knowledge and provide possibilities for ethical 
deliberation, thus ‘provoking’ students to form personal judgments that will lead to 
responsible actions based on their own reflective choices.  
 In Reveries Rousseau claims that happiness on earth is never permanent, but 
fleeting and fluctuating. We do not know the future, we can only hope that life goes 
on and try to prevent possible catastrophes. But it might be unwise to let striving for 
the possibilities of a good life in the future overshadow attending to present 
conditions and issues. Shaping visions for change can be crucial, but it would be 
unwise to concentrate on equality, justice, and vitality for life on earth entirely in an 
unsure future by ignoring pressing problems in the present. Today’s poor and 
indecently treated do not benefit from others’ visions of a better future. Their desires 
are of other kinds than the desires of the rich. Climate change and the increase of 
endangered species and biotopes will not abate and wait for prolonged negotiation. 
Neither sustainability nor development might be the right credo. Humans and the 
earth are changing, so sustainability is difficult and development can have many 
faces. Both need to be subjected to critical discourse, not only in political and 
business contexts, but also in education.  
The modern project had a strong faith in knowledge and enlightenment that could 
lead to a better world. Still, the question remains: For whom was this project 
undertaken? The answer is: At least not for the whole of humanity and not for all life 
forms. The advanced, rational originators and facilitators of this grand project had an 
expansive dream of improving all of humanity. However, now we stand at the 
beginning of a new millennium with a shame that is impossible to shed because most 
of us Westerners, but many others as well, participate in the same race for 
uncontrolled development. And the negative consequences of this inglorious race are 
on show yearly in Worldwatch Institute’s report, State of the World―definitely not 
entertaining but still worth reading. Why is it that an enlightened world spends so 
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much money on military expenses and at the same time so many people lack food and 
clean drinking water? Why do a few hundred people own half of the world’s capital? 
Why are so many luxury goods produced at the risk of polluting nature? For example, 
China produces a super-abundance of low-priced commodities consumed around the 
world because of cheap labor and less restrictive environmental laws. But who buys 
them and how do they dispose of them? 
The existence of the gap between environmental knowledge and action can not be 
blamed just on failures of environmental education or only on formal education. 
Education is both lifelong and lifewide, is involved in all human undertakings, and 
takes place nearly everywhere. Therefore, a total control over the long-term outcome 
of a group’s (or even an individual’s) education concerning values and value-related 
conduct is unattainable. Believing that the present practices of environmental 
education can do all the work needed to save the world does not offer much hope for 
the future. Its status has mostly been like a watchdog that sleeps in the garden and 
never is let in the house permanently as a proper family member. While 
understanding nature and humanity’s role as part of it is crucial for human life, 
learning to live cooperatively in accordance with the life-protecting systems of the 
earth is the most pressing issue for education. It cannot be treated as some kind of 
add-on or complement to ‘basic’ education but has to be built upon the foundation of 
all education. This means that environmental education does not exist on its own 
term, as a stand-alone topic. And it cannot be temporally limited. While nature is life 
itself, of which humans are a part, the relationship of humans to nature is the most 
important cornerstones in all of education. Why do we not use the knowledge we 
have? Benner (2005) repeats Friedrich Schleiermacher’s very relevant question about 
what this generation wants of the next generation. Uljens’ (1998) answer to this 
question is that a non-affirmative theory has no reply because the task of education is 
not readymade answers but, instead, the developing of theories in which questioning 
comes before answers. However, while educators should avoid feeding readymade 
answers to the younger generation, they still need to act as good role models. The 
question that can be asked of educators and other adults, then, is: Do we want to 
continue our destructive lives or are we willing to become better models for the 
young? Why should they do things differently than we do?  
As stressed in the beginning of this book, humans are earthly creatures. ‘From 
dust to dust’ is inescapable. Rousseau wanted to educate humans to become more 
“natural” and he saw a closer connection to the natural world as crucial to that 
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progress. Humans are neither totally nor partly machines, not numbers, not capital, 
and not products―but they can easily start to believe that they are. Humans are 
animals that unfortunately do not always base their actions on all their capacities. I 
agree with Orr who states: “It makes far better sense to reshape ourselves to fit a 
finite planet than to attempt to reshape the planet to fit our infinite wants” (Orr, 2004, 
p. 9). Thus, we return to the quest for self-training, to the “care of the self.” The 
threefold simple answer to my twofold main question can be given in one sentence: 
An education that wants to challenge sustainability builds on reinventions of basic 
educational theories and attends to humans’ self-relation, humans’ mutual relations, 
and humans’ relation to other parts of nature. 
Even if I may have sounded normative in this description of my final conclusions, 
my aim has been to be provocative rather than dogmatic. I hope the thoughts 
presented in this book will awaken new perspectives among readers who are filled 
with the energy and will to make this planet a better one. However, this is no quick 
assignment. I think we have to give up many myths and dreams that distract us. It is a 
delusion to dream that, even if this generation has not managed to save the world, we 
are nonetheless capable of teaching the next generations to be wiser and to live in a 
more gentle ways. If we cannot motivate ourselves to change, we can hardly 
influence others to change. Maybe sustainability needs to become a state of mind, an 
ethos, where the care for future life not is allowed to forgo the care of presently living 
beings and their right to a decent life. After all, I do not believe in excessively 
unrealistic dreams, especially not costly ones. There is no evidence that the model of 
a bad teacher teaches someone to become good, and it seems all too obvious that 
most adults are bad models. We give mixed signals, since we regard poverty as a 
greater shame than our failure to take responsibility for the poor and other defenseless 
creatures of the world. A luxurious life is honored, even when it is attained at the 
expense of the common good. And to return to the beginning of Chapter One, the 
moon may seem like a new El Dorado―a Paradise where humans can escape from 
the daily problems and be infinitely enlightened. However, no matter how much 
money we invest in a tomb in outer space, we cannot escape the death of our human 
substance, our human nature. The great question, then, is whether we can escape the 
loss of humankind on the earth, or if we need a new planet on which to restart human 
life. Nevertheless, we probably can not escape the loss of humankind if we do not 
change human conduct. However, is this possible without changing human nature? 
According to Foucault (1970), history may have confronted humankind with a truth 
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that causes us to stop and face ourselves. Moreover, then we may have to reveal once 
and for all the veil Rousseau talked about; but I will let Foucault have the last word:  
 
The more man makes himself at home in the heart of the world, the further he 
advances in his possession of nature, the more strongly also does he feel the 
pressure of his finitude, and the closer he comes to his own death. History does 
not allow man to escape from his initial limitations – except in appearance, and if 
we take the word limitation in its superficial sense; but if we consider the 
fundamental finitude of man, we perceive that his anthropological situation never 
ceases its progressive dramatization of his History, never ceases to render it more 
perilous, and to bring it closer, as it were, to its own impossibility. (Foucault, 
1970, p. 259) 
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